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Abstract 
This PhD thesis was developed in the context of contemporary challenges 
within water policy and governance; specifically the issue of managing diffuse 
pollution risk in fresh water catchments. As highlighted in the European Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) diffuse pollution poses a major risk in many 
European catchments where the sustainability of the ecosystems and water 
uses is compromised by intensive agriculture. The challenge for catchment 
management is the tricky nature of diffuse pollution. It is what you would term a 
‘wicked problem’ or ‘Post Normal Science’ wherein the facts are uncertain, 
values are in dispute, stakes are high and decision-making is urgent (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1993; Patterson et al., 2013). In response to the WFD the UK 
Government have proposed the Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) which 
represents a paradigmatic shift in approaches to water management; from a 
‘command and control’ approach (i.e. the historic practice of direct regulation) to 
a participatory governance approach (i.e. devolution of power and involvement 
local stakeholders) (Dryzek, 2005; Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014). 
 
The project had two aims. The practical aim was to identify the drivers and 
barriers to delivering the CaBA. The academic aim was to employ the relational 
concept of ambiguity to explore why and how catchment stakeholders 
understand, frame and respond to diffuse pollution risk differently. In order to 
address these aims Timothy embedded himself in Loe Pool Forum 
(www.loepool.org) for four years. Loe Pool Forum (LPF) are a voluntary 
catchment partnership, based in West Cornwall, working to address the risk of 
diffuse pollution through taking a CaBA at the WFD waterbody scale. The 
methodology was directed by Participatory Action Research (PAR) and 
underpinned by ethnography. PAR enabled Timothy to work collaboratively to 
engender positive change within LPF while ethnography generated data upon 
how partnership and participatory working happens in practice. 
 
New insights into the geographies of risk stemmed from the application of 
ambiguity as the conceptual lever. Ambiguity is a dimension of uncertainty 
which accounts for the relational properties of risk. Ambiguity is defined as the 
simultaneous presence of multiple frames of reference about a certain 
phenomenon (Brugnach et al., 2007). Timothy examined ambiguity from three 
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different directions. Firstly, where the ambiguities are in catchment 
management and how local partnerships negotiate them. Secondly, how risk 
frames are produced by both water scientists and the agricultural community. 
Thirdly, what the drivers and barriers are to delivering the CaBA. By thinking 
through risk relationally this thesis provides new insights into the practice of 
catchment management and the socio-cultural geographies around the water-
environment.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to improve both practical and academic understanding 
about delivering the Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) through the 
conceptual lens of ambiguity. The practical objective of this thesis is to identify 
the drivers and barriers to managing diffuse pollution risk at the local scale 
through the CaBA. The academic objective is to employ the relational concept 
of ambiguity to explain how different stakeholders come to know and respond to 
water risks. In essence this thesis uses sociocultural approaches to risk to 
dismantle and then re-theorise why diffuse pollution risk persists as such a 
wicked problem for catchment managers. In doing so this thesis challenges the 
epistemologies and paradigms which traditionally underpin catchment risk 
management; going on to promote ambiguity as a more sophisticated way for 
water managers to analyse conflicts and address barriers in delivering water 
risk management solutions. 
 
1.1: Research Context 
This thesis has been developed in the context of contemporary challenges 
within water policy and governance, specifically the issue of managing diffuse 
pollution risk in freshwater catchments. Over the late two decades the European 
Parliament has made comprehensive steps to update and rationalise water 
legislation. This process produced the Water Framework Directive (WFD), 
which sets common European Union (EU) wide objectives for water quality. To 
be specific, the WFD commits member states to achieve Good Ecological 
Status (GES) of all waterbodies and to enable active involvement of 
stakeholders through the delivery process. More recently, and in response to 
the WFD, the UK Government have proposed the Catchment Based Approach 
(CaBA). This is essentially the mechanism through which the WFD objectives 
will be achieved in the UK at the regional scale. Underpinned by the 
internationally endorsed approach of Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM) the WFD and the CaBA represent a paradigmatic shift in approaches to 
water management; from a command and control approach (i.e. the historic 
practice of direct regulation) to an integrated governance approach (i.e. 
devolution of power and involvement local stakeholders) (Müller-Grabherr et al., 
2014; Stoker, 1996). However, despite enacting a new water management 
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paradigm diffuse pollution still poses a persistent problem in Europe (Patterson 
et al., 2013); where the sustainability of the ecosystems and water uses is 
compromised by intensive agriculture (EA, 2008; Laurent and Ruelland, 2011). 
This is a particularly major challenge in the UK where the Environment Agency 
(2007) estimates that up to 82 per cent of rivers, 75 per cent of groundwater 
bodies and 53 per cent of lakes are ‘at risk’ from diffuse pollution. There are 
thus two layers to the research context. The first is seemingly intractable 
problem of diffuse pollution risk for water managers. The second is the 
participatory governance agenda wherein there is an ambition to empower and 
involve local stakeholders in decision-making and the risk management 
process. 
 
1.2: Research Problems & Questions 
With the Research Context set out I now consider the two interrelated research 
problems. The first is the lack of practical understanding about the drivers and 
barriers of implementing the CaBA to managing diffuse pollution at the local 
scale. The second is the lack of geographical research employing relational 
geographies to explain how different stakeholders come to know and respond to 
diffuse pollution risk. 
 
The first research problem stems from the policy and governance context within 
which the thesis is set. The CaBA was launched by the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in 2013 and specifically aims to 
generate more effective stakeholder engagement in order to sustainably tackle 
the integrated environmental risks of water quality, flooding, biodiversity and 
business needs (DEFRA, 2013). Alongside regulatory groups at the national 
scale and statutory groups at the regional scale it is envisioned that the CaBA 
will be patronised by voluntary groups working at the local scale and who are 
issue driven (Cook et al., 2013). Admittedly there is a plethora of research 
which has, from both practical and academic perspectives, analysed the 
process of participatory environmental management. However, the majority of 
this work has simply examined the extent of ‘stakeholder participation’ rather 
than critically questioning the drivers for ‘participation’ from policy and water 
governance institutions. Further, there is little known about the ways in which 
collaborative catchment management is framed and interpreted in practice at 
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the voluntary group scale (Watson, 2014). Drawing from sociocultural 
geography and Science and Technology Studies (STS) this thesis explores 
exactly why scientific experts want to involve local stakeholders in risk 
management and how this process is interpreted in practice at the voluntary 
catchment group scale.  
 
The second research problem stems from recent directions within human 
geography and water governance to examine risk relationally (Allen, 2011; 
Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2009; Brugnach et al., 2007; Jones, 2009). This 
second problem interacts with the first in that it is in this body of work that the 
thesis’ conceptual framework originates. Relational geography is, in the context 
of water governance, about placing human actors with their priorities, 
preferences, culturally established world views and epistemologies at the heart 
of any analysis of a risk management process. Over the last decade the 
relational concept of ambiguity has emerged as a powerful way to understand 
intractable problems. Defined as “the simultaneous presence of multiple frames 
of reference about a certain phenomenon” (Dewulf et al.,(2004), ambiguity is 
essentially another dimension of uncertainty. Rather than uncertainty in a risk 
management process solely stemming from not knowing enough, ambiguity is 
about the “presence of multiple possible interpretations of a situation” 
(Brugnach and Ingram, 2012). Thus far ambiguity has been employed by a 
number of scholars in a variety of different contexts. For example, it has been 
used to study resource management (Dewulf et al.)2005; Lindahl et al., 2014); 
conflicts in environmental management (Mazur & Asah, 2013; Asah et al., 
2012); framing of environmental policy (Lieshout et al., 2013; Fletcher, 2009); 
and uncertainty and ambiguity in water resource management (Dewulf et al., 
2005; Brugnach et al., 2007; Isendahl et al., 2010). However, ambiguity has yet 
to be used to analyse any aspects of diffuse pollution risk management. This 
thesis addresses the knowledge gap by employing the concept of ambiguity in 
two ways. Firstly, by investigating how different stakeholders come to know and 
frame diffuse pollution risk. Secondly, by exploring where the ambiguities in 
catchment management lie and how catchment partnerships negotiate them. 
 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 1) employ a PAR methodology to ensure 
findings have research impact; 2) identify where the ambiguities are in diffuse 
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pollution management and how a catchment partnership negotiates them; 3) 
explore how catchment stakeholders come to know and frame diffuse pollution 
risk; 4) identify the drivers and barriers to delivering the CaBA. The research 
questions are: 
 
1) Where are the ambiguities in catchment management and how do 
catchment partnerships negotiate them? 
 
2) How do catchment stakeholders come to know water risks? 
 
3) What are the drivers and barriers to delivering the CaBA? 
 
1.3: Research Location 
The research was conducted in Cornwall, a county located in South West 
England, and focuses on a voluntary catchment partnership called Loe Pool 
Forum1 (LPF) who are based in the town of Helston (Figure 1). LPF are working 
to improve water quality in the River Cober catchment. The Cober catchment, 
encompassing Loe Bar, Loe Pool and the River Cober, is of great importance 
because it plays a key role in the rural economy, community well-being, as well 
as hosting unique environmental habitats and crucially supplying drinking water 
to the Lizard region. Loe Bar is of national significance because of its unusual 
geomorphology and as a designated Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty 
(AONB). Loe Pool is the largest natural freshwater lake in Cornwall, a 
designated Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and of considerable 
amenity value for Helston’s residents and visitors. The Cober catchment is of 
high value for South West Water because they abstract to supply Helston and 
the Lizard with clean drinking water2. 
 
                                            
1
 As part of the PAR aspect to the thesis I developed, and now run, www.loepool.org . Please 
visit for a detailed overview of LPF, its history, objectives and recent activities. 
2
 The Cober catchment is a designated Drinking Water Protected Area (DWPA).  
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Figure 1: Map Showing Research Location 
 
The partnership was formed by the National Trust and Natural England in 1996 
in attempt to address the eutrophic state of Loe Pool and achieve the SSSI 
targets. In the intervening 20 years the partnership has grown and membership 
now also includes the Environment Agency (EA), Cornwall Wildlife Trust (CWT), 
South West Water (SWW), Royal Navy Air Station (RNAS) Culdrose, University 
of Exeter (UoE) and Camborne School of Mines (CSM) inter alia. With the 
partnership now including the EA the objectives now include achieving the WFD 
GES status. LPF have made significant progress in reducing the point source 
pollution in the catchment through pushing for revision of discharge permits and 
upgrading STW’s. However, diffuse pollution represents an intractable problem 
for LPF and is currently the primary focus for the partnerships actions. The 
intractability of diffuse pollution stems from a number of issues, for example 
assigning responsibility and cost inter alia, but the fundamental problem is the 
lack of data on the sources and pathways of risk; this hampers where and how 
intervention strategies should be targeted. Nevertheless, LPF is proceeding to 
address the risks through taking a CaBA. For LPF this is about collaborative 
working between environmental agencies and local stakeholders such as the 
agricultural, commercial and residential communities. To understand the 
geographies of risk and ambiguity I embedded myself in LPF for four years in 
order to gather ethnographic data upon how partnership and participatory 
working happens in practice. 
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1.4: Significant Contribution 
This thesis makes three significant contributions knowledge. These 
contributions branch out from the thesis’s central concept of ambiguity. To 
reiterate, ambiguity is a dimension of uncertainty which accounts for the 
relational properties of risk. Essentially, in the context of water governance, 
ambiguity refers to a situation where there are multiple, and equally valid, ways 
of framing the catchment problems and the management options to reduce the 
water risks. The first contribution is predicated on employing the Brugnach et al 
(2007) ambiguity framework to identify where the ambiguities exist in catchment 
management. Building on this I developed new understandings about how the 
different framings of risk interact, come into conflict, and are negotiated through 
a catchment management project. Using Eaton et al’s (2014) three-task process 
for successful mobilisation of collective action, I show how conflicting 
epistemological risk frames have raised a barrier to delivering integrated and 
upstream risk management options. The second contribution is to academic 
understanding about how both water scientists and the agricultural community 
produce their risk frames in the first instance. Using the concepts of affect and 
affordance I show how risk frames are produced in relation to stakeholders’ 
culturally attuned ability to read the environment; and in turn how these differing 
affordances underpin the presence of ambiguity. The third contribution is 
towards understanding the drivers and barriers to delivering the CaBA and in 
particular the participatory agenda within multi-stakeholder catchment 
management. I demonstrate that although LPF faces practical barriers to 
delivering the CaBA, the primary barriers reside in the cultures of science. 
However, I also show how LPF, as an autonomous partnership, has been 
‘positive deviants’ in developing innovative engagement and communicative 
approaches. In summary, this thesis contributes to the body of work around 
ambiguity and the CaBA. In particular this thesis highlights the capacity of 
ambiguity research to expose the process of decision making in catchment 
management and the subsequent challenges of delivering the participatory 
agenda and soft engineering solutions. 
 
Before we move forward it is imperative that I caveat the length (~95,000 
words) of this thesis for the benefit of the readers’ patience. Firstly, because I 
have taken on the challenging task of combining a sociocultural geographical 
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approach to risk with a PAR methodology there are two considerable bodies of 
literature which need to be explicated. As such it is page 105 before the reader 
reaches an empirical chapter. However, this PAR Chapter, starting on page 
103, is not strictly an empirical Chapter either. The nature of PAR is that 
observations and findings emerge through a long and immersive research 
process; and for this project that immersion was four years long. So while 
Chapter 6 is ‘officially’ a methodology chapter it is actually as much, if not more, 
an empirical chapter. This is because it is in Chapter 6 where I identify the key 
themes in the data, set out the headline findings, and begin analysis. The 
second reason for the length of this thesis, is that the empirical chapters are 
underpinned by discourse analysis. This requires many, and sometimes large, 
insertions of transcriptions from interviews. In summary, I justify the overall 
length of this thesis with two arguments. Firstly that PAR necessitates a cyclical 
process of problem identification, action, observation and reflection. Admittedly 
this methodology is text consuming but it crucially enabled me to capture the 
small processual, but critically important, moments in catchment management 
process of decision-making and action. Secondly, by inserting quotations from 
research participants I am able to authentically capture and illustrate the more 
nuanced aspects in the geographies of risk and ambiguity from the direct 
perspectives of different catchment stakeholders. This caveat considered, we 
can move on to the water pollution problem and associated policy. 
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Chapter 2: Water Pollution, Governance and Policy 
 
In Chapter 2 I do three things. Firstly I describe diffuse pollution, its causes and 
impacts and why it presents a difficult, or wicked, problem for water managers. 
Secondly I consider the shift in approaches to water resource management and 
explain the underpinning rationale to partnership working and the participatory 
agenda within policy. Thirdly I turn to the specific water policies which this 
research has been developed in response to i.e. WFD and the CaBA. Through 
this final section I draw out the challenges for CaBA delivery and specify which 
aspects of water governance this thesis will focus on.  
 
2.1: Water Pollution 
Water is a life sustaining element, deeply embedded in our cultural 
backgrounds and a critical natural resource upon which all social and economic 
activities and ecosystem functions depend (Bokova, 2015; UNESCO, 2006; 
WWAP, 2012). As Ban Ki-moon (2015): iv) notes in the forward to The United 
Nations World Water Development Report,  
 
Water flows through the three pillars of sustainable development; economic, 
social and environmental. Water resources, and the essential services they 
provide, are among the keys to achieving poverty reduction, inclusive growth, 
public health, food security, lives of dignity for all and long-lasting harmony with 
Earth’s essential ecosystems.  
 
While all waters are important, this thesis is focuses on freshwater 
environments. As Irina Bokova, the Director-General of UNESCO, (2015: V) 
explains “Freshwater environments are coming under increasing pressure 
across the world”. The pressures on the freshwater resources come from a 
number of sources. Population growth has inevitably placed a greater demand 
on a limited water resource base through urbanisation and overconsumption 
(Bokova, 2015; Rees, 2002). But with specific regard to freshwater catchments 
the primary pressures come from the needs of expanding and intensifying 
agriculture and industry along with climate change (Bokova, 2015; WWAP, 
2012). These pressures have led to a wide variety of pollutants being 
discharged, a significant increase in nutrient loadings of watercourses, surface 
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water acidification from air pollution, and flow regimes negatively affected by 
abstractions (Arnell et al., 2015; Mustapha and Getso, 2014). This results in 
degraded integrity of ecosystems and the depleted availability of natural 
resources, in particular, soil, surface water and groundwater (Brils et al.,(2014). 
For developing countries the primary concern is health risks; the World Health 
Organisation estimates that 80% of all sickness and disease is due to unsafe 
water (Ki-moon, 2012). For developed countries the concern for polluted water 
environments centres more on the economic and cultural services healthy 
ecosystems provide, rather than direct health risks (Bokova, 2015). I now zoom 
in on the diffuse pollution which is the specific type of water pollution this thesis 
is focused on.  
 
2.1.1: What is Diffuse Pollution? 
There are two types of water pollution: 1) point source; 2) diffuse source. Point 
source pollution originates from one particular location and is generated by a 
distinct practice, for example a sewerage treatment plant or an industrial 
discharge (EA, 2006, 2007; Patterson et al., 2013). Point source pollution has a 
discernible source and is therefore easy to identify, monitor and regulate (EA, 
2006, 2007; Stazyk, 2006). On the other hand, diffuse pollution takes many 
forms and originates from multiple sources which can be scattered over a large 
area; for example from land use, leaking pipes, and domestic septic tanks inter 
alia (D'Archy et al., 2000; EA, 2006, 2007). The sources of diffuse pollution are 
therefore exceptionally difficult to identify, monitor, assign responsibility for, and 
thus regulate (Lane et al., 2006; Patterson et al., 2013; Stazyk, 2006). 
 
2.1.2: Causes of Diffuse Pollution 
The causes and sources of diffuse pollution are varied and numerous. This is 
because it is a product of a wide range of human activities, rather than solely 
industrial externalities (Patterson et al., 2013). In the National Audit Office 
(2010): 14) report on ‘Tacking diffuse pollution in England’ the primary sources 
(see Figure 2 ) are listed as: 1) agricultural run-off from fields in the form of 
nitrogen and phosphorus from pesticides and fertilisers; 2) contamination from 
livestock; 3) oil and chemicals from cars and roads; 4) chemicals and 
detergents from misconnected sewage pipes; 5) chemicals and other toxins 
from activities such as car washing, as well as from industry and business. 
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While all of these sources are important, this research primarily focuses on 
agriculture which is known to be the primary cause of runoff carrying surplus 
nutrients, pesticides and eroded soils (Carpenter et al., 1998; Posen et al., 
2011). With 71% of land in the UK in agricultural use (DEFRA,(2015): 1) it 
constitutes the largest source of diffuse pollution in the UK (Blackstock et al., 
2010; Mateo-Sagasta, 2010; Wilkinson et al., 2014). Developments in 
agricultural science, technology and practice have of course been highly 
successful at increasing food production. Consumers in the developed world 
have privileged access to plentiful, diverse and high quality supplies of relatively 
low cost food (Howden et al., 2013). However, driven by agricultural 
intensification and mechanisation, there has also been an increase in runoff 
rates resulting in localised water pollution and flooding issues (Howden et al., 
2013; Owen et al., 2012; Wilkinson et al., 2014). 
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Figure 2: Sources of Diffuse Pollution (NAO, 2010: 14) 
 
Intensification has included the increased application of fertilisers and pesticides 
to improve yields (DEFRA, 2004; Howden et al., 2013; Wilkinson et al., 2014). 
Fertilisers are defined as “any organic or inorganic material of natural or 
synthetic origin that is added to a soil to supply one or more plant nutrients 
essential for growth” (Tucker), 2012: 3). These nutrients are contained in 
manufactured fertilisers as well as organic manures and slurry applied to fields 
(Owen et al., 2012). Pesticides are chemicals used for preventing, mitigating 
and destroying pests such as insects, animals, fugue or microorganisms 
(DEFRA, 2013; Isenring, 2010). Fertilisers and pesticides can enter 
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watercourses through a number of different routes and for a number of different 
reasons. Out of the range of fertilisers it is nitrate and phosphate which are 
most prolific and problematic (Leu et al.,(2004; Owen et al., 2012). Nitrates are 
highly soluble so mostly enter watercourses through leaching and runoff 
(DEFRA, 2004). For example macro pores and cracks in the soil can act as 
short circuits, bypassing the root zone and allowing rapid downward movement 
of nitrates (DEFRA, 2004). Phosphorus, on the other hand, is insoluble so 
primarily enters the watercourse through soil erosion (DEFRA, 2004; Stoate et 
al., 2001), so the risk of phosphorus entering the watercourse is affected by 
rainfall, topography and runoff pathways (Stoate et al., 2001; DEFRA, 2004). 
Similarly, the amount of pesticides lost from either leaching or runoff is related 
to the characteristics of the different compounds’ solubility (Schriever et al., 
2007). While all these physio-chemical properties are important in determining 
risk these are often overridden by local environmental factors (Schriever et al., 
2007). 
 
The way in which fertilisers and pesticides are applied to the land and how the 
land is subsequently managed also has a critical effect on the extent to which 
these chemicals end up in the watercourses (Chon et al., 2012; DEFRA, 2004; 
EA, 2007). For example the application of animal manure to land when the 
ground is saturated or frozen or applying more inorganic fertiliser than the crop 
requires increases the risk of these chemicals entering the watercourse 
(DEFRA, 2004; EA, 2006). Indeed, the timing of work such spraying, ploughing 
or harvesting has a critical impact on the level of risk (DEFRA, 2004, EA, 2007). 
This is because diffuse pollution runoff events are associated with rainfall 
patterns which affect runoff rates, leaching and soil disturbance (DEFRA, 2004; 
EA, 2007). Thus, diffuse pollution is a highly contingent risk; it is dependent on 
local rainfall patterns, the chemicals characteristics, local soil scape, crop cover, 
input application methods and timings inter alia (DEFRA, 2004; EA, 2007). The 
notion that risk can be contingent risk will be developed through this PhD, but 
for now I simply move forward to consider the impacts of diffuse pollution. 
 
2.1.3: Impacts of Diffuse Pollution  
Water pollution represents a serious problem because it can compromise 
drinking water sources, ecology, habitats, and the recreational value of water 
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environments (EA, 2006; EA, 2007). Historically, the concern about pollutants 
has centred on the impacts for human health (Howden et al., 2013). The demise 
of miasmatic theories of disease causation in the nineteenth century focused 
attention on inadequate sewerage disposal and contaminated water supplies as 
the cause of major epidemics such as cholera. The impact of pollution on 
drinking water supplies is still a risk but it is now monitorable, manageable and 
regulated. For example The Drinking Water Directive (DWD) is a European-
wide policy which aims to protect human health through the regulation of water 
consumption. Nowadays the primary risk water pollution has on drinking 
supplies is a financial one. Removing nitrates from drinking water is a technical 
and expensive process for water companies (DEFRA, 2004; EA, 2006). In fact, 
the National Audit Office (2010): 13) estimated that between 2004-05 and 2008-
09, water companies in England spent £189 million removing nitrates and £92 
million removing pesticides from water supplies in order to meet DWD 
standards. 
 
Over the last few decades concern about pollution has broadened to consider 
the detrimental effects on the abundance and distribution of flora and fauna, in 
particular the impacts of excessive nutrients entering ecosystems (EA, 2006; 
Howden et al., 2013). A lack of essential nutrients limits plant growth so 
increasing supply leads to growth and productivity. But, nutrients in excessive 
concentrations cause the growth of the simpler organisms and a reduction in 
biodiversity (DEFRA, 2004). These simpler organisms, such as phytoplankton 
(algaes) and various species of pondweed, have a high Biochemical Oxygen 
Demand (BOD).  
 
The depletion of oxygen in water bodies is termed eutrophication; it profoundly 
changes the characteristics of the ecosystem and can lead to the subsequent 
death of aquatic invertebrates, fish and other aquatic animals (Stoate et al., 
2001; DEFRA, 2004; EA, 2006). At high concentrations blue-green algae can 
be toxic for fish and animals, more generally though it’s the effect of algaes and 
pondweed on sunlight levels within watercourses. Because these simpler 
species thrive in high nutrient conditions they grow to block out the sunlight for 
submerged plant species which eventually die out, this in turn leads to the loss 
of habitat for invertebrates and small fish which rely on these plants for food, 
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shelter and for breeding (Stoate et al., 2001; DEFRA, 2004). As trailed above, 
the eutrophic state of Loe Pool was the primary driver for the partnership to be 
initiated.  
 
High levels of nutrients are not the only problem associated with diffuse 
pollution. Sedimentation and pesticide concentrations in watercourses also 
adversely affect invertebrate communities (Schriever et al., (2007). This thesis 
focuses on the impacts to drinking water supplies and ecology but it’s worth 
noting that diffuse pollution can also affect amenity value for fisheries, 
navigation, water sports, and angling (DEFRA, 2004). In these cases impacts 
arise from both risks to human health and also the landscape value of turgid 
and algae-covered water bodies (DEFRA, 2004). This of course has knock-on 
economic effects for tourism where failures in microbial standards cause the 
withdrawal of blue flag status or other markers of environmental quality, or 
where fishing is no longer possible because of turbidity. 
 
2.1.4: Characteristics of Diffuse Pollution Risk 
The complexity and contingent nature of diffuse pollution sources is what 
fundamentally distinguishes it from point source pollution. This is because the 
risk of runoff is locally determined by the characteristics of each catchment 
which all vary in terms of size, height above sea level, geology and land use 
(OFWAT, 2011).  Another factor which makes diffuse pollution a particularly 
challenging risk to identify and manage is the fact each source may be of little 
significance on its own. But when sources combine in a watercourse they 
culminate to a significant risk (EA, 2007; Patterson et al., 2013). Of course, one 
of the consistent drivers for pollution entering a watercourse is rainfall. 
However, that said rainfall patterns are too affected by local topography, 
weather conditions and ultimately our changing climate (Chon et al., 2012; 
DEFRA, 2005; EA, 2007; OFWAT, 2011; Stazyk, 2006). Indeed, while rainfall 
patterns correlate to downstream pollution events the rainfall patterns 
themselves are irregular and episodic (DEFRA, 2004; Stazyk, 2006; Chon et al., 
2012). This of course makes water monitoring and risk modelling to identify high 
risk tributaries difficult. 
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The risk of diffuse pollution reaching a watercourse is also contingent on the 
pathways. And it is the abundance of possible pathways by which pollutants 
reach surface and ground waters which make the problem so complex (EA, 
2007; Yang and Wang, 2010). It is well documented that land practices can 
magnify the velocity of the surface flow but the actual risk of runoff reaching a 
watercourse or habitat is dependent on the catchments geomorphology, 
lithology and pedology (Candela et al., 2009; EA, 2007; OFWAT, 2011). To add 
a further layer of contingency, the risk of leaching and underground flow means 
that pollutants can take hours, days, or even years to reach a watercourse 
depending on local factors (Chon et al., 2012; DEFRA, 2004; EA, 2007; 
Patterson et al., 2013). This time delay on impact to watercourses only raises 
the difficulty for scientists trying to model diffuse pollution in a catchment 
(Howden et al., 2013). Not only are modellers faced with the challenge of 
quantifying overland flows, from small but multiple sources, but they also have 
to integrate underground flow pattern which work on much longer time scales 
(Chon et al., 2012; Howden et al, 2013). Considering all of these contingencies 
it is easy to understand why it is classed as a ‘wicked problem’ (Patterson et al., 
2013); diffuse pollution is difficult to monitor, model with a high degree of 
certainty, assign responsibility for, and regulate (Chon et al., 2012; EA, 2007; 
Lane et al., 2006; Stazyk, 2006). Furthermore, those attempts to do so are 
resource intensive and thus expensive (DEFRA, 2004; Stazyk, 2006). 
 
2.2: Water Governance 
I now move on to consider water governance regimes and their role in 
addressing diffuse pollution risk. In fact its long been recognised that 
management practices lie at the heart of addressing this water resource 
problem, as noted in the Global Water Partnership’s (GWP) Framework for 
Action (2000): 23) which argues that “The water crisis is mainly a crisis of 
governance. The present threat to water security lies in the failure of societies to 
respond to the challenge of reconciling the various needs for and uses of 
water”. Or as Ban Ki-moon (2012: V) wrote more recently “Addressing how we 
use and manage water resources is central to setting the world on a more 
sustainable and equitable path”. Approaching water resource management as a 
‘crisis of governance’ has been a crucial step forward for social scientists as it 
has opened research possibilities to a wide spectrum of disciplines, beyond just 
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natural scientists and engineers, because (as I will elaborate on through this 
thesis) ‘governance’ is an inherently social and cultural issue (Koutrolis et al., 
2013). And as I have trailed in Chapter 1, there has been a paradigmatic shift in 
approaches to water management from a command and control approach 
towards an integrated approach. I now consider this shift in some detail and in 
doing so I lay the theoretical groundwork for discussing the WFD and CaBA 
policies. 
 
2.2.1: Command and Control 
The traditional water management paradigm has been characterised as a 
‘command-and-control’ approach (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014). In one sense 
this can be defined as the “direct regulation of an industry or activity by 
legislation that states what is permitted and what is illegal” (McManus, 2009): 
51). The ‘command’ refers to the production of water quality standards by a 
government body which must be complied with. The ‘control’ refers to the 
punitive action taken for non-compliance (Abbot, 2006). However, based on 
further reading I have observed that the paradigm of ‘command and control’ is 
accompanied by three more principles: 1) administrative rationalism; 2) 
preference for hard engineering solutions; 3) a belief that risks can be 
calculated on the basis of probability and effects alone. I will discuss these three 
points now. 
 
Dryzek (2005) uses the term ‘administrative rationalism’ to refer to traditional 
arrangements in environmental governance which are based on an autonomous 
bureaucracy. At the heart of administrative rationalism are two ideas. The first 
is, as stated above, that environmental risks are best managed through 
regulatory mechanisms (Dryzek, 2005). Regulation mechanisms might include 
taxes, prices, permits and fines which are administered punitively by a 
government’s environmental agency if standards are not met by polluters 
(Dryzek, 2005). The second idea, and the more important one here, is that 
experts should be at the centre of problem solving for environmental issues. 
Indeed, it’s well observed that science has secured a hegemonic role within 
decision making process of environmental governance (Aitken, 2009), 
positioning itself at the “top of a hierarchy of ways of knowing” (Mellor, 2003): 
509). It is the influence of ‘science’ which has had most effect on the proceeding 
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approaches in water management. The focus of experts on discrete 
environmental issues has meant that water has been managed in scientific silos 
(WWAP, 2012). The result is that rather than having an overarching and 
strategic framework that balances different water uses, in order to optimize and 
share its various benefits across society and the economy, it has led to 
environmental agencies to separate risks and a much criticised sector-by-sector 
approach to water management (Rees, 2002; WWAP, 2012). 
 
The second theme within the paradigm of ‘command and control’ is the 
preference for hard engineering solutions. This includes canalising rivers, dams, 
or building sewage works to treat effluents as opposed to dealing with the 
upstream source of the risk e.g. land management, water consumption and 
waste production (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014). This engineering approach was 
ingrained within the first generation of catchment management projects in 
developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s where planning and risk 
management solutions emphasised engineering works aimed at specific on-site 
and downstream physical outcomes (Darghouth et al., 2008). The rationale 
behind ‘concrete and steel’ based solutions was a modernist belief in the power 
of scientists and engineers to accurately calculate the risks and benefits. Such 
approach is linked implicitly with the development of the ‘modern’ state and the 
paradigm of rational planning (Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). While of course there 
are success stories, post-project analysis concluded that investment costs were 
unjustifiably high, benefits created had a limited life and the failure to pay 
attention to the needs of upstream populations often lead to social distress and 
inequality. By the end of the 1980s the failure of this ‘engineering-led’ approach 
was clear, and instigated a major rethinking of watershed management 
approaches (Darghouth et al., 2008). 
 
The third theme within the paradigm of ‘command and control’ approach is a 
belief that risks can be calculated on the basis of probability and effects alone 
(van Asselt and Renn, 2011). Traditionally decision makers in water 
management have assumed that the future can be predicted (Haasnoot et al., 
2013). This led to policy makers developing static ‘optimal’ plans using a single 
‘most likely’ future based on the extrapolation of trends  (Dessai and van der 
Sluijs, 2008; Hallegatte et al., 2012). However, if the future turns out to be 
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different from the hypothesized future, the plan is likely to fail (Haasnoot et al., 
2013). Furthermore, the choice and design of measures was often done in 
isolation without considering the complexity of ecosystems or the interactions at 
different scales, let alone the social or cultural ramifications (Müller-Grabherr et 
al., 2014). More recently it’s been recognised that risk is not just a physical 
phenomenon but a cultural one too (Rees, 2002).  And that management of 
water resources is a problem of decision making under uncertainty, rather than 
simply risk (Hall et al., 2012). This led to a shift in thinking and the emergence 
of an integrated approach. 
 
2.2.2: Integrated Catchment Management 
The 1990s saw the beginning of a shift in policy discourse about how water and 
the associated environmental, social and economic risks should be managed 
(Darghouth et al., 2008; Hering et al., 2010; Peuhkuri, 2006). There was a 
widespread acceptance of ‘holistic environmental management’ which, within 
water policy, took the form of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). 
IWRM was first advocated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 19773 but only became an international 
policy goal in 1992 following the publication of Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit4 
(Hendry, 2008; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). IWRM was forwarded as a key 
approach to achieve sustainable management of water resources and as a 
means to incorporate multiple and conflicting water demands (Hendry, 2008; 
Hering et al., 2010; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). 
 
The classic definition of IWRM comes from the Global Water Partnership 
(GWP): “a process which promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximise the 
resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP-TAC, 2000: 10). The 
IWRM is guided by four principles: 1) freshwater is a finite and vulnerable 
resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; 2) water 
                                            
3 
IWRM was first promoted at the UNESCO International Conference on Water, which took 
place in 1977 at Mar del Plata, Argentina (Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). 
4
 The Earth Summit is officially known as the ‘United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment 
and Development’ was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At the 2002 Earth Summit in 
Johannesburg IWRM was reiterated as the key policy to achieve sustainable and equitable 
water resource management. 
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development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; 3) women play a 
central part in the provision, management, and safeguarding of water; 4) water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses, and should be recognised as 
an economic good (DWP-TAC, 1999).  
 
The fundamental driver for an integrated approach is the recognition of 
complexity in contemporary environmental risks (Butterworth et al., 2010; 
Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006). Post-modern thinking has revealed the intertwined 
relationships between society and nature and argued that such complexity 
needs to be matched with suitable governance structures (Jeffrey and Gearey, 
2006). As such most analysts would argue that water management has been 
sectorial and reductionist for too long, and that there is a need to better co-
ordinate management of different components of the resource (Butterworth et 
al., 2010). Indeed, as the Deputy Chief Executive of the Environment Agency, 
David Rooke, said following the UK flooding in 2016 “we will need to have that 
complete rethink and I think we will need to move from not just providing better 
defences, but looking at increasing resilience” (Guardian, 2016). Thus it has 
now become accepted by policy and practitioners alike that an integrated 
approach, in principle, would address the failings of modernist approaches by 
working at a catchment scale, co-ordinating between various sectors and 
stakeholders, managing the watercourse holistically and seeking out soft 
engineering solutions (Butterworth et al., 2010; Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 
2007; Medema et al., 2008). 
 
The connection between the primary empirical focus of this thesis, diffuse 
pollution, and other water risks needs to be emphasised here. As stressed 
above, at the heart of ICM is the recognition of interconnected risks and 
therefore approaches to management need to be holistic. In essence ICM 
requires a simultaneous focus on water pollution and on the parallel risks of 
flooding, ecosystem services and the local economy. This is different to 
traditional approaches which tend to artificially separate water pollution, flood 
risk and land management. Thus it is crucial this thesis does not ignore other 
catchment risks because of its focus on diffuse pollution. Especially if the 
management plans to address other risks interact with designs to address water 
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pollution issues.  As such, and in order to trail section 7.3 which examines the 
tensions between managing flood risk with ecological risks, the proceeding 
Literature Review includes reference to the different approaches in flood 
control. 
 
Moving on, the integrated approach to water management has engendered two 
shifts in the practice of governance. The first shift has been from government to 
governance wherein new forms of co-operation have been enabled between 
state and non-state agencies to deliver water management goals at a local 
scale. The second shift has towards involving affected lay groups in the process 
of water management through the stakeholder participation. Both of these shifts 
are worth considering in detail as they are integral to the underpinning rational 
of contemporary water polices in the UK. 
 
Government to Governance 
Part of to the integrated approach to water risk management is the ongoing shift 
in the governing architecture of developed countries, from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ and the emergence of localised partnership working. This is where 
“boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become 
blurred” (Stoker, 1996): 2), new forms of co-operation are emerging and where 
a multitude of actors and processes lead to collective decision making (Asselt 
and Renn, 2011). The shift from government to governance in water 
management is underpinned by the notion that risk adaptation is best organised 
at the local scale whereby a diverse range of stakeholders and scientists, 
natural and social, work on tackling situated environmental risks (Apitz et al., 
2006; Hendry, 2008). 
 
For many geographers, the notion of governance remains fuzzy because of the 
varied, and contested, aspects of environmental management which it covers. It 
is therefore necessary to be clear about what I mean by government, water 
governance, and water management and what aspects are of concern in this 
thesis. ‘Governance’ is often used in opposition to ‘government’. In the context 
of the European WFD (Petersen et al.)(2009: 2063) explain that “whereas 
government is understood as a hierarchical structure of command and control, 
governance is associated with non-hierarchical, decentralized governing and 
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with the participation and voluntary cooperation of all actors involved”. However, 
a dichotomy is problematic in the sense that local partnerships must work within 
government structures of policy and funding; thus decentralized governing is in 
constant tension with government (Leyshon, 2015). And this leads to the 
definitional tension between water governance and management.  
 
The World Bank (2007): 71) define governance as the “structures, functions, 
processes, and organizational traditions that have been put in place within the 
context of a program’s authorizing environment to ensure that the [program] is 
run in such a way that it achieves its objectives in an effective and transparent 
manner”. Under this definition I use the term governance to refer to the 
organisational structures (i.e. departmental arrangements), functions (i.e. what 
those departments do) processes (i.e. policies) and traditions (i.e. culture of 
practice) of the environmental agencies specifically involved in the delivery of 
the WFD and CaBA. Whereas the World Bank (2007): 71) define management 
as “the day-to-day operation of the program within the context of the strategies, 
policies, processes, and procedures that have been established by the 
governing body”. Under this definition I use the term management when 
referring to the on-the-ground delivery of that WFD and CaBA. Or put simple, I 
use the term governance when referring to the intentional or organisational 
aspects to an environmental agency and management when referring to how a 
policy is delivered in practice. 
 
Nevertheless, at the heart of contemporary governance is the practice of 
partnership working (Balloch and Taylor, 2001) with the co-involvement and 
cooperation of relevant agencies (national government, local government, 
voluntary organisations and so forth) in the management of a particular issue. 
And it is the process of partnership working which the focus of this thesis. In 
particular how a voluntary catchment partnership initiates collaborative projects 
and reconciles competing interests in the risk management process. 
 
Stakeholder Participation 
The idea of stakeholder participation is that citizens who are affected by the 
relevant polices should be consulted and involved in decision making (Balloch 
and Taylor, 2001). Whereas partnership working is about collaborative working 
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between existing scientific of governance institutions, stakeholder participation 
is about the involvement of lay publics and non-affiliated individuals or groups in 
the catchment management process. Thus, in theory, stakeholder participation 
goes a step further than partnership working as it brings in the non-expert view 
to decision making. 
 
Over the last few decades stakeholder participation has become a key 
consideration in the international and national discourses in practices of 
environmental policy making (Blackstock, 2007; Collins and Ison, 2009). 
Participation is presented as being essential5 for enabling adaptive capacity and 
ensuring responses match local needs and resources (Smit et al., 2001). The 
most significant piece of policy in Europe has been the Aarhus Convention 
(ECE/CEP/43) which was adopted by EU member states in 1998. The 
Convention was developed as a response to disillusionment with the authority 
of the member states alone to regulate for environmental protection (Leen and 
Abbot, 2003). The Convention obliges public authorities to: 1) respond to a 
request for environmental information; 2) make information available to the 
public; 3) collect and update environmental information; 3) promote public 
participation in preparing plans and programs which are of significance to the 
environment (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007). At the national UK scale the 
participatory agenda is embedded within the Natural Environment White Paper 
(NEWP) (DEFRA, 2011a) where it is foregrounded as way to better respond to 
environmental risks. The NEWP strives to achieve greater participation through 
initiating and supporting Local Nature Partnerships (LNP) which are a 
mechanism for public engagement with environmental governance (DEFRA, 
2011). 
 
However, despite being normatively embedded within all these policy 
documents it is widely recognised, amongst academics at least, that achieving 
participation in practice is a difficult task and many attempts fall short of an 
idealised notion of collaborative governance (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007; 
Reed, 2008). Further, as I will expound in the literature review, one of the 
mistaken assumptions in policy is that stakeholders are a homogenous group 
                                            
5
 In many ways policy discourses present participation as a panacea for all environmental 
management problems; a position that is increasingly being questioned by practitioners and 
scholars (Reed, 2008). 
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and that their priorities and preferences for management options will 
straightforwardly be in accordance with a scientific framing of the risk. 
 
2.3: Water Policy 
In the sections above I have outlined the rationale for the shift in water 
governance paradigms and detailed the two elements, partnership working and 
stakeholder participation, of the integrated approach which this thesis is focused 
upon. I now turn to the specific water policies which this research has been 
developed in response too. Firstly I trace out the developments in European 
water policy as a way to demonstrate: i) how the participatory agenda is 
embedded in current water policies; ii) how policy has responded to the 
increasingly complex nature of water pollution risks. Secondly I review the WFD 
and the CaBA as the specific water polices of concern for this thesis. 
 
2.3.1: Developments in Water Policy  
Over the past four decades Europe has enacted a series of Directives relating 
to all areas of the environment and natural resource protection (Frederiksen and 
Maenpaa, 2007). Marshalled by the EU, the Directives have exerted a major 
influence on the national environmental policies of EU Member States 
(Petersen et al., 2009). The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is the latest and 
most comprehensive of these Directives rationalising and updating water 
legislation by setting common EU-wide objectives (Peuhkuri, 2006). The WFD is 
underpinned by the principles of IWRM, albeit in a more sophisticated form. 
Theoretically the WFD also adopts a participatory approach by looking not just 
at regulatory options to the management of water risks, but also alternative 
mechanisms that can lead to ‘social learning’ and in turn equitable and 
sustainable water use (Gouldson et al., 2008; Hendry, 2008; Hering et al., 2010; 
Peuhkuri, 2006). As Ison et al (2007: 500) state, “The EU . . . sought insight into 
the ways the WFD could be implemented not only though “right laws” and “right 
prices” but also through communicative and participatory approaches”. The EU 
has thus lauded the WFD as a new and progressive type of governance and as 
a blueprint for IWRM that other continents should follow (Gouldson et al., 2008).  
 
To understand the participatory agenda within the WFD it is useful to consider 
the preceding phases of European legislation on water protection (Peuhkuri, 
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2006). Page and Kaika (2003: 329-330), Frederiksen and Maenpaa (2007: 16-
18)6 and (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014: 243-245) divide the development of 
European water legislation into three phases (See Table 1). In the first phase 
(1975-1988) the efforts were focused on improving water quality and safe 
sewage disposal to reduce public health risks (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007; 
Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014; Peuhkuri, 2006). Directives set quality standards 
for water types such as fishing, shellfish and bathing waters, and groundwater 
(EC, 1999). This began with the Surface Water Directive (1975) and cumulated 
with the Drinking Water Directive (1980) (Peuhkuri, 2006). 
 
Phases of European 
Water Legislation 
Aims Legislation and Directives 
Phase One Reduce public health risks 
 Surface Water Directive (1975) 
 Drinking Water Directive (1980) 
Phase Two Reduce ecological risks 
 Urban Wastewater Treatment 
Directive (1991) 
 Nitrates Directive (1991) 
Phase Three 
Integrated approach to reduce health 
and ecological risks 
 Water Framework Directive 
(2000) 
Table 1: Phases
7
 of European water legislation 
 
In the second phase (1988–1998) the emphasis shifted from solely public health 
issues to include pollution control for ecological reasons (Frederiksen and 
Maenpaa, 2007). This second phase was characterised by the setting of limits 
on emission values and improvement, and standardisation in member states’ 
water quality monitoring systems (Peuhkuri, 2006). For example, limits were set 
on values for different pollutants from sewerage and agriculture in different 
types of waters through the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (1991) and 
Nitrates Directive (1991) (Peuhkuri, 2006). In this period the European 
Commission (EC) also revised the Drinking Water Directive (1998) to develop a 
standard approach by adopting an ecological quality of water directive 
(Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007). The revised Drinking Water Directive (1998) 
also introduced requirements for improved public access to information 
(Peuhkuri, 2006). The EU directives from these first two phases were influential 
drivers in water treatment infrastructure investment (Peuhkuri, 2006). While 
                                            
6
 See Frederiksen and Maenpaa (2007: 16) technical report for the Ministry of Environment 
Denmark titled ‘Analysing and synthesising European legislation in relation to water’ for a neat 
timeline of EU directives and legislation.  
7
 Table and phases devised using the work of Page and Kaika (2003) Frederiksen and 
Maenpaa (2007) and Müller-Grabherr et al (2014). 
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these investments led to a decrease in point source pollution, diffuse pollution 
still remained a risk (EA, 2007).  
 
In the mid-1990s there was a growing realisation that the integrated approach to 
environmental issues – outlined above – was necessary to meet sustainable 
development aspirations through understanding the complexity of catchments 
and river basins as natural systems (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014). It was 
recognised that European water legislation had become increasingly 
complicated which lead to different interpretations by member states. The EU 
agreed that there was a need to harmonise and integrate objectives and 
measures (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007). The third phase (1998 onwards) 
was therefore in response to the divergent interpretations of the directives.  The 
ambition was to ensure overall consistency of water policy throughout the 
European Union (EC, 1999). The Commission developed a discussion paper 
setting out a framework for European water policy, and finally in 1997-1998, 
proposed a new piece of legislation – the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
(Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007). 
 
2.3.2: Water Framework Directive 
I now discuss the WFD and explain its key objectives, attributes and the 
classification system. The WFD came into force in 2000 and set a programme 
for delivering integrated management of water resources in Europe through 
setting EU-wide objectives (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007; Peuhkuri, 2006). 
The central objectives are to: (a) prevent further deterioration, protect and 
enhance the status of aquatic ecosystems and the water needs of terrestrial 
and wetland ecosystems; (b) promote sustainable water use based on the long-
term protection of available water resources; (c) enhance protection and 
improvement of the aquatic environment; (d) ensure the progressive reduction 
of pollution of groundwater; and (e) contribute to mitigating the effects of floods 
and droughts (OJC, 2000). These objectives cover all inland surface waters, 
groundwater, transitional and coastal waters (OJC, 2000). At the core of the 
WFD is the classification system and the ecological approach to the 
assessment of the health of water bodies (Petersen et al, 2009; Peuhkuri, 
2006). The WFD’s ambitious aim is to improve the quality of all water bodies in 
the EU to a rating of ‘good’ on the scale: ‘high’ (no human impact), ‘good’ (slight 
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deviation from ‘high’), ‘moderate’, ‘poor’ and ‘bad’ (highly toxic). Further, the 
WFD aims to prevent deterioration in existing status of all water bodies 
(Blackstock et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2009). Achieving the GES targets will 
require addressing a number of pressures on the water environment. But as 
illustrated in Figure 3 the primary reason for WFD target failure, in South West 
England, is the problem of diffuse pollution.  
 
 
Figure 3: Reasons for failure of WFD targets in South West England (EA, 2007) 
 
It is widely recognised that the WFD introduces major changes and a high 
degree of novelty into European water policy and governance (Petersen et al., 
2009). Rather than the WFD merely extending national environmental policy to 
the European level it radically changes the existing paradigm of governance. 
Perhaps the WFD is the most significant and innovative water policy to emerge 
from the European Union (Gouldson et al., 2008; Petersen et al., 2009). It is 
therefore sensible to describe and explain the innovative changes to policy and 
governance the WFD has heralded. 
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First, the WFD uses a holistic measure of environmental health through the 
rubric of “good status”. This is in contrast to older EU directives which focus on 
specific chemical levels in discharges or watercourses. While “good status” is 
composed of several ecological and chemical elements the simplification is 
argued to shift attention from inputs to resulting ecology (Petersen et al., 2009). 
The rationale is that ecological indicators only become meaningful when 
considered in relation to the specific features of each catchment and its local 
conditions (Peuhkuri, 2006).  
 
Second, delivering “good status” will require institutional change linked to the 
debate on ‘governance’ over ‘government’ (Gouldson et al., 2008).  Regulators 
were previously seen as enforcers but under the WFD they have been cast as 
initiators, partners and facilitators (Gouldson et al., 2008).  This will lead to the 
application of a mix of regulatory and non-regulatory approaches delivered by a 
range of actors through partnership working to achieve specific objectives 
(Gouldson et al., 2008). Indeed, the principles of the Aarhus Convention are 
embedded within the WFD and understood as a prerequisite for successful 
implementation (Peuhkuri, 2006). This is set out in Article 14 of the WFD which 
requires that Member States encourage involvement of all stakeholders into the 
implementation process. As is discussed next, this specifically concerns the 
consultation process in the development of River Basin Management Plans 
(RBMP) (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007). 
 
Third, the WFD has triggered the re-organisation of water management by 
hydrological units, RBD and catchments, rather than administrative boundaries 
(Hering et al., 2010). This re-organisation was an ambition of IWRM which 
emphasised the important role institutional structures, boundaries and scales 
can make in sustainable water management; this has of course implications for 
who is now considered a stakeholder (Gouldson et al., 2008; Petersen et al., 
2009). This downscaling of governance boundaries leads us neatly to River 
Basin Management Planning. 
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2.3.3: River Basin Management Planning 
In practical terms the WFD objectives will be implemented at the River Basin 
District (RBD) scale through River Basin Management Plans (RBMP)8. These 
RBMPs set out a strategic vision for exactly how each waterbody within each 
RBD will achieve ‘good’ status through a Programme of Measures (PoM) 
(Gouldson et al., 2008), tailor-made instruments for each RBD indicating in what 
way the WFD objectives will be reached (Peuhkuri, 2006). Directed by Article 14 
of the Aarhus Convention the development process of the RBMPs is supposed 
to provide the opportunity for regional level stakeholders to participate in policy 
making (Peuhkuri, 2006; Gouldson et al., 2008).  
 
Essentially the RBMPs are about identifying, through the ‘river characterisation’ 
process, water bodies at risk of not achieving the GES targets. For example this 
might include identifying pressures from point source discharges, diffuse source 
pollution, water abstractions, water flow regulation, morphological alterations 
and other anthropogenic pressures (Gouldson et al., 2008). Once a waterbody 
is identified ‘at risk’ the member states must develop a Programme of Measures 
(PoM) for each RBD. The exact PoMs each member state will implement 
depends not only on the power of national environmental agencies but also on 
the regional RBD context. Since RBMP are required to include public and 
stakeholder consultation, under Article 14, the drawing up of PoMs is likely to be 
a contested process with different measures having a differentiated impact on 
stakeholders. Within the UK the RBMPs and the PoMs will have statutory status 
(Gouldson et al., 2008). It thus becomes imperative to gain as much ‘buy in’ 
from affected stakeholders as possible. However, the PoMs will not only contain 
further regulatory measures but also non-regulatory and alternative measures 
(Gouldson et al., 2008). For example, in the UK non-regulatory measures to 
deal with diffuse pollution will include Natural England’s Catchment Sensitive 
Farming (CSF) or Soils for Profit (S4P) initiatives in high risk areas. 
 
2.3.4: Catchment Based Approach 
In the final sub section to this chapter I expound the CaBA which has been 
hailed by DEFRA as the start of an exciting new approach to managing the 
                                            
8
 The RBMP are termed the ‘administrative mechanism’ to deliver the WFD objectives and set 
out in Article 13 of the WFD (Frederiksen & Maenpaa, 2007). 
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water environment in a truly collaborative way (Rogerson, 2014). The aim of the 
CaBA is to generate more effective stakeholder engagement in order to 
sustainably tackle the integrated environmental risks of biodiversity, flooding, 
water quality and business needs (DEFRA, 2013). As a way of linking this 
section with the previous RBMP discussion I first explain how the CaBA 
emerged from a problem of spatial fit between ‘on the ground risks’ and 
governance structures. I then go on to detail how the CaBA will be 
implemented. I bring the chapter to a close by specifying how this thesis will 
bring new practical and academic insights to the challenge of delivering the 
CaBA.  
 
Practitioners involved in water governance worldwide have long considered the 
hydrological catchment as a pragmatic scale to work at because it is where 
complex economic, social and ecological systems interact within a geo-
physically delineated space (Ayre and Nettle, 2015). It is thus widely recognised 
that many of the problems facing water environments are best understood and 
tackled through catchment scale policies and initiatives (Crilly, 2011). However, 
when the RBDPs were first published in December 2009 they were met with 
expressions of deep disappointment by regional NGOs9 (Crilly, 2011). One of 
the objections raised was that the regional scale was too big and 
disaggregated, making the RBDPs problematic in terms of having practical 
resonance with water sector activities at the hydrological catchment scale 
(CIWEM, 2013). Thus the CaBA was developed because of failures in the 
‘spatial fit’ between WDF policy, institutional relationships, land use regimes and 
the water environment (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007; Moss, 2001). 
Specifically the perceived gap in effective governance between the higher levels 
of River Basin District planning and the more local issue focused projects at the 
waterbody scale (EA, 2011b).   
 
In March 2011 DEFRA officially launched the CaBA. Alongside the rationale for 
participatory governance and stakeholder objections about the scale of RBMPs, 
the launch of the CaBA sits in a wider political context. The change of 
Government in 2010 led to an invigorated focus on the localism and ‘Big 
                                            
9
 For example Wildlife Trusts and Rivers Trusts who were involved in the first cycle of WFD 
consultation. 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
41 
 
Society’ agendas (CIWEM, 2013). Paralleling this was the explicit recognition of 
the need for IWRM in ‘The Natural Environment White Paper: The Natural 
Choice’ (2011) and The Water White Paper: Water for Life (2011a). The launch 
was accompanied by a Pilot Programme (tested in 10 catchments across the 
UK) in 2012 in order to demonstrate the value of catchment working and how 
the CaBA could best be delivered in practice (DEFRA, 2013). Following 
evaluation of this Pilot Programme, £1.6 million was allocated to the EA in 2013 
for start-up funding of the Catchment Partnerships (discussed below). Finally on 
the 3rd of June 2013 the CaBA was officially rolled out and adopted by the EA in 
all 100 catchments in England and Wales (DEFRA, 2013). Subsequently 
DEFRA have committed a further £2.2 million of funding to the EA for the 
2014/15 period in order to develop Catchment Partnerships as well as for 
funding additional support and communication resources (CIWEM, 2013). 
 
What is a Catchment? 
Confusingly what DEFRA define as a ‘catchment’ is different from what 
geographers have historically referred to as a ‘hydrological catchment’. 
According to the World Bank, a hydrological catchment is defined in terms of 
watershed “as the area that drains to a common outlet” (Darghouth et al., 2008: 
XI). A catchment in this sense is an area of land from which all surface and 
underground water flows to a signal point e.g. sea or lake (CCMH, 2012; 
OFWAT, 2011). However, DEFRA use the term ‘catchment’ to refer to a larger 
administrative boundary, comprising of a series of interlinked waterbodies; so 
for the EA the term ‘waterbody’ is synonymous with a ‘hydrological catchment’10 
in the traditional sense (EA, 2011). Important to note is that it is waterbody 
units, rather than catchments, which must achieve the GES objectives (CCMH, 
2012).  
 
The EA have identified11 8,000 water bodies and 100 catchments for England 
and Wales (OFWAT, 2011). In turn these 100 catchments are grouped under 11 
River Basin Districts which form the basis of reporting for the River Basin 
Management Plans. Within each of these catchments it is envisaged that there 
                                            
10
 Although in some cases the EA may divide a hydrological catchment into more than one 
waterbody because of different risks and management options required in a particular locality 
(EA, 2011). 
11
 These ‘catchment’s were based on the boundaries the EA already use to delineate the water 
environment for their ‘Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies’ (EA, 2011). 
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will be an unlimited number of ‘sub catchment’ projects driven by stakeholders 
and community interests (EA, 2011). In Figure 4 the 11 RBD’s are delineated 
with green boundaries, the 100 catchments are delineated with black 
boundaries and the 8,000 waterbodies are delineated with grey boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 4: WFD Boundaries (DEFRA, 2013) 
Catchment Partnerships 
Catchment Partnerships (CP) are a management mechanism established by 
DEFRA as part of the CaBA to provide a forum for agreeing and delivering 
strategic priorities, discussion of best practice, and as a conduit for organising 
sub-catchment initiatives (DEFRA, 2013). The EA envision one CP to be 
established for each of the 100 Catchments in UK and Wales. The intention is 
that CPs will be led by an agency which is external of Government and who has 
a vested interest in championing the CaBA (DEFRA, 2013; EA, 2011a). So 
while the EA might need to provide support to fill this role in the first instance 
the ambition is that an independent body that can better energise local 
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stakeholders and will eventually take on the position. For example in the South 
West region groups like the Wildlife Trust and West Country Rivers Trusts have 
been particularly active in leading CPs. The EA will fund a Catchment Co-
ordinator post in order to act as the contact point between the CP and the EA. 
Their role will focus on developing a shared evidence base of the catchment’s 
water risks, raising awareness of regulations to support compliance, and 
feeding back potential issues to include in the RBMPs; along with being the 
conduit to Local Nature Partnerships to optimise opportunities for collaboration 
on planning and activities (DEFRA, 2013; EA, 2011b). 
 
CaBA and Challenges for Delivery 
The CaBA document states that decision-making for adaption needs to take 
account of the legitimate interests of the stakeholders by encouraging active 
participation (Brown, 2011; Willows and Connell, 2003). Delivery of the CaBA 
will thus require the EA and partners to develop new ways of working with each 
other and internally in order to change individuals’ and organisations’ behaviour 
through incentives, advice and negotiations (OFWAT, 2011). However, the EA 
admit that there is no blueprint for this new collaborative way of working; rather 
they want stakeholders to be directly engaged in developing best practice (EA, 
2011a). As the name implies the CaBA is more of an approach, or meta 
strategy for governance, rather than a policy in the technical sense (i.e. with 
aim, objectives and a specific delivery plan). Instead of direct guidance for 
delivery the EA have simple provided a number of progressing objectives: 1) 
ensure early identification and involvement of relevant stakeholders in dialogue; 
2) develop a shared understanding of the current problems in the catchment; 3) 
ensure co-ordinated activity that will deliver multiple benefits for the 
environment; 4) gain commitment from stakeholders to more catchment action 
and ambitious targets; 5) assist delivery of primary WFD objectives; 6) and 
assess the implications of adopting catchment working more widely in future 
(EA, 2011a). Further that, as stated at the CaBA launch in the South West RBD 
by Chair of the South West RBDLP the “the ambition is that the CaBA will be 
adopted at both the catchment and waterbody scales of governance” 
(Cresswell, 2013). 
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This thesis focuses on the delivery of the CaBA, through Loe Pool Forum as a 
voluntary catchment partnership, at the waterbody scale. To provide clarity on 
the different scales of governance I have constructed a diagram (see Figure 5) 
which illustrates the different types of catchment groups, and the policy which 
directs them, at the decreasing scales of governance. The diagram was built, in 
part, from Cook et al (2013) typology of catchment groups currently prevalent in 
the United Kingdom. Cook et al (2013) identify three types of groups working at 
different scales: 1) regulatory; 2) statutory; 3) voluntary. Regulatory groups work 
at the strategic national scale (e.g. WFD TAG), statutory groups work at the 
regional scale (e.g. RBDLP’s), while voluntary groups work at the local scale 
(e.g. the EA’s waterbody scale) and are issue driven. The waterbody scale of 
governance has been focused on because it is where the CaBA will be 
delivered in practice.  
 
 
Figure 5: Types of catchment groups and scales of governance (Cook et al., 2013) 
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
45 
 
2.4: Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has moved this thesis forward in a number of ways. Firstly I have 
demonstrated why and how diffuse pollution poses such a challenging, complex 
and wicked problem for catchment managers. Secondly I provided an overview 
of how water governance policy has progressed through modern times. In policy 
terms, this progression centres on the adoption of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM), at the global scale, and the CaBA at the regional scale 
within the UK. As I explained above, this shift has been driven by the rationale 
that water management has been modernist, sectorial and reductionist for too 
long, and that there is a need to better locally co-ordinate management of 
resources, a move away from punitive regulations and engineering solutions 
and towards a participatory governance approach (Butterworth et al., 2010). By 
approaching water challenges as a crisis of governance it has opened a chasm 
full of opportunities for human geographers. In particular the opportunity of 
studying how integrated catchment management works in practice at the 
waterbody scale. Indeed, while delivery of the CaBA is spoken about un-
equivocally in policy documents there has been little, to none, research on how 
this process happens in practice at the waterbody scale through voluntary 
catchment partnerships. As voluntary catchment partnerships are intended, by 
the EA, to make up an integral delivery mechanism there is an imperative for 
further research. One of the most challenging issues is how local partnerships 
deal with ambiguity; because not all risks are known, experienced or perceived 
in the same way. As a result enabling and delivering a multi-agency 
participatory approach sits as a practical and academic problem. 
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Chapter 3: Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity 
 
This chapter sets out the three interrelated concepts, of risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity, which I critically apply to provide new insights into catchment 
management. Of course traditionally the conceptual framework would follow the 
literature review in a thesis. However it is judicious to set out the conceptual 
framework in the first instance because the ontology and epistemology of risk, 
uncertainty and ambiguity are so central to how the research problems are 
approached. The concepts of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity are interrelated in 
that they have been developed in progression and are essentially more 
sophisticated versions of their predecessor. What I mean by this, in simplest 
terms, is that risk is ‘known chance’ (Knight, 1921); but as the study of risks 
developed through time it became clear that we can’t always know with 
certainty. From this realisation the concept of uncertainty was developed; where 
the chance of an event cannot be adequately expressed in probability terms. As 
the study of risk further progressed scholars realised that the same danger can 
be viewed in many different ways, or put differently, some risks are ambiguous. 
Thus ambiguity was developed as another dimension of uncertainty where there 
is “the simultaneous presence of multiple, and equally valid, frames of reference 
about a certain phenomenon” (Dewulf et al., 2005: 116). This conceptual 
progression means it is not possible to meaningfully discuss risk, uncertainty or 
ambiguity alone and thus it is necessary to structure this chapter, as I have, in a 
linear manner. 
 
The end point of this chapter is to specifically put forward the concept of 
ambiguity as framework to provided new leverage in the study of multi-
stakeholder catchment management. It is therefore worth trailing the key 
aspects to ambiguity here as a way to prepare the reader for the critiques of risk 
and uncertainty. The concept of ambiguity has been informed from two parallel 
developments; 1) critiques in Science and Technology Studies of modernist risk 
thinking; 2) geographical movements to thinking space relationally. Firstly the 
concept of ambiguity has been informed by 40 years of interdisciplinary 
research on risk governance; drawing from geography, sociology, psychology 
and most importantly Science and Technology Studies (STS) (van Asselt and 
Renn, 2011). This body of work has provided a convincing, theoretically 
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demanding, and empirically sound basis to argue that many risks cannot be 
calculated on the basis of probability and effects alone; and instead that the 
socio-cultural sources of uncertainty and conflict need to be brought to the fore 
in the risk management process (Asselt and Renn, 2011). Secondly, there has 
been a geographical movement to think space relationally (Heley and Jones, 
2012; Jones, 2009). Thinking space relationally focuses on the intrinsic nature 
of being in the world and the relations between people, places, and objects 
across space and through time (Crouch, 2010; Knox and Marston, 2004). 
Relational thinking offers capacity to describe how different cultural groups 
interpret and respond to risks. The concept of ambiguity thus brings these two 
developments together by placing stakeholders and their diverging 
perspectives, interests, values, and knowledge frames at the heart of the risk 
governance challenge (Isendahl et al., 2010; Lejano and Ingram, 2009; van 
Asselt and Renn, 2011). 
 
This Chapter now traces out that progression in thinking from risk to uncertainty 
to ambiguity. I begin with the technical definition of risk but quickly move on 
discuss the Risk Society thesis as way to understand the nature of modern 
risks; but also as a way to explain why uncertainty has emerged as an 
imperative consideration in water governance. Next I introduce the concept of 
uncertainty, outline its dimensions and offer a number of useful typologies which 
will aid analysis of catchment management. Finally I expound the concept of 
ambiguity, argue for its efficacy as a lens for understanding the challenges of 
multi-stakeholder catchment management and set forth Brugnach et al (2007) 
ambiguity framework as the lens of choice.  
 
3.1: Risk 
The concept of risk originates from mathematics and was initially developed for 
economic decision-making. Initial distinction of risk, discrete from uncertainty, is 
most often associated with the work of Frank Knight12 (1921). In a traditional 
Knightian sense, risk is ‘known chance’ (Knight, 1921: 21) based on statistical 
probability, whereas uncertainty refers to situations where not all possible 
outcomes are known in probabilistic terms (Gregory et al., 2009; Sigel et al., 
                                            
12
 See Runde (1998) for a specific critique of Knight’s (1921) conceptions of risk and 
uncertainty. 
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2010; Wynne, 1991). But risk is not simply just about the chance of an event 
happening, it is also about consequences and impacts (Adams, 1995). The 
technical definition is thus “the probability of an event multiplied by the resulting 
impact” (Gregory et al., 2009: 657). This is often represented in form of a risk 
matrix. For an example, Figure 6 is the risk matrix from DEFRA’s Guidelines for 
Environmental Risk Assessment and Management (2011). In order to calculate 
risk a number of assumptions need to be made. Firstly, that the world is entirely 
governed by laws of probability. Secondly, that both the ‘event probability’ is 
measurable and that pathways to an impact can be determined, mapped and 
predicted (Beck and Holzer, 2007; Gregory et al., 2009). In this sense risk is 
imbued with reductionism, rationalism and the belief in controllability (Gregory et 
al., 2009) and is thus a product of what (Scott)(1998: 303) calls “high 
modernism”. 
 
Figure 6: Risk matrix (DEFRA, 2011) 
 
3.2: Risk Society 
As I discussed above, diffuse pollution risk is complex and contingent and thus 
difficult for scientific environmental agencies to monitor, model and respond to. 
This complexity is not unique to the issue of diffuse pollution but rather an 
increasingly common feature of contemporary environmental risks. The 
challenging nature of contemporary risks is most eloquently captured in the Risk 
Society thesis. Beck’s (1994) Risk Society thesis is imperative to review 
because it was the first text to unsettle the efficacy of modernist risk thinking in 
the management of contemporary risks such as diffuse pollution. 
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
49 
 
According to Ulrick Beck, for the last thirty years we have been living in a Risk 
Society. This is a society where “risks cannot be limited in time nor space, a 
society in which risks are not accountable according to the established rules of 
causality, blame and liability, and a society which cannot be compensated for, 
nor insure against such new risks” (Beck, 1999). The Risk Society thesis has 
been a highly influential text for social scientists (Rasborg, 2012). Whether you 
consider the Risk Society as “an environmentalist manifesto” (Alexander and 
Smith, 1996), merely “intelligent speculation” (Seippel), 1998: 412), or as 
(Latour)(2003: 35) stated “one of the most lively, creative and politically relevant 
agendas developed in recent years”, it has unquestionably been a provocative 
text (Jensen and Blok, 2008; Rasborg, 2012). 
 
For this thesis there are three reasons why the Risk Society is important. First, 
Risk Society is the foremost and principal theoretical treatise on societal risk13 in 
the early twenty-first century (Benn et al., 2009; Jarvis, 2010; Jensen and Blok, 
2008). Risk Society offers a powerful and persuasive macroscopic account of 
the changing relationship between society, nature and risk (Jenson and Blok, 
2008; Benn et al., 2009). Beck has consequently, almost single handily14, 
produced a small industry of risk research and successfully promoted risk as 
the choice optic for studying dilemmas in late modernity (Jarvis, 2010). It thus 
represents a grand theory of risk and therefore functions here as a sensible 
start point for the conceptual framework. Second, Risk Society was momentous 
for geographers and others because it was instrumental in legitimising social 
science work on risk (Benn et al., 2009). Rather than relegating the explication 
of the relationship between society and nature to the natural sciences (Benn et 
al., 2009), Beck expanded debate about risks beyond the technical conceptions 
and enabled social scientists to scrutinise risk thinking in relation to its social 
function (Wynne, 1992; Zinn, 2004). Third, Risk Society provides an extremely 
effective lens to contextualise the empirical focus of diffuse pollution in this 
project. As I now demonstrate through discussing Beck’s Epochs. 
                                            
13
 It is imperative to note that Risk Society is far ranging in its account and not merely about 
environmental risks. Beck (1992) theorises, amongst other things, the transformation of politics, 
the family, labour markets, globalisation and the welfare state (Rasborg, 2012). 
14
 As we know from the history of science, big ideas are not simply a product of individual 
genius (Shapin, 1996). For example right through the plethora of work Beck has produced he 
has been inspired by a number of equally influential scholars such as Scott Lash, Anthony 
Giddens, Deborah Lupton, Bruno Latour and Brian Wynne amongst others (Rasborg, 2012).  
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3.2.1: Epochs  
One of the central observations made by Beck (1992) is the strange paradox in 
late modernity. Rather than late modernity being an era of decreasing risk, 
because of scientific and technological progress, risk might in fact be increasing 
due to technology, science and industrialisation (Jarvis, 2010; Rasborg, 2012). 
Beck (1992) does so through simplifying history into three different epochs; the 
pre-modernity, early modernity and the late modernity (aka Risk Society). In 
order to aid discussion I have constructed Table 2 below which depicts the key 
aspects to these three epochs.  
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Beck’s Epochs (Matten, 2004)
 
 
Pre Modernity 
Beck argues that in the pre-modern epoch societies faced dangers which were 
largely the outcome of the natural world, such as famines, plagues and natural 
disasters (Beck, 1992). In fact, in this epoch Beck contends that risk did not 
exist, but rather societies solely faced hazards or dangers (Elliot, 2002; Lupton, 
2006; Rasborg, 2012). Beck argues that risk did not exist because risk is a 
calculation requiring understanding of cause-effect relationships and probability; 
since mathematics had not been invented the concept of risk could not exist 
 Pre Modern Early Modern Late Modern 
Timeframe & Events 
Prehistoric to the 
middle ages 
Scientific revolution to 
the industrial revolution 
Industrial age and 
digital revolution 
Causes 
Dangers – external, 
‘acts of god 
Risks - external, 
manmade 
Risks – manufactured 
catastrophes, self-
jeopardy 
Examples 
Epidemics, natural 
disasters 
Industrial accidents, 
unemployment 
Climate change, 
radioactive leaking 
Dependence on 
individual’s decision 
No – punishment for 
societal sins, demons 
Yes – individual and 
institutional choices 
No – collectively taken 
decision, imposed on 
individual 
Scope of destruction 
People, countries, 
cultures 
Limited by space, time 
and social boundaries 
Unlimited scope, 
globally distanciated 
Calculation of 
destruction 
Uncertain, externally 
decided fate 
Calculable Incalculable, uncertain 
Responsibility External Determinable 
Yes and No, organised 
irresponsibility 
Avoidance strategies Cannot avoid them 
Possible to employ 
effective strategies to 
avoid risks 
Very difficult to avoid, 
manage and insure 
against 
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(Beck and Holzer, 2007; Elliot, 2002). Beck also separates the concept of 
danger from risk along decisional and temporal dimensions, arguing that “risk is 
the possibility of future damage which can be attributed to a decision by a 
person, organisation or society, whereas danger is the possibility of damage 
that is attributed to factors over which we have no control” (Beck and Holzer, 
2007: 9). Hazards or dangers are extant instances of threats to health and 
human existence by natural catastrophes (Jarvis, 2010; Matten, 2004), whereas 
risk is “the anticipation of the future catastrophe in the present” (Beck, 2009a): 
12). In the pre-modern epoch, catastrophes “no matter how large and 
devastating, were strokes of fate….blame and accusations were of course 
formulated, but they were directed against agencies that could hardly be held 
responsible….they were thus in the broadest sense religiously motivated” (Beck 
and Holzer, 2007: 4). 
 
Early Modernity 
The Scientific Revolution, circa 1600, was arguably the point when the world 
became modern (Shapin, 1998). Throughout early modernity superstition was 
rejected in favour of science, whilst human inspiration and originality were 
rejected in favour of method and repeatability. The English Historian Herbert 
Butterfield described the result of this scientific revolution as the “equivalent to 
putting on a new pair of spectacles” (Shapin, 1998). Science, philosophy and 
economics converged to conclude that reason and science were of the highest 
authority in regard to decision-making. This was underpinned by societal 
conviction that with the power of reason humans could arrive at truth and 
improve the world (Beck, 1994; Shapin, 1998). In the history of risk it was the 
birth of probability calculus15 which stands as the most important event in the 
revolution of risk thinking (Beck and Holzer, 2007). However, the triumphs of the 
probability calculus would not have been possible without conjunction with the 
scientific method (Beck, 2009b). Essentially the scientific method enabled 
identification of cause and effect relationships and the probability calculus 
allowed experts to calculate the likelihood of occurrence under different 
scenarios. The culmination of science and maths enabled, for the first time, ‘risk 
thinking’ whereby risk could be employed as a strategy to transform an 
                                            
15
 Developed in correspondence between Pierre Fermat and Blaise Pascal in 1651 (Beck, 2007: 
4) 
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uncertain future into a rational and manageable entity (Beck and Holzer, 2007; 
Zinn, 2004).  
 
So within early modernity or the ‘knowledge society’ as Beck (2009:15) also 
terms it, danger was transmuted to risk, which could be calculated (Giddens, 
1999). Further, risks were possible to calculate because they had particular 
characteristics. The scope of these risks tended to be limited in space, time and 
by social boundaries (Matten, 2004). Giddens (1999) notes how this meant that 
risks could be fairly well calculated and subjected to risk thinking through inter 
alia actuarial tables (Rasborg, 2012). Blame was thus determinable and 
assignable because they were largely the product of decisions by individuals, 
firms, state agencies and politicians (Beck and Holzer, 2007; Matten, 2004). 
The unambiguous characteristics of risks in early modernity also meant it was 
possible develop effective strategies to avoid, adapt or mitigate these risks. 
Advances in medical science leading to lower infant mortality rates, improved 
technology in food production systems leading to decreased death from 
starvation, and identification of risk in the work place leading to prevention of 
industrial accidents are all examples of positive progress thanks to risk thinking. 
This cumulatively resulted in an increase in average life expectancy in all 
modern industrial countries (Rasborg, 2012).  
 
Late Modernity 
The transition from early modernity to late modernity is deeply intertwined with 
the waxing and waning of trust in calculable risk (Beck and Holzer, 2007), 
whereby “living in a world risk society means living with ineradicable non-
knowing or to be more precise, with the simultaneity of threats and non-knowing 
and the resulting political, social and moral paradoxes and dilemmas” (Beck, 
2009: 15). The early modern epoch was about certainty, controllability and 
unambiguity. So at the heart of late modernity is the realisation that the ‘modern 
project’ may have failed due the end of unambiguity and controllability 
(Bauman, 1991) and the “re-emergence of uncontrollable uncertainties” (Beck 
and Holzer, 2007: 4), or what (Giddens)(1994: 78) terms “manufactured 
uncertainties” – manufactured in the sense those causes of these risks are 
latent by-products of scientific and technological innovations and advances 
(Beck, 2009b; Beck and Holzer, 2007; Curran, 2013). The risks society faces in 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
53 
 
late modernity are “neither the results of external, natural forces nor of deviant 
behaviour, but of the societal, usually technology-based pursuit of legitimate 
and valued objectives” (Beck and Holzer, 2007: 4). The fundamental premise of 
the Risk Society is that in the pre-modern epoch danger originated from nature, 
whereas contemporary risks originate from us and are the unpredicted and 
undesired side effects of early modernity and the industrialisation (Beck, 1992). 
In this way late modernity has revealed a dark side to the modern project (Beck, 
1992). Further, these risks are larger in spatial and temporal scope so have a 
potential to be utterly catastrophic for societies globally (Benn et al., 2009). 
These new risks have led to, as Beck (1992: 22-23) puts it, “the historically 
unprecedented possibility, brought about by our own decisions, of the 
destruction of all life on this planet … this distinguishes our epoch not only from 
the early phase of the Industrial Revolution but also from all other cultures and 
social forms”.  
 
Usefully Beck (1992: 22-24) identifies three characteristics of late modern risks: 
1) they arise as the unintended consequence of modernity; 2) they are 
distanciated over space and time but inescapable; 3) they are invisible to the 
senses and depend on scientific knowledge (1992: 22-24). I argue, and will later 
evidence in the empirical chapters, that diffuse pollution risks has some of these 
features. However, because this argument has never been made before16 I 
have to draw from climate change literature to illustrate the characteristics of 
late modern risks; specifically Bulkeley (2001) and Head & Gibson (2012) which 
offer useful comparative discussion points. 
 
Risks are the unintended consequences of modernity 
Beck (1992: 22-24) claims that late modern risks are the unintended 
consequences of modernity, specifically industrial and technological advances. 
For example, Head and Gibson (2012: 1) state that “anthropogenic climate 
change is a quintessentially ‘modern’ problem”. Indeed, the causes of climate 
change lie deep within modernity, as Bulkeley (2001: 431) succinctly puts it: 
“the apparently innocuous and invisible gases, such as methane and carbon 
dioxide, released as by-products of industrial development have changed the 
                                            
16
 This is with the muted exceptions of Jenson and Block (2008), who used Risk Society to 
interpret pesticides in everyday life, and Stuart et al (2012), who used the concept of reflexive 
modernisation to examine the climate change and U.S agriculture. 
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composition of the atmosphere with untold consequences”. Put differently, 
industrial capitalism is the key feature of modernisation, powered by fossil fuel 
based economies which are the root cause of enhanced greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) (Head & Gibson, 2012). 
 
Risks are distanciated over space and time but inescapable  
Late modern risks transcend the boundaries of early modern risks as they are 
neither confined to a certain location, nor to a limited time span, nor to particular 
groups in society (Beck, 1992; Bulkeley, 2001; Matten, 2004). For example, 
Bulkeley (2001: 432) states how “the sources and experience of climate risk are 
indeterminately distanciated over space and time, stretching social and natural 
relations of cause, effect and responsibility”. In spatial terms, industrialised 
countries are responsible for the vast amount of greenhouse gases (Bulkeley, 
2001; Head and Gibson, 2012) but the impacts of climate change will be global 
and thus the risk landscape is altered by slowly taking shape with border 
crossing implications (Beck and Holzer, 2007). In temporal terms, while it is past 
and current generations who are responsible for the majority of GHG emissions 
it is future generations who will have to deal with the most severe impacts 
(Bulkeley, 2001). This latency period is a particularly emphatically distinguishes 
late modern risks from early modern risks (Beck and Holzer, 2007). With early 
modern risks it was possible to probabilistically predict accidents to happen at a 
particular time to a particular social group, whereas inescapable ramifications of 
late modern risks, such as climate change, will impact both developed and 
undeveloped countries at an indefinable point (Beck, 1992; Beck and Holzer, 
2007; Curran, 2013; Matten, 2004). This is what Beck (1992: 37-38) terms the 
‘boomerang effect’ “in which even the wealthiest, who have benefited most from 
the production of risks, are unable to escape these risks”. 
 
Risk is invisible to the senses and dependent on scientific knowledge 
The third characteristic of late modern risks is their imperceptibility to the human 
senses (Beck, 1992). Instead of senses, detecting late modern risks requires 
the ‘sensory organs’ of modern science to gain recognition, cognitively and 
socially (Jenson and Blok, 2008). It is the capacity of science in the late modern 
era to observe the world, compile into large data sets and then model or 
investigate to uncover invisible, to the human senses, relationships of cause 
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and effect (Aiken, 2000; Bulkeley, 2001; Matten, 2004). Climate change for 
example is a statistical construct assembled from a range of meteorological, 
oceanographic and atmospheric data over a period of thirty years (Leyshon and 
Geoghegan, 2012). This notion of invisibility is related to the characteristic of 
distanciation. These late modern risks only exist because of science’s ability to 
identify distanciated causal relationships (Beck, 1992). Climate change relies on 
monitoring, recording and then modelling small changes in the global climate 
trends, not a process which could ever be completed by using human senses 
alone (Bulkeley, 2001; Matten, 2004). Beck (2007: 16) describes invisibility as a 
key feature of the world risk society through the “expropriation of the senses, 
and hence of common sense, as an anthropological precondition of self-
conscious life and judgement”. Beck (2007:16) goes on to explain how “human 
life is thereby jeopardised to its very core and individuals robbed of their power 
of judgement”. In summary, these three characteristics of late modern risks, 
illustrated through the example of climate change, provide some grounded 
observations to why late modern risks are so difficult to know and manage. 
 
3.2.2: Criticisms of the Risk Society 
There are of course numerous criticisms and problems with Beck’s Risk Society 
thesis and I will deal with these now. Firstly, as mentioned above, the Risk 
Society is a grand theory of risk and therefore often criticised for not having a 
firm grounding in empirical research (Benn et al., 2009; Lupton, 2006). For 
example (Curran)(2013: 49) contends “Beck has not provided a single specific 
case that shows catastrophe would happen in a unitary and global way, nor any 
substantive evidence to show that these risks will unfold in an even way within a 
given region”. The second objection is whether, as Beck claims, risks in late 
modernity are new. Critics argue that we have always been confronted with all 
kinds of risks and the ones Beck identifies in late modernity are not 
unprecedented (Matten, 2004; Rasborg, 2012). For example Elliot (2002) and 
Rasborg (2012) challenge Beck on whether is it really possible to say that the 
epidemics of syphilis and bubonic plague in earlier periods are less risky than 
today’s illnesses (Elliott, 2002). The third problem scholars, especially human 
geographers, have with Risk Society is the notion of the boomerang effect 
whereby even the wealthiest nations will not be able to escape the risks (Beck, 
1992). This claim belies the decades of development geography which have 
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shown that inequality, class, socio-cultural resilience and knowledge networks 
all influence and produce a differentiated geography of vulnerability (Curran, 
2013; O’Brien et al., 2007). The primary argument Curran (2013: 52) makes is 
that applying Risk Society uncritically risks “under illuminating the social 
structuring of the underlying differentiated forms of risk”. 
 
The fourth and final issue with Risk Society is whether Beck leaves us with risk 
as real or constructed. A realism approach insists that risks are real phenomena 
that exist independently of our observation, where as a constructivists approach 
sees risk as a product of human perception and scientific staging (Beck, 2009c; 
Rasborg, 2012). However, Beck (1996: 4-7) advocates a ‘reflexive realism’, that 
is, an intermediate position between the two extremes; noting that it is not 
possible to make a decision as to whether a realist or a constructivist approach 
is more adequate (Rasborg, 2012). Beck’s reflexive realism can be described 
as a conditional constructivism, wherein even if risks are interpreted differently 
at different times and places, they nevertheless have a real content that cannot 
be reduced to interpretations (Lupton, 1999b): 61). As a geographer, drawing 
from STS, who is aiming to theorise diffuse pollution risk from data gathered 
through working in partnership with natural scientists this notion of reflexive 
realism becomes increasingly powerful as this thesis progresses. 
 
3.2.3: Risk Society & Diffuse Pollution 
Risk Society is an extremely persuasive thesis which provides the historical 
context and much needed macroscopic account of the changing relationship 
between society, nature and risk (Benn et al., 2009; Jensen and Blok, 2008). 
Admittedly there are a number of problems with the thesis which are outlined 
above. Of particular issue for this thesis is its societal level focus which means 
Risk Society lacks purchase for theorising risk at the community of individual 
level. Nevertheless for geographers it has been a hugely influential text 
because it legitimised social science work on risk and brought to the fore a 
critical approach to the role of science in governance (Lupton, 2006).  
 
Risk Society has of course been applied as an interpretive lens to a variety of 
environmental issues. However, the only application of Risk Society on the 
issue of water pollution was by Lowe et al (1997). Lowe et al (1997) concluded 
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that much of their study conformed to Beck’s analysis; with the crucial exception 
of how water pollution became a politicised problem. They argued to the 
contrary of Beck’s point that late modern risks, which are often invisible to the 
senses, are dependent on science to identify and publicise. Lowe et al (1997: 
195) discussed how in the case of water pollution “regulatory officials and 
citizens groups can combine to establish pollution as a major public issue open 
to popular definition and with science playing a supporting role”. So in the 
process of the National Rivers Authority (RNA), during the 1990’s, attempting to 
build a constituency for public regulatory functions they actually drew from 
discourses in environmental morality propagated by the environmental social 
movements of the time. This then dramatically differs from scientification 
account for responding to late modern risk put forward by Beck. The wider 
implication of this finding is that “through strategic links between regulatory 
scientists and environmental groups, particular sociocultural constructions of 
risk can be established to accommodate popular experience” (Lowe et al, 1997; 
195). Or in other words, while science is important for identifying and evidencing 
risk the way in which it is responded to can involve and be affected by society 
as a risk issue morphs into the public domain.  
 
With the acknowledged exception of Lowe et al (1997) Risk Society has not 
been applied to the issue of diffuse pollution risk; that’s despite what I would 
argue are obvious parallels between what Beck describes as a late modern risk 
and diffuse pollution risk. This is gap in the knowledge which this thesis 
addresses. In particular, the application of Beck’s epochs to the emergence of 
diffuse pollution as policy, scientific, moral and social phenomenon. To 
summarise, Risk Society does two things for this thesis. Firstly it lays the 
conceptual groundwork for approaching risk and its management critically. 
Secondly it provides a useful, and under applied, conceptual starting point to 
understand why diffuse pollution is difficult to know and respond to. 
 
3.3: Uncertainty 
As was explained in the Risk Society section, risk based thinking became a 
defining feature of what Beck (2007: 15) terms the ‘first modernity’ whereby risk 
was a strategy to transform an uncertain future into a rational and manageable 
entity (Zinn, 2004). The efficacy of risk thinking has been challenged by the 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
58 
 
conditions of late modernity whereby “living in a world risk society means living 
with ineradicable non-knowing or to be more precise, with the simultaneity of 
threats and non-knowing and the resulting political, social and moral paradoxes 
and dilemmas” (Beck, 2007: 15). However, in the paradigm of water 
governance ‘risk based thinking’ has long been, and to an extent still is, 
dominant. Indeed, traditionally decision makers have assumed that water 
environments comply with notions of equilibrium and thus the future can be 
predicted (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Mehta et al., 2001). This has led to the 
development of static ‘optimal’ plans, based on the ‘most likely’ future, and the 
pursuit of hard engineering solutions which can be predicted and controlled 
(Haasnoot et al., 2013; van den Hoek et al., 2014). 
 
Over the last decade17 it has been uncertainty, rather than risk, which has 
dominated discussion around water governance (Brugnach et al., 2007; Pahl-
Wostl et al., 2011). In accordance with the notion of reflexive modernity, 
recognition of uncertainty has stemmed from improvements in scientific 
capabilities to understand the water environment. Science has shown us that 
rivers and their catchments are complex, and dynamic systems which do not 
adhere to principles of equilibrium (Page et al., 2012). Hydrologists and 
ecologists are now aware of the uncertainties which stem from the natural 
randomness of environmental forcing, and this in turn has brought into question 
the efficacy of traditional risk models of catchment processes (Beven and 
Alcock, 2012). Uncertainty has also emerged because of the paradigm shift in 
water governance policy. IWRM favours ‘nature-inclusive’ and ‘stakeholder 
engaged’ management strategies but this has increased the sources of 
uncertainty as decision makers now have to consider not only natural and 
technological factors but also social and cultural sources of uncertainty 
(Brugnach et al., 2007; Page et al., 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011). So it is now 
uncertainty, rather than risk, which is the basis for analysis in the management 
of water resources (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Zinn, 2004). 
 
                                            
17
 It could of course be argued that management of water resources has always been a problem 
of decision making under uncertainty and this claim, that it is new, is simply a reflection of 
discourses in water governance (Hall et al., 2012). 
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3.3.1: Typologies of Uncertainty 
Knight (1921) noted how uncertainty resulted from not having enough 
knowledge on which to define the odds of a future occurrence. So in the original 
and technical sense, uncertainty refers to situations where not all possible 
outcomes are known in probabilistic or objective terms (Siget et al., 2010). So in 
a broad sense uncertainty is a simply about missing knowledge, or the absence 
of information, which prevents a system being known deterministically (Isendahl 
et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2010). Subsequently, scientists of all disciplines have 
engaged with the concept of uncertainty and have identified a varied number of 
dimensions. A number of different uncertainty typologies have been proposed 
and used in the research but, as typical in academia, there is no agreement on 
the best system of classification. Nevertheless typologies help make difficult 
ideas more tangible (Asselt et al., 1999) and I draw from the highly influential 
work of Walker et al (2003)18 who proposed an uncertainty analysis framework, 
called the W&H framework. This framework synthesised previous typologies to 
produce a conceptual basis for the systematic treatment of uncertainty for those 
involved in policy analysis and risk assessment. They distinguish three 
dimensions of uncertainty: 1) location; 2) level; 3) nature. 
 
1. Location of Uncertainty  
Walker et al (2003) discuss the ‘location of uncertainty’ with regard to where 
uncertainty manifests itself within a system (see Figure 7). Creating a model, a 
simplified graphical abstraction, helps to visualise the actors, links and cause-
effect relationships characteristic of the system (Walker, 2000). Of course, I do 
not need to emphasise how models are a central component of catchment 
management. There are two sources of location uncertainty: 1) context; 2) 
model structure. 
 
                                            
18
 See also Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Courtney, 2001; Makridakis et al, 2009; and Walker et 
al, 2010 for more uncertainty typologies. 
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Figure 7: Diagram illustrating location of uncertainty (Walker et al., 2003) 
 
Context refers to the how the boundary of the system has been delineated and 
the completeness of its representation compared to ‘reality’. Context, as a 
source of uncertainty, essentially refers to the adequacy with which the system 
has been framed in the first instance. The concept of context uncertainty is 
illustrated in Figure A and B (in Figure 7) where ambiguity in the problem 
formulation leads to the wrong question being answered (Walker et al., 2003). 
Model structure refers to understanding about the system’s processes (i.e. past, 
present, or future patterns). Model structure uncertainty arises from a lack of 
sufficient understanding, including the behaviour of the system and the 
interrelationships among its elements (Walker et al, 2000). The concept of 
model structure is illustrated in Figure C and D (in Figure 7) where competing 
interpretations of the cause effect relationships exist, and it is probable that 
neither of them is entirely correct (Walker et al., 2003). As I will later discuss in 
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the empirical chapters, ‘location uncertainty’ is a difficult issue when multiple 
stakeholders are involved because actors will differ in how they put boundaries 
around a system, or what or whom is at the centre of attention (Hoek et al., 
2014). 
 
2. Level of Uncertainty 
The second dimension is the ‘level of uncertainty’, more often referred to as 
epistemic uncertainty, and this about the presence or absence of knowledge 
(Beven and Alcock, 2012; Walker et al., 2010). In order to understand the 
management of uncertainty in water governance, it is important to recognise the 
spectrum of different knowledge levels which exist. Wynne (1992: 114) 
distinguishes four19 levels of uncertainty: 1) risk; 2) uncertainty; 3) ignorance; 4) 
indeterminacy. Wynne (1992) refers to risk (1) when ‘we know the odds’ and 
chances of different outcomes can be defined and quantified by structured 
analysis of mechanisms and probabilities. Uncertainty (2) is when the ‘odds are 
not known but the main parameters are’.  Ignorance (3) is when we ‘don’t know 
we don’t know’. Ignorance stems from a lack of knowledge about the 
parameters of risk, the linkages of effect and the completeness and validity of 
that knowledge. Indeterminacy (4) refers to uncertainty in ‘causal chains and 
open networks’ and raises the question of whether the knowledge is appropriate 
to fit the realities it is applied to (Wynne, 1992: 114). Wynne (1992) scale of 
uncertainty is akin to former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s 
(2002) famous statement: “As we know, there are known knowns, these are 
things we know we know; we also know there are known unknowns, that is to 
say we know there are some things we do not know; but there are also 
unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know…. It is the latter 
category that tends to be the difficult one”. 
 
3. Nature of Uncertainty 
The third dimension is the ‘nature of uncertainty’. Walker et al (2003) build on 
Asselt et al’s (1999) work to identify two elements to the ‘nature of uncertainty’: 
lack of knowledge (epistemic), as above, and variability. Variability is an 
attribute of reality where the system or process under consideration can behave 
                                            
19
 See Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) and Walker et al (2010) for further discussions on levels of 
uncertainty. 
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differently under similar circumstances (Asselt et al., 1999). Crucial to note is 
that variability interacts with the first type of uncertainty, lack of knowledge. 
Walker et al (2003) identify three types (see Figure 8) of variability: 1) natural 
randomness; 2) social variability; 3) behavioural variability. Natural randomness 
is the inherent chaotic and unpredictable nature of natural processes. This is 
more often referred to as stochastic or aleatory uncertainty (Beven and Alcock, 
2012; Cooney, 2012). Societal variability refers to the chaotic and unpredictable 
nature of societal processes at the macro level. Behavioural variability refers to 
‘non-rational’ behaviour, cognitive dissonance and deviations from standard 
behavioural patterns at the micro or individual level. 
 
Figure 8: Diagram illustrating nature of uncertainty (Walker et al., 2003) 
 
In the preceding section I have set out the three key dimensions of uncertainty. 
The work discussed above makes clear that uncertainty is multifaceted, can 
originate from various sources and further that these sources have the potential 
to interact. This considered the application of any uncertainty typology is thus 
likely to be a much messier process in research practice than is implied in these 
frameworks. Nevertheless for a thesis on catchment management, within which 
uncertainty has become a dominant subject, the typologies above go a long 
way to enabling me to break down its different dimensions. However, what 
these frameworks lack is a way to comprehensively account for the social and 
cultural factors in the process of water management. This is a significant 
problem in the context of IWRM and participatory agenda which now requires 
water managers, and researchers, to consider other stakeholders’ perspectives. 
 
Previously, in the context of command and control water management 
solutions, it was predominantly just expert analysis of the uncertainty which was 
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taken into account (Isendahl et al., 2010). The ‘participatory agenda’ now 
means that uncertainty is not simply a technical issue but also one of social, 
ethical and political concern. Uncertainty is no longer just about the absence of 
information or the adequacy of models but also an issue of stakeholders who 
will have profoundly different experiences, disciplinary backgrounds, 
expectations, and values at the individual and collective level (Brugnach et al., 
2007; Hoek et al., 2012; Hoek et al., 2014). Hoek et al (2012; 2014) in fact goes 
further and argued how the social factors are actually more influential on 
decision making compared to understanding the natural dynamic and 
uncertainties in a system. So while the typologies of uncertainty offer great 
scope for analysing systems from technical perspectives they do not adequately 
account20 for the social and cultural issues arising from the implementation of a 
participatory agenda within water governance. This is where the concept of 
ambiguity offers new leverage. 
 
3.4: Ambiguity 
Ambiguity is defined as “the simultaneous presence of multiple frames of 
reference about a certain phenomenon” (Dewulf et al., 2005: 116). Thus before 
I explicitly discuss ambiguity it is necessary to explain what is meant by a 
‘frame’. The sociologist (Goffman, 1974): 21) was one of the first scholars to 
develop the concept, using the phrase “schemata of interpretation” to define a 
frame. In this sense a frame is similar to a ‘world view’ in that it functions to 
mediate all kinds of experiences, knowledges and interpretations to 
contextualise a situation (Brugnach et al., 2007; Lindahl et al., 2014). 
Importantly, frames are not the same as perceptions. ‘Perception’ refers to a 
single aspect of a relationship between reality and an individual’s 
understanding, whereas, a ‘frame’ refers to the much more complex and 
multifaceted relationship between knowledge and action (Lindahl et al., 2014). 
Frames have two functions for an individual or community. Firstly they serve as 
a framework to help make an otherwise meaningless succession of events into 
something meaningful (Borah, 2011). This is achieved by an actor selecting the 
relevant aspects of an issue, connecting them into a sensible whole, and 
delineating boundaries (Dewulf et al., 2004). Secondly, frames function as a 
                                            
20
 It is prudent to note here that although Walker et al (2003) typology does include behavioural 
and social variability it does not do so in a rigorous enough way from a social science 
perspective. 
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guide, or bias, for action (Lieshout et al., 2013; Perri, 2005); because how an 
issue or problem is framed in the first instance will elicit preferences for actions 
and point to certain solutions (Brugnach et al., 2007). 
 
With frames defined I can now meaningfully explain the concept of ambiguity. In 
the first sense ambiguity can be considered as another dimension of 
uncertainty; it is not about the location, level or nature of uncertainty but is the 
presence of two or more equally valid frames or interpretations about the 
system of concern (Brugnach et al., 2007; Brugnach and Ingram, 2012; Hoek et 
al., 2014). As is illustrated in Figure 9 ambiguity is uncertainty of a different kind; 
it is about actors knowing differently (Hoek et al., 2014). In decision-making 
contexts the different actors and organisations are likely to have diverging 
perspectives due to respective interests, values, and knowledge frames 
(Isendahl et al., 2010; Lejano and Ingram, 2009). For example, “a situation of 
water shortage can be seen as a problem of ‘insufficient water supply’ for one 
actor, and one of ‘excessive water consumption’ for another one” (Brugnach et 
al., 2007). Framing is crucial to consider because different perspectives on the 
formulation of a problem inevitably lead to distinct preferences for solutions 
(Brugnach et al., 2007). For example, a particular framing by a stakeholder 
group about the location of uncertainty will influence where boundaries are put 
around the system in the first instance (Hoek et al., 2014). In sum ambiguity 
refers to the situation in which there are different, and sometimes conflicting, 
views on how to understand the system to be managed (Brugnach and Ingram, 
2012; Dewulf et al., 2005; Hoek et al., 2014; Isendahl et al., 2010; Oughton and 
Bracken, 2009). 
 
As a human geographer the concept of ambiguity is attractive because it is 
deeply relational in that it places human actors, with their priorities and 
preferences, at the heart of any analysis in a risk management process. In fact 
relational scholars see concepts such as risk and uncertainty as having no 
meaning independent of the knowledge relationship a decision maker 
establishes with an environmental system (Brugnach et al., 2007; Hoek et al., 
2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Through the empirical chapters I will employ the 
concept of ambiguity to reveal these knowledge relationships in catchment 
management from two directions. Firstly, I will use frame analysis to reveal how 
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different stakeholder groups frame diffuse pollution risk, and secondly I will use 
Brugnach et al (2007) Ambiguity Framework to reveal where the ambiguities are 
located in the process of managing diffuse pollution. 
 
 
Figure 9: Diagram illustrating sources uncertainty in relation to ambiguity (Hoek et al., 2014) 
 
3.4.1: Frame Analysis 
Typologies are used by ambiguity focused scholars to facilitate comparative 
frame analysis21. I have drawn from, and combined, the typologies observed by 
Gray (2003), Kaufman et al (2003), Dewulf et al (2004) and Shmueli (2008) who 
are researchers concerned with understanding intractable disputes in multi-
stakeholder management challenges. To guide this explication of the five 
different types of frames I have produce Table 3. Pertinent to reiterate here is 
that individual frames are deeply relational and therefore they are dependent on 
a person’s values, beliefs, experiences, interests and relationships (Gray, 2003; 
Kaufman et al., 2003; Shmueli, 2008). At group scale they are likely to be 
influenced by broader social issues such as fairness, justice and rights, power, 
access to information, and risk perceptions (Shmueli, 2008). 
 
Substance frames refer to the actual issues and how disputants relate to them 
(Dewulf et al., 2004; Shmueli, 2008). Substance frames are about the primary 
relationship an individual, or group, would have with an issue. For example, in 
the context of diffuse pollution a water companies’ primary relationship with a 
catchment might be one of compromised supply, for farmers it might be the 
regulatory relationship with the EA, and for conservationists it might be diffuse 
                                            
21
 Scholars use two terms to refer to the concept of framing; frame theory and frame analysis. I 
use the term frame analysis because of the way I intend to employ framing as an interpretative 
lens lever rather than a predictive theory. 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
66 
 
pollutions impact on bio-diversity. Shmueli (2008) informs us that substance 
frames are produced in relation to a stakeholder’s: 1) aspirations - general 
hopes for fulfilment of vital interests; 2) issues - the perceived bones of 
contention; 3) outcomes - specific positions or desired solutions to the conflict at 
hand. 
 
Table 3: Typology of frames 
 
As would be expected, risk frames are about the likelihood of the loss or gain in 
a future event (Heimer, 1988). Loss or gain can refer to financial, 
environmental, or cultural issues. Depending on an actor’s standpoint, the level 
and extent of risk is likely to be different (Kaufman et al., 2003). Risk frames are 
important to understand because they reveal an actor’s knowledge of potential 
impacts, their level of exposure and the degree to which the risk is dreaded 
(Kaufman et al., 2003). Identity is fundamental to understanding environmental 
disputes because inevitably conflicts arise when people’s identities are being 
threatened in relation to a problem or a proposed solution (Gray, 2003; 
Rothman, 1997). At the heart of an identity frame is the question of how an 
individual would answer the question “who am I?” (Gray, 2003). These identity 
frames often only emerge in relation to a specific problem or a proposed 
solution (Rothman, 1997). 
 
Characterisation frames mirror identity frames in that they are statements made 
about others, or in other words how an individual would answer the question 
“who are they?” (Gray, 2003: 23). Characterisation frames are similar to 
stereotyping in that they centre on assumed traits, positive or negative, about a 
different individual or group (Gray, 2003; Kaufman et al., 2003). 
 
Type of Frame 
 
Definition Components 
Substance 
Primary relationship stakeholder has to 
an issue. 
Substance frames are produced in 
relation to stakeholders: 1) aspirations; 2) 
bones of contention; 3) desired 
outcomes. 
Risk 
Likelihood of the loss or gain in a future 
event. 
Loss or gain can refer to: 1) financial; 2) 
environmental; 3) cultural issues. 
Identity 
Organisational purpose and fundamental 
values of a particular group 
Identity frames are influenced by: 1) 
relationships; 2) values; 3) interests. 
Characterisation 
Statements made about others; assumed 
traits, positive or negative, about a 
different individual or group. 
Identity frames are influenced by: 1) 
relationships; 2) prejudices; 3) interests. 
Process 
How a group sees, and seeks, 
resolutions to the problem 
Process frames are influenced by other 
frames: 1) substance; 2) risk; 3) identity. 
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Characterisation frames are often employed by a group to undermine a 
disputant’s legitimacy, cast doubt on their motivations or exploit their sensitivity 
(Kaufman et al., 2003). For example, by framing an ‘other’ in terms of an 
oppressor an individual can strengthen their own identity frame and justify an 
action (Kaufman et al., 2003). But as I discuss in the Literature Review, 
exposing and then encouraging actors to consider their own and other’s framing 
goes a long way to establishing common ground for disputants to engage 
meaningfully. Process frames are about how a group sees, and seeks, different 
remedies or resolutions to the common problem (Kaufman et al., 2003). 
Process frames reveals how an actor views the structure of the problem, how 
decisions should be made, by who decisions should be made, and whether they 
are fair, inclusive and legitimate (Shmueli, 2008). And because of complexity in 
environmental systems groups are likely to draw significantly different 
conclusions about the best course of action (Kaufman et al., 2003). 
 
This typology for frame analysis goes someway in providing the tools to reveal 
the knowledge relationships in catchment management. But the downfall of this 
typology is that it conceives a group’s frames as static. Whereas the process of 
catchment management is in constant progression as stakeholders interact 
through decision making over strategic plans and interventions (Dewulf et al., 
2009). This considered I bring this frame analysis section together by setting 
forth Eaton et al’s (2014: 233)22 ‘three task process for mobilising collective 
action’ as a potentiall lever for analysing catchment management in action. The 
three task process involves: 1) diagnostic framing; 2) prognosis framing; 3) 
motivational framing. The first task is ‘diagnostic framing’ wherein a problem is 
identified. Diagnostic framing is based on the available information to a 
particular group where they come to a conclusion about the source of the risk. 
The second task is ‘prognostic farming’ where a proposed solution to the 
problem is developed along with a course of corrective action. Prognosis 
framing will emerge in relation to substance frames, identity frames, power 
frames, risk frames inter alia. Further, as we know, depending on how a 
problem is framed it will elicit preferences or a ‘prognosis’ for corrective action. 
The third task is ‘motivational framing’ which is about enrolling others to engage 
                                            
22
 Eaton et al (2014) drew from the work of Snow & Benford (1988) to use the theory of 
‘mobilising collective action’ to analyse national imaginaries underpinning siting proposals of a 
biomass bioenergy development in northern Michigan, USA. 
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in the suggested corrective action. This requires considering how different 
groups’ frames interact, mitigating potential conflict and compromising on a 
direction for management options. The final point to make here is that likelihood 
of success of collective action depends on achieving consensus in each of 
these three framing tasks (Eaton et al., 2014). The three task process for 
mobilising collective action offers a, much needed, way to bring the temporal 
aspects into analysing the process of catchment management. What frame 
analysis does not offer is a way to identify where uncertainty and ambiguity is 
located in the system of concern. To address this shortfall I now turn to the work 
of Brugnach et al (2007). 
 
3.4.1: Locating Ambiguity 
Brugnach et al (2007) provide a useful framework for locating where ambiguity 
is in a given system (See Figure 10). This draws from and builds on the 
previous uncertainty frameworks set out previously. Brugnach et al (2007) 
identify three types of knowledge relationships and three types of subsystems 
where uncertainty occurs in water management. The knowledge relationships 
identified are essentially the dimensions of uncertainty discussed previous (i.e. 
location, level and nature) with the addition of ‘multiple knowledge frames’ 
which brings in the concept of ambiguity. Where Brugnach et al (2007) add new 
dimensions, compared to the uncertainty frameworks discussed above, is by 
delineating between the natural, technical and social systems. In sum this 
framework provides a pragmatic way to break down a system and better identify 
the location of uncertainties (Hoek et al., 2014). 
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Figure 10: Ambiguity Framework (Brugnach et al., 2007) 
 
Typologies and matrixes suffer considerable criticism for reducing complex 
issues to simple categories. However, I argue here that this framework is a 
particularly useful way to break down, and enable discussion of, the potentially 
messy issues in catchment management. Recognising the inherent complexity 
in water systems the proponents of this framework acknowledge that different 
types of uncertainties and the natural, technical and social systems are all 
closely interrelated and interdependent (Hoek et al., 2014). For example, 
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hydrologists tend to treat anticipation and occurrence of floods as a variability 
uncertainty (aka stochastic or aleatory); but the prediction of floods is often 
subject to major epistemic errors from a lack of knowledge about local runoff 
processes  or the build-up of debris at bridges inter alia (Beven, 2013). 
Similarly, there is no clear and transparent distinction possible between 
subsystems. For example, uncertainty about which technology to apply in a 
flood defence project also has implications in both the natural system and social 
activities (Hoek et al., 2014). These problems accepted I would argue that 
Brugnach et al (2007) ambiguity framework provides best available model for 
conceptualising the challenges within diffuse pollution risk management. 
 
3.5: Chapter Summary 
In this Chapter I have critically examined the concepts of risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Through doing so I have traced out how geographer’s engagement 
with these concepts has matured. From risk, in the technical and reductionist 
sense, towards uncertainty, and the acknowledgment of epistemological 
challenges; and culminating in the progressive concept of ambiguity which 
recognises the socio-cultural geographies of risk management. In this way all 
three of these concepts are interlinked and as such it is impossible to speak of 
risk without also considering uncertainty and ambiguity. The key points to take 
forward from each of concepts are as follows. Firstly, Risk Society and Becks 
characterisation of late modern risks offers provides a useful, and under 
applied, conceptual lens to understand why diffuse pollution is difficult to know 
and respond to. Secondly, the W&H framework (Walker et al., 2003), 
distinguishing three dimensions, offers a starting to guide to for me to identify 
and locate the sources of uncertainty in a catchment management project. The 
Chapter concluded by forwarding frame analysis and Brugnach et al (2007) 
framework as particularly useful conceptual levers for analysing the challenges 
of multi-stakeholder catchment management. I now turn to the literature which 
has applied these concepts. 
 
 
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
71 
 
Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
In the previous two Chapters I have set out the water policy context and the 
conceptual framework. In this Literature Review Chapter I bring these practical 
and academic threads together by examining previous scholarship which has 
engaged with risk, uncertainty and ambiguity. The review has been structured 
into three sections in accordance with the core themes in my research 
questions; 1) ambiguity; 2) knowing risk; 3) drivers and barriers to delivering the 
CaBA. An overview of the three sections is illustrated in Figure 11 below. Bullet 
point A summaries the starting assumption, bullet point B summaries what the 
review section covers. 
 
 
Figure 11: Structure of Literature Review 
 
The Chapter begins (see 4.1) by reviewing the literature which has applied 
frame analysis in the study of environmental management projects. This section 
explores the negotiations and conflicts which happen through decision making 
and risk management. I then go on to specifically consider the research which 
has considered the issues of uncertainty and ambiguity in the context of water 
governance. The major gap I identified in this body of work is the absence of 
explanation to how stakeholders come to know risk and in turn produce their 
framing. To address this shortcoming I turn (see 4.2) to the literature on risk 
•  A - Ambiguity is a relational concept useful for 
explaining conflicts and controversies in multi-
stakeholder governance. 
•  B - Review considers applications of ambiguity to 
analysis of environmnetal governance. 
4.1: Ambiguity & 
Governance 
•  A - The late modern risk of diffuse pollution is difficult 
to know because of its complex, contingent and elusive 
characteristics. 
•  B - Review considers the work which has approached 
knowing risk relationally.  
4.2: Knowing Risk 
•  A - Underpined by the principles of IWRM the CaBA 
ambition is to enable stakeholder participation and 
partnership working. 
•  B - Review considers the drivers and barriers of the 
participatory agenda in practice.  
4.3: CaBA - Drivers & 
Barriers 
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perception and socio-cultural approaches to studying risk. This section forwards 
the work on affect and affordance as useful ways to reveal the intricacies of how 
different catchment communities know and frame diffuse pollution risk. In the 
final section (see 4.3) of the Literature Review I return to the issue of CaBA, as 
my policy focus, and examine the literature on the drivers and barriers to 
delivering the CaBA. This section primarily focuses on the literature which has 
engaged with issues surrounding the scientisation of risk management and local 
decision making. 
 
4.1: Ambiguity & Governance 
In the last decade there has been a growing body of literature in framing and 
ambiguity studies from a broad range of social science disciplines. One of the 
most common applications of frame analysis is to the issue of conflicts, 
metaphorical or otherwise, in environmental management projects. As trailed 
above, at the heart of participatory governance is the challenge of dealing with 
stakeholders’ diversity of needs, values, interests, and their relationship to risk. 
As I now discuss, this contemporary approach to governance is often 
accompanied by disagreement and conflict over the best environmental 
management strategy to pursue. 
 
4.1.1: Ambiguity, Conflict & Environmental Management 
First and foremost I must review Moralizing the Environment – Countryside 
change, farming and pollution by Lowe et al (1997). For reasons I will now 
explain, this text has been particularly influential on how I structured this thesis, 
my conceptual and methodological approach, and its empirical focus. As such I 
provide a review of the text here and then proceed to use it as point of 
comparison through the thesis. In essence Moralizing the Environment is a 
sociological analysis on the phenomenon of water pollution. The text was based 
on a major empirical investigation, conducted in 1989 and 1995, of water 
pollution from dairy farming in South West England. The aim of the study was to 
examine how water pollution transformed from being seen as a side effect of 
agricultural modernisation to an act of wrong doing. Or put differently, this book 
explores how the natural, countryside-sustaining activity of farming became one 
of the most intensely regulated industries by the late 1980s (Lobley, 2000). The 
text is useful for this thesis because of how it acknowledged that pollution could 
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be ambiguous. As Lowe et al (1997: 6) explain “all too often, the diagnosis of 
environmental problems such as farm pollution is presented as purely and 
simply a matter of objective science. However, in many environmental conflicts 
there is a confusion and dispute, even among the scientists, about the nature, 
cause and extent of the problem”. This approach to conceptualising pollution, 
underpinned by thinking from STS, directed Lowe et al (1997: 10) to ask new 
and more incisive questions about the phenomenon of water pollution. For 
example, how did the various actors define pollution? How did different actors 
see the farm pollution problem? How did each actor characterise the other 
actors involved? who was managing to enrol whom into their way of seeing the 
world? And whose version of pollution was succeeding?. As such this book tells 
a number of stories which have relevance for this thesis; in particular Chapter 5 
and 6 which provide accounts of pollution from the perspective of Pollution 
Inspectors, ADAS farm advisors and dairy farmers.  
 
From these two Chapters there are a number of points to discuss her with 
regard to the issues of ambiguity in environmental management. Lowe et al 
(1997: 204) explained how “Pollution Inspectors had an absolute notion of farm 
pollution” and that farmers were ultimately culpable for contamination originated 
from their farm. Whereas the ADAS farm advisors “were much more willing 
tolerate incidents within context” (Lowe et al, 1997: 183) and were able to 
understand farmers perspectives. The difference for these perspectives was 
that while Pollution Inspectors were armed with regulatory powers the ADAS 
advisors realised that “in practice that they were dependent upon cooperation 
with the farming community” (Lowe et al, 1997: 207). Therefore improving river 
quality required working with a more ambiguous notion of pollution. Indeed, 
rather than marching onto farms with all their legislative guns blazing it was 
necessary to take a more subtle approach (Lobley, 2000). An approach where 
the punitive sanctions were implicit but the main task was persuasion, 
negotiation and an appeal to social responsibility (Lobley, 2000). For farmers 
the notion of pollution was entirely relative. The cause and seriousness being 
dependent on weather, timings, mitigation measures, and the relative power 
they had in a given context to prevent pollution. In sum they found different 
definitions of pollution and different understandings of the seriousness. The 
conclusion Lowe et al (1997) came to was that what counts as a pollution 
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incident is essentially a social judgement, albeit one that is informed by 
available scientific evidence. A study of agricultural pollution is, therefore, also 
“a study of the social construction of the environment, and how different groups 
struggle to define the specific nature of the problem and construct solutions to 
it” (Lowe et al, 1997: 6). 
 
Dewulf et al (2004) employed discourse analysis to examine how various 
stakeholders involved in a collaborative soil conservation initiative in southern 
Ecuador framed resource management. Their starting point was that “natural 
resource issues are not just out there in the natural world” (Dewulf et al., 2004: 
178) but that different stakeholders will highlight different aspects of a problem 
or opportunity and this inevitably leads to conflict in management. The project 
began with analysis of actors’ usual frames (AKA substance frames) which 
were delineated in a table under the headings issue frame (i.e. general 
relationship with soil resource), mission, specific interest and role in 
collaborative project. As the project developed the researchers tracked how 
each actor’s frames initially met in conflict, interacted, and in time evolved. The 
researchers concluded that convenors of collaborative projects should not 
attempt to merge different actors’ frames into a mutually acceptable 
configuration. Instead they suggested that frames should be left intact and 
convenors should focus on exposing and communicating frames and then 
connecting the different actors into a working relationship.  
 
Shmueli’s (2008) paper summarises a three-year project with the Consensus 
Building Institute in Israel which was focused on conflicts in environmental 
planning including disputes over land ownership and uses, competition for water 
resources, cultural clashes over territory and the impact of polluting industries. 
The paper uses frame analysis on three case studies to reveal the complicated 
relationship between spatial patterns of planning policy, cultures and 
environments. The epitome of conflict in substance, identity and 
characterisation frames can be found at the heart of this paper. While the Israeli 
Jews see settlements in the Galilean hills as the fulfilment of the Zionist dream 
(framed as ‘Independence’) the Israeli Arabs look at the same landscape 
through their ‘Naqba’ (‘Catastrophe’) frame. These frames come into conflict 
through the legal planning process when the Arab town of Sachnin applied to 
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expand its municipal boundaries in order to increase tax revenue, alleviate 
overcrowding and to deal with water pollution causes23. The account explores 
the stakeholders’ widely divergent frames of reference on the same planning 
application. For Sachnin local council the issue is control over environmental 
externalities; for the District Planning Authority the issue is demographic 
equality; for the Israel Defence forces the issue is security; for the local Israel 
Environmental group the issue is greenbelt preservation for Jewish 
communities. In the end the power imbalance prevailed and there was a new 
Jewish settlement built on the land. However, the protracted legal and multi-
stakeholder process led to the new residents declaring a desire to cooperate 
with their Arab neighbours in joint Arab-Jewish educational pursuits and other 
mixed activities. Shmueli (2008) argues that through the legal process 
disputants gained a greater understanding and respect for one another’s 
perceptions, behaviours and goals which enabled them to talk to, rather than 
over, one another.  
 
More recently, Mazur and Asah (2013) employed frame analysis to understand 
and manage the underlying conflict in stakeholder attitudes about a grey wolf 
recovery programme in Washington State, USA. The programme was initiated 
by the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) who wanted to 
restore the decimated wolf population. Anticipating conflict in stakeholders’ 
standpoints on the programme they encouraged broad participation from five 
key groups: hunters, Government Agency Officials, scientists, livestock owners 
and conservation advocates. Mazur and Asah’s (2013) starting point was the 
deficiency of understanding about the human dimensions (i.e. preferences, 
attitudes and management options) in environmental governance. To address 
this issue the authors employed frame analysis to systematically structure the 
stakeholders’ standpoints and reveal the relational aspects to decision making. 
The outcome of this methodology was the delineation of stakeholders’ 
standpoints (three frames identified amongst the five groups) and the detailing 
of prioritised issues: 1) areas of consensus and disagreement; 2) intra-
stakeholder framing contradictions; 3) trade-offs among competing preferences; 
4) latent agendas fuelling the conflict.  They concluded that the systematic 
                                            
23
 The source of the water pollution is from the adjoining industrial complexes which the Sachnin 
local council has no control over. 
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structuring of stakeholder frames minimises ambiguity and thereby facilitates 
conflict management and consequent achievement of conservation goals. For 
Mazur and Asah (2013) frame analysis offered a way to simplify what was 
previously considered an intractable conflict in conversation management. 
 
We can take a number of key points from the three studies reviewed above. 
Firstly that frame analysis is sensible way to understand reasons for ambiguity 
in multi-stakeholder governance. Secondly, building on the first point, frame 
analysis offers a coherent method to breakdown the prioritised issues of 
contention and systemically order them into a communicable format. Thirdly, 
building on the second point, that by a researcher revealing and communicating 
different group’s frames it may lead to conflict resolution, or at least could 
represent the first step on a journey towards mutual understanding; or as 
Shmueli (2008) noted it can enable groups ‘to talk to, rather than over, one 
another’.  
 
4.1.2: Ambiguity, Uncertainty & Water Management 
I now turn our attention to the literature which has specifically considered 
ambiguity and uncertainty water management. In Isendahl et al’s (2010) project 
their starting problem was that uncertainties in water management are so far 
mostly dealt with intuitively or based on experientially derived knowledge. 
However, in Isendahl et al’s (2010) project there was a desire from practitioners 
for more a more systematic approach to dealing with uncertainty. The empirical 
study took place in the Don˜ana region of the Guadalquivir estuary in southern 
Spain. Most industries in the region are water dependent. Due to its wetlands 
and marshes the area is assigned numerous protection classes and joined to a 
national park. The protection of the marches has led to conflicts with water 
dependent industries such as rice, strawberry and cattle farming. The central 
issue is that these activities clash with conservation interests. The results were 
gathered from two workshops in Seville with stakeholders including 
representatives from the water authority, National Park administration, Regional 
Institute, Biological Research Station for Water and Mediterranean Institute of 
Advanced Studies. Through a card sorting exercise a broad range of criteria to 
make sense uncertainties was produced by different subgroups, these were 
then merged into a shared list of criteria. This method proved a successful way 
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to systemically structure the issues of uncertainties from the different 
standpoints. Their conclusion was that there was great profitability in the 
interactional process of developing the shared list of criteria enabled a more 
robust decision making. More specifically it allowed the differences in framing to 
be made explicit and thus enabled better communication about the 
uncertainties. In that way the process served as an opportunity of social 
learning. However, Isendahl et al (2010) noted how this only represented the 
first step in reframing; overcoming the framing differences, in the practice of 
decision making, still remained a challenge for water managers as the project 
concluded. 
 
Hoek et al’s (2014) start point was that while approaches to uncertainty in 
decision-making continue to evolve they are still mostly represented as 
individual or separated issues. Based on studies of ecological engineering flood 
defence projects in the Netherlands they demonstrate the importance of 
cascades of interrelated uncertainties. The data was drawn from two case 
studies. The first was the Oyster Dam which is located in the Eastern Scheldt 
estuary and part of the larger Delta Works project which was implemented as a 
response to the dramatic flooding of the delta in in 1953. The second was the 
Sand Engine Delfland project which is an innovative large scale experiment to 
test the feasibility of mega-sand nourishments in the face of high erosion rates. 
Building on Brugnach et al (2007) Ambiguity Framework Hoek et al (2014) 
examined the interaction of uncertainties in the natural, technical and social 
subsystems (see Figure 12). Hoek et al (2014) provide this example, 
“knowledge about the effects of a particular technology on an ecosystem might 
be incomplete (hence: in area 4), the uncertain impact of a technology can be 
interpreted from a societal perspective (hence: in area 5) or an unpredictable 
natural phenomenon might influence a human activity (hence: in area 6). 
Finally, some uncertainties can concern all subsystems (area 7)”. They 
concluded that their conceptualisation of uncertainties as cascades provides 
new opportunities for coping with uncertainty. Furthermore, they argue that a 
cascade approach is a useful way to bridge the gap between actors from policy 
and science as it shows how the uncertainties, held relevant in different arenas, 
are actually directly related to partnership based decision making.  
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Figure 12: Subsystems of Uncertainty (Hoek et al., 2014) 
 
4.1.3: Summary 
In this ambiguity section I have considered the academic and practical pros and 
cons of framing for understanding ambiguity in multi-stakeholder governance. In 
academic terms frame analysis offers the researcher a way to systematically 
organise, and simplify, different groups’ relations to an issue (Mazur and Asah, 
2013). Frame analysis thus offers an effective mechanism to reveal new 
understandings about where the ambiguities are in catchment management and 
how catchment partnerships negotiate them. My rationale for using frame 
analysis is therefore its ability to expose what risk is, what it means to whom, 
and why actors conceive of and respond to risks differently. In practical terms 
frame analysis offers a sensible way to identify and map a group’s framing of an 
issue in preparation for communication. As discussed above, many conflicts 
resist resolution simply because of communication issues. If a stakeholder 
group does not clearly organise and articulate their framing of an issue then 
their needs and values may be neglected (Mazur and Asah, 2013). Shmueli 
(2008) though raises the important question about how it will serve those being 
researched. Indeed, I argue here that there is a lack of consideration, in these 
previous projects, about how the research process changed the groups who 
were studied, for better or worse. This point can be addressed, as I will, though 
employing Participatory Action Research (PAR) in order to ensure my 
engagements lead to ethically considered positive action. While there is no 
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guarantee that frame analysis can resolve conflicts there is a large body of 
evidence that shows how it can, though joint negotiation processes, opening 
avenues for previously conflicting groups to develop a common language and 
enabling working relationships. 
 
Further to my rationale for employing ambiguity are three shortcomings of 
previous projects. The first is that ambiguity has not yet been applied to the 
issue of diffuse pollution management at the catchment (waterbody) scale. 
Secondly, most ambiguity focused research employs ‘one off’ workshops with 
‘easy to access’ expert stakeholders rather than engaging with, for example, lay 
communities. The problem with these is that they lack depth as just provide a 
‘snap shot’ of stakeholders framings. In antipathy, I intend to underpin my 
methodology with the principles of ethnography; wherein Loe Pool Forum will be 
observed at great depth over a long time period. The third point, which leads to 
section 4.2, is the absence of work which has explained how different 
catchment stakeholders come to know and frame risk. As emphasised above, 
epistemology is a fundamental issue in any study of risk, uncertainty or 
ambiguity. Yet there is a lack of ambiguity research which has examined how 
knowledge and framings of risk are produced by different groups. In particular 
how people, who work and live in the catchment, read environment and assign 
a level of risk to its state. I thus propose this is a fruitful area for investigation. 
However, while ambiguity facing scholars have not engaged with this aspect of 
framing there is a plethora of work, from a range of social sciences, which has 
explored the ways people and cultural groups come to know risk. I now turn to 
this body of literature. 
 
4.2: Knowing Risk 
Risk perception literature explains that there are two ways human brains form 
thoughts and come to know risk; analytically or affectively (Kahneman, 2011). 
This theory originated from cognitive psychology in the 1970’s, subsequently 
developed from a number of disciplinary standpoints and then made famous by 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) in his book ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’. ‘Thinking fast’ 
refers to the affective process and ‘thinking slow’ refers to the analytical 
process. I start by reviewing these two processes in turn. 
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4.2.1: Analytical & Affective  
Essentially the analytical process refers to assessing risk in the technical sense, 
i.e. “the probability of an event multiplied by the resulting impact” (Gregory et 
al., 2009: 657). The analytic process requires critical consideration and 
simulation of the hazards, through statistical summaries, to assess the risk of 
adverse consequences (Weber, 2006; Weber, 2010). The analytic process 
encodes reality in abstract symbols, words or numbers then processes logically 
and deliberatively to quantify the risk (Epstein et al., 1992). This process 
therefore requires the statistical data, appropriate processing means (including; 
awareness, control and/or technology) and explicit expertise (Weber, 2006). 
The analytical process of knowing risk has been at the heart of hazard 
concerned institutions and has enabled the anticipation and management of 
current risks, but also future ones (Reddy, 1996). Within the UK analytical 
assessments of diffuse pollution risk are underpinned by the Source-Pathway-
Receptor (S-P-R) model (DEFRA, 2011b). This conceptual model (Figure 13) 
presents the hypothesised relationships between the source (S) of a hazard, the 
pathways (P) by which exposure might occur, and the receptors (R) those 
features of the environment that we value and that could be harmed (S-P-R) 
(DEFRA, 2011). DEFRA (2011) claim that the S-P-R model has proven effective 
and flexible in modelling risk by offering the user a way to represent the scope 
of the problem, clarify the environmental components at risk and set the 
boundaries of the risk assessment. 
 
Thus it can be assumed that water scientists and catchment managers produce 
their knowledge and framing of risk through this analytical method based on the 
S-P-R model. However, in practice the complex and contingent nature of diffuse 
pollution makes any comprehensive application of the S-P-R model challenging. 
For example, in order for DEFRA to produce an evidence base to direct strategy 
for reducing diffuse pollution they commissioned the engineering consultants 
Royal Haskoning to produce a risk evidence matrix; ‘Non-Agricultural Diffuse 
Pollution - Substance and Impact Matrix’ (Hallas et al., 2006). This aimed to 
enable users to identify pollution sources, interrogate pathways, and determine 
potential impact to water quality (Hallas et al., 2006). Royal Haskoning collated 
all available data on diffuse pollution and produced an evidence matrix. The 
result was 80 pages worth of matrix (Figure 14) with numerous drop down 
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boxes linking to contingent information and context depended notes. From this 
real world example of the S-P-R model in action we can see that the analytical 
approach can result in a product which is confusing and difficult to navigate. 
This considered it could be anticipated that in practice not all catchment 
partnerships will rely on analytical analyses of diffuse pollution risk because of 
its complexity. 
 
 
Figure 13: Source-pathway-receptor model (DEFRA, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 14: Non-Agricultural Diffuse Pollution - Substance and Impact Matrix (Hallas et al., 2006) 
 
The second way people understand risk is through affective processes. Affect 
refers to emotion and the positive or negative feeling people have about specific 
objects, ideas, images or events (Kahneman, 2011; Weber, 2006; Weber, 
2010). Geographers define affect as the pre-cognitive dimension to 
encountering the world (Pile, 2010; Thrift, 2009). The affectual processes for 
understanding risk are attached to mental representation. This includes both 
perceptual representations (pictures, sounds, smells) and symbolic 
representations (words, numbers, and symbols) (Damasio, 1999). These mental 
representations are attached through learning and experience to positive or 
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negative feelings (Slovic et al., 1998). While the analytical process requires the 
input of data the affective system requires real world experience (Weber, 2006; 
Weber, 2010). This is because affective approaches work on the basis of 
temporal and spatial association and similarity. Adverse or uncertain aspects of 
the environment are translated into affective responses such as fear, dread or 
anxiety and thus risk is manifested as feeling rather than probability 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). The affective system is intuitive, automatic, and fast 
(Weber, 2006). This function allows people to navigate quickly and efficiently 
through a complex, uncertain and dangerous environments by drawing on 
feelings associated with particular representations (Finucane et al., 2000; 
Kahneman, 2011). For example Isendahl et al (2010) explained, in their project 
on water management in Spain, that experientially derived knowledge was 
relied on because “decisions can be taken quickly as the analytic processes of 
deliberate reasoning are bypassed” (Isendahl et al., 2010: 844). 
The principle conclusion from this work is that affect-driven and experientially 
derived knowledge is much more likely to influence24 an individual’s everyday 
risk perception, and decision making, than analytic processes involving abstract 
knowledge (Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Weber, 2006). Further, 
there is a consensus that affect and in particular negative affect is the well 
spring of action (Dessai et al., 2004; Leisrowitz, 2006; Peters, 2000); emotions 
like fear or worry motivate people to remove themselves from danger or to 
manage the environment in ways that reduce feeling of vulnerability (Weber, 
2006). The problem with reliance of the affect and experientially derived 
knowledge is that it can create what DeSilvey (2012: 31) terms ‘anticipatory 
history’ whereby “prevailing narratives tend to project long-term conservation 
indefinitely forward into the future”. DeSilvey’s (2012) central point is that these 
narrative formulations can fall short when confronted with the impending 
transformation because of accelerated environmental change; i.e. the increased 
flood risk associated with precipitation scenarios driven by climate change. 
 
The analytical-affective literature review above goes a long way in moving 
thesis forward in terms of understanding how catchment stakeholders might 
come to know and frame risk in the first instance. However, there are number of 
                                            
24
 Although it is prudent to note here that scholars accept that the two systems of risk analysis 
are not opposed or disconnected but operate in parallel and interact with each other (Damasio, 
1994). 
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shortcomings in in this literature. One problem from a geographer’s perspective 
is the use of the ‘individual’ as the unit of analysis. The absence of attention 
towards context means that the relationships between individual cognition and 
the larger social environment are ignored (Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2009; 
Norgaard, 2006). Scholars who have taken a socio-cultural approach25 to risk 
argue that same risk will be viewed differently by various groups. For example, 
in(Wilkinson) (2001: 11) paper of Social Theories of Risk Perception he argued 
that “individual experiences of the social processes of risk perception may lead 
them [people] to adopt a broad range of unclear or contradictory views about 
the magnitude of hazards”. Or as Tulloch and Lupton (2003: 1) said “risk 
knowledges are historical and local. What might be perceived to be ‘risky’ in one 
era at a certain local may no longer be viewed so in a later era or in a different 
place”.  As a result managing risks is not just about resolving an analytical-
affective knowledge validity contest; but about subjective disputes and debates 
over their nature, their control and whom is to blame for their creation (Lupton, 
2006; Tulloch and Lupton, 2003). The second problem I have with analytical-
affective literature is that it does not go far enough in explaining how individuals 
and cultural groups read the environment. One of the most powerful bodies of 
work which has engaged with the challenge of understanding how people read 
the environment is the literature on affordance and cultural attunement. I turn to 
this literature now. 
 
4.2.2: Affordance & Cultural Attunement 
The concept of affordance was developed by the psychologist Gibson (1979) 
and is about the relational potential for action between an individual and its 
environment. To give a mundane example about the use of an escalator; for 
adults it affords travel between floors, for children an escalator affords play 
                                            
25
 There is a significant body of literature on the socio-cultural approach to risk which I do not 
have space to fully review here. Instead I provide a synopsis. This approach to risk originates 
from the work of Mary Douglas who highlighted the central role of conceptual boundaries of 
order and disorder in cultural notions of pollution; arguing that dirt is essentially disorder, “it is 
matter out of place” (Douglas, 1966: 35). Later Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) wrote Risk 
and Culture which put forward the argument that attitudes towards risk and danger vary 
systematically according to a small number of cultural biases or world-views which can be 
identified in different contexts and societies. More recently the socio-cultural approach has been 
applied to cultural perceptions of industrial risks by Zonabend (1993), Walker et al (1998) and 
Bickerstaff (2009; 2010; 2012), and also to the issue of climate change and cultures of denial by 
Norgaard (2006). The central conclusion from this work is that “knowledge and action emerge 
from ideas, practices, discourses, and perceived risks as much as from technological 
assessments of environmental quality” (Nerlich et al., 2010: 98). 
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(Clapham, 2011). Affordance emphasises the physical properties of an object or 
environment relative to a particular person (Clapham, 2011) thus Gibson (1979: 
127) defined affordance as “what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill”. With this Gibson suggested that people do not 
perceive qualities but rather affordances; “the meaning is observed before the 
substance and surface, the colour and form, are seen as such” (Gibson, 1979): 
127). The radical aspect of this concept is it implies that ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ 
of things in the environment can be directly perceived (Kilbourn and Isaksson, 
2007). This direct perception is neither solely objective nor subjective, but it is 
both “equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behaviour. It is both 
physical and psychical, yet neither” (Gibson 1986: 129). This notion is akin to 
Beck’s idea of ‘reflexive realism’; wherein risks have a real content but are likely 
to be interpreted differently at different times and places by different people 
(Adam et al., 2000; Lupton, 1999a). 
 
The ability to, and manner in which, people ascribe affordances to an 
environment is culturally learnt and culturally attuned. Gibson (1979: 254) refers 
to this cultural attunement as the “education of attention” and this is about the 
practice of learning to perceive (Kilbourn and Isaksson, 2007). In the simplest 
sense attunement is about educating the attention of the visual perceptual 
system (Clapham, 2011; Kilbourn and Isaksson, 2007). This process of learning 
to perceive is intimately linked with action and practice (Kilbourn and Isaksson, 
2007). As Lave and Wenger (1991): 93) note “learning itself is an improvised 
practice; a learning curriculum unfolds in opportunities for engagement in 
practice”. Such process of perception and attunement thus becomes relative to 
the skills and capacities of the perceiver while at the same time the affordances 
can be culturally handed down and shared by several perceivers (Gibson, 1979; 
Rantala et al., 2011).  
 
Thus different cultural groups will afford different meanings, uses and 
importance to different aspects of the environment; the result is that different 
groups will frame aspects of the environment differently. Or as (Zaff)(1995: 241) 
observed “we perceive ourselves in relation to the environment but may fail to 
detect an affordance because of a lack of attunement”. The key argument is 
that attunement, individual or cultural, leads to constructed meanings about 
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what an environment affords (Clapham, 2011). From this literature we can draw 
out that catchment stakeholders will come to know and frame water risks in 
relation to their cultural attunement and subsequent affordances ascribed.  
 
The key task for researchers wishing to reveal affordances is unpacking social 
practices26 (Clapham, 2011; Heft, 2007; Heft and Kytta, 2006). A useful 
interpretation of practice is the everyday, lived, routinised, mental and bodily 
activities which encompass knowledge, skills, meaning and emotion (Cloke and 
Jones, 2001). A focus on practices is useful for studying affordances because it 
leverages an understanding of how risk knowledges develop through living, 
working and encounters with the environment (Brace and Geoghegan, 2010; 
Cloke and Jones, 2001). Similarly, in the literature on the socio-cultural 
geographies of risk there is discussion on how practices are entangled with the 
production of risks, risks being made experientially and emotionally close or 
distant through arranging objects and ideas within spaces (see (Bickerstaff and 
Simmons, 2009; Wakefield, 2001; Zonabend, 1993). In sum, we can draw from 
this literature that a study of practices enables not only an insight into how 
people afford risk in an environment but also develop risk knowledge though the 
‘doing’ in a particular environment (Wakefield, 2001). 
 
In developing the idea of practices, scholars have moved forward to think about 
phenomenological issues and embodied practices (Crouch, 2003). Indeed there 
is a growing body of work (Anderson, 2006; Anderson and Harrison, 2006; 
Dewsbury, 2002; Thrift, 2004, 2007; Wylie, 2005; Wynne, 1996) within socio-
cultural geography which has begun to examine the affective dimensions of 
experience which are shaped by embodiment. The basis for such thinking is 
that the individual is multiply sensate, and so practices involve numerous 
sources and genres of information (Crouch, 2006; Harré, 1993). The recognition 
of an embodied experience challenges the idea that the mind and body are 
separate, instead recognising the holistic process of encounter (Harré, 1993). 
Embodied practice provides a way of thinking through the relationship between 
doing, the mobilisation of sensualities and the knowing of risk (Harre, 1993). 
Rather than conceiving knowledge to just be produced through just visual 
                                            
26
 There is of course a vast body of social science work on social practices which I do not have 
space, or need, review fully here; but for influential papers see Crouch (2001; 2006; 2010). 
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perception and auditory exchange it brings to the fore the non-visual, affective 
and sensory aspects to human experience (Pile, 2010). To bring the key points 
from this literature together I now review some studies which have focused on 
affordance, cultural attunement and practices. 
 
Rantala et al (2011) took a practice based approach to study the relationships 
between weather, human action and the natural environment among wilderness 
guiding in Finnish Lapland. Rantala et al (2011) showed how a guide’s 
embodied knowledge helps them see affordances in the weather which ensures 
groups safety and comfort. For example avoiding the risks or hypothermia or 
overheating is based on the ability to read, anticipate and afford meanings to 
the environmental conditions. Interestingly most guides did not have 
professional guiding training but their reading of various affordances of weather 
was based on lay knowledge, or as  Rantala et al (2011: 285) term a “specific 
repertoire of weather-wise skills”, that guides acquire through a life time of 
experience of being in ever changing environment. This means that the 
perception of environment is dependent on the cultural attunement of the 
guides. This study brought new insights to the discussions of practices and 
affordance through highlighting the interplay between humans and the 
environment. Rather than weather just being a medium between humans and 
the environment they argue that it also evokes and holds strong agency. The 
weather affects not only people’s emotions but they argue that it also 
manipulates social and material practices by narrowing or extending 
potentialities for outdoor activities. In this way they provided a richer and more 
nuanced understating of how weather is involved in the way humans act in and 
perceive the natural environment (Rantala et al., 2011). 
 
The cultural and moral influences on how farmers afford and frame risk were 
explored by Lowe et al (1997). In their study of dairy farmer’s discourses they 
drew out three important points with regard to farmer’s explanations on the 
causes of water pollution and their culpability. Firstly, moral arguments were put 
forward around their “responsibility as producers and countrymen” (Lowe et al, 
1997: 143) to provide food to the nation; and water pollution being a side effect 
of this societal demand. Secondly, productivism resonated with the cultural work 
ethic of farmers. They saw “sloth rather than greed as sinful, linked 
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industriousness with virtue, and saw wealth as a reward for hard work; thus 
productive farmers are better farmers from virtuous hard work” (Lowe et al, 
1997: 201). Thirdly, farmers “were at pains to point out that they were also 
subject to the forces of nature” (Lowe et al, 1997: 143). Or in other words, 
heavy rains are equally responsible for pollution. Lowe et al (1997: 192) found 
that “farmers were able to draw on a rich repertoire of justification, which 
essentially naturalised their actions, by portraying themselves as subject to 
elemental forces that they could only partially control and which absolved them 
of culpability”. This study demonstrates the importance of understanding cultural 
factors in the affording and knowing of risk.  
 
The paper by Burton & Paragahawewa (2011) ‘Creating culturally sustainable 
agri-environmental schemes’ builds on Lowe et al (1997) observations in a 
discussion of affordances in the context of environmental management. The 
papers’ key point is that contemporary agri-environment schemes are limited in 
success to influence farmer’s long term attitudes towards the environment 
because they are not culturally sensitive. They explore the tensions between 
environmentalist and farmers through how the landscape is perceived. 
Conventional farmers across the world are known to dislike untidy farming 
because it is indicative of inefficient farming (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). 
Untidiness and unproductive farming is read by observing and ascribing 
affordances to different practices. In arable farming the productivity of the land 
can afforded on the basis of whether the correct pesticides and fertilisers have 
been applied at the correct times and levels, straight ploughing, machinery set 
properly, ‘tramlines’ spaces evenly space, grass in good condition etc. (Burton 
et al., 2008). Straight and equidistant lines for example are important to prevent 
the over and under application of field treatments during the year, evenly 
spaced crops are important to limit the competition for nutrients between plants, 
even crop colours are important because it means that the soil preparation and 
treatment have been good and thus the crop will yield evenly (Burton et al., 
2008; Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011). 
 
A point of ambiguity can arise though when different groups want different 
things from the landscape and thus afford the environment differently. 
Specifically that ‘good farming’ as the agricultural community see it is 
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contradictory to the ‘good farming’ the conservation community would see. For 
example within livestock farming dense light green grass coverage suggest 
good stock management and appropriate application of fertiliser; whereas for 
conservationists light green grass suggests an over application of fertiliser and 
a mono-crop desert devoid of wildlife habitat (Burton & Paragahawewa, 2011). 
Their concluding point is that AES have been unsuccessful because tidy-
productivist farming is a deeply culturally embedded way of seeing and thus 
difficult to change. 
 
4.2.3: Summary 
This section of the Literature Review has served to set out the key issues of 
affect, affordance, cultural attunement and practices and how different scholars 
have approach them. The central point being that risk, and thus the framing of 
risk, is multi-dimensional being influenced by social and cultural factors 
(Assmuth et al., 2010). A secondary point relates to methodology and how this 
research is ethnographic based. In line with this I aim to reveal the intricacies of 
how different catchment communities know and respond to risk with thick 
ethnographic descriptions. The research gap, which instigated this section, still 
stands in that there is a dearth of work on catchment management and the 
production of risk knowledge and risk frames by different stakeholders. In 
particular I found no work on the process of how water scientists and catchment 
managers afford risk to water. Although considering the work of Burton and 
Paragahawewa (2011) we can anticipate that this process will be different to the 
agricultural community. In summary, I assert that there is a gap in the literature 
on affect, affordance and cultural attunement with regard to their application to 
the issue of how stakeholders come to know and frame water risks. 
 
4.3: CaBA – Drivers & Barriers 
In the final section to the Literature Review I return to consider the CaBA, as my 
policy focus, and examine the literature on the drivers and barriers to delivering 
the CaBA. I will show that understanding the drivers and barriers to delivering 
the CaBA is not only a key policy concern but also raises important academic 
questions around epistemology, science, governance and the participatory 
agenda. I begin by reviewing the literature on the participatory agenda and 
critically interpret the underlying discourses. Following this I introduce Actor 
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Network Theory and argue for its potential as a new way to theorise the drivers 
for the participatory agenda. With regard to barriers, my start point is the well 
documented issue about the scientisation of risk management and how it’s led 
to the exclusion of non-experts in governance and local decision making. I 
provide an alternative to this status quo by discussing the literature from 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) which has challenged this hegemonic 
position as well as examples from practice where catchment management has 
been done differently. 
 
4.3.1: Drivers for Delivering the CaBA 
The traditional assumption, within both policy and academic discourses, is that 
more participation is better (Blackstock, 2007; Blackstock and Richards, 2007). 
As a result a large portion of academic literature on the participatory agenda 
focuses to the ‘level’ of participation achieved using typologies. The most 
famous of these is Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’ which describes 
stakeholder involvement on a continuum from ‘passive dissemination of 
information’ to ‘active engagement’. Since then numerous scholars27 have 
developed Arnstein’s ‘ladder’ or built their own continuum. However this type of 
work tells us little about what the drivers are for expert agencies to want to 
include lay stakeholders in a management process. More recently though 
Blackstock et al (2007), Reed (2008) and Reed et al (2009) have moved the 
typology focused debate forward, and usefully, analysed the discourse with 
policy for the participatory agenda. The three rationales they have identified are: 
1) normative; 2) pragmatic; 3) instrumental. 
 
Normative rationales focus on benefits for democratic society, citizenship and 
equity. Success in normative terms is then about preventing marginalisation of 
certain groups, gaining public trust in decision making and achieving social 
learning which enriches both society and individual citizens (Blackstock, 2007; 
Reed et al., 2009; Reed, 2008). Pragmatic rationales focus on the quality and 
durability of environmental decisions that are made through knowledge 
engagement with stakeholders (Reed, 2008). Success in pragmatic terms is 
about the exchange of ‘useful’ information which will better allow higher quality 
                                            
27
 For example Bigg’s (1989) who described the level of engagement on a scale that can be 
contractual, consultative, collaborative or collegiate. Or later Farrington (1998) reduced the 
continuum of participation to simply ‘consultative’ or ‘functional’.  
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decision making and more tailored interventions based on more complete 
information enabling anticipation and amelioration of unexpected negative 
outcomes before they occur (Reed, 2008; Reed et al., 2009). Instrumental 
rationales focus on collaborative relationships which assist with diffusing conflict 
before and during implementation of a risk aversion strategy (Blackstock et al., 
2007). Instrumental success is thus about understanding and responding, 
through inclusive approaches, to how different stakeholders frame the risks as 
well as their diagnosis and prognosis for action (Blackstock et al., 2007; Reed et 
al., 2009). These rationales provide informative guidance to the underlying 
discourses driving the participatory agenda. To build on discussion of 
participation driven by instrumental rationales I now turn to the literature on Post 
Normal Science (PNS). 
 
PNS emerged from a small but persuasive body of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) literature which has questioned the capacity of reductionist based 
scientific methods to capture and manage the complexity in risks of late 
modernity. This literature has raised questions over the sufficiency of the type of 
scientific endeavour which seeks to quantify risk in a static measure. STS 
scholars specifically challenge the lack of acknowledgment of uncertainty and 
an un-self-critical stance towards truth claims from science and argue such an 
approach obstructs effective decision-making (see (Aitken, 2009; Collins and 
Evans, 2007; Demeritt, 2001; Jasanoff, 2010; Whatmore, 2009; Wynne, 1993) 
inter alia). 
 
Figure 15: Diagram of Post Normal Science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) 
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The term Post Normal Science (PNS) was coined by Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1993) and refers to a particular type of scientific endeavour. An endeavour that 
is markedly different from other types of sciences such as ‘applied’ or 
‘professional consultancy’, as illustrated in Figure 15. PNS is particular type of 
project where the facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes are high and 
decision-making is urgent. The implication from Funtowicz and Ravetz’s (1993) 
thesis is that PNS requires consultation with a wide range of expert voices, 
guidance from other groups, and the consideration of locally detailed 
knowledge. The parallels between PNS and diffuse pollution management are 
worth emphasising. As (Beven and Alcock)(2012: 124) explained “faced with 
the very real uncertainties about catchment responses, management should be 
treated as a social and political process. The scientific evidence simply cannot 
be sufficiently convincing in the context of so much uncertainty. It is therefore a 
better strategy to try to get consensus about robust and adaptive management 
strategies without resort to model predictions”. This considered, I argue that one 
potential driver for the CaBA and the participatory agenda is the nature of 
diffuse pollution management as PNS. Because, by critically approaching the 
social construction and function of science there is an argument for the 
inclusion of other ways of knowing to participate, in the process of catchment 
management, is bolstered (Funtowicz, 1990; Hinkel, 2011; Hulme, 2009; Nelson 
et al., 2010; Whatmore, 2009). 
 
More recently Watson (2014) analysed how the CaBA has been delivered in 
practice and the drivers for mobilising collective action at the local scale. 
Watson’s (2014) start point was that there was very little known about the ways 
in which collaboration was framed and interpreted in practice by the host 
catchment partnerships. The methodology involved conducting 22 semi-
structured leaders of catchment partnerships in the UK. To guide analysis 
Watson (2014) used a conceptual model, termed ‘contextual conditions’ (see 
Figure 16), developed in previous published research (see McCann 1983; Selin 
& Chavez, 1995; Watson, 2004). 
 
In short the “contextual conditions refer to the incentives and disincentives for 
collaboration created by prevailing legal, administrative and financial 
arrangements, perceptions of the condition of the catchment, and the nature of 
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existing inter-organisational relationships” (Watson, 2014: 364). Similar to Eaton 
et al (2014) three task process for mobilising collective action this model 
involves a series of progressive steps. Problem-setting involves “sharing 
knowledge, beliefs and ideas to develop a common understanding and ‘identity’ 
for the issues or problems that confront the participants” (Watson, 2014: 364). 
Similar to diagnostic framing, problem setting may be “derailed if participants 
continue to subscribe to contradictory interpretations or explanations” (Watson, 
2014: 364). Direction-setting is about the establishment of agreed goals or ends 
of the project. Again similar to prognosis framing in order to generate lasting 
commitment, “goals should reflect common aspirations that are considered 
worthwhile and feasible by the collaborators” (Watson, 2014: 364). Structuring 
is about developing the procedures of governance within a partnership; such as 
the decision making rules, multiparty structures, and mechanisms for interaction 
and joint decision making (Watson, 2014). Finally, outputs refer to the policies, 
plans, agreements, programs, and projects that are jointly created as a result of 
collaboration (Watson, 2014). Essentially outcomes are actual changes in 
economic, social, environmental, or institutional conditions that emerge 
following implementation (Watson, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 16: Contextual Conditions and the CaBA (Watson, 2014) 
 
The primary conclusion was that there is a significant gap between the idealized 
narratives of collaboration, set out in the CaBA, compared to the actual practice; 
as the delivery of the CaBA has been much narrower in scope, direction, and 
structure than was envisioned by DEFRA (Watson, 2014). In the first sense no 
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partnership framed the rationales for collaboration in the same way nor took the 
same path to ‘outputs and outcomes’. In fact Watson (2014) found that the 
design and implementation of collaborative management was shaped according 
to local institutional, social and environmental conditions (Watson, 2014). The 
implication is that partnerships are not neutral hosts to the CaBA but rather 
actively interpret and frame collaboration according to local issues and their 
own interests (Watson, 2014). 
 
For example Watson (2014) showed how the partnerships measured the 
success of outputs against their own history, priorities and relationships; rather 
than against the principles of the CaBA. In many cases partnerships cited 
improvements in water quality first and then the normative benefits of 
collaboration second. The wider point Watson (2014) makes is that local 
catchment partnerships are powerful entities in their own right and that their 
own priorities, values, attitudes, and understandings shape the process of 
collaborative working. Watson (2014) concluded that hosts framed and 
approached delivering the CaBA according to their own particular funding 
arrangements, management priorities, actor networks, attitudes toward 
knowledge and uncertainty, and willingness to share power and take risks. We 
can draw from Watson’s (2014) paper, and from the Eaton et al (2014), that the 
drivers for delivering the CaBA for catchment partnerships may not be wholly 
predicated on normative or instrumental rationales. But rather driven by their 
own interests and priorities, and conditioned by local factors. This considered I 
now propose a far more radical way to theorise the drivers for the CaBA; Actor 
Network Theory (ANT). 
 
ANT was originally developed in the late 1980’s by Bruno Latour, Michael 
Callon and John Law (Cressman, 2009). It was established as an analytical 
technique to understand science, and in many respects governance, in action 
(Burgess et al., 2000; Kaghan and Bowker, 2001). Founding scholars first use 
the ANT to describe and explain how scientists construct, maintain and 
negotiate order in socio-technical systems (Kaghan and Bowker., 2001). 
Indeed, the theory does not typically attempt to explain why a socio-technical 
system exists but rather focuses on the infrastructure and how actor-networks 
are formed or how they fall apart (Crawford, 2005; Lemke, 2000; Spinuzzi, 
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2008). Thus I put ANT forward as an alternative way to theorise the drivers for 
the CaBA. The potential stems from its efficacy to theorise how the existing 
networks for managing water risks ‘have fallen apart’ or how the CaBA 
represents the ‘construction’ of new network. I do not have space to provide a 
full review of ANT literature here. Instead I review the key principles of 
enrolment and translation. 
 
In order to discuss the notion of enrolment we need to flesh out the term ‘actor-
network’. The theory conveys the idea that an actor does not act ‘alone’ but 
under the influence of the network’s constituents, human or non-human 
(Spinuzzi, 2008). The term actant, rather than actor, is used to stress that non-
human entities as well as human actors may be determinants of social 
interactions and outcomes (Ginn and Demeritt, 2008). Analysts focus on how 
actors enter into alliances, or not, to satisfy their diverse aims and this process 
has been coined enrolment. Essentially, enrolment is about how actors find 
ways to convince others to support their own aims (Spinuzzi, 2008). Latour 
speaks of networked assemblages that operate by enrolling, or incorporating, 
various hybrid actants into longer, stronger and more durable networks 
(Crawford, 2005; Ginn and Demeritt., 2008).  
 
The concept of translation is similar to the idea of enrolment except it focuses 
on power and the process by which actors translate the aims and interests of 
others into their own thereby enrolling them in their actor world (Burgess et al., 
2000; Crawford, 2005). In one sense translation is about attempting to gain 
rights of representation, establish identities and impose conditions of interaction 
(Burgess et al., 2000; Crawford, 2005). The translation is a process riddled with 
issues of power because for an actor to achieve success other actors’ worlds 
must be colonized (Burgess et al., 2000). But rather than power as possession, 
power is persuasion and is measured via the number of entities enrolled in the 
network and the durability of relations between actors (Crawford, 2008; Ginn 
and Demeritt, 2008). Actors thus become powerful through their ability to enrol 
others in a network and to extend their network over greater distances (Burgess 
et al., 2000). The durability of the actor-network depends of whether actors 
conform and continue to conform to their allotted roles. 
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ANT has of course been applied to a variety of environmental management 
issues. However, ANT has only ever been applied to the issue of water pollution 
management by Lowe et al (1997). The central methodological principle of ANT 
is to ‘follow the actors’; which requests me, as an ANT practitioner, to begin with 
the empirics in my case study. Nevertheless there are a number of empirical, 
and conceptual, points to draw from the ANT account in Moralizing the 
Environment. 
 
In ANT tradition Lowe et al (1997: 197) insisted that the story of farm pollution 
requires consideration of human and non-human actors. In their study the 
actors included “a vigilant public, the scientists who developed the detection 
methods and pollution inspectors armed with instruments and knowledge” 
(Lowe et al, 1997: 9). The constellation of actants included “the roles and 
functions of farmers, environmentalists, pollution inspectors, magistrates, cows, 
fish, snails, slurry, rain, pits, tanks, pumps and various pieces of paper (forms, 
guidelines, regulations and codes of practice)”. But in the first instance Lowe et 
al (1997: 197) argued the very recognition of water pollution problem 
“necessitates the orchestration these diverse and diffuse elements”. Or in other 
words, water pollution risk demands constructing a credible network. 
 
As explained above, for a network to become credible it relies on a variety of 
intermediaries in order to become durable and stabilised. In their study the 
important intermediaries identified included “pollution incident statistics, 
telephone hotlines, regulations, codes of practice and waste management plans 
were all important in efforts to mobilise diffuse networks in order to stigmatise or 
regulate farm pollution” (Lowe et al, 1997: 199). Lowe et al (1997: 198) 
discussed how these intermediaries had become stabilised, through one, “fixed 
relationships technologically [I.e. to embed water monitoring equipment in the 
catchment] and secondly through pollution discharge regulation”. In essence 
what this means is that “for contamination to be termed pollution it has to be 
detected, and for this to happen other actors [human and non-human must be 
involved” (Lowe et al, 1997: 9). 
 
Therefore they argued that “repercussions for the farmer are linked not only to 
the detection of pollution but also to assessments of its seriousness, and 
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interpretations of regulations” (Lowe et al, 1997: 9). This space for 
‘interpretation’ lead rebukes and protests amongst farmers “on the grounds that 
data was a social construction” (Lowe et al, 1997: 200). This case study 
proceeded to explore how key actors, in opposing networks, struggled to 
establish or resit different meanings. In sum this research illustrates how 
“accounts on pollution problems involve a host of social actors, natural entities 
and technical artefacts” (Lowe et al, 1997: 197). The wider point is that a purely 
sociological analysis of water pollution would not have adequately accounted for 
the powerful roles of the non-human actors. 
 
To summarise, ANT offers a way to theorise the processes of catchment 
management and the drivers for CaBA at the meta scale. What I mean is that 
rather than analysing the drivers, for IWRM and stakeholder participation, from 
the perspective of normative, pragmatic or instrumental rationales an ANT 
approach allows me, as the researcher, to step back and analyse how the water 
governance network functions as a whole, or doesn’t, to manage diffuse 
pollution. 
 
4.3.2: Barriers to Delivering the CaBA 
The potential drivers, and ways scholars have analyses them, for the CaBA 
considered I now move on to review the literature on the potential barriers. I 
begin by discussing the scientisation of risk management and the participatory 
agenda. I then go on to review action research projects which have done water 
governance differently and therefore offer examples as to how stakeholders 
can, or cannot, be involved in catchment management. 
 
The natural sciences have been fundamental in identifying water environment 
risks and therefore currently play the central role in defining, measuring and 
predicting the risks pollution poses (Hinkel, 2011; Pigeon, 2010). In fact the very 
recognition of diffuse water pollution risk is down to the capacity of scientific 
methods to longitudinally monitor water quality, and then understand how tiny, 
but cumulative, forcing will have profound effects on the water environment 
(Kastens et al., 2009). As a result, the natural sciences (including physical 
geography, engineers and, increasingly, water modellers) have come to 
dominate the public, policy and scientific discourses around water management 
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(Hulme, 2008, 2011). Subsequently the natural sciences’ epistemological, 
ontological and methodological perspectives and approaches, epitomised by 
command and control (Müller-Grabherr., 2014) and administrative rationalism 
(Dryzek, 2005), have commanded how risks are defined, known and 
researched (Dessai et al., 2004; Kelly and Adger, 2000; O'Brien, 2004). 
However, there is an extensive and heterogeneous body of literature28 which 
has deep rooted concerns about the assumptions present in scientised 
approaches to environmental management, both in theoretical and practical 
terms (Aitken, 2009; Jasanoff, 2010).  
 
Firstly, that the scientisation of risk has created an epistemological boundary 
between scientific and lay knowledge, with scientific knowledge cast as 
sufficient and lay knowledge cast as deficient (Aitken, 2009). As such this 
expert-lay dichotomy represents a barrier for the participation of non-scientists 
in governance and thus also prevents alternative framings of the risks along 
with locally specific knowledge. Secondly, building on the previous point with 
regards to ontology, scientisation has led to the framing of risk in solely 
technical terms i.e. probability of event x magnitude of impact. But as we know 
from the socio-cultural approach, ambiguity, and PNS literature approaching 
water governance through a lens of cause and effect hides the multiple and 
differentiated ways in which different stakeholders know, frame and experience 
the water environment. Further, that such an approach permits a “technological 
moralization” in environmental decision making, whereby it becomes 
unnecessary to employ moral and ethical imperatives (Beck and Holzer., 2007).  
 
These critiques originate from the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962), philosopher of 
science, in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn (1962) 
questioned the scientific process as being conceptually and methodologically 
unified and instead argued that scientific knowledge was the outcome of local 
patterns and training (Shapin, 1998). Similarly, the sociologists Bruno Latour 
and Steve Woolgar (1979), in their ground breaking work Laboratory of Life, 
studied the socially influenced daily practices of scientists which led to the 
                                            
28
 This work has most notably come from Science and Technology Studies (see Aitken., 2009; 
Demeritt., 2001; Collins and Evans., 2003; Collins and Evans 2007; ; Latour., 1993; Jasanoff et 
al., 1995; Jasanoff., 2010; Wynne., 1993 inter alia), but also received important contributions 
from geographers, and sociologists. 
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construction of scientific facts (Demeritt, 2001). These scholars, as well as 
subsequent STS work, argue that it is not possible to distinguish between 
‘scientific’ and ‘lay’ knowledge on the assumed differences of practice, 
contextual dependency, personal values, or norms and standards (Aitken, 2009; 
Cerezo, 1996; Evans, 2005; Jasanoff, 1995). Further, that science is as much a 
social and institutional process as it is an objective process of uncovering truth 
and fact (Irwin, 2001). 
 
The literature discussed above provides the theoretical foundations to critical 
question the exclusion of non-expert knowledge in catchment management on 
the grounds of difference. What this literature does not inform us on is how or 
why science is able to position, and maintain, itself at the “top of a hierarchy of 
ways of knowing” (Mellor,(2003): 509). To understand this issue we need to turn 
to the literature on ‘boundary work’. This phrase was coined by Gieryn (1983) 
who used it to describe the practice of scientists distinguishing their intellectual 
activity from other kinds of knowledge production. Maintenance of these 
boundaries are extremely importance as they serve professional scientific 
functions such as; intellectual authority, autonomy from political interference, 
and acquisition of resources (Gieryn, 1983; Jasanoff, 1995; Zehr, 2000). 
 
But Gieryn (1983), and other STS scholars (see Jasanoff et al., 1995; Zehr., 
2000 inter alia) argue that these boundaries between knowledge domains are 
socially constructed through rhetoric, and therefore are flexible rather than 
being precisely defined. In light of this point, Cerezo and Garcia (1996) provide 
a more useful distinction between lay and scientific knowledge. They argue that 
knowledge is constituted from the claims or assertions about the world that are 
accepted, valid and sufficient within a given social or cultural context; rather 
than the difference lying in the capacity of the knowledge to explain. Thus 
Cerezo and Garcia (1996) suggest that it is the social or cultural variables which 
validate, or not, the sufficiency of knowledge within a particular social space. In 
essence this body of work challenges the positivist view of science as being the 
source of objective truths and therefore considers the boundary between 
scientific and lay knowledge erroneous (Aitken, 2009; Collins and Evans, 2007; 
Evans, 2005). 
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Nevertheless, the result of boundary work has been the discrediting and 
exclusion of lay knowledge from the decision-making process on grounds of 
deficiency (Aitken, 2009; Collins and Evans, 2007). The most frequently cited 
example of boundary work is Wynne’s (1996) study of the Cumbrian sheep 
farmers affected by the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. Wynne (1996) 
explained how government scientists disregarded farmers’ knowledge, and long 
experience of both the local landscape and sheep management, on grounds 
they lacked scientific credentials. Crucial to note Wynne (1996) argued that the 
exclusion of lay knowledge was to the detriment of the decision making; 
specifically the duration of farming restrictions which led to livelihood losses.  
 
The literature reviewed above, underpinned by social constructivism, is most 
often criticised for relativism, wherein all risk knowledge becomes a matter of 
representation and interpretation (Luckhurst, 2006). This is not the argument 
this thesis is trying to make; as I dealt with in discussion of Beck’s reflexive 
realism. Rather, the point is one that Latour and Woolgar (1979) make, that 
taking a critical-constructivist stance towards science offers space to 
reconceptualise the practice from being sterile, inhuman, organised, logical and 
coherent towards being understood as a process where scientific facts emerge 
from a laborious process, which can be messy and confusing (Luckhurst, 2006). 
Fundamentally this position allows me space to critically question the sufficiency 
of natural science alone to command the management of complex risks such as 
diffuse pollution where quantification is difficult (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). 
In summary, catchment partnerships attempting to fulfil policy demands for 
participatory governance face a challenge that goes beyond developing better 
techniques, tools and mechanisms for participation; there is the deep rooted 
problem of legitimising other ways to know the world and its risks (Collins and 
Ison, 2009; Eden, 1996; Sarewitz, 2004). Despite these challenges there are a 
number of innovative and progressive action research projects which have 
overcome the challenges of boundary work and developed new ways of doing 
participatory catchment management. It is this literature I review next. 
 
4.3.3: Innovative Participatory Catchment Projects 
The ESRC funded Understanding Environmental Knowledge Controversies 
(KCP) (Whatmore, Lane, and Ward 2007-2010) was conceived in order to 
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address the ‘knowledge controversies’ generated by risk management 
strategies associated with diffuse environmental problems such as flooding. The 
aim was to harness the generative potential of these public controversies to 
practice new relations between science and democracy in the context of 
environmental knowledge claims (Lane et al., 2011; Whatmore, 2009). In liaison 
with the EA the investigators identified two case study locations suffering from 
controversial flooding; Ryedale in Yorkshire, centred on Malton and Pickering, 
and the Ouse system in Sussex, centred on Uckfield. Competency Groups 
(CGs) were formed as a mechanism to enable new participatory relations 
between scientists and the local community. CGs were composed of scientists 
(natural and social) and lay people for whom the flooding was a matter of 
particular concern (Landström et al., 2011). The participants worked 
collaboratively to share different perspectives on the flooding problem, air 
stakeholder values and ultimately produce new knowledge on hydrological risks 
(Landstrom et al., 2011). 
 
At Pickering the CG worked with hydrological scientists to develop a new flood 
risk model. This required the reshaping of the relationship between scientists 
and lay people and dissolving the boundaries between knowledge domains. 
The lay participants had to learn about how a hydrological risk model functions; 
while the hydrological scientists had to work out how to incorporate non-
standardised information into the model. The process took the scientists’ 
generic and reductionist flood model and redesigned it to the specific location 
through the inclusion of local geographical lay knowledge (Landstrom et al., 
2011). This process was not without its ‘boundary work’ challenges. For 
example the local members of the CG initially found it difficult to articulate and 
validate their concerns against the authority of flood risk maps produced by the 
EA (Lane et al., 2011). Nevertheless, as the project progressed the local 
members revealed deep qualitative understanding of flood hydrology (Lane et 
al., 2010). Overcoming these barriers resulted in, the instrumental benefit of, a 
finely tuned model which improved the prediction and effectiveness of flood risk 
management in the area (Lane et al., 2011).  
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
101 
 
The Understanding and Acting within Loweswater29 project was led by 
Lancaster University and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH) and 
involved an interdisciplinary team of geographers, ecologists and a sociologist. 
From the late 1990s onwards the NT and the local community registered how 
the brown trout populations and game angling had declined in Loweswater 
(Waterton et al., 2006; Waterton et al., 2012). Investigations by the EA and 
CEH, into the long-term records of lake water quality, showed a pattern of 
increasingly toxic blue-green algal blooms (Maberly et al., 2006). The 
assessment concluded the water quality was ‘moderate’ in terms of the WFD 
GES standards (Maberley et al., 2006). Management action was therefore 
necessary to achieve the ‘good’ status demanded (Maberley et al., 2006). 
 
The aim of the Loweswater project was thus to address the environmental 
problem of pollution in the lake. To achieve this aim the objectives were: 1) to 
create a new partnership mechanism; 2) conduct interdisciplinary research in 
order to produce new knowledge about the catchment and management 
solutions (Waterton et al., 2012). The partnership mechanism, called the 
Loweswater Care Project (LCP), was set up to address this problem. The 
participants included the farmers, the local community, and the institutional-
stakeholders such as the District National Park Authority, DEFRA, NT, and the 
EA (Waterton et al., 2012). With a degree of uncertainty, the cause of pollution 
was thought be phosphorous deriving from diffuse sources.  At least in part from 
farms’ increased use of slurry holdings and slurry and fertiliser applications 
(Bennion et al., 2000). 
 
The diffuse nature of the pollution’s source made the issue controversial 
because it required all stakeholders to agree on long term economically, socially 
and ecologically viable changes in land management practices (Waterton et al., 
2012). The progressive element to the LCP was the holistic approach in terms 
of what was considered legitimate knowledge. The research team accessed lay 
knowledge of the catchment by employing semi-structured interviews with all 
the people who live, or had lived, in the catchment. The interviews focused on 
respondents’ understandings and feelings about living and working around 
                                            
29
 Loweswater is a small lake owned by the National Trust in the North West region of the Lake 
District National Park (Waterton et al., 2012). 
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Loweswater as well as their memories of land and lake management practices 
overtime, and socio-cultural structures and tensions (Waterton et al., 2012). The 
qualitative data enabled deep understanding about the complex inter-
dependencies of social and natural systems through the community’s 
livelihoods. The outcome of the LCP was mutually agreed and effective 
changes to land management practices which addressed the pollution problem.  
 
Similar to the KCP, the LCP contributed to the widening recognition that lay 
publics have salient knowledges and critical perspectives that can work 
productively alongside scientific approaches (Leach et al., 2005). However, 
through LCP the researchers recognised the considerable challenges with the 
involvement of stakeholders. For example, in the LCP participant farmers 
wanted to re-orientate the project towards farm polices and economics in order 
for the outcomes to have greater relevance to their own problems (Bell et al., 
2010; Waterton et al., 2006). Again, as with the KCP, there were reservations in 
the LCP as to whether this is an applicable methodology for addressing all 
environmental problems because of its bespoke nature and its reliance on an 
engaged local community (Waterton et al., 2006; Waterton et al., 2012). Indeed, 
all positive outcomes considered projects like these may be difficult to recreate 
because they rely on the willingness and ability of the participating scientists 
and lay communities to change their ways of working (Landstrom et al., 2011). 
Further, that the open-ended nature of the process makes it difficult to predict 
the outcomes. As such these factors make it difficult to foresee as a widely 
applicable method to solve environmental problems (Landstrom et al., 2011). 
 
In summary, both RELU funded projects represent a radical departure from the 
normal practices of catchment management with the knowledge hierarchy being 
re-shaped (Lane et al., 2011; Waterton et al., 2006; Waterton et al., 2012). One 
of the key outcomes was the confirmation that, aligned with the PNS thesis, lay 
knowledge can offer in-depth qualitative understandings of environmental 
problems and provide fresh perspectives towards management solutions. 
Furthermore, both projects illustrated the need for participatory governance in 
dealing with the complex and diffuse environmental problems of flooding and 
pollution. In the KCP the inclusion of lay knowledge brought new information 
that improved the flood risk model. In the LCP the participation process created 
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new forms of dialogue with land managers which enabled the diffuse problem of 
pollution to be dealt with. This went beyond the normal means by which the EA 
would address pollution, usually through punitive measures (Waterton et al., 
2006). Essentially, the KCP and LCP are progressive examples of how to 
rearrange to catchment management process in an authentically collaborative 
way. 
 
However, the more recent study by Cook et al (2013) questions whether this 
new approach has been taken up more widely. Cook et al (2013) focused on 
the mundane machinery and situated protocols of IWRM to examine the 
persistence of ‘normal’, i.e. command and control, catchment management 
despite the participatory turn. Empirical data was gathered through textual 
analysis of legislative and policy documents and from qualitative analysis of 
materials generated via an international (Scotland, Canada and New Zealand) 
dialogue between four participatory catchment organisations (PCO). The key 
finding was that while policy statements promise symmetric30 engagements with 
stakeholders the mechanics of legislation lead to asymmetric participation. 
Cook et al (2013) found that participation in practice is reshaped by four 
competing frames: 1) representative democracy, which admits the public’s 
voice; 2) professionalisation, which can exclude framings that facilitate more 
symmetric engagement; 3) statutory requirements, which hybridise PCO’s to 
deliver government agendas and; 4) evidence-based decision-making, which 
tends to maintain knowledge hierarchies. 
 
It could have been expected that after decades of the participatory agenda that 
the knowledge hierarchies of normal catchment management would have been 
flattened and new effective ways to involve stakeholders would have emerged. 
However, under these four competing framings of participation Cook et al 
(2013) found that discursive and practical resources that can facilitate hierarchy 
are surprisingly durable. For example, a central tenant of normal catchment 
management is for evidence-based decision making which had not be 
dislodged by the participatory turn (Lane et al., 2011). Cook et al (2013: 773) 
conclude that “the power effects of framing must become explicit topics of 
                                            
30
 Cook et al (2013) use the term symmetry to refer to relative equality of opportunity for 
participation and deliberation within a decision making process. 
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discussion in processes of environmental policy deliberation for participation to 
result in more symmetric forms of public engagement”. We can conclude that 
the scientisation of risk management still represents a barrier for authentic 
delivery of the CaBA. 
 
4.4: Chapter Summary 
This Chapter began by reviewing the literature on ambiguity in environmental 
management projects; demonstrating that frame analysis offers an effective 
mechanism to reveal the relational properties of risk within multi-stakeholder 
catchment management (Mazur and Asah, 2013). Within this work I identified 
two key research gaps. The first was the lack of work which has applied frame 
analysis to examine the ambiguities in a catchment scale diffuse pollution 
management project. By focusing my study on Loe Pool Forum, as a voluntary 
catchment partnership, I will address this research gap. The second was the 
absence of work which has explained how different catchment stakeholders 
come to know and frame risk in the first instance. To address this second 
shortcoming I turned to the literature on socio-cultural approaches to risk 
perception; specifically affect, affordance and cultural attunement. I showed 
how this work offers great potential to reveal new insights into how different 
catchment communities know and frame diffuse pollution risk. However, I found 
no work on the process of how water scientists and catchment managers afford 
risk to water. This is a research gap I will fill by studying the knowledge 
practices of both the lay and expert stakeholders in the catchment. The final 
section examined the literature on the drivers and barriers to delivering the 
CaBA. I discussed the potential normative, instrumental and pragmatic drivers 
before going on to argue for Actor Network Theory as a new, and more radical, 
way to theorise the drivers for delivering the CaBA. The review of the potential 
barriers focused on the scientisation of risk management and how it has led to 
the exclusion of non-experts in governance and local decision making. This 
barrier was challenged by arguments from the STS literature and from practical 
research projects which have done catchment management differently. 
However, Cook et al (2013) found that the knowledge hierarchies of normal 
catchment management were surprisingly persistent and durable in the UK. It 
could therefore be anticipated that the barriers stemming from boundary work 
still have relevance today. The final summary point to make is with regard to 
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methodology. Within all of this literature there is a methodologically imperative 
that such work should serve those being researched (Shmueli, 2008); thus I will 
employ Participatory Action Research (PAR) in order to ensure my 
engagements lead to ethically considered positive action.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
At the core of my methodology is Participatory Action Research (PAR). PAR is 
unlike the conventional social science research process wherein data is 
collected and then, at a later date, analysed. The nature of a PAR is that it is 
made up of many smaller cycles of research, action and reflection. As such 
each cycle yields data from which I can immediately draw out themes and 
identify findings. The consequence is that any methodological account is 
inseparable from empirics, findings and even tentative conclusions. As such it is 
necessary to separate the Methodology Chapter, which contains the 
underpinning theory and rationale, from the Fieldwork Account. In this short 
Methodology Chapter there are four components: 1) Plan of Enquiry; 2) PAR - 
Genealogy and Principles; 3) PAR – Methodological Framework; 4) Methods. 
The first two components set out the theory and principles underpinning PAR 
and in the second two components the ‘how’, with regard to the process of 
PAR, is explained. 
 
5.1: Plan of Enquiry 
The aim of this thesis is to improve both practical and academic understanding 
about delivering the Catchment Based Approach (CaBA) through the 
conceptual lens of ambiguity. The academic objective is to employ the relational 
concept of ambiguity to explain how different stakeholders come to know and 
frame water risks. The practical objective is to identify the drivers and barriers to 
delivering the CaBA. Informed by the research gaps identified in the literature I 
developed the following research questions: 
 
1) Where are the ambiguities in catchment management and how 
do catchment partnerships negotiate them? 
 
2) How do catchment stakeholders come to know water risks? 
 
3) What are the drivers and barriers to delivering the CaBA? 
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There are of course a variety of frameworks a qualitative human geographer 
could draw from to develop a plan of enquiry31 for answering these questions; 
phenomenology, historical, critical research, grounded theory, case study, 
ethnography and participatory action research to name a few (Bickman and 
Rog, 2008; Gomez and Jones, 2010). The simple plan of enquiry I developed 
involves PAR, as the framework, and ethnography as the methods. Firstly I will 
engage with a catchment partnership to develop a working relationship. 
Secondly I will collaboratively produce a PAR agenda. Thirdly, through this PAR 
process I will employ ethnographic methods to capture data on the geographies 
of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity within my case study of catchment 
management. To clarify, I am not employing two methodologies. But rather, 
PAR offers the methodological framework to enable me to conduct deep, and 
ethically considered, ethnography. Ethically considered because doing 
ethnography inevitably intervenes in the field studied, so rather than negate that 
power PAR offers me a method to not merely academically describe practices 
but simultaneously embrace my role in changing them (Pain, 2004). Further, 
that PAR will ensure my thesis has practical as well as academic impact. I begin 
by providing a comprehensive overview of PAR’s genealogy and its 
underpinning principles.  
 
5.2: PAR - Genealogy & Principles 
No single discipline is responsible for the development of PAR (Pain, 2004) and 
it has been practised in a diverse range of contexts including education, 
community development, agriculture, industry, health and, of course, geography 
(McDonald, 2012). What ties these disciplines together is adherence to a 
philosophical praxis which has been developed in response to dissatisfaction 
with conventional research methodologies. Conventional research is 
characterised by an externally developed research design, the extraction of 
data from the ‘field’ and their transportation to distant research institutes for 
lengthy processing by experts, ending in the presentation of results at a 
                                            
31
 I use the term ‘plan of enquiry’, rather than method, because it puts focus on how one thinks 
about the questions rather than procedure (Rudestam and Erik, 2007) and in fact rejects the 
notion of a formalised procedure as unhelpful and unnecessary (Clifford and Valentine, 2003). 
Instead, to maintain rigour, qualitative researchers employ reflexivity, during and after method 
as an audit trail demonstrating the exact decision making process (Sharkey and Larsen, 2005). I 
do this in Chapter 6 by meticulously tracing out and reflecting on decisions made though data 
collection. 
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scholarly conference and in journals and occasionally reports for policy makers 
(Kesby et al., 2005). The criticisms of conventional research are that it is: 1) 
undemocratic; 2) reflects rather than changes issues of power and inequality; 3) 
lauds ‘expert’ knowledge over lay; 4) generates knowledge for understanding 
not action. I now trace out PAR’s genealogy and in doing so explore these four 
issues and how PAR attempts to address their shortcomings. 
 
It was Kurt Lewin, a social psychologist, in 1946 who coined the term ‘action 
research’ (AR) (Walter, 2009). Lewin used the term to describe a spiral action of 
research aimed at problem solving and bringing about democracy in post-World 
War II countries (Robson, 1993). Lewin felt that ‘the best way to move people 
forward was to engage them in their own enquiries into their own lives’ and in 
doing so stressed the fundamental role of democratic collaboration (McNiff, 
1988):22). Since the conception of AR there has been enormous progression in 
methods, a proliferation in its application and the emergence of something 
called PAR. The key distinction between AR and PAR is that AR focuses on 
action and output, whereas PAR emphasises the importance of process and 
social learning (Pain and Francis, 2003). In this sense PAR has been developed 
as a component of a much larger radical social agenda (Breitbart, 2003). As 
founding PAR scholars, such as Freire (1970), insist that there must be 
diffusion, or even relocation, of power. Conventional assumptions about who 
directs, owns and benefits from research must be reversed (Cornwall and 
Jewkes, 1995; Pain, 2004; Walter, 2009). This is done by changing the role of 
the researcher from director to facilitator and catalyst (Walter, 2009). As such, 
(Kindon et al.)(2007: 518) defines PAR as “effectively and ethically engaging 
people in processes, structures, spaces, and decisions that affect their lives, 
and working with them to achieve equitable and sustainable outcomes on their 
own terms”.   
 
Alongside concerns about power the founding scholars32 of PAR were 
dissatisfied with the hegemony of ‘expert’ knowledge in the conventional model 
of research; which they saw as extractive (Kesby et al., 2005; Pain and Francis, 
2003). Within the conventional model university researchers occupy a privileged 
                                            
32
 Key founding scholars, working from developing countries in the 1970's, include Marja Liisa 
Swantz in Tanzania, Orlando Fals-Borda in Columbia, and Rajesh Tandon in India inter alia 
(Brydon-Miller., 2001). 
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position as sources of wisdom for environmental planning and local investment 
(Coombes et al., 2014; Kesby et al., 2005). Whereas for PAR scholars there is 
an insistence that knowledge should be recovered from below and validated not 
by experts but the community of interest itself (Breitbart, 2003). Congruent with 
the concept of boundary work PAR is highly critical of the expert-lay dichotomy. 
By researchers rejecting the expert-lay dichotomy there is space opened for 
participants to take an active role in controlling and directing the research itself 
(Kesby et al., 2005). This relinquishing of epistemological hegemony is reflected 
in the language used by PAR scholars; rather than informant or respondent the 
term participant is used (Kesby et al., 2005).  
 
From the 1980’s onwards feminist critiques of conventional academia (see 
(Kindon, 2003; Maguire, 1987; McIntyre, 2000); questioned who benefited from 
the research outcomes (Pain., 2004). The major criticism was that conventional 
research is guided by the principle to do no harm, but that ethic rarely produces 
positive impacts for those being researched (Kesby et al., 2005; Pain, 2004). In 
contrast, the feminist standpoint is that research “has an obligation to create 
social spaces in which people can make meaningful contributions to their own 
wellbeing and not just serve as objects of investigation” (Benmayor), 1991: 
160). As a result PAR focuses on action and effecting positive change 
(Breitbart, 2003). 
 
The key development, in terms of guiding my methodology, happened in the 
late nineties and early noughties when there was a recognition that ethnography 
and intervention are not distinct but are rather interwoven practices (Mesman, 
2007). Doing ethnography inevitably intervenes in the field studied and the 
researcher affect is not a choice but an unavoidable condition of research 
(Mesman, 2007). As a consequence it is agreed that ethnographers should not 
negate their power and claim to merely ‘describe practices’ but instead embrace 
their role in changing them (Pain, 2004). By accepting ethnography as 
intervention, and my power and responsibility as a researcher, I can work with 
participants, not simple on them, in order to improve processes, spaces and 
decisions which affect their lives (Walter, 2009; Kindon et al., 2007). Further, 
that by embracing collaboration and taking a non-hierarchical approach it’s 
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hoped that I as a geographer can overturn the conventional ways academics 
work outside universities (Pain, 2004). 
 
Through the mid to late noughties there was a growing interdisciplinary effort 
towards ‘open science’ (Cisler, 2007; DeLyser and Sui, 2014). In fact Cribb and 
Sari (2010) tout the open science paradigm as one of the defining 
characteristics of contemporary scientific enterprise. Gezelter (2009) identified 
four principles of open science: 1) transparency in methods of data collection, 
processing and analysis; 2) public availability and reusability of data; 3) public 
accessibility of scientific/scholarly communication and publications; 4) increased 
scholarly collaboration facilitated by web-based tools. The final point to make, 
with regards to the drivers for contemporary applications of PAR, is the impact 
agenda within universities which is driven by the Research Excellence 
Framework. As is well known, there is an increasing pressure on academics, 
from funding bodies, to demonstrate impact upon the economy, society, public 
policy, culture and the quality of life (Dean et al., 2013). The momentum of open 
science and the imperative of the impact agenda have obvious implications for 
the attraction of PAR to contemporary geographers as it offers a methodology 
to deliver it. 
 
In summary, the section above has outlined the key developments in PAR from 
its democratic roots to contemporary influences on the impact agenda within 
universities. It is worth reiterating the two key principles of PAR, participation 
and action, and how I will adhere to them. The participatory principle requires 
the research process to be equal and collaboratively involve the ‘community of 
research interest’. I will achieve this by engaging equally with both LPF, as the 
partnership of focus, and the agricultural catchment community. The action 
principle insists that research should be more than just finding out; research 
should also involve an action component that seeks to engender positive 
change (Blackstock and Richards, 2007; Breitbart, 2003; Walter, 2009). I will 
achieve this by working with LPF to improve their understanding around other 
stakeholder’s framing of water risks, mapping of catchment risks and to 
furthering their community engagement agenda through online media. In the 
next section I set out the methodological framework for conducting PAR. 
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5.3: PAR - Methodological Framework 
The literature on PAR provides considerably more detail about the philosophy, 
ideology and politics of the approach than about the research process 
(Breitbart, 2003). For example Kindon (2010: 530) refers to PAR as “part of an 
ongoing process of negotiation and politics” rather than a straight method with a 
discernible endpoint (DeLyser and Sui., 2014). Conventional methodologies 
follow the steps of planning, acting, observing and evaluating in a linear manner 
(Khan and Chovanec, 2010). What distinguishes PAR from this linear model is 
that these steps are iterative, reflexive and repeated in cycle (Kesby et al., 
2005; Whitehead and McNiff, 2006). 
 
Lewin (1946) originally used the term ‘spiral’ to describe this process of action 
research but contemporary scholar’s use the term ‘cycle’ (Robson, 1993; 
McDonald, 2012). I have chosen to employ the cyclical framework set out by the 
sociologist Maggie Walter in Chapter 21 Participatory Action in Social Research 
Methods (Ed. Walter., 2009). Walter’s (2009) cycle has five steps: 1) Problem; 
2) Planning; 3) Action; 4) Observation; 5) Reflection. This cyclical framework is 
illustrated in Figure 17. In the subsequent paragraphs each of the stages will be 
fleshed out with regard to practical detail. 
 
 
Figure 17: Diagram iterative cycle of participatory research (Walter, 2009) 
 
Stage 1: Problem 
Stage one is about establishing the problem. The problem must be identified by 
the community itself and certainly not be diagnosed from outside, especially not 
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from the researcher (Breitbart, 2003; Coombes et al., 2014; Walter, 2009). 
Furthermore the community of interest, people who are most affected by the 
problem, must wish to solve or change the issue of concern (Walter, 2009). The 
output of the scoping study should be: 1) identification of the key problems; 2) 
identification on those associated with the research; 3) outlining the key causes 
and impacts; 4) prioritisation of problems (Kesby et al., 2005; Walter, 2009).  
 
Stage 2: Planning 
Following initial collaboration with the community, the planning stage 
commences and the focus is on how to tackle the problem (Walter, 2009). This 
stage is essentially about producing a suitable methodology to address the 
problem in context (Kesby et al., 2005). In the early cycles this is more often 
about collecting further information whereas in later cycles it is more likely to 
involve planning on how to employ that information (Brietbart, 2003). Finally, 
good practice within the planning stage of the first cycle requires negotiation of 
a memorandum of understanding. The researcher and community should agree 
to a list of priorities, achievable outcomes and rights over information generated 
(Kesby et al., 2005). 
 
Stage 3: Action 
The third stage is about putting the planning stage into action (Walter, 2009). 
This stage can involve a variety of social science research methods depending 
what is appropriate for the problem. In line with ‘true’ or ‘deep’ PAR my intention 
is to involve participants in this action stage (Kesby et al., 2005). The output 
from this stage is the generation of data which answers the original research 
problem. 
 
Stage 4: Observation  
The fourth stage is observation where the action and its outcomes are 
considered by the community of interest and researcher (Walter, 2009). This 
typically involves an exercise where the data generated is ‘interviewed’ by 
participants (Kesby et al., 2005). My intention is to use the catchment 
partnership as the steering group for the PAR cycles. LPF partnership meetings 
will be used as the space in which the observations are questioned, critically 
challenged and an opportunity for further data to be added (Kesby et al., 2005). 
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Stage 5: Reflection & Evaluation 
The final stage is to encourage participants to reflect and evaluate the 
information generated, actions completed and overall outcomes of the cycle 
(Walter, 2009). If this reflection leads to concluding that the action stage was 
effective, then the cycle starts again building on this initial success (Walter, 
2009). If this reflection deems the first action unsuccessful, or not as successful 
as anticipated, then these outcomes are taken into consideration in the planning 
of the next cycle (Walter, 2009). The reflection and evaluation stage should be 
conducted in relation to the list of priorities and achievable outcomes set out in 
the planning stage (Blackstock et al, 2007). 
 
The PAR cycles continue until the problem is resolved or the objective reached 
(Walter, 2009). As illustrated in the PAR model (see Figure 17) the cycles do 
not repeat themselves, rather the previous cycle informs the next (Walter, 
2009). Conceivably, this process could repeat forever so deciding on an end 
date is difficult. For social scientists employing PAR this is particularly 
problematic. The complexities in the social world mean that it is almost 
impossible to decide unequivocally that a problem is resolved (Walter, 2009). 
Furthermore, a community is likely to have multiple and divergent agendas and 
therefore unanimous satisfaction is almost unattainable (Brietbart, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the end date for my PAR will be set based in UoE PhD hand in 
deadline, March 2016. I now move on to explain the methods I will employ 
through the PAR process to gather data.  
 
5.4: Methods 
The methods for data collection are underpinned by the principles and practices 
of ethnography. Ethnographic research has developed out of a concern to 
understand people’s lives from the ‘inside’ (Cloke et al., 2004; Cook, 2005; 
Miller and Glassner, 2006). The key principle of an ethnographic approach is 
the extended immersion in the research environment and the in-depth 
involvement with the research participants (Cloke et al., 2004; Herbert, 2000). 
Indeed, depth of immersion is paramount to understanding the social orders, 
ways of doing, and ways of knowing (Cloke et al., 2004). The objective is to 
unearth what the group takes for granted, and thereby reveal the knowledge 
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and meaning structures that provide the blueprint for action within that social 
group (Herbert, 2000). Another principle, akin to PAR, is that the whole process 
should be iterative (Flick, 2009). Researching iteratively involves constantly 
reflecting on and revising the methods, categories and theories used to 
examine the subjects and data (Cloke et al., 2004; Flick, 2009). 
 
The rationale for employing ethnography is that to answer my research 
questions which demand ‘capturing slippery data’. What I mean by this is that 
catchment management is cumulative process, rather than a single event. This 
necessitates me to ‘be there’ in the processual moments and to observe 
practice of partnership working, decision making and stakeholder interaction. 
This consideration directs the research methods towards gathering data 
qualitative and employing ethnographic methods in order to capture the 
‘momentary’ data. By momentary I refer to the events, conversations and 
practices which are fleeting yet momentous in terms of explaining geographies 
of catchment risk management (Law, 2004; Law and Urry, 2004). Indeed, the 
fundamental value of ethnography is its capacity to capture qualitative 
information that cannot be represented, or is not most effectively represented, 
through hypothetical deductions, covariance’s or degrees of freedom (Herbert, 
2000; Miller and Glassner, 2006). Ethnographic methods are thus appropriate 
because I do not wish to uncover universal laws, but rather explain the socio-
cultural geographies of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity. An ethnographic 
approach enables just this by capturing the richness of stakeholder’s 
knowledge, perceptions, practices and experiences in their own terms 
(Blackstock, 2007; Krefting and Krefting, 1991). I now move on to describe how 
I will identify the research participants, gather the data and analyse it.  
 
5.4.1: Research Participants 
In an ideal world it would be desirable to conduct an extensive and intensive 
project and have detailed observations on a large number of catchment 
management projects (Gomez and Jones, 2010) but inevitably the project 
scope was constrained by the practicalities of time and resource. In order to 
achieve depth of ethnography and impact from participatory action research, I 
will engage with just one catchment partnership (See Appendix 1. Case study 
Identification for more details) 
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Qualitative geographers tend to refer to ‘selecting or enrolling research 
participants’ rather than sampling, in the technical sense, because the aim is 
not to generalise findings from the sample to the population (Rudestam and 
Newton, 2007). Also for qualitative researchers the number of research 
participants is not typically known or stated prior to project commencing and 
may change in size and type during the project’s development (Langen, 2009). 
However, because a catchment boundary provides a definitive geographical 
parameter it is possible to speak of, and identify, with some degree of certainty 
the ‘target population’ (Jensen and Shumway, 2010). There are of course a 
number ways to select participants, or decide on a ‘sample’ from the target 
population (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
I employed what is termed as ‘purposive’ or ‘non-random’ selection of 
participants (Parfitt, 2005). Parahoo (1997) describes purposive sampling as “a 
method of sampling where the researcher deliberately chooses who to include 
in the study based on their ability to provide necessary data”. Purposive 
sampling is often used with case study ethnographic research where by 
participants are chosen because they have experienced or are experiencing the 
phenomenon that is being explored (Rudestam and Newton, 2007). 
Researchers employing purposive sampling thus begin with a list of criteria on 
which the participants or groups of participants will be selected (Parfitt, 2005). 
My criteria for selecting stakeholders are twofold: 1) work or live within the 
catchment; 2) affect or are affected by catchment management decisions. 
 
5.4.2: Participant Observation 
Through the PAR process I will employ a variety of methods to address the 
different problems the case study catchment partnership faced. These methods 
are critically discussed in Chapter 6, but include interviews, risk mapping 
exercises, a farm enterprise survey and field walks. Here though it is necessary 
to explain the rationale behind participant observation, as a core ethnographic 
technique, which ran through the entirety of the PAR process. From my 
participant observations I was able to ‘capture the slippery information’ to 
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explain the sociocultural geographies of risk and build an accurate account of 
the cumulative process of catchment management. 
 
Essentially participant observation is about paying attention to what people say 
they do, why they say they do what they do and, most importantly, what they 
actually do (Cloke et al., 2004). This is achieved, as the name implies by being 
a participant and observing a social group in their natural setting (Bengry-
Howell et al., 2008) participant aspect will be achieved by embedding myself, 
and more importantly making myself useful, within LPF catchment partnership. 
Being a participant will enable LPF and stakeholders to not only ‘tell me’ but 
also ‘show me’ what is going on; enabling me to access the wealth of situated 
local knowledge and framings of water risks and their management (Cloke et 
al., 2004; Cook, 2005). Observation wise it is about being a good listener, 
listening to how people interact with each other and logging the consistent 
discourses underpinning those interactions (Shurmer-Smith, 2002). 
 
I will employ participant observation in three spaces: 1) catchment partnership 
meetings; 2) scientific practices; 3) agricultural practices. I will flesh these out 
now. Firstly I will observe how a catchment partnership works in practice 
through attending LPF meetings. Secondly I will observe how water science, 
and identification of water risk and other risk activities, from the perspective of 
LPF, happen in practice. Thirdly I will engage with the catchments agricultural 
community at depth where I can observe farming practice in action. Through 
these observation spaces I will be able to understand the complexity of 
participant’s lives and the way they know and respond to water environment 
risks. Cumulatively these observations will produce a body of data from which a 
particular discourse from a stakeholder’s perspective on a water management 
issue can be identified.    
 
5.4.3: Data Analysis 
The method of data interpretation I employ is discourse analysis which is the 
study of meaning in language using interpretative and inductive approaches 
(Aldunce et al., 2015). Discourse analysis has been used in framing research in 
a variety of contexts; risk and resilience management (see Aldunce et al., 
2015), policy analysis (see (Lieshout et al., 2013), territory and planning 
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disputes (see (Shmueli, 2008), and of course knowledge and management 
disputes in water governance (Brugnach et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2013; Hoek et 
al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2007) inter alia. 
 
A discourse is defined, by (Hajer)(2000: 44), as “a specific ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed 
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical 
and social realities’’. A discourse is created through an actor’s language choices 
which verbally highlight certain elements and qualities of a social reality (Drake 
and Donohue, 1996). Cumulatively language choices present storylines or 
narratives about and around a particular reality (Aldunce et al., 2015). However, 
inspired by the philosophical work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, discourse analysts 
have conceived that the importance of language goes beyond its use as a 
observational mirror of reality; in other words, language is not merely a neutral 
expression of interests and meanings (Dewulf et al., 2004; Lieshout et al., 
2013). Wittgenstein’s argument was that language does not mirror reality but 
actors actively use language to construct the meaning of reality in a particular 
social situation through a process of language games (Dewulf et al., 2004; 
Fischer and Forester, 1993). Subsequently, discourse analysts do not see 
language as tool of representation but rather as a means for an actor to 
accomplish things within a social situation (Potter and Wetherell., 1987 cited in 
Dewulf et al., 2004). In essence, a problem, its causes, and solutions are not a 
given but “created in the minds of citizens by other citizens, leaders, 
organizations, and government agencies, as an essential part of political 
manoeuvring” (Stone., 2002:156 – cited in Lieshout et al., 2013).  
 
Discourse analysis thus offers far more scope, compared to alterative frame 
analysis methods such as psychological experiments or statement sorting, as it 
allows better access into the minds of the research participants and 
understanding their framings and water knowledges. However, the researcher is 
faced with a much greater methodological challenge with regard to identifying 
these frames and knowledges. Because discourses are not self-evident, the 
researcher must construct them based on interview data, or other moments of 
dialogical exchange (Aldunce et al., 2015). A grounded theory approach is most 
effective for dealing with such data, within a catchment management process, in 
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order to construct these discourses. This is the process of recording, 
transcribing and coding qualitative data by looking for patterns, regularities and 
variations in language and expressions (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). My task as 
the researcher is to zoom in on what knowledges and frame configurations are 
made of through analysis of metaphors, catchphrases and depictions (Borah, 
2011; Dewulf et al., 2004). The aggregated codes produce themes or 
discourses which, in turn, the researcher connects to the framing held by a 
certain group (Aldunce et al., 2015). The specifics of how I conducted discourse 
analysis, of the qualitative data gathered, is described and justified through 
Chapter 6. 
 
5.5: Chapter Summary 
Chapter 5 has taken this PhD forward by setting out the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of 
the methodology. The Chapter began by discussing the principles of PAR and 
the rationales for me employing it in this thesis. The key point is that social 
science research inevitable intervenes in participants lives. Therefore my 
central rationale for employing PAR is driven by the ethic that I should work with 
LPF not simply on them, in order to improve the process of catchment 
management. With regard to ‘how’, the key point is that the data collection and 
analysis will involve multiple PAR cycles each addressing a small problem LPF 
face. These cycles will be consistently accompanied with me making 
ethnographic observations; this will cumulate to produce a list of action research 
outcomes for LPF and a large body of qualitative data for the academic focused 
empirical Chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter 6: PAR – A Fieldwork Account 
 
Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive fieldwork account of the PAR process. As 
such Chapter 6 is as much a methodological account as it is an empirical 
Chapter. Indeed, it is through this Chapter where I identify the key themes in the 
data and set out the headline findings, alongside explaining how the project had 
research impact. I begin by providing an overview to the three components of 
my PAR process. The first component was Project Initiation where I identified 
my catchment case study and collaboratively developed the research plan. The 
second component was Partnership Working. This involved observing the 
process of partnership working and examining the production of scientific risk 
knowledge. In action research terms this was about identifying the drivers and 
barriers to delivering the CaBA. The third component was Agricultural 
Engagement. This focused on understanding water management issues in the 
case study catchment from an agricultural perspective. For sake of clarity I have 
split the components into separate fieldwork accounts; in reality they overlapped 
and interacted. The research activity descriptions within the three components 
are detailed in Table 4. 
Table 4: Overview of PAR cycles 
 
One contemporary principle of PAR is the notion of ‘open science’ which 
emphasises the transparency in methods of data collection, processing and 
analysis (DeLyser and Sui, 2014). To adhere to this principle I have produced, 
see Table 5, a visualised account of PAR components and how they overlapped 
and interacted. This chronological chart evidences what Kesby et al (2005) term 
 Cycle Research Activity Description 
   
Project 
Initiation 
Cycle 1. Conducted a scoping study to identify case study partnership 
Cycle 2. Collaboratively developed research plan 
   
Partnership 
Working 
 
Cycle 3. Observation of governance and science in action 
Cycle 4. Interviewed catchment partnership members 
Cycle 5. Developed partnership website as part of communications plan 
Cycle 6. Conducted first catchment walk over with partnership members 
Cycle 7. Conducted second catchment walk over with partnership members 
Cycle 8. Conducted third catchment walk over with partnership members 
   
Agricultural 
Engagement 
Cycle 9. Delivered a farmer risk mapping workshop 
Cycle 10. Developed and refined catchment risk maps 
Cycle 11. Interviewed the agricultural community with catchment risk maps 
Cycle 12. Conducted a farm enterprise survey 
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the ‘depth’ of participation and action by illustrating how my engagement with 
the catchment stakeholders ebbed and flowed through time. 
 
 
Table 5: Chronological chart of field work PAR Cycles 
 
6.1: Project Initiation 
 
Cycle 1: Scoping Study 
 
Problem - Planning - Action  
The first problem was to identify and engage with a suitable catchment 
partnership to host my PAR project. PAR practitioners advise that if an exact 
topic is undecided then it is best practice to conduct a pilot study (Brietbart., 
2003; Kesby et al., 2005; Walter, 2009). In line with this principle I began by 
researching what catchment partnerships were operating in Cornwall. This 
process is documented in Appendix 1 where I explain how Loe Pool Forum 
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(LPF) was eventually decided on because it met a list of criteria33 set before 
project initiation. 
 
Observation 
The scoping study yielded some important observations about LPF. I consider 
these here as a way to provide an overview of LPF. Each PAR cycle revealed 
points for analysis. So in the following section I also begin on the process of 
analysis about how the different stakeholders frame catchment risks and the 
potential issues of ambiguity. This case study overview has 6 components: 1) 
LPF - Overview & History; 2) Governance Structure & Stakeholders; 3) LPF & 
the Catchment Based Approach; 4) Catchment Management Plans & Risk 
Histories; 5) Water Pollution – A Risk Management History; 6) Flooding – A 
Risk Management History. Imperative to note is that this overview also 
combines data and observations which were gathered in later stages of 
research. Integrating this data was necessary to ensure all case study 
information was in one section. 
 
LPF - Overview & History 
Loe Pool Forum (LPF) is a catchment partnership working to improve water 
quality and reduce flood risk in the River Cober catchment. The Cober 
catchment is located in South West Cornwall (see Figure 1). Like many lowland 
lakes in the UK, nutrient levels in the Lake are high and as a result Loe Pool 
suffered from algal blooms during the 1980’s till 2006. This process of 
eutrophication has had a huge impact on its ecology, including the native plant 
and trout populations. LPF was initiated in 1996 in order to develop a strategy 
for reversing the process of eutrophication. The founding members of LPF were 
the National Trust (NT), Natural England (NE), and the Environment Agency 
(EA). Through the years LPF partnership membership has increased and now 
includes South West Water (SWW), Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF), 
Cornwall Wildlife Trust (CWT), Royal Payments Agency (RPA), University of 
Exeter (UoE), Camborne School of Mines (CSM), Royal Navy Air Station 
(RNAS) Culdrose, Kelda Water, Helston Community College, and Cornwall 
                                            
33
 See Appendix 1 for full explanation, but the key points for why LPF was chosen was that: 
Firstly, with no other researchers working with LPF I would not be competing for time and 
resources. Secondly, my enquires were met enormous amount of enthusiasm which boded well 
for conducting PAR. Thirdly, and mostly importantly, LPF are working to deliver the CaBA to 
address the integrated risks of diffuse pollution and flooding. 
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Council (CC). See Figure 18 for a map of where the key areas, environments 
and infrastructure are located in the catchment. 
 
Figure 18: Cober Catchment Map 
1 Loe Pool - SSSI 
2 Helston Town 
3 SWW STW 
4 RNAS Culdrose STW 
5 SWW WTW 
Figure 19: Key for Cober Catchment Map 
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Aims & Objectives 
In 2015 LPF reviewed their aims and objectives, they are as follows: 
1: To bring about a change in Loe Pool from an algae dominated 
state to a clear freshwater lake with healthy populations of plants 
and fish. 
2: To allow for seasonal, natural fluctuations in water levels without 
compromising flood defences, allowing shoreline plant 
communities to thrive. 
3: To make the most of wildlife value of Loe Pool and its 
catchment. 
4: To make Loe Pool and its catchment a place that is attractive 
and well used by the local community and visitors alike. 
 
LPF Objectives are: 
1: In partnership with the Environment Agency promote a 
catchment approach to manage both pollution and flooding risk. 
2: Work with the local farming community to help to improve the 
water quality across the catchment. 
3: Continue liaison with Royal Navy Air Station Culdrose and 
South West Water about improvements to sewerage treatment 
works to address point source pollution. 
4: Support the National Trust to improve community engagement 
with Loe Pool environment though footpath networks and local 
events. 
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Figure 20: Images of algae blooms in Loe Pool 
 
Governance Structure & Stakeholders 
LPF is currently34 constituted of four sub groups and an overseeing executive 
group (see Figure 21). Each sub group has a different set of responsibilities to 
achieve the partnerships overall aims and objectives, set out above.  The 
                                            
34
 The way LPF has been structured and governed over the years has changed and developed 
significantly. The significance of these developments, for the way risk is managed, is dealt with 
in the Chapter 9. 
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Partnership Executive is made up of the Chairs from each of the sub groups 
and has overall responsibility for strategic direction of the partnership; meeting 
once a year to review. The Point Source group is chaired by the EA, as the 
pollution regulating body, and is responsible for managing SWW and the RNAS 
Culdrose discharge permits for their sewage treatment works (STW). The 
Catchment Group is made up of NE, EA, CWT, CSF and S4P; this group is 
working to address diffuse pollution risk. The Lake and Lower Cober group is 
responsible for the Loe’s biodiversity and aim to achieve the SSSI standards 
and WFD GES status. The Community and Communications Group are 
responsible for stakeholder engagement and communicating LPF’s successes. 
 
 
Figure 21: Governance structure of LPF 
 
In many respects LPF embodies this shift in water management from 
‘government’ to governance’ wherein the boundaries between and within public 
and private sectors have become blurred” (Stoker, 1996: 2). Indeed, the LPF 
includes not only government agencies but also charities, businesses and other 
local institutions. Thus I assert that LPF is an example of this new type of 
partnership-cooperation which has emerged to collectively tackle a local and 
situated environment risk (Asselt and Renn., 2011; Hendry., 2008). However, 
these different organisations bring their own agendas and framings of the risks. 
Therefore it’s worth considering here key partners substance frames (i.e. the 
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primary relationship a stakeholder has to an issue). I have done so in Table 6 
under the headlines of Macro Groupings (representing organisational status), 
Interests (primary concerns), and Responsibilities (official relationship to risks). 
Table 6 shows that while all stakeholders’ have a significant relationship with 
some aspect to the catchment their fundamental interests and responsibilities 
differ. The key observation made is that the difference in substance frames 
centres around whether the partner’s primary interest is conservation, flooding 
or economic profit. 
 
Stakeholders 
Macro 
Groupings 
Interests Responsibilities 
    
Environment 
Agency 
 
Government 
 Flood Risk 
 Pollution Risk 
 
 Flood warning and 
defence 
 Delivery of WFD targets  
 Environmental 
regulatory compliance 
by business and publics 
   
Natural England 
 Habitats & 
Biodiversity 
 Ecosystem 
Services 
 
 Delivery of 
environmental advice 
and grant aid to 
agriculture 
 Designation and 
conservation of SSSI, 
AONB, and NNR’s  
    
Cornwall Wildlife 
Trust 
Non-
Governmental 
Organisation 
 Habitats & 
Biodiversity 
 
 Delivery of 
environmental advice 
   
 
 Biodiversity 
 Eco-system 
services 
 Preservation of 
landscapes 
environmental and 
social value 
    
South West 
Water 
Business 
 Profit 
 Futurity of 
environmental 
resource 
 Compliance with 
abstraction and 
discharge regulation 
   
Agriculture 
 Profit 
 Futurity of 
environmental 
resource 
 Compliance with 
abstraction and 
discharge regulation 
 Compliance with RPA 
Cross Compliance 
Table 6: Overview of LPF substance frames 
 
Table 6 lists the key stakeholder, their interests and responsibilities. However, it 
is important to note here that as the research progressed it became apparent 
that some of these groups are absent, or at least unrepresented in person, at 
the LPF meetings; specifically the Town Council and the farming sector. 
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Explanation to how and why these stakeholders are absent from LPF is fully 
explained in the Participation and Power section on p267. 
 
LPF & the Catchment Based Approach 
The CaBA is embedded within LPF’s strategy for managing local water risks. As 
the NT’s Head Ranger (MH, 2012) explained “through LPF we are trying to 
develop an integrated way of managing, not just the Pool, but the flood plain 
and the catchment. The challenge for LPF is how you maximise storage for 
flood events, deliver the biodiversity objectives, but in a way which doesn’t 
compromise public access”. As stated in the Activities Agenda 
(http://loepool.org/about/), this commits LPF to thinking holistically about the 
catchment and its issues. This involves working collaboratively with 
environmental agencies and local stakeholders such as the agricultural, 
commercial and residential communities. LPF ambition is that through 
stakeholder engagement the priorities for action are decided collaboratively and 
a sustainable management plan results. However, as trailed above, all 
stakeholders do not have the same interests, responsibilities and ultimately 
framing of the Cober catchments risks. To understand the context of the Cober 
catchments water risks, and why its management is plagued with ambiguity, its 
necessary to consider the catchment management plans which aim to reduce 
these risks, alongside the histories of water pollution and flood risk 
management strategies. Admittedly this is a long case study introduction, but 
this context is necessary to set out here in order to provide background 
knowledge on the politics which underpin the later points I make about 
ambiguity. 
 
Catchment Management Plans & Risk Histories 
The two central issues LPF faces are pollution and flooding risk. Loe Pool is at 
risk of pollution, currently failing its SSSI and WFD GES status targets, and the 
St Johns area of Helston is at risk of flooding. The two locations of these risks 
are shown in Figure 22. The following account of risk histories provides the 
empirical platform from which I make claims about the socio-cultural nature of 
risk management. The historical account is based on analysis of the LPF 
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meeting minutes, consultant reports, and the 1998, 2003 and 2009 Loe Pool 
Catchment Management Project (LPCMP) reports35. 
 
 
Figure 22: EA flooding map showing location of water risks 
 
Water Pollution – A Risk Management History36 
LPF’s fundamental aim is to ‘bring the lake back to life’ and in doing so achieve 
its SSSI and WFD GES targets. In technical terms this is about delivering 
catchment management options which will take the lake from mesotrophic to 
oligotrophic conditions. This of course means reducing point and diffuse source 
pollution entering the lake. LPF has made substantial progress in addressing 
point source pollution. One enormous step forward was the installation of 
Tertiary treatment plant at South West Water’s Helston’s sewerage treatment 
works. This quartered the input of Phosphorus into Loe Pool and there have 
been no algal blooms since 2006. Another more recent investment has been 
from Royal Naval Air Station (RNAS) Culdrose37 who upgraded their sewage 
treatment plant in 2015. This reduced their phosphors input to the Loe to below 
1 mg per litre. As illustrated in Figure 23. However, despite these steps forward 
in addressing point source pollution, diffuse source pollution still poses a 
significant risk to both the ecology of the lake and the SWW drinking water 
                                            
35
 The LPCMP reports were produced by Dr Jan Dinsdale on behalf of the National Trust 
Penrose; they can be found on the reports page of http://loepool.org/about/.  
36
 To accompany this risk management history please see Figure 24 for timeline of the water 
quality issues in the Cober produced by Angus (2015). 
37
 Royal Naval Air Station (RNAS) Culdrose is located on the south side of Loe Pool and 
discharges its waste water into the Pool via a sewage treatment plant on the Carminowe 
stream. In January 2015 RNAS Culdrose, in partnership with Kelda Water Services, completed 
a £2 Million investment in upgrading the sewage treatment plant. 
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outtake which regularly has to shut down as a result of upstream diffuse 
pollution. In 2015 the phosphors nutrient loading analysis from the EA 
concluded that 1/3rd of originated from point sources and 2/3rds originated from 
diffuse sources. 
 
 
Figure 23: Graph of RNAS Culdrose Phosphorus input to Loe Pool 
 
While a reduction in diffuse water pollution is the primary objective for LPF there 
is no overarching management plan to guide how this should be achieved in 
practice. This is because LPF, with no budget for action, are reliant on partners 
delivering on the ground action. On the enforcement and regulation side the key 
partner is the EA who have pursued severe risk issues in the catchment. 
Essentially the EA are responsible for pollution ‘control’ though punitive action 
taken towards non-compliance (Abbot, 2006). On the advisory and support side 
it has been NE through their: 1) Entry Level Stewardship; 2) High Level 
Stewardship; 3) Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) initiative; 4) Soils for Profit 
(S4P) initiative. The most recent and positive step to addressing diffuse 
pollution has been the commissioning of the SWW Upstream Thinking project. 
SWW extract drinking water from the Cober to supply the Lizard area. However, 
over the last 10 years SWW have had to shut down the WTW due to frequent 
episodes of high levels of ammonia which are untreatable. Because of the 
strategic importance of the Cober for drinking water supply they have funded 
CWT to conduct a series of tailored interventions to address upstream pollution.  
The SWW UST project will run from 2015-2020 at the value of £1.5M.  The 
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project will include: 1) Tailored farm advisory work on soil, water and habitat 
management; 2) Capital farm intervention works; 3) Advice and capital works on 
private domestic drainage; 4) Community engagement; 5) Flow attenuation 
measures to reduce downstream flooding. The overall aim is to bring drinking 
water quality, water resource, flood risk, biodiversity and farm business benefits 
across the entire Loe Pool and River Cober catchment. 
 
Alongside nutrient reduction measures ‘bringing the lake back to life’ will also 
require water level management to support habitat restoration; because in order 
to create the conditions for diverse littoral and submerged flora communities to 
establish it is necessary to have natural seasonal fluctuations in the lake level 
(Dinsdale, 2009; Dinsdale and Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Dinsdale, 1998). Thus 
LPF have developed a Water Level Management Plan (WLMP); the water level 
is managed through the setting of height of the penstocks at Loe Bar.  The 
WLMP has been informed over the years by number of monitoring surveys (see 
Dinsdale, 2009; Wilson and Dinsdale, 1998), and from a number of consultants’ 
recommendations including Halcrow (1998), Haycock and Vivash (1999) and 
Haycock (2000). 
 
The key observation to make here is that LPF, as a case study of a voluntary 
catchment partnership, are the orchestrators rather than the deliverers of diffuse 
pollution management. LPF are reliant on partner’s capacity to leverage funding 
and then deliver action. Indeed, I observed how LPF represents a space where 
the partners: 1) meet to share knowledge, data and best practice; 2) conjoin 
and overlap objectives in order to gather evidence for their further funding of 
their individual independent projects. 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
131 
 
 
Figure 24: Water events on the Cober – Past to Present 
 
Flooding – A Risk Management History38 
For the EA the primary risk is flooding. The EA has a statutory duty to reduce 
flood risk through funding defence projects. At the strategic regional scale this 
process is organised through the West Cornwall Catchment Flood Management 
                                            
38
 See Figure 30 for timeline of flood events on the Cober – Past to present (Angus, 2015) 
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Plan (CFMP). This document sets out the preferred, by regional partners, 
options for sustainable flood risk management over the next 50 to 100 years. 
Helston is cited as having “high levels of flood risk…with 200 properties at risk” 
(EA), 2012: 16), and that the “existing flood risk management actions do not 
adequately deal with river or surface water flood risks” (EA, 2012: 18). In 
partnership with local stakeholders it is the EA’s responsibility to address this 
flooding risk. The CFMP will be delivered locally through the Helston Flood 
Alleviation Scheme (FAS). This scheme has been in development and 
consultation since 1998. In 2013 the engineering company Black and Veatch 
produced an Appraisal Long List of Options (B&V project no: 122234) on which 
the local stakeholders, including the public, NT, NE and CC, were consulted on. 
The EA are now (in 2015) seeking internal approval on the business case for 
the FAS, follow this there will be stakeholder consultation in 2015/16 and 
construction is planned to start 2016/17. 
 
Figure 25: Annotated map showing locations of flood risk engineering responses 
 
I now provide a short history of flood risk management in the Cober catchment. 
For locations of these developments see Figure 25. Through this account I 
emphasise the command and control, scientisation of risks and hard 
engineering based response the EA have employed to address flood risk. 
Essentially there are two components to the engineering responses to the flood 
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risk the Water Board (WB)39, River Authority (RA) and later the EA have 
delivered over the years. The first is the channelization (see Figure 26), and 
subsequent de-silting, of the River Cober between Zacharys Bridge and Loe 
Pool. The second is the installation and development of different penstock40 
technologies on Loe Bar. Channelisation is the modification of the river 
morphology; including channel realignment, rectification of meanders, bank 
protection and bed clearing (Landemaine, 2015). The historical rationale for 
doing so is to reduce the frequency of flooding by increasing river flow rate 
(Brookes, 1985). 
 
Figure 26: Photograph of the channelised Cober in 1992 
The River Cober was originally channelized, straightened, and disconnected 
from the Willow Carr flood plain in 1946. The “first phase of improvements to the 
adit (penstocks) were in response to the 1984 event (in Helston flood)” (Wilson 
and Dinsdale, 1998: 20). This involved replacing the rock tunnel (see Figure 27, 
28 and 29) with a nonadjustable concrete sluice. Then “subsequent flooding in 
1988 prompted the second phase of work; which involved channel 
improvements downstream and upstream of Zacharys Bridge” (Wilson and 
Dinsdale., 1998: 20) and these works were completed in 1989 and then 
repeated in 1992.  
 
                                            
39
 Following the Water Act 1945 Water Boards (WB) were formed through merging local 
authorities. The Act granted WB’s the powers to construct necessary works. Following the 
Water Resources Act 1963 responsibility for flood defence was then delegated to the newly 
formed River Authorities (OFWAT, 2006). 
40
 A penstock is a sluice or gate structure which enables water managers to control flow from a 
water head, in this case Loe Pool. 
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In 1997 the, newly formed, EA fitted adjustable metal plates on penstocks, 
enabling control of water levels. However, for engineering reasons these new 
adjustable penstocks did not function and they remained, as before, fully open 
(Dinsdale, 2002). The revised WLMP, revised following Haycock (2000) 
consultant report, “recommended that the Loe Bar weir level be permanently set 
to 3.5m AOD, except in extreme flood events when it could be lowered to 3.05m 
AOD if necessary” (Dinsdale, 2003: 12). Implementation of the WLMP 
recommendations was delivered in 2001 by the EA. But, again, for engineering 
reasons the penstocks could not be fixed and a metal plate was simply attached 
to the outlet, “meaning that there is no longer any mechanism for adjustment, 
for example during extreme flood events” (Dinsdale, 2003: 12). In 1998 the EA 
began developing longer term solution to the flood risk and began consultation 
on the Helston Flood Alleviation Scheme (FAS). However, the was a slow 
moving process and it was not until 2013 when the engineering company Black 
& Veatch had produced an Appraisal Long List of Options.  
 
Figure 27: Photograph of original outlet tunnel in Loe Bar 
 
Figure 28: Photograph of Construction of concrete sluice in 1984 
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In the meantime there was a “flood risk incident in early July 2012… due to the 
risk posed by high lake water levels” (EA rep, LLC minutes 10/08/12) the EA 
unsuccessfully attempted to source a pump. Instead to “alleviate flood risk, the 
metal plates fixed to the concrete base of the weir at the outlet structure were 
removed.  This reduced the level of the outlet structure from 3.5m to 3.05m and 
provided sufficient release of flood waters” (EA rep, LLC minutes 10.08.12). A 
few months later the penstocks were fully refurbished allowing desired setting of 
water level (LLC minutes 10.08.12). Yet they EA kept them at the 3.05m AOD 
level over the preceding years. 
 
 
Figure 29: Photograph of completed sluice in 1984 
 
Then in December 2012 and January 2013 the St Johns area suffered two 
severe floods. This pushed the WLMP and the FAS up in the EA’s list of priority 
defence projects.  In 2014 the EA updated the LPF LLC group on the preferred 
options41 for the River Cober FAS. Once the business case has been approved 
internally there is planned to be stakeholder consultation in 2015/16 and 
construction is planned to start 2016/17. The “preferred option is to reduce flood 
risk in Helston by an improved system to manage high water levels in Loe Pool 
at times of high flood risk and remove need to over pump” (LLC minutes, 2014). 
These works have the potential to create 10ha of new marginal habitat around 
Loe Pool through lowering of the water levels. In turn this will allow for 
reinstatement of the WLMP. 
 
 
                                            
41
 This was informed by the consultants Black & Veatch (2013) report.  
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The EA informed LPF that this will require the following action: 
 
 “Modified penstocks with a lower invert and a tilting weir which will 
allow us to have greater control of water level in Loe Pool and 
lower the resting level if required. This will provide more flood 
storage in Loe Pool and reduce the risk of triggering an over 
pumping emergency response” (LLC minutes, 2014). 
 “A new emergency flood relief tunnel adjacent to the existing 
outfall tunnel in the Loe Bar. The tunnel will reduce risk of the Pool 
level rising to dangerous levels, remove need to over pump, and 
provide resilience in system in event of penstock failure” (LLC 
minutes, 2014). 
 “Raising the existing flood defence embankments in Helston” (LLC 
minutes, 2014). 
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 Figure 30: Flood events on the Cober – Past to present 
 
The key observation to make here is that the historic, and to a large extent the 
current, approaches to catchment management in the Cober are characterised 
by the traditional ‘command-and-control’ paradigm. Indeed, as I have discussed 
there is a great preference, from the EA at least, for hard engineering solutions 
such as canalising the river and concrete flood defences. This is of course in 
antipathy to the CaBA which implies an integrated approach to consider the 
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upstream source of the risk e.g. land management, water consumption and 
waste production (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014). Instead, the EA’s approach in 
the Cober is akin to the first generation of catchment management solutions 
which used engineering works aimed at specific on-site and downstream 
physical outcomes (Darghouth et al., 2008). To agree with Gearey (2006) I 
argue this is regressive example of water management driven by the ‘modern’ 
state and the paradigm of evidence based rational planning. 
 
Summary of Risk Management Conflicts 
To summaries the observations made I have constructed a table 7 which shows 
how the different LPF partners and stakeholders frame the catchment risks. To 
illustrate the divide in substance frames I have highlighted the agencies which 
are primarily concerned with flooding in blue and the agencies concerned with 
conservation and the downstream effects of pollution in green. In the simplest 
terms these agencies framing of the risks can be divided into whether homes 
and people or the environment and bioddiveristy are of most importance.  
 
Stakeholders Responsibilities  Priority Interests  
   
Environment 
Agency 
 Flood warning and defence 
 Delivery of WFD GES targets  
 Environmental regulatory 
compliance by business and 
publics 
 Helston flood risk 
 WFD GES targets for 
Lower & Upper Cober 
water bodies 
 
   
Cornwall Council   Flood defence  Helston flood risk 
   
Helston Town 
Council 
 Flood defence  Helston flood risk 
Natural England 
 Designation and conservation 
of SSSI, AONB, and NNR’s 
 Delivery of environmental 
advice and grant aid to 
agriculture 
 Loe Pool & Bar SSSI 
targets  
 Loe Pool & Loe Bar 
biodiversity 
   
Cornwall Wildlife 
Trust 
 Conservation management 
 Delivery of environmental 
advice to businesses and 
publics 
 Habitat and biodiversity 
in Loe Pool & Loe Bar 
 
   
National Trust 
 Conservation of landscapes 
for environmental and social 
value 
 Biodiversity in Loe Pool 
 Public access to Loe 
Pool 
  
   
Table 7: Overview of stakeholder’s relations to flooding and pollution risk 
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Reflection - Evaluation 
The last stage of PAR cycle 1 is to reflect and evaluate the process. Based on 
prior reading of PAR and subsequent observations there are a number of 
reasons why LPF proved a suitable case study. Firstly, and most importantly, 
LPF is what Cook et al (2013) would define as a ‘voluntary partnership’ in that 
they work at the WFD waterbody scale and have formed organically in response 
to a specific local risk. This made LPF attractive in terms of scale because it is 
at the local scale ‘where the action happens’ in terms of implementing an 
integrated approach for catchment management. Indeed, scale is very 
important when choosing a project and participants (Kesby et al., 2005). Firstly, 
the small size of the catchment and partnership meant that I could speak to a 
larger proportion of catchment stakeholders, rather than a small sample. Further 
to this, LPF have been working to address pollution issues since 1996 and are 
therefore an example of an established partnership. Secondly, as Jones (2013) 
noted, ‘interesting’ is a good qualification for a case study. The Cober 
catchment is interesting from a geographer’s perspective because the risk 
management issues are complex; the catchment suffers from both water quality 
and flooding risks. In principle then, dealing with issues in the Cober demands a 
truly integrated approach in order to manage the combined issues. Thirdly, it is 
well documented that large institutions often only pay lip service to supporting a 
PAR project whereas voluntary organisations can have more scope to be 
flexible and incorporate a researcher’s work into the organisation’s aims (Kesby 
et al., 2005).  
 
As the Field Work Account demonstrates, the flexibility offered by LPF as a 
voluntary partnership had significant benefits for conduction PAR. The 
disadvantage of course is that the research impacts are potentially local rather 
than ‘policy changing’ (Kesby et al., 2005). In partnership with LPF I addressed 
this issue through regularly disseminating the research findings at LPF 
meetings which are attended by practitioners working at regional scale, i.e. 
Cornwall Catchment Partnership (CCP). The fourth reason for choosing LPF 
was related to the nature LPF’s structure as an organised group. Indeed, PAR 
scholars warn that voluntary unstructured groups should be avoided because 
they are vulnerable to disintegrate, stop meeting as a group or cease 
communicating with each other, this would of course jeopardised the project 
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(Kesby et al., 2005). The pre-existing and well established structure of LPF 
enabled me to rely on long term engagement with the partnership.  
 
Cycle 2: PAR Agenda 
 
Problem - Planning 
Once I had identified LPF as the participant group the next problem, through 
Cycle 2, was to develop the action research agenda and elicit the specific 
research questions to be pursued. Of course, these questions should be 
brought to the attention of the researcher by people who are most affected and 
prospective collaborators (Brietbart., 2003; Coombes et al., 2014). After initial 
contact with the LPF chairperson it was decided that I should attend LPF 
meetings to present my research project and ask for input on how collaboration 
should go forward. 
 
Action 
I began attending LPF meetings in the summer of 2012 to better understand the 
partnerships aims, objectives and structure. From these meetings I developed a 
research proposal and circulated to LPF partners for comment. At the LPF 
Community Group meeting on the 24/10/2012 I presented my preliminary 
project proposal. This was discussed in depth. Re-wording my proposal I then 
presented the proposal at the LPF Catchment Group meeting on the 6/11/2012 
and the LPF Executive Group meeting on the 13/11/2012. At each of these 
meetings I logged the themes, specific questions and wider concerns from all 
stakeholders present. 
 
Observation 
Out of these LPF meetings came two very distinct action research problems: 1) 
Understanding how LPF could be more effective as a partnership; 2) 
Understanding agricultural communities’ knowledge and framing of diffuse 
pollution risk in the catchment. I will discuss these in turn now. While LPF has 
been operating since 1996 and had various successful quality improving 
projects they registered that they had reflected very little on how they work as a 
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partnership and how success could be improved in the future. Interestingly, LPF 
recognised that they were made up of ‘natural scientists’ and had under-
engaged with the social and cultural aspects to partnership working and 
catchment management. LPF saw me as an ‘expert’ outsider and social 
scientists that could enlighten them on their own practice and the cultural 
aspects of the challenges of water management. The two issues I committed to 
providing data and analysis on for LPF were: 1) What are the drivers and 
barriers to successful partnership working and delivering the CaBA?; 2) How 
can we better engage and communicate with catchment stakeholders?. It was 
agreed I would provide a summary of research findings at LPF meetings42. 
 
LPF’s primary concern was that they had had very little engagement with the 
agricultural community with respect to understanding the catchment risks from 
their perspective. While Natural England initiatives such as CSF, ELS and HLS 
have been active in the catchment, the officers rarely discuss issues beyond 
delivery of advice and grant aid. It was also noted that LPF’s understanding of 
pollution risk primarily stemmed from ‘bad practices’ and ‘ageing infrastructure’ 
on dairy farms. There was considerable concern raised in the Catchment Group 
meeting (6/11/2012) that the makeup of the agricultural community might be 
changing; with an increasing number of horticultural businesses operating in the 
catchment. Considering this there was great enthusiasm to better understand 
this potential shift and the management issues which might come along with it. 
The drive for LPF to better understand the agricultural community was the 
ambition to eventually deliver authentic participatory catchment management. In 
LPF’s ideal future not only would all the key environmental organisations be sat 
round the table, but also representatives from the farming community. The three 
issues I committed to providing data, analysis and action on for LPF were: 1) 
What is the agricultural communities’ understanding of water environment risks 
in the catchment?; 2) How does the agricultural community characterise the 
causes and solutions for the water environment risks?; 3) What are the current 
                                            
42
 Crucial to emphasise here is that these are not ‘more’ research questions but outcomes from 
PAR which are of high importance to LPF. My commitment is to provide, through the PAR 
process, better understanding and action on these issues; but not for them to be specific 
questions for me to answer in the empirical chapters. 
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challenges their farm enterprises are facing? Again, it was agreed I would 
provide a summary of the findings on these questions at LPF meetings43. 
 
Reflection - Evaluation 
In the next two paragraphs I am going to reflect on the first two Cycles. Kesby et 
al (2005) suggest that seeking early association with the organisation is 
paramount in order formulate the research topic and solicit the burning 
questions that need addressing. As this Field Work account evidences PAR is 
extremely time intensive and the research impact and findings only emerge 
much further down the line. Further to this point, as Brietbart (2003) noted, it 
took a lengthy amount of time to gain trust with participants before access was 
given and knowledge was shared (Brietbart, 2003). For example it has taken till 
my final year of the PAR project when I can email a member of the EA’s Flood 
Defence Team and get a swift, detailed and revealing response about a specific 
issue. In this sense I would agree with (Walters, 2009: 78) that “time and trust 
are interlinked elements in collaborative research and sit at the centre of any 
effort to cultivate a deeper understanding of place and ‘indigenous’ viewpoints”. 
 
The second issue of reflection is about the negotiation of a memorandum of 
understanding which details research priorities and desired outcomes; with LPF, 
as participants, and me, as the researcher. Good practice in PAR is to, prior to 
data collection, establish the participants’ and researchers’ rights and 
responsibilities and clarify ownership over data generated (Kesby et al., 2005). 
LPF’s primary interest in the PAR project was the acquisition of information 
which was of practical use for catchment management. While this was my 
agenda too I also wanted to explore more ‘academic’ themes around 
geographies of risk, affect and knowledge production. However, the absence of 
a written memorandum of responsibilities and outcomes made the separation 
and empirical discussion about the academic elements difficult. However, the 
absence of a written memorandum allowed flexibility for me as a researcher to 
follow the most pertinent issues.  
 
 
                                            
43
 See footnote 41. 
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6.2: Partnership Working 
 
Cycle 3: Observation of Governance and Science 
 
Problem 
In order for me to understand how catchment management happens in practice 
I embedded myself within LPF catchment partnership for the duration of the 
PAR period. My theoretical start point for understanding catchment 
management is drawn from ANT wherein organised collective action within 
socio-technical systems relies on the agreement of connected actants. Based 
on this assertion, successful catchment management is not a given but requires 
the participation of key actors and alignment of scientific infrastructure (Gray 
and Gibson, 2013; Heeks, 2013). My research aim in this cycle was to describe 
catchment management as a socio-technical system and how scientists44 
construct, maintain and negotiate order (Kaghan and Bowker, 2001). I achieved 
this by gathering detailed ethnographic data on social encounters, institutional 
practices and the process of decision making in catchment management 
(Clarke, 2002; Spinuzzi, 2008). My practical start point assumption for this cycle 
was that catchment management is not an isolated event but a process of 
decision-making which happens over an extended period.  This necessitates 
long-term participation in order to align my PAR project to the scientific and 
governance agendas of LPF. 
 
Planning 
LPF is guided by the Partnership Executive, under which there are four sub 
groups concerned with different water management issues in the catchment. 
Following discussion through Cycle 2 it was agreed that I would attend group 
meetings in order to gather observational data on partnership working and 
catchment management. 
 
                                            
44
 I use this as an umbrella term to include any expert involved in catchment management.  
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
144 
 
Action 
Over the four years I was engaged with LPF I attended every Executive and 
sub-group meeting. The depth of my participation increased as the project 
developed and I eventually gained, what ethnographers term, and ‘insider’s 
perspective’. Through 2012 and 2013 I attended these meetings as passenger. 
Through my South West Doctoral Training Centre work placement (23/09/2013 
to 1/09/2014) I took on the role of organising LPF meetings and writing the 
minutes. I continued in this role until 2015 wherein I took the official job of LPF 
Project Coordinator and was employed by the National Trust. The meeting 
events are listed in Table 9. 
 
I collected a large number of my observations at LPF partnership meetings but I 
also engaged, to a lesser extent, with regional governance. The South West 
Liaison Panel (SWLP) is a regional partnership responsible for providing 
strategic direction in delivering the objectives of the WFD.45 I attended and 
contributed to these meetings, observing the discourse around water regulation 
and the participatory agenda. These meetings were held at the Environment 
Agency’s regional offices Manley House, Exeter. The meetings I attended are 
listed in Table 8. 
 
Meeting Date 
SW River Basin Liaison Panel 06/02/2013 
  
SW River Basin Liaison Panel 24/04/2013 
  
Launch of the Catchment Based Approach 
(CaBA) in the South West 
05/07/2013 
  
SW River Basin Liaison Panel 28/08/2013 
Table 8: List of SW River Basin Liaison Panel meetings attended 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
45
 The SWLP aims to deliver the WFD objectives through implementation of the River Basin 
Management Plans (RBMP) within which the participatory agenda is embedded. The SWLP 
includes stakeholders from all sectors involved in or affected by water policy. Through the 
SWLP meetings these stakeholders express their own agendas and negotiate with each other 
and the EA about how the WFD objectives conflict or align with their own groups aims.  
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LPF Sub Group Date 
  
Partnership Executive 
13/11/2012 
12/11/2013 
26/02/2014 
23/02/2015 
  
Point Sources Group NA 
  
Catchment Group 
06/11/2012 
12/03/2013 
15/10/2013 
11/03/2014 
14/10/2014 
14/04/2015 
06/10/2015 
  
Lake & Lower Group 
30/11/2012 
26/03/2013 
10/12/2013 
09/07/2014 
19/03/2015 
30/09/2015 
  
Community Group 
24/10/2012 
26/11/2013 
03/06/2014 
19/05/2015 
20/10/2015 
  
  Table 9: List of LPF partnership meetings attended 
 
Parallel to my observation of partnership working I also observed how science 
was produced and managed. Through my four year ethnographic engagement 
with LPF, I built an extensive set of trusted relationships with members and the 
associated scientific network. This enabled me access as a participant observer 
on scientific surveys. Studying science in practice was important for three 
reasons. Firstly, in order to answer Research Question 2, I needed to study 
science in action to understand where the uncertainties and ambiguities lie in 
catchment management. Secondly, in order to answer Research Question 2, I 
was particularly interested in how the water environment is ‘read’ by individuals 
in the first instance; by this I mean how an environment is sensed, observed, 
afforded a risk, recorded as knowledge and then inscribed into the network. 
Thirdly, in order to answer Research Question 3 from an ANT perspective, I 
needed to understand the process of inscription; whereby an object, in this case 
water, is rendered into a medium, (i.e. data and scientific reports), which then 
becomes credible in the governance network (Kaghan and Bowker, 2001; 
Spinuzzi, 2008). In summary, studying science in action was about 
understanding the process which forms the evidence basis from which LPF will 
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make catchment management decisions. I have listed the science events 
observed below (Table 10). However, the science events are not self-
explanatory in terms of what they are and their importance in the process of 
catchment management, thus I provide a full explanation in Appendix 2. 
 
Event Date Description 
Macrophyte dive survey 10/09/2012 
As part of the ongoing monitoring of Loe Pool a broad 
qualitative search for macrophyte communities using 
scuba divers was conducted.  
Macrophyte transact survey 21/09/2012 
As part of the ongoing monitoring of Loe Pool a transact 
survey of the shoreline macrophyte community was 
conducted. 
EA Walk Over 
investigation
46
 
25/09/12 
The EA Walk Over investigations are conducted by the EA 
in order to identify the reasons why a waterbody is failing 
its WFD GES targets 
Production of risk maps 14/01/2013 
As part of PAR cycle 10 I worked collaboratively with NE to 
produce runoff risk maps of the catchment. 
LPF Walk Over 1. 22/02/2013 
As part of PAR cycle 6 LPF conducted a catchment walk 
over to assess diffuse pollution risks. 
S4P analysis 28/05/2015 Soils analysis is conducted to assess runoff risk. 
LPF Walk Over 2. 21/01/2014 
As part of PAR cycle 7 LPF conducted a catchment walk 
over to assess diffuse pollution risks. 
Sediment trap assessment 10/03/2014 
Following a severe runoff incident the EA, CSF and a 
sediment trap specialist was called in to assess mitigative 
action on a farm. 
LPF Walk Over 3. 27/01/2015 
As part of PAR cycle 8, LPF conducted a catchment walk 
over to assess diffuse pollution risks. 
Table 10: List of observed scientific events in action 
 
Observation 
There are number of important observations from Cycle 3 which I have listed in 
Table 11; these are fully explored in the empirical chapters.  
 
Observation Description 
Uncertainty   
There is little understanding about the sources and pathways of diffuse 
pollution. 
Failure of regulation  
There has been a failure of the regulatory actor network to manage the 
diffuse pollution risk. 
Staff turnover and transience 
The constant re-structuring of environmental agencies and the 
associated transience of staff in posts is a barrier to creating effective 
working relationships with catchment stakeholders and erodes local 
knowledge of issues.  
Scientistation of catchment 
management  
The hegemony of positivist and reductionist science has led to silo 
working and a fascination with risk models. This is a challenge for 
managing runoff risks which are cross cutting.   
Expert and connected 
individuals 
The success of LPF as a partnership has been down to a small number 
of expert individuals. Core LPF members not only have a depth of local 
knowledge but are also trusted and connected in the professional water 
management networks. This amounts to power which is paramount for 
effective decision making. 
Ambiguity 
LPF meetings serve as an effective space where ambiguities about 
catchment issues can be exposed, discussed and resolved. 
Table 11: List of observations from PAR cycle 3 
                                            
46
 Due to data protection and trespassing laws I was not able to attend the actual EA Walk Over 
and data of this event comes from interviews with EA officers and LPF meeting minutes. 
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Reflection - Evaluation 
The result of my participation and commitment to LPF meetings evolved to 
become the space where the future PAR cycles were developed and directed 
from. The process of feeding back emerging research findings proved an 
extremely effective way to steer the action elements of the research. While all 
interviews and field observations were important the LPF meetings offered the 
greatest data in terms of understanding the practice of catchment management 
and ambiguity. This is because the insider status I gained enabled me to 
capture the everyday, mundane and mobile geographies of risk management. 
However, at times my identity at these meetings was questioned with members 
inquiring ‘whether I was studying them’ at particular moments. 
 
Cycle 4: Interviews with Experts 
 
Problem - Planning - Action 
Attending, observing and participating in the LPF meetings proved, over the 
duration of the project, to be particularly effective for gathering data on the 
practice of catchment management. However, the nature of partnership 
meetings means there is a focus on decision making rather on reflecting on the 
process of catchment management and the associated drivers and barriers to 
delivering the CaBA. In order to address this shortfall I interviewed LPF 
members and regional experts who are involved with decision making which 
affects the Cober catchment. I developed an interview schedule which was 
based around the key research themes. These key themes were: 1) job role 
and responsibilities; 3) working relationship with LPF; 3) catchment science and 
the challenge of knowing and managing diffuse pollution; 4) the participatory 
agenda. Over the course of project I managed to interview 27 experts and with 
10 of those 27 I conducted a follow up interview. These interviews were face to 
face and typically lasted 1-2hrs. I was also able to shadow CSF and S4P 
officers on their farm visits. I attended 5 CSF and 2 S4P farm visits. 
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Table 12: Interview List 
 
 
Department Job Title 
Interview 
One 
Interview 
Two 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
A
g
e
n
cy
 
Integrated 
Environmental Planning 
Head Regional 
Environmental Planning 
Officer 
14/06/2012  
Integrated 
Environmental Planning 
Regional Water Resource 
Planning Officer 
21/06/2012  
Integrated 
Environmental Planning 
South West Principle 
Climate Change Officer  
17/10/2012  
Integrated 
Environmental Planning 
Environmental Planning 
Officer 
18/06/2012 07/10/2013 
River Basin Planning 
River Basin Programme 
Manager 
24/04/2013  
Communications WFD Engagement Officer 14/09/2012  
Evidence Walk Over Officer 15/11/2012  
Evidence Walk Over Officer 06/06/2013  
Evidence Commissioned Researcher 12/06/2011 03/08/2012 
Evidence Commissioned Researcher 01/12/2012  
N
a
tu
ra
l 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 
Environmental 
Stewardship 
Higher Level Stewardship 
Advisor 
19/06/2012 11/10/2012 
Environmental 
Stewardship 
Entry Level Stewardship 
Advisor 
12/11/2012  
Catchment Sensitive 
Farming 
CSF Advisor 18/10/2012 25/04/2013 
Soils for Profit S4P Advisor 20/11/2012 07/08/2013 
Cornwall Area of 
Outstanding Natural 
Beauty 
Partnership Manager 04/10/2012 11/10/2012 
S
o
u
th
 
W
e
st
 
W
a
te
r Supply & Demand Operational Analyst 01/11/2012  
Drinking Water Services Principle Water Scientist 24/10/2012  
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
T
ru
st
 
Penrose Estate General Manager 10/10/2012 11/10/2012 
Penrose Estate Head Ranger 22/11/2012 03/06/2014 
Penrose Estate Community Ranger 03/10/2012  
Penrose Estate Ranger 27/06/2012  
C
o
rn
w
a
ll
 
W
il
d
li
fe
 
T
ru
st
 
Conservation Team 
Upstream Thinking Farm 
Advisor & Loe Pool Forum 
Project Consultant 
27/06/2012 09/10/2013 
U
n
iv
e
rs
it
y
 o
f 
E
x
e
te
r 
Environment & 
Sustainability Institute 
Lecturer in Environmental 
Social Science 
03/09/2012  
W
e
st
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
R
iv
e
rs
 
T
ru
st
 
Policy and Development 
Director of Policy & 
Development 
25/10/2012  
O
th
e
r 
Surfers Against 
Sewerage 
Campaigns Director 03/12/2012  
Independent Researcher Eco-Geographer 25/10/2012  
Helston Community 
College 
Geography Teacher 18/12/2012  
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Observation 
The key practical observations which guided the following PAR cycles are listed 
in Table 13; again, these observations are fully analysed in the empirical 
chapters. 
Observation Description LPF’s Desired Action 
Local 
knowledge 
 
LPF members explained how their primary 
source of knowledge about the catchment 
risks was through statistical outputs from 
water monitoring and modelling. LPF 
significantly lacked local knowledge about 
the catchment in terms of its topology and 
land practices. 
 
LPF members expressed desire for 
group walkovers of the catchment to 
‘get their bearings’ on the catchments 
geography. 
Stakeholder 
communications 
There has been an absence of 
communication to non-expert catchment 
stakeholders about the water pollution risks. 
 
LPF members expressed desire to 
develop a communications strategy 
to increase awareness about the 
catchments water pollution risks. 
 
Agricultural 
perspectives 
LPF members explained that there was a 
lack of understanding about local farmer’s 
knowledges and perspectives on the water 
pollution risks. 
 
LPF members expressed desired to 
capture agricultural perspectives on 
the risks and how management might 
best proceed with mutual benefits. 
 
Table 13: List of observations from PAR cycle 4 
 
Reflection - Evaluation 
The planning, organising, conducting and transcription of interviews was 
extremely time intensive. However, this method was hugely effective because it 
produced data on what was not said within LPF meetings. It was through a 
cross referenced analysis from interview and LPF data that I was able to reveal 
the politics of risk management. Or more specifically, it revealed that for LPF 
catchment management is much more than just making evidence based 
decisions but equally about the negotiation over priorities and interests. 
 
Cycle 5: Communications Project 
 
Problem 
Through Cycle 4 two problems emerged: 1) lack of communication, and 
promotion, about the work which LPF has achieved in improving the water 
environment; 2) absence of engagements with institutions beyond the 
immediate environmental management network. Firstly, at the Community 
Group meeting (26/11/2013) the LPF Project Consultant (JD) explained that 
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while “they always wanted to better engage with the community, they did not 
really know why or how to do it” and as such the Community Group had 
become a little redundant. The lack of public engagement is part of a longer 
history around Loe Pool. Historically the local public have had very little relation 
and interaction with Loe Pool. Being a privately owned estate they could not 
play or fish up until 1975 when Lieutenant Commander J.P. Rogers, owner of 
the Penrose Estate, gave it to the National Trust. The rules around no 
swimming or boating still exist but the NT have recently started granting fishing 
permits and made great steps in opening public path access to Loe Pool. The 
second problem was the absence of engagement with institutions beyond the 
environmental agencies. With no allocated budget for LPF the partnership relies 
on enrolling interested parties to conduct research and deliver action on the 
ground. In the CG on the 15/10/2013 and the 11/03/2014 the need to better 
engage with the University of Exeter as a way to enrol new interests, budgets 
and expertise was agreed on as priority. 
 
Planning 
In collaboration with LPF a threefold plan was developed: 1) creating a space to 
communicate the work of LPF; 2) increase engagement with publics in order to 
create positive relations of care with Loe Pool; 3) develop relationships with 
University of Exeter, Tremough to get research done, raise profile of issues and 
ultimately achieve funding. 
 
Action 
LPF had a website but its functioning was poor and traffic was low. It was 
agreed that the first step to improving relations with the local community and 
wider afield was to develop a new website for LPF. I took on this task and built 
http://loepool.org/.  Alongside this major task I completed a number of other 
actions to better communicate LPF; my actions are listed in Table 14. 
 
Action Description 
Website Using WordPress I developed a website and blog for LPF http://loepool.org/  
UoE Field Trip 
In collaboration with collegues are UoE (Centre for Geography, Environment and 
Society) and LPF CG we organised a student field trip. Geo2426/2426b 
Environmental Policy and Politics Water at a Local Scale: Cober Catchment Fieldtrip. 
14th November 2013 
Newspaper Article 
West Briton http://www.westbriton.co.uk/Finding-way-help-farmers-protecting-
waterways/story-20450341-detail/story.html  
CSM Camborne School of Mines research 
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Table 14: List of actions in PAR Cycle 5 
Observation 
In line with principles of PAR, Cycle 5 enabled public accessibility to lay 
summaries of catchment projects, scientific reports and publications and 
visualization of findings (Gezelter, 2009). As a result we saw a huge rise in 
online, and international, traffic to the website (see Figure 31 and Figure 32) 
and a number of collaborative projects being developed with UoE (see 
http://loepool.org/research-reports/  page for evidence of project outputs). 
 
 
Figure 31: Loe Pool Forum website international visitors 
 
Helston College Helston College blog and poster competition 
Rolling Ball Film 
Documentary film on the Walk Over 3 and the efficacy of the Rolling Ball risk maps: 
http://loepool.org/ under films 
Strapwort film 
Documentary film on Strapwort planting: http://loepool.org/2015/06/06/documentary-
film-on-the-reintroduction-of-strapwort-to-loe-pool/  
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Figure 32: Loe Pool Forum website traffic 
Reflection - Evaluation 
My endeavour to develop and deliver on a series of actions to increase the 
communication of LPF’s work was a resounding success. While this work was 
supported by an ESRC Doctoral Training Centre Work Placement scheme this 
Cycle nevertheless consumed considerable PhD time and resources. The point 
to make about this Cycle is that in retrospect a clearer agreement about my 
commitments and responsibilities for delivering action would have enabled a 
better balance between academic writing and delivering LPF’s desires. That 
considered, it was my enthusiasm and achievement on such LPF ‘wants’ which 
formed the basis for a close working relationship with LPF members and later 
enabled me deeper access to key their previously candid opinions on 
catchment management. 
 
Cycle 6: Walk Over 1 
 
Problem 
Cycles 6, 7 and 8 were developed in response to discussions at LPF Catchment 
Group meetings about the lack of their local knowledge around diffuse pollution, 
catchment geography and farming practices. While LPF have been engaged in 
catchment management since 1996 the primary type of knowledge they have of 
the catchment is statistical summaries of water monitoring data and risk model 
maps (see Figure 13). In the Partnership Executive meeting (13/11/2012) and 
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the Catchment Group meeting (06/11/2012) I presented the concept of Post 
Normal Science (PNS) and made the case for the potential power of local 
knowledge in guiding management of challenging risks such as diffuse 
pollution. The groups agreed that there was a lack of grounded knowledge 
within LPF about the catchment and that this should be addressed. 
 
Planning 
In the Catchment Group (CG) meeting (06/11/2012) it was agreed that the team 
should organise a walk over event to better understand the issues on the 
ground. This was initially inspired by the WFD Walk Over survey which was 
conducted in the Cober by EA on the 25/09/12. While the full EA WFD Walk 
Over report was not available the Catchment Group had been briefed on the 
headline findings; which at immediate reading offered no new information about 
the sources of diffuse pollution. The CG raised a particular point of 
dissatisfaction with the Walk Over being conducted in dry weather. At the CG 
meeting (06/11/2012) the members began to discuss where to conduct the first 
WO. The LPF convenor and ecologists pointed to the Sithney tributary in the 
south east area of the catchment. It was reported in previous 30/09/09 
Community Group meeting that the EA had received a high number of pollution 
incident reports on their hotline about the area. The plan from the Catchment 
Group meeting (06/11/2012) was to organise a walk over in the New Year 
(2013). The primary aim was agreed to be improve our tactile knowledge of the 
Sithney tributary, paying particular attention to; i) land practices; ii) pollution 
risks; iii) risk pollution pathways.  
 
Action 
On the 22/02/2013 WO1 was conducted. This was attended by NE regional 
HLS advisor, NE regional CSF officer and me. Despite preference for wet 
conditions the day was dry and had been proceeded by a week of dry weather 
(NE pattern of winds & weather). The method was rudimentary. We surveyed 
the tributary using an OS map and by taking photographs, logging land 
practices and assigning a level of risk after discussion about land issues. We 
stopped at 6 sites (see Figure 33), the details of the observations made on 
WO1 are listed in Table 15 and the risk assessments of the different field 
illustrated in Figure 34. 
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Figure 33: Map of Walk Over 2 route and sites 
 
 
Site Site Description Issues Discussed 
1 Flooding – St Johns area  Number of houses at risk and lack of house adaptations 
2 
Recently cropped Daffodil 
field 
 Top soil erosion 
 Gullied 
 Sprayed headlands for weeds 
 Stone movement evidencing rapid runoff 
 Pathway from high risk field down road to Sithney 
stream 
3 Natural woodland buffer zone  Flow attenuation feature and quality habitat 
4 Daffodil field 
 Heavy soil erosion 
 Blown hedge 
5 Foaming watercourse  Traced to farm 
6 Poached fields 
 Heavily poached field 
 Field has been rolled  
 Probably out wintered stock leading to poaching 
 Compaction issues 
Table 15: Legend for Figure 28 
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Figure 34: Example of risk logging map 
 
Observation 
After the event I produced a PowerPoint report of the day which I presented at 
the next Catchment Group meeting (12/03/2013), where the WO1 was 
discussed in depth by the group. Through the presentation a number of 
successes and further questions were agreed on and minuted. I will list these 
now. Firstly, there was great importance and benefit, with regard to in getting to 
know the catchment geography through tactile exploration. Secondly, that we 
had observed a number of diffuse pollution risks that should be being picked up 
by the RPA and Cross Compliance. The RPA later engaged with LPF via email. 
Thirdly, that most high risk fields seen were part of a horticultural business. CSF 
took this on and later and began to engage with more growers. Fourthly, there 
was a number of large low risk areas which need to acknowledged and de-
prioritised for engagement. Fifthly, the group discussed the ethical issues with 
‘snooping’. SW from SWW saw no ethical questions with such practice whereas 
the LPF convenor saw a potential future problem with broken trust for future 
engagement. This stemmed from LPF Executive discussions around trying to 
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engender positive engagement with catchment farming community, rather that 
regulatory. 
 
Reflection - Evaluation 
WO1 proved a success from a number of perspectives: 1) LPF members began 
building a mental map of the catchment; 3) improved skills of looking for risks in 
the catchment; 3) discussion of management options highlighted the importance 
of farmer engagement as many incidents were not regulatable. However, 
because WO1 was only attended by NE there was only a single framing of the 
runoff issues found. It was agreed that another WO needs to be completed with 
staff from different agencies so ambiguity in management options can be 
exposed. 
 
Cycle 7: Walk Over 2 
 
Problem 
While WO1 was a useful starting point the lack of participation by different 
agencies meant the possible actions and management strategies for dealing 
with issues was absent. It was felt that if we could encourage a range of 
professionals from the RPA to the EA to attend with the aim that this would 
expose the ambiguities and practical options for management. 
 
Planning 
In anticipation of the Upstream Thinking project the investigation aimed to 
familiarise LPF partners with the catchment’s topography, connectivity and land 
use. By discussing current and desired land management the investigation 
process would expose differences in knowledge and approaches to water risks. 
The plan was to use the risk maps developed in Cycle 9. 
 
Action 
On the 21/1/2014 members of Loe Pool Forum (LPF) and partners conducted 
an investigation of the Cober catchment. The team drove around the central 
and North Eastern area of the catchment (see Figure 35) stopping at issues of 
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concern (see Figure 16), recording observations and discussing management 
options (see Figure 17). WO2 was attended by LPF Project Manager, NE’s HLS 
Advisor, NE’s CSF Advisor, EA’s Catchment Coordinator, CWT’s UST 
Manager, CWT’s Farm Advisor, EA Environment Officer, EA Flood Defence 
Manager and I. The day began with a team meeting where NE’s HLS Advisor 
(AKA JC) outlined the aims and objectives of the day’s catchment investigation. 
JC wanted the team to take an ecosystem services approach to observing the 
catchment. The ecosystem services approach would look at current and 
potential land management in terms of their functions for reducing pollution, 
alleviating flooding and cultural service provision. 
 
 
Figure 35: Sites stopped at on Walk Over 2 
Site Site Description Issues Discussed 
1 South West Water Outtake  Floodplain and connectivity 
 Tributary diversion because of pollution 
2 Daffodil field  Diffuse pollution risk 
 Bespoke management options 
 Farmer engagement 
3 Burst stream from Daffodil field  Management options 
4 Out wintering  Farmer engagement options 
5 Out wintering and forage grazing  Farmer engagement options 
6 Sewerage fungi  Enforcement action 
Table 16: List of runoff risks observed at each site on Walk Over 2 
 
Observation 
After completing WO2 we assembled in the Blue Anchor pub in Helston to 
discuss observations and follow up actions to. In Table 17 I present a refined list 
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of the observations and notes I made of that meeting. These were fed back to 
LPF at the next CG meeting. 
 
Issue Discussion Points 
Success of WO2 
 The WO2 enabled a grounded knowledge of the catchments land use, 
connectivity and topography to be produced. 
 For partners who work at the strategic level WO2 demonstrated the 
challenges of the addressing on the ground diffuse pollution risks. 
 The process of assembling experts from different agencies to discuss 
specific runoff issues enable ambiguities in perceptions of risk and 
management options to be exposed. 
  
Runoff risks 
 On the WO2 the EA explained that the Cober responds rapidly to rainfall 
events.  
 The team observed high connectivity in terms of runoff pathways 
confirming the EA’s analysis of hydrographs. 
 Concluding that the Cober is a highly connected and rapidly responding 
catchment means for the UST project that no particular areas could be 
identified as low risk. 
  
Enforcement vs 
Engagement 
 Discussions around the runoff incident at site 2 exposed a conflict in 
opinions about risk mitigation solutions. 
 One part of the team saw the issue as one which needed punitive 
enforcement action and another part of the team saw it as an issue which 
needed farmer engagement and advice.  
 This conflict exposed ambiguity in risk perceptions and understanding the 
issues from a farmers perspective.  
  
Flow attenuation 
solutions 
 The team agreed that at a number of sites flow attenuation features could 
be beneficial for reducing both downstream flooding and pollution risks.  
 However, the EA raised the point about the uncertainty in effects of 
installing flow attenuation features. Debris dams for example are one way 
of putting a hydraulic break on flow. But the EA explained the evidence 
around flow attenuation features is uncertain and can actually potentially 
downstream flooding risks if installed in the wrong place. 
 EA to research and report back to LPF about best practice for channel 
management and debris dams. 
  
Partnership Working 
 One challenge of doing collaborative exercises such as attending LPF 
meetings and WO’s is that it means a work load beyond people’s job 
roles. LPF members need to communicate ‘up the line’ that time needs to 
be allocated for partnership working. 
 One challenge of farmer engagement is that job positions within 
environmental agencies change frequently meaning there is little 
consistency in engagement with farmers. This is a larger structural 
problem that is not likely to change.  
Table 17: List of observations from PAR cycle 7 
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Figure 36: Photograph of team on Walk Over 2 
 
Reflection - Evaluation 
Walk Over 2 was reflected on with participants in subsequent LPF meetings. 
The consensus was that WO2 was a success on three accounts: 1) WO2 
enabled a ‘ground truthing’ of diffuse pollution catchment models; 2) proved a 
social learning exercise for those at the strategic level to understand the 
challenges and uncertainties associated with identifying and labelling diffuse 
pollution incidents on the ground; 3) the exercise exposed the ambiguities in 
different experts framing of diffuse pollution and how it should be managed. In 
particular the exercise exposed a divide in the participants about how incidents 
should be managed. Those at the strategic level saw incidents as issues for 
regulation and punitive action whereas those who worked with farmers saw 
issues as complex and to be managed through farmer advice and support. In 
sum WO 2 represented a successful exercise of social learning. 
 
Cycle 8: Walk Over 3 
 
1. Problem 
Firstly, building on the successes of WO1 and WO2 it was agreed that another 
iteration of the WO, in a different part of the catchment, would be useful for 
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refining the methodology. Secondly, there was also dissatisfaction with the risk 
maps (developed in Cycle 10) used as a guide in WO2. Building on one 
observation that the catchment is highly connected, in terms of risk pathways, it 
was agreed that a different type of risk map which focused on pathways, rather 
that topography and proximity to water courses, would be more effective as a 
guide for a WO methodology in the Cober catchment. Thirdly, one of the 
uncertainties which emerged was around the efficacy of installing flow 
attenuation features. It was uncertain whether this could actually increase the 
risk of flooding downstream. In response to this problem it was agreed that 
attendance of an EA expert in catchment flooding to talk through possible 
upstream solutions was needed on WO 3. 
 
2. Planning 
NE’s HLS advisor began a conversation with an EA technical specialist in 
catchment modelling. GK pointed to the Rolling Ball (RB) catchment model as a 
potential mapping option for highlighting flow pathways. The RB is essentially 
an extremely detailed map of a catchment’s flow pathways. The RB uses data 
from digital terrain models (LIDAR) to identify natural flow pathways determined 
by topography only. We agreed that the RB model should be used in the WO3.  
 
3. Action 
On 27/01/2015 2015 we conducted WO3 with the EA’s technical specialist in 
catchment modelling, NE’s CSF officer, CWT’s ecologist, LPF Project Manager, 
UoE Geography Professor and I. 
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Figure 37: Rolling Ball Risk Map 
 
Figure 38: Photograph of WO3 team gathering local knowledge on runoff pathways from landowner 
 
4. Observation 
The RB maps showed (see Figure 37) to have great advantages over standard 
‘heat maps’ (as used in WO1 and WO2) of risk and conventional flood 
inundation models because they: i) are high resolution (showing water 
pathways down to ditch scale); ii) are a platform to engage with highly specific 
local knowledge by ‘ground truthing’ during catchment field walks; iii) provide 
the a visual prompt for stakeholders to discuss how they frame the causes of 
risks differently; iv) provide a collaborative learning experience which could lead 
to the identification of bespoke solutions such as leaky dams or ditches; v) 
provides a useful methodology to eliminate high risk areas in the catchment. 
The central problem with the RB maps was that they did not account for hedges 
or banks which altered the pathway. As a result the risks identified on the walk 
over were pulled into doubt when at the end of the walk we identified a major 
reed and bank system which filtered and then stopped all upstream flow.  
 
5. Reflection & Evaluation 
At the CG meeting on 14/04/2015 I presented the observations from W03 and 
we critically discussed the methodology. The CG compared the risk assessment 
process using heat maps to the RB maps. The CG agreed that there are a 
number of problems with traditional heat maps for understanding and managing 
issues such as diffuse pollution: 1) Data on the sources, pathways and 
receptors of runoff are riddled with uncertainties; 2) The quantification of risk 
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makes it difficult for stakeholder’s local knowledge to be taken into account; 3) 
Risk assessments conceal the multiple ways different catchment stakeholders 
frame the issues and their priorities and preferences for management. We then 
discussed the pros and cons of RB maps. 
 
One question was why on some areas of the maps the modelled pathways run 
in straight lines. The Farm Advisor for CWT (SC) explained that the straight 
lines happen because of missing high resolution data in the model and they 
have been replaced with data of lower quality which results in crude straight 
lines. SC discussed the advantages of the maps he had found while using in 
East Looe catchment. The CWT found it very useful to: i) eliminate areas of no 
risk in the catchment; ii) starting a conversation with colleagues about a farm; iii) 
discuss issues with farmers in conjunction with field waste management plan. 
However, SC also confirmed our observation that the biggest problem with the 
pathway lines is that they do not include hedges or field use and both of these 
factors make the difference when looking at sources and pathways. The other 
agreed challenge would be conducting this type of WO over a whole catchment. 
 
6.3: Agricultural Engagement 
 
Cycle 9: Risk Mapping Workshop 
 
Problem - Planning 
My start point, and aim for Cycle 9, was to trial and refine risk mapping 
exercises which would best reveal the agricultural communities knowledges and 
perspectives. In collaboration with NE’s HLS advisor and CSF officer it was 
decided we should conduct a farmer forum workshop in the catchment to trial a 
number of Participatory Diagramming techniques (Kesby et al., 2005). The 
workshop was combined with a CSF promotional event wherein how CSF can 
offer advice and grant aid set out; and feedback provided from the EA about the 
WFD catchment walk over. The exercise was based on causal risk model 
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(Fenton and Neil, 2006). This is essentially about tracing out the causal chain 
which leads to an impact. 
 
 
Figure 39: Six stage causal risk model exercise 
 
In the exercise there were six stages and at every stage through the workshop 
the data would be logged. The farmers were asked to think about their own farm 
and how the question corresponds to their own situation. This exercise is set 
out in Table 18 and Figure 40 below. 
 
Step Description of Exercise 
1 - Trigger 
To ground this exercise in a real world situation I chose to focus on a recent heavy 
precipitation to provide context; on Saturday the 24th of November Cornwall 
experienced a heavy precipitation event, so heavy that the EA issued a Sever Flood 
Warming alert for the Cober. The farmers will be asked to place a red sticker on the 
chart in relation to how extreme they saw the event; see Figure 36 and 38. 
 
2 - Risks 
The farmers will then be asked to write on post-it notes the potential risks that could 
arise on their farm or in the wider catchment 
3 - Adaptation  
Farmers to note how over the years they have adapted their farm enterprise and 
practice to cope with severe rain events. 
 
4 - Connectivity  
Using the blue pens the farmers will be asked to mark on the catchment map where 
they saw unusual water pathways on their farm and across the catchment. 
 
5 - Impacts 
Using posit notes farmers will be asked to list the impacts felt on their farm in this 
event. 
 
6 - Mitigation 
Considering what you have heard from EA and CSF today, write down the actions you 
or catchment agencies could take to mitigate the risks of a heavy rain fall event. 
 
Table 18: Risk Mapping Workshop Exercise 
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Figure 40: Risk assessment graph 
Action 
The farmer forum event took place on the 19/12/2012 in the village of Carnkie 
(TR13 0DS) at 10-12am. The event was attended by 12 farmers from 7 different 
farms who were primarily from small farms. The event was supported by BH 
(CSF), CM (ELS), JC (NE), CM (EA) and ST (EA). As Brietbart (2003) 
suggested, the event support team also included refreshments. The whole 
event discussion was recorded on Dictaphone and later transcribed. All 
participants agreed that photos and discussion about specific of their farm could 
be used as data. The farmer forum also served as an effective communication 
event47 for environmental agencies and myself communicating the LPF aims, 
objectives and future engagement opportunities. Essentially this event served 
as a listening exercise to hear about the farmers’ perspectives on issues and 
the challenges they face. 
                                            
47
 Materials and handouts included: 1) Capital Grant Scheme handbooks; Maps of catchment – 
drainage, soils, slope; 2) Summary of advice visits and events on offer; 3) Jeremy’s 
engagement map of the catchment; 4) EA walkover report; 5) General CSF/NE/EA leaflets; 6) 
Sign-up sheet with tick-boxes for CSF: 1-to-1 advice, events, CGS visits, ETIP and S4P visit. 
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Figure 41: Photograph of farmers annotating catchment map 
 
 
Figure 42: Photograph of completed risk assessment graph 
 
Observation 
The key observations made from Cycle 9 are set out In Table 19. 
Observation theme Observation details 
Risk Knowledge 
 Farmers showed extremely detailed and longitudinal knowledge of 
rainfall and runoff events in relation to their own farm.  
 Farmers were largely unaware of downstream pollution impacts in 
Loe Pool and for SWW drinking water intake. 
 
Challenges for farm 
businesses 
 Preceding heavy summer rainfall patterns have compromised 
productivity. The impacts have included flooding, water logged fields 
and soil erosion. 
 Weather impacts have driven farmers to redirecting water flows and 
for one farm switching from conventional arable to low input organic 
farming in order to reduce soil loss.  
 Milk prices have damaged profits.  
 
Table 19: Observations from Cycle 9 
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Reflection - Evaluation 
On reflection the exercise developed in Cycle 9 was heavily influenced by the 
experts who have a technical, reductionist and positivist approach to 
conceptualising risk. This is illustrated in the six stage risk assessment causal 
model (see Figure 39) LPF asked me to employ. Nevertheless, the exercise 
served as a useful starting point to understand water pollution risk and 
management from an agricultural perspective. The exercise was officially 
evaluated at the LLC meeting on the 26/03/2013 and the CG meeting on the 
12/03/2013. The outputs from the LPF meeting minutes are set out in Table 20.  
 
Theme Reflections 
Successes 
 Exercises revealed farmers detailed local knowledge of weather and runoff 
pathways on their farm.  
 All farmers were very forth coming with specific information, even if it showed 
problems on their farm. 
 The map was particularly effective to engender discussions. 
 
Criticisms 
 The six stage causal risk exercise was convoluted and ineffective in gathering 
useful information. 
 While the map discussions were effective the exercise needs refining in order 
to coherently capture farmers risk knowledge of the catchment. 
 
Way forward 
 Initial thoughts about refining the mapping exercise are to use symbols to 
represent risky areas. This data can then be better processed (displayed on a 
map) and communicated to the concerned parties. 
 Climate and weather graphs would be also useful for understanding water 
risks in relation to the challenges farmers face.  
 The discussions that emerged as a result of the mapping exercise were 
purposefully allowed to run on. However if the exercise is to be taken to a 
larger group the exercise will need to be tightly facilitated to enable all 
questions to be answered. 
 
Table 20: Reflections from Cycle 9 
 
Cycle 10: Developing Risk Maps 
 
Problem 
The key output from Cycle 9 was the agreement, amongst LPF members, about 
the efficacy of using maps for discussing runoff risk with farmers. In research 
terms these served as a useful tool to reveal farmers knowledges and 
perspectives on pollution risk. In action terms they served as a communication 
tool to highlight the concerns of LPF. However, the methodology used in cycle 9 
was not particularly coherent or effective and therefor LPF concluded that a 
tailored risk map for the Cober catchment was needed. 
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Planning 
As Kesby et al (2005) note, authentic PAR is about working in partnership with 
an organisation to establish research tools and a methodological process which 
are appropriate for the context; and paying attention to cultural issues as well as 
resources opportunities and constraints. By this stage in planning I had 
developed a productive working relationship with JC, BH, CE and JD from LPF. 
We agreed through LPF meetings and further email exchanges that a tailored 
risk map of the catchment would be very useful for both LPF and for me to take 
to farmer interviews. 
 
Action & Observation 
We met at the regional NE offices in Truro on the 15-3-13 to work with the NE 
GIS specialist to produce the risk map. Through this meeting the key 
parameters the risk map should include were decided on. These were: 1) slope 
angle; 2) watercourses. Slope angle was included because of its role is 
accelerating runoff towards a water course. The water courses were included 
because they are the pathway through which pollutants reach the receptor (i.e. 
SWW WTW and Loe Pool). It was agreed that the maps should be as simple as 
possible in order to engender instant discussion with farmers, i.e. red is high 
risk and green in low risk. The NE GIS team then produced a risk map of the 
catchment (see Figure 43). In order for me to have meaningful discussions with 
farmers, at a scale which they related to, the NE GIS team produced maps for 
me, on request, based on the CPH no of farms I was to interview. 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
168 
 
 
Figure 43: Risk map of Cober 
Reflection & Evaluation 
I felt at this stage there was a tricky ethical issue with me taking the risk maps to 
farmers in order for them to mark the runoff issues they faced onto the map. In 
particular, LPF wanted me to identify the causes and pathways of pollution; 
septic tanks, leaking pipes, bad farming practices, pathways; ditches, diffuse 
runoff, temporary streams, sediment loss etc. Essentially it felt like surveillance 
science and thus I was worried how I would be breaking farmers’ trust once I 
had collected, analysed and shared the data. 
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Cycle 11: Interviews with Farmers 
 
Problem & Planning 
The problem for Cycle 11 was the lack of one-on-one discussion with farmers to 
understand their knowledge and framing of the diffuse pollution risk in the 
catchment. My academic objective was to capture water pollution risk issues 
from the perspective of the agricultural community. In terms of practical 
objectives, through Cycle 3 and 4 there emerged a number of 
problems/questions from a LPF perspective under the theme of agricultural 
knowledges: 1) What is the agricultural communities understanding of water 
environment risks in the catchment?; 2) How does the agricultural community 
characterise the causes and solutions for the water environment risks?; 3) What 
are the current challenges their farm enterprises are facing? Following 
consideration of these problems I developed a farmer interview schedule, 
around these issues, which was then emailed to LPF for approval. In order to 
conduct farmer interviews it was necessary to first connect with the agricultural 
community, which NE assisted with. 
 
Action 
Natural England were able to provide me with a catchment map48 which showed 
farm holdings, registered with the Rural Payments Agency (RPA), marked with 
their County Parish Holding (CPH) numbers and colour coded according to farm 
size.  I was able to count the number of holdings and categorise according to 
farm size. Analysis shows that there are 170 farm holdings officially registered 
with the RPA. 
 
Size of Holding (Ha) Number of Farm Holdings 
>100 7 
50-99 12 
20-49 41 
<20 110 
 170 
Table 21: Size of farm holdings in catchment 
                                            
48
 Map was produced by Ordance Survey for NE and valid with RPA up until 2014. 
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Total no* 
CPH’s in 
catchment 
No* of working farms 
known to NE 
No* of CSF farm visits 
(2009-2013) 
170 70 38 
Table 22: Number of working farms in Cober catchment 
 
However, through informal conversations with Natural England (NE), specifically 
the Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) and Soils for Profit (S4P) officers 
working in the catchment, it was apparent that there are only 70 working farm 
enterprises in the catchment. Due to data protection laws NE were not able to 
share any more information regarding these farm sizes or types. Based on 
interviews with CSF, S4P and interviewed farmers it was apparent that the 
discrepancy between registered farm holdings and the number of working farms 
was because of a local structural trend in the agricultural community. This trend 
will be full discussed in the empirical chapters but centres on the practice of 
retiring farmers not selling their land but renting it out to neighbouring working 
farms and horticultural companies. Considering the actual number of working 
farms and CSF visits helps in that it provides a realistic figure of 38 for my 
recruitment strategy. However, considering I did not have a capital grant ‘carrot’ 
I expected actual research participant numbers to be lower because of the lack 
of incentive for farmers.  
 
Due to legal regulations on data protection none of LPF’s partner agencies 
could share contact information about farm holdings in the catchment. My 
recruitment strategy, in terms of acquiring contact details, was four pronged. 
Firstly, I surveyed the existing farm information available on the internet49. 
Secondly, I accompanied CSF and S4F on farm visits in my capacity as a 
researcher. Thirdly, I used a networking approach at local farmer forum events. 
Fourthly, I used a ‘snowballing method whereby a successfully enrolled farmer 
would pass on the contact details of friendly neighbours. The combination of 
these methods resulted in 65 farm contact details, out of the 170 farm holdings 
registered. 
 
                                            
49
 This publically available contact information on farm holding came primarily from 192.com, 
Google Maps, and Yell.com. 
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The recruitment of farmers as research participants was achieved through two 
methods. The first method was through a face--to-face request. For example at 
farmer forum events and accompaniment of CSF and S4P visits I would simply 
ask if any farmers would be able to participate. The second route was through 
cold calling via the phone and door knocking when I was in the catchment. This 
combined approach was surprisingly effective and I managed to speak to 
farmers at 52 of the 65 farms I had contact details for. At the point of meeting I 
would provide a short introduction of who I was, how I was working in 
partnership with LPF, what research participation would require, and how the 
data would be used with regard to confidentiality. The result of the recruitment 
strategy was 32 farmers agreeing to participate.  Out of the original list of 52 
only 5 farmers refused outright to participate. There were 15 farmers who were 
interested in the project and keen to share their knowledge and experiences. 
However, despite persistent call returns and even door knocking, through the 
data collection period, they were too busy to participate. 
 
 
Figure 44: Graph showing number of farmers who agreed to participate in research 
 
Observation 
Through analysis of farmer’s discourses I constructed an illustrative history of 
how the Cober Catchment’s agricultural economy has changed through time 
since the Second World War. This addressed a key problem for LPF; in that 
they knew very little about the agricultural history, current businesses working in 
the catchment and how such changes had affected the environmental risks. 
Through interviews three key themes emerged: 1) land use change: 2) 
approaches to water management: 3) increased risks from a changing climate 
32 
15 
5 
No* Research Participants 
Agreed to
Participate
Too Busy
Refusal
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and competitive markets. For LPF I interpreted these changes in relation to 
three eras: 1) Grandfathers farm: 2) Fathers farm: 3) Current farming. These 
pictorial stories (See Figure 40, 41, & 42), representing how the risks have 
changed through timed, were presented to LPF at the Catchment Group 
meeting in 2014 and then uploaded to the LPF website. Communicating this 
story of agricultural change, in combination with farmer interview extracts, 
enabled LPF members to develop empathy and understanding about the 
pressures farmers face. Such ‘empathy’ is hard to evidence as an outcome, 
never the less post LPF meeting discussion the EA’s Integrated Environmental 
Planning Officer (DH, 2014) said “that presentation you did was very useful. My 
role is a little bit disconnected from the farmers themselves, so getting that 
opportunity to hear their voices were really useful”. Akin to Dewulf et al (2005) 
my ambition was not to merge agricultural and conservationist frames; the point 
was to expose the agricultural framings intact in an attempt to bring the actors 
into a working relationship. As Mazur and Asah (2013) explained, if a 
stakeholder group does not clearly organise and articulate their framing of an 
issue then their needs and values may be neglected. So my action here was to 
communicate an absent stakeholder, from LPF meetings, perceptive on the 
catchment risks. I argue that this was essentially the first step, ever made within 
LPF, to try and reframe the risks from an agricultural perspective. As Isendahl et 
al (2010) explain, this is the first and most meaningful step in reframing and 
overcoming framing differences. 
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Figure 45: Grandfather’s farm 
 
Figure 46: Fathers farm 
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  Figure 47: Current farming 
 
Cycle 12: Farm Enterprise Survey 
 
Problem 
At the LPF Catchment Group meeting (15/10/2013) and the Community Group 
meeting (26/11/2013) I began feeding back the preliminary findings from 
analysis of farmer interview data.  Alongside receiving praise for these 
presentations there was a request that this data would be even more useful if it 
was quantified50. Responding to this request I agreed to develop and conduct a 
farm enterprise survey. 
 
Planning 
The survey was developed collaboratively via email exchanges with NE HLS 
advisor, NE CSF officer, NE S4P officer and CWT ecologists. Discussions 
through the planning stage focused on questions around the relationship 
between precipitation, runoff risk and farm resilience. Through both the farmer 
interviews and LPF meetings there was a strong discourse around the 
                                            
50
 As I will discuss in the empirical chapters there is a great drive among scientific environmental 
agencies to have information quantified. 
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perceived increase in winter precipitation and intensity in those rainfall events. 
These concerns were heightened after the winter of 2012 when Helston 
flooded. We agreed that gathering data on how farmers in the catchment have 
been affected and how they have adapted would be the aim of the survey. We 
agreed that the three themes of the survey would be: i) farm enterprise 
information; ii) impacts of weather on farm; iii) farm adaptations to reduce runoff 
risk. Serendipitously NE had just published a report on Climate Change Farm 
Resilience Planning (Kendal and Cairns, 2013) which offered a practical 
methodology for raising awareness among the farming population of climate 
change threats and opportunities for their faming and land management 
systems and recommends adaptive actions for farm managers planning the 
future management of their holdings. We used the Farm Questionnaire 
developed as part of this project as the basis for our survey which would be 
tailored towards runoff risk and diffuse pollution. 
 
Action 
Over 2014 took the survey to the farmer interviews and called back the farmers 
I had already spoken to and got them to complete over the phone. Out of 32 
farmers interviewed, 26 agreed to complete the full farm enterprise survey. The 
numbers on participation in the farm enterprise survey is set out in Figure 44. 
 
 
Figure 48: Chart show participation in farm enterprise survey 
 
5 
6 
15 
26 
Participation in Farm Enterprise Survey   
no* of farmers refused to
participate in research
no* farms where survey not
applicable; retired or
diversified from agriculture
no* of farmers too busy to
participate despite researcher
call backs
no* Surveys completed
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Observation 
The survey produced a plethora of statistical data farm enterprises in the 
catchment. For LPF I produced a summary report which was presented to LPF 
in 2015 and published on the LPF website. I will now illustrate the key findings 
as it provides important context for the theoretical discussion of risks in the 
empirical chapters. 
 
 
Figure 49: Chart showing farm enterprise classification 
 
The FBS classify farms based on 10 ‘robust types’, these are: 1) Cereals; 2) 
General Cropping51; 3) Horticulture52; 4) Specialist Pigs; 5) Specialist Poultry; 6) 
Dairy; 7) LFA Grazing Livestock53; 8) Lowland Grazing Livestock54; 9) Mixed55; 
10) Other & Non-classifiable. A farm is allocated to a particular type when the 
contribution of a crop or livestock type comprises more than two-thirds of its 
                                            
51
 Holdings on which arable crops (including field scale vegetables) account for more than two 
thirds of their total SO excluding holdings (FBS, annex document) 
52
 Holdings on which fruit (including vineyards), hardy nursery stock, glasshouse flowers and 
vegetables, market garden scale vegetables, outdoor bulbs and flowers, and mushrooms 
account for more than two thirds of their total SO (FBS, annex document). 
53
 Holdings on which cattle, sheep and other grazing livestock account for more than two thirds 
of their total SO except holdings classified as dairy. A holding is classified as a Less Favoured 
Area (LFA) holding if 50 per cent or more of its total area is in the LFA (FBS, annex document). 
54
 Holdings on which cattle, sheep and other grazing livestock account for more than two thirds 
of their total SO except holdings classified as dairy (FBS, annex document). 
55
 Holdings in which none of the above categories is responsible for more than 2/3 of SOs (FBS, 
annex document) 
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total Standard Output (SO). I have clarified some of the classification definitions 
in footnotes. The bar chart shows that 23% of survey participants were Mixed, 
26% were Lowland Grazing Livestock, 42% were Dairy, and 7% were 
Horticulture. 
 
Farm Size FTE No* Farms 
Very small 
<0.5 FTE or 0.5 < 
1 FTE 
0 
Small 1 < 2 FTE 9 
Medium 2 < 3 FTE 7 
Large 3 < 5 FTE 5 
Very large >= 5 FTE 3 
  
24
56
 
Table 23: Farm Size 
 
The Farm Business Survey57 (FBS) calculates farm size according to the 
amount of labour hours used, rather than hectares managed. The FBS convert 
the number of hours worked by employees to the equivalent number of full time 
workers, on the basis that a full-time worker works a 39 hour week and so 1900 
hours a year. This leads to the classification of farms by number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE). I have used the same method to display the farm sizes of the 
research participants. 
 
                                            
56
 The reason only 24 out of the26 farms were included was that these two farms rent out their 
land so do not employ directly. 
57
 The Farm Business Survey is conducted on behalf of, and financed by, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) see http://farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/index.aspx  
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Figure 50: Chart showing pressures and impacts on farms 
 
The key observation to make on Figure 46 is that the impacts of rainfall on 
nutrient runoff and stock health are detrimental pressures for farm enterprises in 
the Cober. In particular, it is summer rainfall which poses a comparably higher 
risk to farmers than winter rainfall. What Figure 46 also shows is that, rather 
than runoff being solely an environmental concern, the impacts of ‘loss of land 
due to flooding’, ‘increased soil erosion’, and ‘damage to soil structure’ are 
equally important to the farm enterprises. With regard to adaptations (see 
Figure 47) the data shows how farmers are making a variety of adaptions to 
cope with the environmental conditions; in particular ‘resurfacing tracks’, 
‘increased animal housing’ and ‘assessment of soil structure and remedial 
action’, which all have positive impacts on downstream nutrient and sediment 
runoff. In summary, the observations from Cycle 12 have enabled both an 
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understanding of the environmental pressures farmers face but also an insight 
the Cober’s agricultural community perspective on the issue of sediment and 
nutrient runoff. 
 
 
Figure 51: Chart showing farm adaptations 
 
6.4: Chapter Summary 
The first key issue to discuss in this Chapter summary is that of positionality. In 
particular my role and influence over how the PAR progressed. As the reader 
would be aware, my role and influence changed markedly through the PAR 
process; specifically with regard to the balance between research and action. 
To demonstrate how my positionality changed through the project I constructed 
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Table 24. This shows how not only my role changed by how that influenced the 
action and research elements of the methodology. 
 
Position Description Pros & Cons 
   
Observer 
Unknowing of people, 
practices and politics 
 Positioned to critically observe the process of catchment 
management without prior knowledge of politics 
 Unable to instigate action due to lack of trusted 
relationships with LPF members 
   
Integrated 
Knowing and 
understanding 
 Knowing LPF members roles, responsibilities, practices 
and the accompanying politics between partners 
 Able to participate and contribute effectively in LPF 
meetings; and voice a human geographer’s perspective 
 Able to initiate discussions around risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity with partners. Able to organise Walk Over 
events with LPF 
 Action begins to take over research 
   
Agent of 
Change 
Influencing and 
Directing 
 Able to set agenda 
 Too close, LPF agenda became my action agenda 
 Original research direction became blurred 
   
Table 24: Phases of Positionality 
 
The nature of PAR is that the process, success and failures are critically 
considered at each cycle through the reflection stage. Instead of reiterating 
points I begin to close this Chapter by providing a summary of the key 
observations and practical actions. These findings are organised under the 
three central research themes: 1) Ambiguity; 2) Knowing Risk; 3) Delivering the 
CaBA. 
 
With regard to ambiguity there were three key observations/actions. Firstly, up 
until my PAR project there had been little, to none, consideration about how 
farmers perceived the pollution risks. I demonstrated to LPF, contrary to their 
assumption, that runoff risk is a significant concern for farmers; but just for 
different reasons compared to conservationists. Secondly, that within LPF’s 
knowledge of the catchment there was a significant epistemic uncertainty with 
regard to the sources and pathways of diffuse pollution in the catchment. This 
directed the PAR process to developing and conducting a three cycles of risk 
mapping to address that local knowledge gap. Thirdly, I observed how amongst 
LPF stakeholders that there were multiple substance frames based on their 
interests and responsibilities within the catchment, see Table 6. As 
demonstrated in Figure 28, these frames can be crudely divided into whether 
flooding or conservation is a priority for the stakeholder. 
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With regard to knowing risk there were also three key observations/actions. 
Firstly, previous to my PAR project there was a reliance on pollution risk models 
to understand the catchments issues. Through the WO exercises the 
importance of ‘ground truthing’ models and questioning ‘expert’ assumptions 
proved to be an effective method to build a tactile understanding the Cober. 
Secondly, I observed how the traditional ‘scientific methods’ for knowing diffuse 
pollution in the catchment were inadequate. As the ethnography progressed I 
witnessed how ‘experts’ drew on non-scientific methods (i.e. sight, smell, touch) 
to assess diffuse pollution risk. Thirdly, the WO exercises, interviews and 
ethnography revealed how stakeholders may see the same environment but 
they afford very different risks to its state. This observation is useful in that it 
academically helps us to understand the origins of ambiguity.  
 
With regard to delivering the CaBA there were four key observations/actions. 
Firstly, that LPF are committed to principles of the CaBA but were struggling to 
deliver so in practice because of a number of barriers. One barrier is the 
preference for a command and control approach to catchment management 
from the EA; which is of course in antipathy to the CaBA principles. A second 
barrier was the level of staff turnover in environmental agencies. I observed how 
the constant re-structuring of environmental agencies and the associated 
transience of staff in posts is a barrier to creating effective working relationships 
with stakeholders as it erodes both those relationships and local knowledge of 
issues. The final key observation to make is with regard to drivers for the CaBA. 
The implied driver for the CaBA in policy is the normative and instrumental 
benefits of participatory water management. The key observation I made was 
that the current regulatory framework for reducing diffuse pollution risk was 
ineffectual – the implication being that a new approach to change catchment 
practice is needed which should include agricultural engagement. 
 
In the previous three paragraphs I have summarised the key observations and 
actions resulting from my PAR endeavour. These observations form the 
backbone of the discussions in the following three empirical chapters. In the first 
of these empirical chapters I examine the geographies of risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity. 
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Chapter 7: Risks, Uncertainties or Ambiguities 
 
Chapter 7 answers research question 1. In this Chapter I examine how both 
farmers and partners of LPF frame the issue of diffuse pollution. I begin (section 
7.1) by examining agricultural framings of diffuse pollution and show how, for 
farmers, the causes and impacts are certain and simple. Secondly (section 7.2), 
I show how for LPF the issue of diffuse pollution is uncertain and ambiguous. 
Thirdly (section 7.3), I provide a critical account how LPF have negotiated the 
multiple catchment risks through the process of partnership working and the 
delivery of two catchment management plans; the Loe Pool WLMP and the 
Helston FAS. 
 
Through this Chapter I demonstrate how frame analysis is a sensible method 
for geographers to organise, and simplify, different groups’ relations to an issue, 
and how it offers a platform to theorise the ‘why’ behind the causes of conflicts 
in multi-stakeholder environmental management. Using frame analysis to 
examine conflicts, controversies and ambiguity in governance is of course not a 
new endeavour. The originality in the following account emanates from the use 
‘epistemological frames’ to explore the root causes of the conflicts and 
controversies in catchment management. I have coined the term 
‘epistemological frames’ to refer to how an actor uses different types of 
knowledge, ‘scientific’ or ‘lay’, and how in turn that affects decision making. 
Essentially epistemological frame refers to, and is dependent on, on an actor’s 
position an epistemological spectrum from empirical based knowledge to tacit 
based knowledge. On one end of the spectrum you have scientific knowledge 
which is understood to be empirically based, universally applicable, objective 
and de-contextualised and on the other end of the spectrum you have tacit 
knowledge which is implicit, indigenous and context dependent resulting from 
talents, experience and abilities (Ingram, 2008). The way I employ 
epistemological frames is with regard to what knowledge-information an actor 
draws from to make a decision about a management practice. I argue that an 
actor’s epistemological frame will determine what type of decision is made 
about a risk. This point builds on the work of Cerezo and Garcia (1996) who 
argued that the validity of knowledge claims or assertions about the world are 
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relative to a cultural group. One of the central arguments I go on to make is how 
epistemological frames provide new leverage for understanding ambiguity. 
 
7.1: Agricultural Community – Framings & Certainties 
Through agricultural discourses there emerged two prominent themes around 
the risk of runoff: 1) heavy summer rainfall events; 2) horticultural business 
practices. In the following section I examine the discourses around these 
themes to reveal the farmers framings on causes and impacts of runoff. 
Important to note here is that I found little ambiguity, i.e. multiple framings of 
runoff cause and impact, within the discourses. Farmers spoke about these 
causes and impacts with great certainty. I mean this in two ways, firstly that they 
were consistent themes in discourses through all farmer interviews. Secondly, 
and more importantly, there was great certainty in the way farmers spoke about 
the truth and the validity of their claims. The two issues were never presented 
as possibly causes of runoff but were spoken about as certain and inevitable. 
 
7.1.1: Summer Rain and a Changing Climate 
For all farmers it has been the heavy summer rainfall patterns over the last 
decade which has applied the greatest pressure on their business and seen as 
the key driver of runoff. I evidence this claim in two ways, firstly through data 
gathered as part of the farm enterprise survey and secondly through interview 
extracts. In Figure 52 the results on pressures and impacts to farm enterprises 
in displayed. The first point to make is that rainfall rather than drought, 
temperature or flooding poses the greatest pressure on the farm. Indeed, rain 
was the most common answer to the question “What are the main pressures 
your farm; regulations, input costs, selling price?”. As a horticultural farmer (BR, 
2014) answered “The climate at the moment, very much so, overwhelming. All 
that sand there should have been spread in the fields 6 weeks ago. They can’t 
get out there. The tractors would sink, get bogged down”, or as a sheep farmer 
(SH, 2013) answered “the rain. We have just had the wettest winter in record. I 
haven’t been able to do anything on my fields because it’s just been too wet”, or 
as a large dairy farmer (AC, 2013) answered “The wet summers, land was too 
wet” (AC, 2013). The second point to make is that summer, rather than winter; 
rainfall has the greatest impact on the farm business. Amongst the impacts 
identified are increased soil erosion, damage to soil structure and timings of 
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cows out on grass which all have directly implications for runoff. A dairy farmer 
explained how recent heavy rainfall patterns over the last decade had placed 
huge economic stress on his enterprise; “housing the cattle early was the main 
impact. A lot more money spent on bedding and feed. As feed went up with 
everything else it cost £4,500 more this year. You are also looking at the extra 
working of cleaning the dung out the sheds and all the other aspects”. I 
summarise here with the observation that one key framing of rain and runoff is 
‘economic loss’. 
 
 
Figure 52: Pressures and Impacts on Farms 
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“we are experiencing far more of these unseasonal storms” 
For the farmers the perception is that the risk posed to their farm associated 
with rainfall patterns is increasing. As Figure 53 shows58, there is a perception 
that over the last ten years the risks associated with rainfall had increased; 
especially with patterns of summer rainfall. 
 
 
Figure 53: Farmers perception if of precipitation trends 
 
As a semi-retired dairy farmer (AD, 2013) explained “I think there has been a 
long term change. Wetter in the last 10 years; my father, before his demise, 
would say we are experiencing far more of these unseasonal storms. We used 
to have storms during the winter but you wouldn’t expect them in spring summer 
and autumn, not as erratically as we are getting them”. Or similarly as another 
dairy farmer (MV, 2013) explained, in relation to the hay production which 
requires dry summer weather to cut and lay, “We had land in Constantine 15 
year ago. All we used to do down there is make hay. We would make 3000 
bales of hay with no problem. We can barely make 300 now”. Or as a mixed 
farmer (MC, 2013) explained “You don’t get long spells of dry weather in the 
summer. It seems you might have a week or a couple in a month. There is not 
that long spell where you have opportunity to do harvesting. It’s like you have to 
do it in a few days”. Furthermore as a small beef farm (SM, 2013) said “When 
                                            
58
 Farmers were asked “How has the risk of these impacts changed over the last 10 years? 
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we were at school, the summer holidays used to be sunny for 6 weeks, that’s 
the mid 1990’s it seemed to be August red hot from when you left school to 
when you went back. I guess as well it’s to do with what you do, if it rained 
when you were younger you would stay indoors but now you have to get out 
there and get on with it. I would say there is definitely more rainfall”. Of course, 
while the majority of farmers perceived that the climate was changing there 
were a number of more nuanced viewpoints. For example from the Jenkins 
family: 
 
TW:  Do you think you have seen a longer term change in 
weather pattern? 
GJ:  We have had a spate of wet summers. 
RJ: But then that has happed in the past. My dad is 
reading a book which is about the Oxford farming 
diary written in the 1800 and that is pretty much 
mirroring what we are seeing now, over a 20 year 
period. It’s really similar. 
GJ: I think it’s just coming round again. I don’t think 
nothing is new. 
RJ: I am not sure we have seen enough of it to know that 
it is longer term change. It is far more unsettled that it 
used to be and the seasons are different. But I 
haven’t been around long enough to know. There are 
certainly changes. 
 
The major point to make here is about the relations which underpin farmer’s 
framing of water. Rainfall per se is not a problem but it is the perceived and 
experienced increase in summer rainfall which represents a significant pressure 
for farmers; through reduced number of working days, damage to soil structure 
and increased erosion inter alia. So at least over the last ten years risk to 
farmer’s livelihood has literally rained from above. It’s worth considering this 
perception in relation to analytical risk assessment of climate change. On initial 
inspection the farmers lay knowledge is correct. The observed precipitation 
trend at the UK national scale has been for an increase in average yearly 
rainfall and the projection is that this will continue because of climate change 
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(Kosanic et al., 2015). However, Kosanic et al (2015) analysed climatic data 
from weather stations in West Cornwall and concluded to the contrary, that 
there was a negative trend in precipitation through the 20th and 21st century. 
One of the weather stations included in Kosanic et al (2015) study is situated 
within the Cober catchment at RNAS Culdrose, see Figure 54. 
 
 
Figure 54: Graph of yearly average rainfall at Culdrose 
 
Returning to the climate data from Culdrose I then constructed a chart with just 
summer rainfall patterns. Interesting this actually vindicated the farmer’s local 
knowledge about rainfall patterns. The chart below (see Figure 55) showing an 
increase in summer rainfall and importantly a number of above average wet 
summers59 in the last ten years. 
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Figure 55: Average summer rainfall at Culdrose 
 
“I have changed stock - the climate isn’t changing, it’s getting worse” 
For farmers there was such certainty in their perception of a changing climate 
that many had diversified or managed their farm to reduce the risk of runoff. 
Indeed, the pressures associated with rainfall were a key factor in decisions 
around the future of the farm and a driver for adapting (e.g. investing in 
infrastructure or changing cropping regimes and soil management) the farm 
enterprise. As a medium sized sheep farmer (SH) said “I have changed stock 
because the climate isn’t changing, it’s getting worse. From beef to sheep, this 
reduces the number of stock per hectare and sheep are lower impact on the 
land”. From a sociocultural perspective this framing of water runoff as driven by 
climate change has not been constituted from an analytical assessment but 
from everyday practices and observations about the environment. This point is 
akin to Zonabend’s (1993) and Norgaard’s (2006) arguments around the 
production of risk and presencing; wherein climate change, as a potentially 
abstract risk, has been made experientially and emotionally close for farmers 
through the doing of farming. Farmers continued, and explained how many of 
the dairy farmers had reached a limit in terms of how they can adapt the 
enterprise to cope with the increased rainfall. Further, that the risks associated 
with prolonged rain are multiple and interact. As a family of dairy farmers noted:  
 
SV:  There is a limit to how you can adapt.  
MV:  Definitely. 
CV:  You only said this morning we have to put these new 
cubicles up. If you had enough feed, and the cubicles 
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were up, you would bring them in all the time. But 
because last year was a disaster for silage we would 
have to buy it in. Well it shouldn’t be like that in June 
months. 
 
A small dairy and beef farmer added to this observation about how heavy rain 
has multiple and interacting risks for dairy farmers as well as stating how it’s 
been a driver for him diversifying his income.   
 
AD: I diversified into building work some time ago. The 
main issue has been housing, if you are in trouble 
with the weather you have to house them. These 
heavy rain storms we have been having for the last 
few years. 
TW:   Is that to avoid soil damage? 
AD:  Yes, grassland is your cheapest source of feed. I 
make it high priority to maintain that. If you have 
cattle out in the odd shower that isn’t too much to 
worry about; but is to worry about is when you get 
the heavy downpours and if the cattle are out they 
will step the grass up, as in make it dirty, then they 
won’t eat it then they will start mooing. That’s why I 
bring them in. 
 
Summary 
There are a number of summary points which need fleshing out here. Firstly, 
farmers framed the primary cause of runoff as a climatic inevitability of wet 
summers. Runoff for farmers was never framed in terms of downstream impacts 
but from the perspective of resource loss from their farm. This is a seemingly 
simply point but has much wider implications as it disrupts some perceptions 
from conservationists60 that farmers only motivated to reduce runoff because of 
regulatory and punitive mechanisms. What I have shown is that runoff risk is of 
high concern for farmers and how water is entangled with their livelihoods. What 
I have also shown is that not all rain is risky. Farmers expect and can cope with 
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 These conservationists’ perceptions were discussed through the PAR field work Chapter. 
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heavy rain in the winter. But it has been the last decade of heavy summer 
rainfall which has put all farmers under enormous working and finically 
pressure; and in turn driven runoff risks. The last point to be made is with regard 
to the certainty within farmers framing of this risk. While climate change may be 
an abstract statistical and future situated risk for some publics, for farmers it is 
an experienced phenomenon; which has driven adaptations on the farm and 
diversification of enterprises. Further, that farmer’s perceive an increasing level 
of risk to their farm from an experienced climate change. While statistically 
average rainfall is decreasing this is relatively irrelevant for farmers because it is 
the summer part of the year which is most vulnerable and holds the most 
importance for agricultural production and runoff risk.  
 
7.1.2: Horticultural Practices 
The second cause of runoff, as framed by the farmers I interviewed61, was 
identified as the unscrupulous land management practices of the horticultural 
businesses. The characterisation by these farmers of the horticultural 
businesses and their land practices was stark, cutting and vicious. When 
farmers were asked about the sources of diffuse runoff they consistently framed 
the horticultural industry as the fundamental culprit. I begin by documenting the 
high-risk cultivation practice farmers cited as the cause of diffuse pollution 
runoff problems. 
 
“There is no need to plough so deep” 
All farmers interviewed identified a long list of practices conducted by the 
horticultural businesses which they deemed high risk in terms of the causing 
runoff. I discuss four of the most problematic: 1) de-stoning; 2) depth of 
ploughing; 3) furrow direction; 4) crop rotation. Firstly the practice of de-stoning 
was cited. This is a standard process, within the horticultural industry, of 
removing the large stones (see Figure 56: Photograph of granite boulders 
removed as part of high risk ploughing practice) in a field in order to improve the 
tillage of the soil. The ramification is on the soil structure, which becomes highly 
vulnerable to runoff in rainfall events. As a mixed farmer explained:  
 
                                            
61
 Crucial to point out here the data I draw on was collected through interviews with the 18 dairy, 
6 lowland grazing livestock and to a lesser extent the 6 mixed farmers. The voice of the 
horticulturalists is absent and this represents a significant shortcoming in my account. 
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RJ: Traditionally we [the farming community] wouldn’t 
have caused those sorts of damages. We [on own 
farm] don’t push our ground as hard. We farm in a 
rotation. My dad grows potatoes and he wouldn’t 
dream of de-stoning land. He thinks it’s a terrible 
thing to do. You pick up the big rocks by hand; it’s a 
different way of farming. 
 
Secondly, the depth of ploughing and the resulting infiltration rate was cited as a 
high-risk practice. This was explained to me by a dairy farming family:  
 
MV: The growers plough too deep as well. There is no 
need to plough so deep, to cultivate so deep. 
RV:  With all this rain around it’s only going to wash down. 
CV: Whereas if the fields are in grass, the fields will 
absorb a lot more. You don’t get the runoff, whereas 
if your soil is broken up it can’t hold the water. That’s 
when your river and your Loe Pool is vulnerable.  
 
Thirdly, ploughing furrows parallel to the direction of the slope was identified as 
a problem that exacerbates runoff. As a sheep farmer (MC, 2013) explained “if 
you have bulb banks facing the wrong way they will run water like a river. So 
there is bound to be nutrient runoff”. This point about furrow direction was 
reiterated by a farmer who had actually worked for a local daffodil farm: 
 
CW: They create little mini rivers. We were picking flowers 
once for a neighbour and it bucketed down. It just 
started as a stream down each row, then by the 
bottom on the field was covered in water, 1m or 
more. We used to plant Daffs but I have seen 2m 
hedges covered, soil up over the hedge.  It’s 
shocking the runoff you get.  
 
Fourthly, the lack of crop rotation was identified as a problem. It was explained 
to me that horticultural businesses typically rent fields for three years before 
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moving on to rent a different field. In these three years the fields are in constant 
crop. This was seen as an abuse of the land from which it can never recover. 
Further, the use of large and heavy machinery results in soil compaction which 
is difficult to rectify as a retiring farmer (MB, 2013) explained:  
 
MB: There isn’t the rotation either. You will go from bulbs 
to cauliflower to potatoes and back to bulbs. It is just 
crop, crop, crop when there is not stability in the soil. 
You are just packing, packing and packing it. The 
runoff is the result. We have fields down next to us at 
Praze. They have been grassed out for a while but 
even the grass didn’t help, they had been compacted 
so much that as soon as it rained it would runoff. 
 
For MB (2013) the horticulturalists operate an extremely intensive operation. Or 
as CW (2013) put it they are “big boy industry” and can be associated with all 
the environmental problems of agricultural intensification.  
 
Figure 56: Photograph of granite boulders removed as part of high risk ploughing practice 
 
“They rob the ground” 
The summary perspective, polemic in a sense, was that the horticultural 
industry was ‘robbing the land’ and that the whole industry was not only 
unsustainable, in terms of soil resource, but also the central cause of runoff risk 
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and downstream pollution issues. Here I am in discussion with the small family 
run dairy farm who have previously rented their land to the horticulturalists:    
 
CV: Well at the end of the day you will have the income 
but nothing else left. 
RV: Once they have come and gone you will have 
nothing but a bare field. 
TW:  What with the nutrient and soil loss? 
RV:  Yes. 
SV:  They rob the ground. 
RV:  Just left with all the stone on top. 
 
However, it was difficult to distinguish between criticism originating from 
genuine concern about runoff risk or resentment about the success of a 
different farming industry in the area.  
 
SM: Back when I was the age of my sons now we used to 
grow about five acres of potatoes each year which 
gave us a good living. Now it would be a waste of 
time as you have your big growers with 1000 acres 
with big kit, going all over the roads; making a lot of 
compaction issues which leads to runoff. What we 
would do is grow one field and then put it back to 
grass again. 
 
SM (2013) compares his families ‘sustainable’ practices to the ‘high risk’ 
practices of the horticultural farmers. The undercurrent to this comment though 
is that a cohort of farmers has been put out of business because of the scale of 
horticultural operations.  
 
“Which kind of growers? There is a hell of a difference” 
While ‘robbing the ground’ was the headline perspective, the same farmers also 
offered a more nuanced perspective about the horticultural industry. The crux of 
the issue is how horticulturalists, or as they are known locally, ‘growers’, leave 
the soil structure.    
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TW:  What do you think about the growers’ effects on the 
  land? 
CW: Which kind of growers? There is a hell of a 
difference. If you get cabbage, that’s good fertiliser, 
they don’t cut everything because the supermarkets 
only want certain sizes. So they leave a certain 
amount of crop which gets ploughed back under. 
That’s good for soil like barley. You plant barley and 
there is certain amount which gets ploughed back 
under and which rots. It’s like the straw or dung. But 
Daffs just strip the land of all goodness.  
 
There was also an empathic understanding that horticultural growing was an 
inherently risky practice and that farming differently would be difficult. The 
horticultural industry uses large machinery and thus there is a practical need to 
plough parallel (high risk) to the slope direction. This is because the tractor and 
towing machinery could tip over if ploughed perpendicular (low risk) to slope 
direction. When I asked how this risk could be reduced to farmers there was no 
definitive answer and they appreciated that with such machinery that was the 
only way to farm.  When thinking about pressures ‘beyond the farm gate’ there 
was also empathy that consumer demand drives the industry to farm in the way 
it does:  
 
MC: Looking at it from somebody who has seen a lot of 
years of variations. The whole market with people’s 
buying attitudes is that we want flowers cheap, we 
want food cheap. Which has generated growers 
growing massive areas of cauliflower, several 
hundred acres of flowers; and therefore you need big 
kit to cope with all the acreages. 
 
Furthermore this consumer demand was driving the industry to farm, on what 
was previously considered marginal land as a small dairy farmer MC (2013) 
said “they have used all the good stuff up [land] and had the best of it. But now 
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they are struggling so they will go to more marginal areas”. Or as a medium 
sized dairy farmer (AC, 2013) said:  
 
AC: There is a lot of competition for land. A lot of people 
want it. They’re buying or renting less crop-able land 
just so they can have fresh ground. So fields which 
you have coloured red62, well people wouldn’t have 
thought of cropping them before, but now because 
there is so much competition they need that land and 
they are willing to put the kit in there and do it. 
 
The final point to make in this expounding of a nuanced, compared to the 
section above, framing of the horticultural farming is with regard to profit. It was 
explained to me that all farmers not just the larger growers were driven by profit: 
 
RJ: We [farmers] have tendency to be greedy. If you ask 
any farmer, they will always tell you what they are 
doing to make ends meet. Part of it is if they make 
£X on 10 cows this year they will want 20 cows next. 
We all push resources. It affects the wider world 
when farmers do it. Part of that comes with 
understanding the true cost of food production. That 
is primarily driven by making money and how hard 
we push the land. Some potato growers are really 
big business. They are all about profit. But it is 
across the board. 
 
The discussion about the long and detailed list of risky horticultural practices 
always ended with farmers then drawing a comparison with their own farming 
system. And more often than not underpinning their own farming identity as one 
which is low risk in comparison.  
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“I think about how I want my son and my grandson to farm” 
The deep and critical attack on the horticultural practices, with respect to their 
role runoff risk, was more often immediately followed by how their farming 
system and cultural ethics were different. The dairy farmers and small holders 
essentially felt unfairly blamed for the diffuse pollution issue in the catchment: 
 
TW: So the bulb and potatoes growers you would class 
as really high risk compared to dairy? 
RV: Yes. They [NE & EA] always come back to the 
livestock and cattle, we always get the brunt? of it. 
 
The dairy and smallholder farmers further characterised the horticultural 
industry as having a short term economic rather than long-term relationship 
driven by a sense of responsibility for a sustainable future. As a medium sized 
dairy farmer (RJ, 2013) commented “I am not an environmentalist by any 
stretch of the imagination. I don’t want to sound fluffy; but we do have to 
consider what we are leaving behind. I don’t think we always get it right”. Or as 
a family of sheep farmers discussed: 
 
Mrs VC: The ground doesn’t keep on giving. If it was your 
own ground you would look after it more. 
Mr JC: I think about the fact that I want my son to farm that 
and my grandson to farm that. The eight to ten big 
growers down this end are basically saying to hell 
with everyone else we are going to make money out 
of it. 
Mrs VC: Make a quick buck and get out. 
Mr JC: If it doesn’t work then they pull out and move on. 
Mrs VC: We are set up that it goes through generations. 
Whereas a lot of the crop people are coming in on 
their own back and they are not worried about what 
went before and what went after, so as long as they 
have a good living and can retire well then. 
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There was a significant discourse which emerged around the cultural ethics and 
drivers for the horticultural farmers and how they treat the land different to 
family run farms. Farmers characterised the horticultural industry as prioritising 
profit over a sustainable relationship with the land. As a dairy farming family 
explained: 
 
Mr GC: Well the growers it’s not their ground is it, its rented 
isn’t it. 95% would be rented. 
TW:  Is that a factor in how they manage the land? 
Mr GC: Basically they are taking crops off it for quite a few 
years and when it is no longer viable they will move 
on and leave the mess behind. 
Mrs SC: The farmer who is renting the land is happy because 
he has had cracking rent for 10 years. But after they 
have nothing, the soil structure is wrecked 
completely. The gateways are 30ft wide the water 
pipes are all dug up, there is no chance of it going 
back to how they took it over. You can’t have it both 
ways. You can’t have the high rent and then have it 
back to the way it was. 
 
Characterisation frames are statements made about others; they centre on 
assumed traits, positive or negative, about a different individual or group (Gray, 
2003; Kaufman et al., 2003). The data explored above shows a strong and 
negative characterisation of the horticultural industry with regard to their impact 
of runoff risk. But as we know, characterisation frames are often employed by a 
group to undermine a disputant’s legitimacy and to cast doubt on their 
motivations (Kaufman et al., 2003). In the case of the dairy farmers, exploiting 
others bad practices shifts blame away from their own activities. However, 
evidencing this as a motivation for the discourse would be difficult and I did not 
pursue that line of enquiry. 
 
7.1.3: Summary 
In the discussion above I have shown how farmers frame the causes of diffuse 
pollution risk as a climatic inevitability of increased summer rainfall and from 
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bad land management practices. Thus the cause and responsibility for pollution 
always resides elsewhere. The implication of this discourse therefore might be 
that farmer’s frame diffuse pollution as problem for conservationists. However, 
while the downstream impacts of nutrient laden runoff is not the primary 
concern for farmers the loss of nutrients out the farm system is. As I have 
evidenced above, the sustainability, financial profitability and futurity of a farm 
enterprise relies on the conservation of soil and nutrient resources. In other 
words, farmers frame diffuse pollution as an issue of resource loss rather than 
ecological impact. In this sense farmers are working to reduce runoff as 
earnestly as LPF but simply driven by different motives. 
 
As a way to lead into sections 7.2, which discusses uncertainties faced by LPF, 
I will provide an explanation for why farmers work with risk certainties and LPF 
work with uncertainties. My explanation rests on culturally influenced 
episetmolgical frames, or in other words how knowledge is validated in lay 
(agricultural) and expert (LPF) communities. The identification and recognition 
of uncertainty can only emerge after a process of reflexivity within a group. 
Such process of critical reflection is far less prevalent with agriculture; for 
farmers knowledge is valid if it functions. This is markedly different from a 
scientific culture which is founded on critical, often statistical, analysis of any 
data and knowledge. The claim I make for the lack of uncertainty with 
agricultural discourses around runoff risk is a simple one. That amongst the 
agricultural community there is an absence of reflexivity about knowledge. 
Whereas the self-critical culture in science produces an uncertain reality. The 
implication of this claim is that notions of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity and 
culturally produced and held. 
 
7.2: Loe Pool Forum – Framings & Uncertainties 
I found that, unlike farmers, knowledge about the sources and pathways of 
runoff risk amongst LPF members is highly uncertain and ambiguous. In this 
section I explore the location and nature of these uncertainties and ambiguities. 
To do this I use Brugnach et al (2007: 7) knowledge relationships framework to 
show where the uncertainties and ambiguities are within catchment 
management from expert’s perspective. Brugnach et al (2007) inform us that 
uncertainty can stem from three issues: 1) unpredictability; 2) incomplete 
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knowledge; 3) multiple knowledge frames; in natural, technical or social 
systems. Essentially this framework, as pioneered by Walker et al (2003), helps 
us to identify where uncertainty manifests itself within a system. My key 
observations about the location of uncertainty and ambiguity are listed in Table 
24. 
 
 
(1) Unpredictability 
(2) Incomplete 
Knowledge 
(3) Multiple 
Knowledge Frames 
(A) 
Natural 
Systems 
1A - Climate & Rainfall 
 
2A - Monitoring Data 
2A - Flow pathways 
2A - Pollution 
Apportionment 
 
3A - Thresholds of Risk 
(B) 
Technical 
Systems 
  3B - Causes of Flooding 
3B - Effectiveness & 
Appropriateness of Run-off 
Attenuation Features 
(C) Social 
Systems 
  3C - Pollution Management 
Interventions 
Table 25: Location of Uncertainties and Ambiguities in Management of the Cober Catchment 
 
7.2.1: Unpredictability 
Unpredictability63 is an attribute of reality where the system under consideration 
can behave differently under similar circumstances (Asselt et al., 1999). 
Unpredictability can stem from: 1) natural randomness; 2) social variability; 3) 
behavioural variability (Walker et al., 2003). In the case of LPF, but applicable to 
any catchment, is the uncertainty which arises from unpredictability and natural 
randomness in rainfall and climate patterns.  
 
1A - Climate & Rainfall 
One of the more consistent drivers for diffuse water pollution is rainfall with 
downstream pollution events correlating to rainfall patterns (DEFRA, 2004). So 
in theory identifying the sources and pathways of diffuse pollution is possible by 
tracing problem tributaries in high rainfall events. However, I found that the 
irregular and episodic character of rainfall patterns combined with monitoring 
capabilities means this is not possible and as such is a source of uncertainty. 
For example, the EA in the Cober only conduct spot check monitoring of 
tributaries on a monthly basis which means they often miss pollution events. So 
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 AKA variability, natural randomness, or stochastic or aleatory uncertainty (Cooney, 2012; 
Beven, 2013) 
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while SWW and the public call the EA’s incident Hotline to report pollution 
events there is a lack of monitoring capability to ascertain the incidents origin. 
This is a classic example of where sources of uncertainty interact to breed 
further uncertainties. In this case the unpredictability in rainfall patterns interacts 
with incomplete knowledge about the sources and pathways of pollution 
because of the absence of sufficient monitoring systems.  
 
7.2.2: Incomplete Knowledge 
Incomplete knowledge (AKA epistemic uncertainty) is simple about the 
presence or absence of data on a natural, technical or social system (Beven 
and Alcock, 2012; Walker et al., 2010). Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) broke 
incomplete knowledge down into three categories: 1) inexactness; 2) 
unreliability; 3) ignorance. Recognising a spectrum of incomplete knowledge is 
of course a more sophisticated way to approach this source of uncertainty 
(Walker et al., 2010). 
 
2A - Monitoring Data 
To build on the points made in 1A, the incomplete knowledge stems from two 
sources. Firstly the lack of monitoring points in the Cober and secondly the 
regularity of when that data is collected. Water quality data for the River Cober 
is available to LPF from two sources; the EA and SWW. The EA used to have, 
2000-2010, one continuous monitoring station at Trenear Bridge which recorded 
a variety of chemical elements. However, this data was “collected in an irregular 
fashion across the time period and the station occasionally moved positon to a 
different tributary” (Angus, 2015). The EA now only conduct monthly spot 
monitoring at three points on the Cober. The single continuous data set 
available is from SWW who sample at their intake every minute for the purpose 
of their WTW. However, this monitoring point is in the central part of the 
catchment which means: A) it only captures 50% of potential pollution area; B) it 
cannot differentiate between the multiply upstream tributaries where pollution 
could come from. In summary, uncertainty stems from the incomplete 
knowledge about the sources of pollution because of a lack of comprehensive 
monitoring capabilities. As Angus64 (2015: 31) critiqued in her investigation into 
upstream pollution “due to the irregularity in data collection with particular 
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reference to data from Bodily confluence, validity of some of the conclusions 
drawn is questionable and not as accurate if data was recorded at regular 
intervals”. Thus incomplete knowledge does not just stem from an absence of 
data but also ‘ignorance’ about where the problem tributaries are due to the 
locations of the monitoring data. 
 
2A - Flow Pathways 
The most comprehensive model of catchment pathways is the Rolling Ball risk 
maps (as discussed in PAR Cycle 8). These proved quite effective in our Walk 
Over exercise 3. They are also regularly used by CWT in the UST project to 
assess potential runoff issues and begin discussions with farmers about risky 
fields. As the field Ecologists (SH, 2015) said, “they [Rolling Ball] are useful 
maps because they make the invisible visible”. However, inexactness and 
unreliability are two sub sources of uncertainty within the Rolling Ball maps. 
Inexactness stems from a lack of empirical data in the model. So in some 
places the map shows straight lines of risk pathways (see Figure 57). 
Unreliability stems from the inability of the model to account for hedges and 
banks which alter the pathway. As a result, as the CWT Officer (LG, 2015) said, 
these maps “always need local interpretation of landscape claims, often you find 
that things aren’t just so. Ground truthing is always necessary”. Uncertainty 
within the issue of flow pathways stems from inexactness and unreliability. 
These sources of uncertainty also interact with the absence of an up to date 
data of land use which would help identify potential sources. As the CWT 
Officer (LG, 2015) said “the landscape is constantly changing in terms of use, 
any map immediately becomes out of date; makes it difficult for us to know 
where the priority areas are”. 
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Figure 57: Inexactness in the Rolling Ball Model 
 
2A - Pollution Apportionment 
The final issue of incomplete knowledge with regard to the natural system, is 
with how the sources of pollution are apportioned. Apportioning where pollution 
comes from is important so LPF know where to target interventions. 
Apportionment is discussed by LPF in two ways. Firstly, apportioned in terms of 
tributaries and secondly with regard to point or diffuse sources. Apportionment 
could of course include a plethora of different pollutants. The EA focus on 
phosphate because it is the primary driver for eutrophication and a proxy for 
other pollutants. But, there are two types of phosphate (Total P or Ortho P) so 
apportionment depends of which one is focused. River standards and targets 
use Ortho P while Lake standards and targets use Total P. So in 2012 the EA 
set up Total P monitoring on the three tributaries to Loe Pool i.e. the Cober, 
Carminowe Creek and Penrose Stream. Due to reduced available resources the 
data set was small with 2 results for each site in 2013, 6 results in 2014 and 4 
results in 2015. The EA then used the OECD lake model excel spreadsheets to 
calculate the current and target loads for Loe Pool65. These estimated 
apportioned loadings (for 2014) are set out in Table 25. However, the EA’s 
Environmental Planning Officer (DH, 2015) who conducted this analysis said 
that “what the model says is not supported by the ‘in lake’ data. We need further 
                                            
65
 The EA were able to calculate that the Total P load to the Loe is 3000 Kg/year. This is three 
times higher than the WFD targets which require 1129 Kg/year or the SSSI targets which 
require 959 Kg/year. So roughly this means that a Total P load reduction of 2/3 of the current 
load is required to meet the in lake standards. 
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refining of the model and more data on flows I think. But with such a limited data 
set the model may not be able to reliably predicted lake concentration”. 
Essentially the incomplete knowledge has prevented accurate pollution 
apportionment. 
 
Tributary % Flow % Load (Total P) 
Cober 89% 71% 
Carminowe 7% 26% 
Penrose 4% 3% 
Table 26: Total P Loading to Loe Pool for 2014 
 
‘Further refining’ of the loadings modelling was later conducted by the EA’s 
Environmental Monitoring Officer in 2015. As Table 26 shows the loading for 
each tributary is significantly different from the previous model. But as the EA 
Monitoring Officer (JD66, 2015) said “confidence is low in these figures as 
samples were not taken on the same days so direct site comparisons were not 
possible and there were not enough results to make using the average 
concentrations/loading statistically robust”. To summaries the, uncertainty in 
understanding of pollution apportionment is due to incomplete knowledge (i.e. 
water quality data).  
 
Tributary % Load (Total P) 
Cober 58% 
Carminowe 39% 
Penrose 3% 
Table 27: Revised Total P loadings for Loe Pool 
 
7.2.3: Multiple Knowledge Frames 
Multiple knowledge frames refers to ambiguity where there is a “presence of 
multiple possible interpretations of a situation, which are sensible and equally 
valid” (Brugnach & Ingram, 2012: 61). In the evidence I now discuss, I argue 
that these multiple knowledge frames originate from not only stakeholders 
substance frames but also their risk and epistemological frames. 
 
3A - Thresholds of Risk 
In this section I discuss how ambiguity can be a product of different risk frames. 
As we know, depending on an actor’s standpoint, the level and extent of risk is 
likely to be different (Kaufman et al, 2003). Ambiguity became particularly 
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conspicuous when LPF, at a Catchment Group meeting in 2012, considered the 
issue of chemical levels in the river and the thresholds of risk for different 
stakeholders. In the first example I discuss the ambiguity between SWW and 
the EA about the risk thresholds for ammonia and phosphate levels (mg/L) in 
the Cober. As previously outlined, SWW primary relationship with diffuse 
pollution is the risk it poses to the drinking water supply; the EA’s primary 
relationship to diffuse pollution is the risk it poses to achieving WFD GES status 
and discharge regulations. The following discussion was between NE HLS 
Advisor (JC), SWW Chief Water Scientists (SW) and CWT Manager (CM):   
 
JC: The next action Steve was to ensure the procedure 
was in place for each peak event.  
SW: They are getting reported. I have a meeting with their 
managers and will reiterate the need for all events to 
be reported to the EA hotline.  
JC: Did they see that as a useful thing to have the two 
data sets linked? 
SW: Yes, but as we have discussed many times. There is 
anomaly between the trigger which is of a risk to us 
and one which is an environmental risk. The guys 
probably need reminding, it is a low level diffuse 
ammonia problem for us, that you [talking to EA 
Officer] are not really concerned about. But we are. 
Every time we get a rainfall event it triggers an 
ammonia spike which means the water works get 
shut down. We understand that they are different 
drivers but it does pose a problem to us.  
CM:  If there is enough evidence we can act on it. 
SW: I will make sure they keep reporting the ones above 
0.2 (mg/L) usually we just report over the bigger ones 
above 1.0 (mg/L) which is a definite event. 
CM: It does need to be a significant enough event for us to 
respond to.  
JC:  It’s how you define significant isn’t it.  
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CM: If this continues on with a pattern then it is obviously 
something we can look at.  
SW: It’s the big ones we talk to you about and you 
respond admirable but it’s the low level ones which 
are not significant for you but do pose a problem for 
us. The ones which are above 0.2 (mg/L) affects the 
disinfection process; however, we do understand that 
they are not environmentally significant. We used to 
report all events but we now only report higher ones 
because they cause us both an issue.  
 
There are three important points to make about this exchange. Firstly, that 
diffuse pollution is not a homogenous risk. It is multifaceted and relationally 
dependent on a stakeholder’s risk frame. It is multifaceted in that the risk is 
actually constituted of various chemicals and ‘relational’ in that risk is dependent 
on whether you are trying to produce drinkable water, protect ecology, or 
enforce discharge regulations. Secondly, as the exchange shows, any response 
from the EA to a problem requires ‘evidence’. Diffuse pollution risk is thus not 
an overt reality but has to be constructed through the analysis of water 
monitoring data. However, as shown discussed above section, SWW only 
monitor at the drinking water outtake and the EA only spot monitor on the three 
different tributaries (critically discussed in section 8.2). This means that even if 
SWW could ‘evidence’ a significant event then identifying the exact source, or 
multiple sources, would be difficult. Thirdly, the Catchment Group meeting 
served as an effective forum to discuss this ambiguity, not simply for SWW to 
flag the point again with the EA but for the rest of the stakeholders to hear and 
understand the different relations these agencies have with the same chemical. 
In a follow up interview with SW I pursued this point about the EA having 
different risk thresholds and he explained how it also applied to pesticides.  
 
TW: So the agencies assign different levels of risk to 
different chemicals? 
SW: What I would say is that the water quality triggers for 
water supply might be out of kilter to the 
environmental quality triggers. For example ammonia 
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causes us an issue at 0.2 (mg/L), but it’s not until 3 
(mg/l) that it’s an issue for the EA. Their statutory 
obligation is different. If you look at pesticide use in 
the catchment for example, we are concerned with 
all pesticides which are used in that catchment. The 
EA only target those who are on statute books, those 
who are controlled under regulation.  
 
There was another layer of complexity to this ambiguity. The ecological 
threshold of risk, with regard to phosphate levels, is lower than the threshold of 
risk for SWW’s water treatment process. SW explained in a later catchment 
group meeting that phosphate is a “low priority parameter” for SWW. This is 
because it is only when concentration of phosphates rises above 100 (mg/L) 
that the coagulation processes in drinking water treatment plants may be 
adversely affected (Laws, 1993); whereas, for LPF phosphate is a key target 
nutrient as the LPF Ecologist explained. 
 
JD: Historically, up until the 1990’s, there was 300 (mg/L) 
coming into the Loe, now we are down to about 80 
(mg/L) and we are aiming towards 20 (mg/L). That’s 
the target for LPF and the NT. The EA and everyone 
else have their own targets but they are almost all 
the same. We concentrate on phosphate as a 
nutrient, rather than nitrogen, because it hangs 
around longer and is easier to measure, it’s not so 
changeable and if you can limit out phosphorus you 
can limit out everything else as well.  
 
The point that I have made above through examples is that ambiguity occurs 
because of stakeholders’ different risk frames. Wrapped up in this issue of risk 
thresholds and targets is the relationship science has with producing a risk 
itself. For example, phosphate is not just the chosen target nutrient for LPF 
because of its ecological risk but also because it’s “easier to measure” 
compared to nitrogen. Therefore producing a risk target is not simply the result 
of an impact assessment but is also determined by the technological monitoring 
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capabilities of science. Rather than risk being produced based on the ‘source, 
pathway and receptor model’ it is also affected by the capacity of science to 
properly evidence a risk with an acceptable level of certainty.  The resulting 
situation is that phosphate is used as proxy for other ‘risky’, but scientifically 
immeasurable, nutrients such as nitrogen. This argument is reiterated in the 
following exchange where SW discusses how the problem of risk identification 
lies in the quality and quantity of available data. 
 
JC: Do you want to want to update us on SWW drinking 
water intake? 
SW: Only that things haven’t changed, we still get low 
level ammonia shut downs following rainfall events.  
JD:  Has it been worse with this summer being wetter? 
SW: No, the problem with the data sets is the same. It’s a 
limited data set, spot samples are taken monthly for 
phosphorous. You only get 12 a year, you get some 
and you don’t get some. Phosphorous in terms of 
water is a low priority parameter; it’s not a great 
driver. We haven’t got that level of monitoring. But 
what we have got is and we will continue to report is 
the ammonia events that we have; we understand 
the limitations with that. So things are the same as 
they were. But you could say that on a catchment 
scale from our perspective for quite a while.  
 
On this extract above my points are twofold. Firstly, that ambiguity in catchment 
management is a result of different relations to chemical levels in the water and 
the respective needs and priorities of different stakeholders. Secondly, that risk 
identifying and responding to risk is inextricably linked to the capabilities of 
monitoring science.  
 
3B - Causes of Flooding 
There are two framings of cause of flooding in Helston (see 8.3.2 for 
comprehensive discussion on differing diagnostic framings) and in this section I 
pull apart the uncertainties which underpin them. As will be explained in section 
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8.3.2 the EA frame flooding as a downstream issue, whereas LPF frame it as an 
upstream issue. I argue this uncertainty essentially stems from ‘model 
structure’. What I mean by this that there is a difference in the two groups about 
understanding of the behaviour of the system and the interrelationships among 
its elements (Walker et al., 2000). I demonstrate this claim though using 
extracts from a LPF meeting and subsequent interviews. 
 
In a LPF meeting LPF CGM (6/11/12) DW (EA Environmental Planning Officer) 
noted that “EA research shows that the Cober catchment was fully saturated 
during flood events last January, so changes in land use and soil management 
best practice would not be beneficial to that particular flood type. There is 
currently no evidence showing that agricultural run-off is a specific issue in the 
Cober catchment; this is with the exception of Mousehole were evidence points 
to the influence of upstream land management”. The retort to this, in the 
meeting, was a question about the model structure and its efficacy by the LPF 
consultant (JD) “in a small catchment such as Mousehole it is relatively simple 
to track pathways and sources, and have simple evidence of flood issues.  In 
the Cober, longer pathways from field source to stream make gathering this 
evidence more difficult.  SWW suspended soils, ammonia and pesticide records 
for flood periods do show that agricultural run-off is an issue in the catchment 
for drinking water”. These excerpts show how there is competing interpretations 
around cause, effect and evidence. But these excerpts also evidence how 
‘expert models’ come into conflict when well informed individuals, working for a 
voluntary catchment group, bring equally valid local knowledge which has also 
been informed, in the case of LPF, by an understanding of other successful 
upstream thinking projects. For example, the NE Lead Advisor (JC) said “the EA 
always quote the Boscastle flood [2004] where evidence suggested that that 
soil infiltration rates/land use did not necessarily have a significant impact in 
extreme storm events as there is no time for this volume of water to be 
absorbed. But that is not the Cober! Risk is locally specific and there are many 
projects like the Belford which shows it does work” (JL, 2012). 
 
Agreeing with the core LPF members some later modelling was done by Dr Ilya 
Maclean (UoE) on the 2012 flood event (in Helston) which showed how 
upstream land management would make a difference to both flooding and 
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pollution events. See Figure 58 which shows that “if the catchment wasn’t 
covered intensive agricultural land there would be no flood risk” (IM, 2015). IM 
(2015) argument was that “flood events are caused by run-off, which is high 
during periods of high rainfall when the land is intensively managed, but would 
this would mostly absorbed by the soil when the land is covered in trees etc., 
partly because the soil isn’t saturated”. IM and the EA discussed this modelling 
in 2015. The point of contention comes down to the EA’s assumption that whole 
catchment is saturated in flood events. IM had a problem with this and strongly 
argued that the “0% event when the catchment is totally saturated never occurs 
and that there are always steep sloped which have unsaturated soil”.  
 
Figure 58: Influence of land use on flood risk in 2012 
 
As a human geographer I am in no position to say which model structure is 
right. And as Walker et al (2003) noted it’s possible that neither parties are 
entirely correct on their model structure. What I am qualified to do as a human 
geographer is highlight how this presents a source of uncertainty for the 
management of the Cober. A source of uncertainty which has to date 
prevented, because of the EA’s hegemonic position in catchment management, 
initiatives that LPF would like to see such as “upstream interventions to improve 
water quality and reduce flood risk under some of the storm event scenarios 
with other multiple conservation benefits” (JD, 2014). As I now elaborate on in 
3B. 
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3B - Effectiveness & Appropriateness of Run-off Attenuation Features 
Run-off Attenuation Features (RAFs) are low cost, soft engineered catchment 
modifications, including bunds, ponds, traps, leaky dams, physical wetlands 
(Barber and Quinn, 2012). They are designed to slow, store and filter run off 
from agricultural land in order to reduce flood risk, improve water quality and 
create new habitats and biodiversity (Barber and Quinn, 2012). Within the 
Cober there are two knowledge frames about the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of RAF’s. As trailed above, the core LPF members are in 
favour of employing RAF’s while the EA’s Flood Defence Officer (RD, 2014) 
said “they would be ineffective in the Cober, also they could be 
counterproductive and increase Helston flooding”. Contrary to this local 
assessment are the conclusions from the Belford Catchment Solutions Project 
which explained how installing RAFs can reduce concentrations of suspended 
sediment, phosphorus and nitrate in run-off. However, a less referenced point 
from this project is that the study also showed how there as a lack of retention 
of any pollutants during storm events, this was attributed to the remobilisation of 
previously deposited material (Barber & Quinn, 2012). There was also an 
answered question about bund or pond failure. This is what the Flood Defence 
Officer (RD, 2014) was referring to with “increased Helston flooding”. RD’s point 
was that “under extreme events these ‘offline’ ponds can fail and cause a 
surge”. The retort to this, agreed on by all core LPF members, was aired by the 
NT Lead Ranger (MH, 2014) “it’s about uncertainty, the EA hate uncertainty. My 
lay opinion is that Helston keeps flooding and this concrete and steel stuff in St 
Johns [the area of Helston which floods] just seems a bit medieval now”. What 
we can draw from this is that the underlying epistemological frames in the two 
parties affect their ambition to think upstream and employ RAF’s. To be specific, 
LPF’s position is that ‘we should take that risk as other strategies just haven’t 
worked’, whereas for the EA there needs to be substantial and certain evidence 
for its success. The EA’s wider point was that “every catchment is different in 
terms of geology and different land practices; these need to be acutely 
considered if you’re going to get flow attenuation right” (RD, 2014). 
 
I now move on to consider the practical issues for the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of RAF’s. For example an EA specialist in catchment modelling 
questioned the appropriateness of RAF’ considering the Cober’s topography 
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and geology; “its such rapid response catchment, if you look at the hydrograph 
there is such little delay between rainfall events and peak flow at Helston” (JB, 
2015). As the Rolling Ball map shows, the Cober is characterised by numerous 
small tributaries. There is thus a question about effectiveness of RAF’s, what 
scale they would need to be on and practical questions about delivery. As the 
EA’s Environment Officer (AB, 2015) explained, with regard to scale and 
delivery, “you would need a huge number of RAF’s, to make a difference; and 
that’s a lot of farmer engagement”. As stated in Chapter 6 (Cycle 11) there are 
170 registered land owners in the Cober and thus installing RAF’s would take 
huge resources in terms of farmer engagement time. To add to this challenge 
there may be some resistance for ‘re-wilding’ and re-wetting areas and thus 
each engagement would require carefully negotiation with the farmer about their 
own needs and priorities; all which would take significant personnel time. This is 
different to the Belford example where one water company owned the entirety 
of the catchment so engagement cost was minimal. The other problem, from a 
practical perspective, is that any RAF intervention may have a delayed benefit 
downstream. For a polemic example, trees take many years to grow before 
becoming effective runoff attenuation features. So for the EA who have to be 
‘seen to be acting’ this delay in effectiveness raises a practical barrier to their 
endorsement. In summary, the uncertainties in delivering RAF’s make it difficult 
to propose as a cost-effective, evidence based and timely solution to the 
pollution and flooding issues. 
 
3C - Pollution Management Interventions 
With regard to the social system I found multiple knowledge frames about 
pollution management interventions. The following example I use to 
demonstrate this claim is from the second stop on Walk Over exercise 2 in the 
northern part of the catchment (see PAR Cycle 2). The key issue here (see 
Figure 60) was the runoff from a daffodil field (source - circled in red), which 
exited through a gate way, onto a road and directly ran down (pathway - orange 
line) to the Cober (receptor – yellow line) (see Figure 59). 
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
212 
 
 
Figure 59: Annotated OS map of Walk Over 2 
 
Figure 60: Photograph of controversial runoff incident 
 
The following exchange demonstrates the wide range of opinions about severity 
of the diffuse pollution risk issue at site two: 
 
JC: If there are thousands of these in the catchment it’s 
going to affect St Johns67, I am convinced it is.  
BH: But this really isn’t a big issue. We will see much 
worse as the day does on.  
JC: But looking at that running off there now! A thousand 
of these is going to add up. 
                                            
67
 St Johns is an estate in Helston prone to flooding. 
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TF: The question is, at what point does this small flow 
which is full of pesticide and fertiliser become a point 
source issue? When does it become a regulatory 
issue? 
BH: The thing that I am trying to come back to is that they 
are complying. 
JC:  Are they?  
JD:  Yes 
BH: It will be a long time before anything like this is seen 
as a problem by the RPA [Rural Payments Agency]. 
JC: I think the farmer will know this is a bit of an issue. 
It’s our job to push it up his priority list. 
BH:  But he will say that the water has to go somewhere.  
JC:  I don’t know why you are making excuses for him. 
BH: The reason I am playing devil’s advocate is that I 
was in Marazion the other day and I was stood in a 
gateway which was so deep in silt you could lose a 
small child in there. The farmer wasn’t doing 
anything about it. Highways weren’t doing anything 
nor the EA. So I come here and just think phewa. 
JD:  Yeah, if it’s not up to my knees it’s not bad enough. 
 
The primary observation here is the disagreement about the severity of risk. BH 
and JD see the risk as minor while JC and TF see the risk as severe. In this 
case differences in risk perception originate from individuals’ knowledge about 
current diffuse pollution issues both locally and regionally. As farm advisors, 
working across West Cornwall, BH (CSF) and JD (UST) have a wide base of 
experience to pull on for assessing on the pollution risk. Their knowledge of 
severe issues happening throughout Cornwall and the RPA’s cross compliance 
regime leads them to question the severity of the risk. Conversely, JC (Natural 
England) questions the level of compliance but also frames the problem slightly 
differently; JC is not just concerned with pollution but also the cumulative effects 
of such runoff incidents for flooding in St Johns (high risk area for flooding in 
Helston). Essentially the conflict in perception of risk arises because of the 
different relations to and knowledge of diffuse pollution held by agency staff. 
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This extract also illustrates the contingent and un-regulatable characteristics of 
diffuse pollution risk. It is contingent in the sense that if we had passed this field 
on a day when it was not raining we would not have stopped because of the 
relatively low runoff flow. It is un-regulatable in the sense that the farmer is 
complying with the Soil Protection Review as part of the RPA compliance 
regime. In a debrief discussion at the Blue Anchor Pub in Helston the 
discussion continued about how runoff issues, like those found at site two, 
should be dealt with. A particularly heated exchange ensued about the solutions 
for such issues; regulatory action or farmer engagement. Again, this extract 
demonstrates how diffuse pollution is framed differently: 
 
RD: Water has to be returned to the river of a certain 
quality, why are farms allowed to irrigate and pollute 
as we have seen today? Essentially they have used 
the rain water for a process and dirtied it. 
BH: You’re right to an extent, they are not allowed what we 
saw today. But you have to show that is the fault of 
the farmer. 
TW: What we saw today was not a conscious effort of 
putting dirty water back, it was because of the 
conditions. 
RD: No, it is because the farmer is applying an 
industrialised process; that is the reason for the dirty 
water.  
CM:  But that’s diffuse pollution, everyone pumping out a 
little bit. 
RD: The question is then, is there possibility of 
enforcement, we are talking about direct action really. 
All:   Everyone roles their eyes. 
TF: You would want to go down that route after you have 
exhausted all the other routes. 
RD: But [to the CWT Ecologist], your reaction to the daff 
runoff was that it was nothing.  
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The key piece of evidence in this exchange was nonverbal; it was the group’s 
physical reaction – eye rolling – to RD’s suggestion that punitive action was the 
solution. JD, BH, and CM saw the issues from completely the opposite 
perspective with enforcement being the very last option. TF agreed that 
enforcement should only be used once all the other options had been 
exhausted. In a later discussion back in the car park I enquired why everyone 
‘rolled their eyes’ to RD’s point. JD said “it’s a regressive suggestion, it’s as if he 
doesn’t understand the diffuse pollution management or what we are trying to 
do with the catchment based approach”. In this conversation JD, BH and CM 
had three rationales for their objection of punitive action: i) it had been an 
extremely wet period therefore some runoff is inevitable; ii) going down the 
enforcement route closes doors to the farming community; iii) fining farmers, 
who are struggling to financially cope, is only going to hamper efforts to deal 
with the runoff. What I have demonstrated above is that agency staff not only 
see the severity of the risk differently but also that they frame the issues 
differently in terms of risk responses. Essentially though, LPF core members 
(represented by JD and BH) contest the suggestion that such an incident should 
be managed through administrative rationalism and what Dryzek (2005) terms 
regulatory mechanisms. 
 
7.2.4: Summary 
Through section 7.2 I have used the Brugnach et al (2007) ambiguity framework 
explore the location and nature of uncertainties and ambiguities in catchment 
management. There are four specific conclusions I need to flesh out. Firstly, 
sources of uncertainty interact with each other; this is what Hoek et al (2014) 
term ‘cascade uncertainty’. For example I found that unpredictability in the 
natural system about rainfall patterns interacted with incomplete knowledge 
about flow pathways and pollution apportionment in turn breeding new more 
complex uncertainties. This example also showed how there is no clear 
distinction possible between the subsystems (i.e. natural, technical, social). 
Indeed, I showed how in reality there is interdependence between subsystems 
and which have ramifications for the nature of uncertainty. Nevertheless, I 
would argue alongside Asselt et al (1999) that researchers using frameworks of 
ambiguity and uncertainty help make and communicate difficult ideas and 
complex realities more tangible. 
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Secondly, to build on this previous point of interrelated sources of uncertainty, I 
would agree with Beven and Alcock (2012) and Hoek et al (2014) that the 
paradigm shift in water governance towards favours ‘nature-inclusive’ and 
‘stakeholder engaged’ management strategies has increased the sources of 
uncertainty. For example in the Cober, nature inclusive strategies such as 
RAF’s require considering local catchment topologies and geologies to ensure 
they are effective and ‘safe’. Similarly, stakeholder engagement has meant that 
the number of ‘risk thresholds’ to consider and manage for has increased. 
However, what I would argue is that local partnerships such as LPF provide a 
suitable space to work through these geographically specific issues in relation 
to available data and different stakeholder needs. To elaborate, LPF provides a 
space where different framings can be aired but also where a consensus for 
action can be reached. I do not mean a consensus in terms of unilateral 
agreement. I refer to a consensus which is more nuanced. In that while all 
stakeholders needs may not be addressed with a participant catchment 
decision there is a consensus that this is the best step forward given the current 
‘evidence’ and resources. 
 
The third point to make is that the applying the concept of ambiguity offers a 
profound method to reveal intricacies of different stakeholders relations to risk. 
Not only would I say that risk has no meaning independent of knowledge 
relationships (Brugnach et al., 2008; Hoek et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2007) I 
would argue that risk management is relational to each stakeholders 
epistemological frame and their ambition to work with uncertainty rather than 
cite it as a barrier for action. The fourth, and final, conclusion I wish to make is 
with regard to ‘incomplete knowledge’. What I have observed so far in 
catchment decision making (from the more positivist stakeholders) is, to 
paraphrase a discourse, ‘if only we had more data and better modelling we 
would be able to make that decision’. I would argue this comes back to Beck’s 
(2007: 15) point about reflexive modernity which for LPF means “living with 
ineradicable non-knowing”. Not only has the data I have presented challenged 
the efficacy of risk based thinking in catchment management but it has also 
pointed to how LPF may never know completely and it’s about moving forward 
despite the uncertainty. 
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7.3: Mobilising Collective Action 
In the section above I have discussed the different framings of diffuse pollution 
risk in relative isolation. The CaBA, underpinned by principles of IWRM, though 
is never simply about managing one type of risk but rather it involves 
considering a variety of often competing risks. In the case of the Cober 
catchment the two major risks to be managed are water pollution and flooding. 
In the following section I examine ambiguity in the process partnership working 
to deliver two catchment management plans. Catchment management plans 
are documents which are developed in response to a particular risk and set out 
the actions through which that risk will be reduced. As trailed in the Chapter 6, 
the two plans I have followed are the West Cornwall Catchment Flood 
Management Plan (2012), to be delivered locally through the Helston Flood 
Alleviation Scheme (FAS), and the Loe Pool Water Level Management Plan 
(WLMP). In essence this process of governance is about how LPF, a ‘voluntary’ 
catchment partnership who are driven by a water pollution issue and work at the 
catchment scale, interact or ‘work in partnership’, with a ‘statutory’ catchment 
group who are primarily driven by reducing flood risk. For conceptual leverage 
and in order to sensibly structure the discussion of findings I draw from Eaton et 
al’s (2014: 233) three task process for successful mobilisation of collective 
action; 1) diagnostic framing; 2) prognosis framing; 3) motivational framing. 
Through this section I also further develop the notion of ‘epistemological frames’ 
to explore the root causes of the conflicts and controversies in catchment 
management. 
 
7.3.1: Substance Frames 
Considering the FAS and WLMP and the respective priorities of different expert 
agencies, it is possible to list the group’s substance frames. Substance frames 
refer to the actual issues and how disputants relate to them (Dewulf et al., 2004; 
Shmueli, 2008). Within my case study catchment there are numerous 
stakeholders with varying substance frames. With the exception of the EA the 
stakeholders can be crudely sorted into two groups on the grounds of whether 
flood risk (blue) or ecological risk (green) is their priority substance frame. There 
is no need to labour this simple point but, as would be expected, depending on 
a stakeholders’ frame determines whether they prioritise the delivery of the FAS 
or the WLMP. As a reminder of the observations made in the PAR Chapter, I 
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have reinserted the table of key stakeholders, their responsibilities and priority 
interests. 
 
Stakeholders Responsibilities  Priority Interests  
   
Environment 
Agency 
 Flood warning and defence 
 Delivery of WFD GES targets  
 Environmental regulatory 
compliance by business and 
publics 
 Helston flood risk 
 WFD GES targets for Lower 
& Upper Cober water 
bodies 
 
   
Cornwall Council   Flood defence  Helston flood risk 
   
Helston Town 
Council 
 Flood defence  Helston flood risk 
Natural England 
 Designation and conservation of 
SSSI, AONB, and NNR’s 
 Delivery of environmental advice 
and grant aid to agriculture 
 Loe Pool & Bar SSSI 
targets  
 Loe Pool & Loe Bar 
biodiversity 
   
Cornwall Wildlife 
Trust 
 Conservation management 
 Delivery of environmental advice 
to businesses and publics 
 Habitat and biodiversity in 
Loe Pool & Loe Bar 
 
   
National Trust 
 Conservation of landscapes for 
environmental and social value 
 Biodiversity in Loe Pool 
 Public access to Loe Pool 
  
   
Table 28: Overview of stakeholders’ substance frames 
 
7.3.2: Controversies in Diagnostic Framing 
There is a long-standing controversy in how the flood risk in Helston is 
diagnosed by the different stakeholders. This is a crucial issue to consider 
because of its ramifications for delivering the FAS and the WLMP as risk 
reducing strategies. Historically the cause of flood risk in Helston has been 
diagnosed as an issue of ‘water backing up’ in the Loe and this led to the 
practice of cutting a channel through Loe Bar to allow the lake to drain out to 
sea. This was originally done in the winter time by Helston town folk with 
shovels and later with bulldozers68 (see Figure 61). From 1986 onwards a 
series of hard engineering solutions have been delivered to speed water flow 
away from Helston and lower the lake level in winter; including installation of 
penstocks on the Bar and channelization of the Cober. I now analyse the 
nuances within different stakeholders’ diagnosis of Helston’s flood risk. 
                                            
68
 For a full historically account of ‘cutting the bar’ see the LPF website I developed 
http://loepool.org/loe-bar/  
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Figure 61: Photograph of cutting Loe Bar in 1979 (Davies, 2013) 
 
Helston Council & Public 
The diagnosis that Helston flooding is caused from water backing up is strongly 
held by the Helston Town Councillors. As Councillor Williams noted recently 
“there has been much work done on clearing and protecting the banks of the 
River Cober by the fairground car park…They've (EA) done a brilliant job so far 
and I'm very pleased with the progress…What I'd like to see now is the level of 
Loe Pool controlled. That would stop the flooding from Lidl [supermarket] up to 
that area of town”. The EA Environment Officers working in the catchment also 
noted how the majority of calls they receive69 from the public are about the 
“blockages downstream of the boating lake causing flood risk” (CM, 2013). 
According to opinions expressed in LPF meetings the council’s diagnosis 
primarily stems not from a consideration of ‘science’ but rather from the historic 
narrative of flood risk diagnosis. This historical narrative forms the Councils 
epistemological framing of risk diagnosis.  
 
This is what DeSilvey (2012: 31) terms ‘anticipatory history’ whereby “prevailing 
narratives tend to project long-term conservation indefinitely forward into the 
future”. Indeed, the narrative of ‘water backing up’ and the practice of ‘cutting 
the bar’ has been prevalent position for over 200 years. DeSilvey’s (2012: 31) 
central point is that these narrative formulations can fall short when confronted 
with the impending transformation because of accelerated environmental 
                                            
69
 Received and logged through the EA’s Common Incident Classification System (CICS). 
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change; i.e. the increased flood risk associated with precipitation scenarios 
driven by climate change. There is of course a parallel argument within the risk 
literature in that if we rely on our affective processes based on past experience 
and emotion then we may struggle to anticipate future and time delayed risks. I 
make this point here because the Council, representing the diagnosis of the 
local community more widely, has had marked influence on the pursuit of hard 
engineering solutions. While their diagnosis may be valid it has focused 
attention on downstream rather than upstream problems and solutions. LPF’s 
position is that this has been a barrier to long term flood resilience i.e. delivering 
upstream flow attenuation through innovative land management.  
 
Environment Agency 
The EA’s end diagnosis is the same, i.e. flood risk is a downstream not 
upstream issue, but their reasoning is much more sophisticated. The crux of 
their argument is based on analysis of lake level monitoring data in comparison 
with water level data at the Cober at St Johns. Analysis shows that flood events 
correlate to lake levels and thus points to the, historically accepted, conclusion 
that flood risk is primarily driven by ‘water backing up’ from the lake. The EA 
also note that flooding is exacerbated by the narrow river channel and the how 
the low sided walls allow the river to spill into the residential area. An alternative 
hypothesis is that flood risk is caused by flow dynamics of the catchment. The 
EA have considered this diagnosis by modelling the catchment’s flow patterns 
and hydrographs. The EA’s conclusion is that land management upstream, i.e. 
flow attenuation, makes no difference to the peak flow on the hydrograph at 
Helston. The interesting point here is the assumptions in the EA’s catchment 
flood model; the model assumes that the catchment is 100% saturated. 
However, as I have discussed in section 8.2 this is an ambiguous issue and one 
which has been challenged by different models. Never the less it the EA’s 
resulting diagnosis.  
 
Loe Pool Forum 
LPF’s diagnosis of flood risk is markedly different. In the first instance they 
contest the number of properties claimed to be at risk. The CFMP states there 
are “200 properties at risk”, the EA state that “between 40 and 63 properties are 
at risk depending on the model used” (i.e. a model based on 1:50 year or 1:100 
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year rainfall event) at a cost of £1,875,600 (LLC meeting minutes 30/11/2012). 
Whereas based on observation a LPF representative, crucially a St Johns 
resident, stated “I have seen 5 or 6 properties in St Johns Road flooded in the 
past 20 years, but that is probably not relevant” (JD, 2015). There are a couple 
of interesting points to be made about this statement in relation to risk. Firstly 
that this analytical analysis, i.e. modelling, of risk produced a vastly different 
assessment compared to affective processes, i.e. JD’s 20 year observations. 
But as we know risk is not just about what has happened but what could 
happen in the future. Secondly, JD being a scientist purposively hedged the 
statement; “but that is probably not relevant” (JD, 2015).  After four years of 
working with JD I can state that this snippet of comment is the indicative of the 
epistemological tension scientific practitioner’s face ‘on the ground’. That is, 
while JD knows something from ‘experience’ it cannot be used to guide 
catchment management until there is corroborative ‘scientific evidence’.  
 
The bigger point is that LPF contest the diagnosis of flooding as an issue of 
water backing up. They see the problem as one of upstream land management. 
From an interview about the flooding in 2013 the LPF project manager noted 
how “there was a similar flood to this [2012] on new year’s day 2003 which 
flooded to people’s doors in a similar way in St Johns road. But the flooding in 
2003 was not about the pool it was about a cloud burst above Heston and it was 
the water coming down the river”. Again, this diagnostic claim is underpinned by 
observation rather than modelling data; so remains ‘irrelevant’ for informing the 
FAS. This is because ‘scientific evidence’ is a prerequisite for knowledge 
participation in catchment management; a claim which is discussed at great 
depth in Chapter 9. Another, admittedly ‘non-scientific’, argument put forward by 
the NT Property Manager was that “despite 200 years of cutting Loe Bar and 50 
years of canalisation and debris clearing in the Cober, Helston still floods” (AC, 
2013). Similar to the LPF project manager AC’s claim implies that flood risk is 
an upstream rather than ‘water backing up’ problem. The crux of LPF’s 
contention about the EA’s diagnosis is that their risk model is “based on a 
saturated catchment” (JC, 2015). As discussed in 8.2 the NE lead advisor 
questions this position “I have always challenged this as a) catchments are 
never completely saturated and b) common sense and experience from other 
catchments where interventions have been done (e.g. the Belford project) have 
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shown that they [upstream flow attenuation measures] do make a substantial 
difference” (JC, 2015). All these different diagnosis frames considered the 
resulting situation is one of ambiguity.  
 
7.3.3: Divergent Prognosis Frames 
The differences, controversies even, in diagnostic framing have led to a conflict 
in prognosis framing. Prognosis framing is about the proposed solution to the 
problem and the suggested course of action (Eaton et al., 2014). As previously 
discussed, prognosis frames are determined by diagnosis framing; in other 
words how an actor views the structure of the risk. Prognosis framing is much 
similar to what other framing scholar’s term ‘process frames’ in that they are 
about how stakeholders seek different remedies or resolutions to an issue 
(Kaufman et al., 2003). The aim of studying prognosis or process frames is that 
it reveals how an actor thinks decisions should be made, by whom, and whether 
an actor sees them as fair, inclusive and legitimate (Shmueli., 2008). In the 
following section I consider these issues alongside my newly coined concept of 
‘epistemological frames’. Which I argue, as this section develops, poses a 
barrier to how ambiguity is negotiated and equally how consensual prognosis is 
arrived at, at the catchment scale.  
 
Before I begin it is sensible to provide a synopsis of the prognosis framing. CC 
and the EA diagnose flood risk as one of water level ‘backing up’ and rightly 
want the lake level kept low during winter i.e. penstocks fully open. LPF who 
diagnose the flood risk as lower than 63 properties, see the flood risk cause as 
one of upstream management and desire natural fluctuations in the lake want 
the Penstocks kept at 3.05m AOD in the summer and 3.5m AOD in the winter. 
As should be clear, the conflict in prognosis framing arises because of the 
detrimental ramifications of unnatural fluctuations in lake level for re-
establishing the littoral and submerged flora communities versus the detrimental 
ramifications for flood risk from the lake if its management seeks to mimic 
natural fluctuations. But as comprehensively set out in the LPF case study (see 
Chapter 6), the history of risk management in the Cober catchment has been 
dominated by hard engineering solutions to the flood risk to the detriment of 
pursuing upstream catchment management; as an long term sustainable (i.e. 
benefiting both flood and pollution issues) alterative, or at least supplementary, 
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option. At the heart of the arguments I make in the following section is that it’s 
the dominant stakeholders, i.e. the EA, epistemological frames which raise the 
barrier to progressive and alternative catchment management options, 
suggested by LPF, being considered. 
 
Loe Pool Forum: For a CaBA 
In essence the LPF prognosis is that flood risk should be managed by a 
combination of flow attenuation upstream, through innovative land management 
solutions70, and raising the, currently low, river side walls in St Johns, and more 
controversial that the lake level needs to be returned to having natural 
fluctuations of water levels except in times of severe flood. This argument is 
built on a number of points which I set out now. Firstly that such an approach 
would enable LPF to negotiate a more natural fluctuation for the WLMP. 
Secondly that LPF see the hard engineering solutions, such as dredging of the 
Cober, as ineffective. As AC (2012) noted “they have done on a few occasions 
because of fear it was silting up and causing back flooding. It was a complete 
waste of time and money”. The stretch of Cober dredged passes through the 
Willow Carr.  As this is part of the SSSI, so the second argument LPF make is 
that this is hard engineering is ineffective but also that it is ecologically 
damaging to the invertebrates and spawning fish. Thirdly, and at the heart of 
LPF prognosis, that the CaBA should be pursued over simple hard engineering 
responses to reducing risk. As NT Head Ranger MH (2013), and chair of LPF 
Lake and Lower Group, explained in detail “given that these things [referring to 
heavy rainfall events] appear to be happening more and more regularly, and 
how do you take the community with you on things like that…reconnecting the 
flood plain for example would be great for wildlife but I instinctively think that 
people would say I don’t like that [referring to the community diagnosis of flood 
risk]. That’s the challenge of the catchment based approach. The reality is that if 
we are not getting the catchment management right then we are whistling in the 
wind anyway. It is so much more than the Pool, it’s looking at that whole thing is 
really important”. Nevertheless this ambition to pursue a CaBA in the Cober has 
to be negotiated through the consultation of the FAS. 
 
                                            
70
 Discussed elsewhere but include offline water storage, woodland, reconnecting flood plains 
and reduction of soil compaction inter alia. 
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LPF were engaged and participated in a number of ways in deciding the short 
list of options for the FAS. In a LPF LLC meeting (30/11/2012) DW ran though 
the long list of options seeking approval. The prognosis framing, expressed by 
JC (NE Lead Advisor) and JD (LPF project manager and Ecologist), was logged 
and recorded. Their comments were the following “multiple small-scale water 
storage solutions (e.g. wetland creation) and improvement in catchment land 
management practices would be likely to deliver some flood risk advantages 
and alongside this bring significant benefits for the quality of water Loe Pool, the 
Cober and therefore also to raw drinking water abstracted from the Cober.  It 
would therefore be worth ensuring that these were included in the bid”. The FAS 
(as of 2016) is ongoing so inclusion of such measures cannot be commented 
on. What is worth considering is the epistemological frames which underpin 
LPF’s prognosis. For the NE Lead Advisor and LPF project manager (at the 
time) and Ecologist their prognosis is not just based one flood risk model of the 
catchment. It was constituted from an mix of: 1) local knowledge of flooding 
events; 2) consideration of the integrated catchment management literature; 3) 
heavy scepticisms about the uncertainties in the EA’s generic flood model; 4) 
consideration that previous downstream hard engineering approaches have not 
historically been effective; 5) desire for the natural fluctuation in lake levels. 
 
Environment Agency: For a Hard Engineering Approach 
My central argument here is that the epistemological framing of the EA 
combined with public pressure for action has driven the EA to pursue hard 
engineering solutions for risk management; rather than their own policy of the 
CaBA.  Indeed despite the plethora of evidence for the limited success of hard 
engineering solutions in dynamic systems (Müller-Grabherr et al., 2014) the EA 
are still pursuing such policy. It is therefore imperative to consider why. I begin 
with considering the issue of public pressure. The public diagnosis in Helston 
about the cause of flood risk is that it is an issue of “water backing up”. So the 
continued maintenance of the canalised river has been driven over the years by 
public pressure. As MH (2012) noted “the EA have to be seen by the public to 
be doing something because, as they admitted, there are incessant phone calls 
about river blockages from public… they want to see the rivers clear”. These 
calls are received and logged through the EA’s Common Incident Classification 
System (CICS). Indeed, the continued pursuit of hard engineering solutions, as 
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opposed to a CaBA, is similarly driven by pressure be seen to be “doing 
something about it” (JC, 2015). As JC (2013) also noted “hard engineering has 
material results for the public to see”, later going on to add “I think that the EA 
are coming round to this more integrated catchment approach nowadays but I 
guess that concrete and steel still will be part of any solution when it can be 
‘shown’ to be cost effective to protect property” (JC, 2015). 
 
My second argument for EA’s predisposition for hard engineering solutions 
rests on their epistemological framing.  This epistemological framing originates 
from the EA’s cultural heritage of engineering and modelling science and their 
centres on the need for science and evidence, accompanied with a high degree 
of certainty, to inform decision making71. As the CaBA catchment coordinator 
(TF, 2015) noted about the EA culture “the thing is they are out of their [EA] 
comfort zone in terms of considering farming culture and catchment 
approaches, they are comfortable with evidence and data”. This EA’s 
desideratum for certainty in evidence also prevents negotiation for alterative risk 
management solutions. I specially refer to the potential for installing multiple 
upstream flow attenuation features such as debris dams, trees and offline 
storage ponds. The trouble with these is, from the EA’s perspective, is that they 
are accompanied with a great degree of uncertainty in terms of effectiveness 
and potential benefits are time delayed.  As discussed in 8.2, firstly there is a 
lack of evidence about how upstream flow attenuation is effective in different 
catchments with different geology and different land practices. Secondly any 
management options take huge resources, time and money, to deliver. In the 
Cober catchment there are 170 registered land owners to engage with and any 
intervention may have a delayed benefit downstream. For a polemic example, 
trees take many years to grow before becoming effective runoff attenuation 
features. And even if these measures were effective each farmer has different 
needs and priorities so such cultural factors in, for example, persuading farmers 
to install water harvesting technology may not be wholesale applicable. In 
summary, the uncertainties in delivering a CaBA make it difficult to propose as a 
cost-effective and timely solution to a flooding issue which has been around for 
200 years. As JC (2012) explained “the EA have a strange aversion to 
                                            
71
 This is a major point of discussion which is the focus of Chapter 9. 
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catchment management and an engineering bend, I assume this is because of 
the material results concrete over hedgerows provides”. 
 
7.3.4: Challenges for Motivational Framing 
The third task is motivational framing which is about enrolling others to engage 
in the suggested corrective action. It is understood that the likelihood of success 
of collective action depends on achieving agreement on each of the previous, 
diagnostic and prognosis, framing tasks (Eaton et al., 2014). My start point is 
that LPF were successful in both engaging with and influencing the FAS 
through the Black and Veatch consultation process and subsequent lobbying of 
the EA at LPF meetings. For example LPF were engaged and participated in a 
number of ways in deciding the short list of options for the FAS. The desire for 
natural fluctuations in water level was also logged as a consultation point. The 
success of LPF negotiations was also reflected in the fact that the FAS included 
options so the water level can be managed. Unfortunately, with the consultation 
and costing phase incomplete it is not possible for me to comment on the final 
outcome.  
 
However, it is worth reflecting on the negotiation process of motivational 
framing. I would argue there are a number of reasons for LPF success in getting 
the opportunity to consult. Firstly, LPF, as a partnership, have a 20 year 
relationship in working with regional agencies. As a group their work is 
recognised by the CCP as being progressive in pushing for integrated 
catchment management. Secondly, LPF members are direct agents within 
these governance networks so navigation of the consultation process is familiar. 
Further, that they were also successful in terms of producing and manoeuvring 
scientific documents to further their agenda. This process of ‘consultation’ 
happens over a long period (1998-2016) and through opaque consultant 
reports. Considering the expert nature of LPF membership it raises the question 
how non-expert voluntary partnerships could have participated in the same way; 
an important point which is dealt with in Chapter 9. In summary, by studying 
how the management plans got delivered in the Cober catchment I was able to 
closely consider the challenge of delivering catchment management. My 
conclusion is that, driven by the EA’s epistemological frames, the status quo of 
pursuing hard engineering has been pursued. Ironically this comes down to 
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taking risks; a risk in pursuing the more uncertain policy of upstream integrated 
catchment management. These findings have relevance for not only my case 
study partnership but also for other voluntary partnerships. 
 
7.4: Chapter Conclusion 
Chapter 7 has added to the body of knowledge in three ways. Firstly, I explored 
how the agricultural community frame runoff and diffuse pollution risk. For the 
farmers the causes and impacts were certain; runoff was driven by heavy 
summer rainfall events and exacerbated by bad land management practices of 
others. Secondly, I explored the issues from LPF perspective and found that, 
unlike farmers, knowledge about the sources and pathways of runoff risk 
amongst LPF members is highly uncertain and ambiguous. Thirdly, I examined 
how uncertainties and ambiguities are negotiated through the process of 
catchment management. Through in-depth analysis of different stakeholders 
diagnosis and prognosis frames I showed how and why mobilising collective 
action is challenging for LPF in the context of ambiguity. 
 
The thread which ties these findings together is the, freshly coined, concept of 
epistemological frames. To reiterate, this is that concept that an actor frames a 
risk, makes an assessment of risk and pursues a risk management preference 
dependent on the type of knowledge, empirical or tacit, they trust and rely on for 
decision making. A central conclusion is that uncertainty and ambiguity can only 
exist after a process of critical self/group reflection. As such I claim that the lack 
of uncertainty within agricultural discourses, about causes of diffuse pollution, 
derives from the absence of reflexivity about their own risk knowledge. Whereas 
the self-critical culture in science produces the discourse of uncertainty. The 
wider implication is that the very existence of uncertainty, for a particular group, 
is dependent on the culturally influenced epistemological frame. 
 
To build on this point, I would forward previous claims that risk and uncertainty 
have no meaning independent of the knowledge relationships and 
epistemological frames actors have with/to an environment (Brugnach et al., 
2008; Hoek et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). This conclusion has very practical, 
as opposed to purely academic, consequences for how risk is managed. As 
fully explicated through section 7.3, I demonstrated how the EA’s demands for 
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empirical-objective knowledge of catchment risks have influenced the diagnosis 
and prognosis framing and, in turn, the management actions within the Cober. 
Crucially, I argue that this is to the detriment of delivering innovative and 
integrated catchment management interventions. Instead the result was the 
pursuit of a ‘command and control’ approach with the preference for concrete, 
steel and canalisation. The wider conclusion is that the type of approach taken 
in catchment management is dependent on the epistemological frame of the 
most powerful stakeholder. 
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Chapter 8: Knowing Risk 
 
In this chapter I answer research question two; how do catchment stakeholders 
come to know water risks? I do this by employing the concepts of affect, 
affordance and cultural attunement to examine knowledge practices. The focus 
is on the knowledge practices of two crudely homogenous catchment 
stakeholder groups, the scientific and agricultural communities, and how they 
know risk in the first instance. There are four parts to answering research 
question one. Firstly I examine how the agricultural community come to know 
water, pollution and the associated risks. Secondly I examine how the scientific 
community produce diffuse pollution risk knowledge. Thirdly I bring these two 
accounts together and explore how stakeholders afford different risks to the 
same environment. Fourthly I zoom out of the empirics and consider the 
findings in relation to Beck’s Risk Society and how we know late modern risks. I 
begin by considering agricultural knowledge practices. 
 
8.1: Agricultural Knowledge Practices 
The very notion of diffuse pollution assumes a conservationist framing of water 
and its function for a catchment community; instead I used the more neural term 
of ‘runoff’, as a reference point in interviews, to understand farmer’s 
relationships to water. This is because the term ‘diffuse pollution’ frames the 
issue as downstream impact whereas the term ‘runoff’ is equally sensitive to the 
upstream loss of soil and nutrient resource to a farm business, as well as the 
downstream ‘impacts’. Thus, in order to understand how farmers come to know 
diffuse pollution I begin by simply talking about the relationship between farmers 
and the water environment. Indeed, it has been long observed that the intimate 
relationship between agriculture and the environment distinguishes it from other 
industries (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; Clark and Lowe, 1992). Certainly 
compared to the environmental management sector farmers have a far more 
intimate relationship with water because of its agency over the agricultural 
livelihoods. As a sheep farmer (SH) explained: 
 
SH: Whereas for city people the weather just affects their 
tennis game on the weekend. For a farmer its 7 days 
a week and you are on call 24 hrs a day. You can’t 
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just bugger off as the animals need looking after and 
checking.  
TW: It seems like the weather really gets into farmers in 
an emotional sense through how it affects their 
animals health, as well as profit? 
SH: Yes, if I got invited to work for the Environment 
Agency I would bite their hand off. You’re on a 5 day 
week unless it’s flooding, but even then you are not 
going to get less money when there is a flooding 
incident, you might actually just get overtime. 
 
I begin then with the simple observation that water, in the form of weather, is 
inextricably connected to farming practices and in turn farmer’s livelihoods. For 
farmers, as Rantala et al (2011) noted, rather than weather just being a medium 
between humans and the environment it also holds strong agency by 
manipulating material practices by narrowing or extending opportunity for 
farming. As the father (MV, 2013) of dairy farming family reiterated “I don’t think 
people realise that the weather is the governing factor in farming”. In this sense 
water and how it flows, i.e. ‘runoff’, and its effects are as fundamentally 
important to farmers. As I explained in Cycle 12 of PAR, for farmers ‘water’ and 
‘runoff’ is a very risky issue. The difference lies, between framing of runoff by 
conservationists and farmers, in at what point in waters journey through the 
catchment when it becomes ‘risky’; an observation I build on in Chapter. 
Through farmers discourses around knowing runoff there were five72 recurring 
practices through which farmers read changes in the water environment, 
ascribe affordances, and in turn know water risks: 1) handed down knowledge; 
2) natural and agricultural rhythms; 3) farm infrastructure; 4) cropping; 5) health 
and happiness of stock. The commonality in these sources of farming 
knowledge is that they constituted through real world experience, rather than 
analytical assessments. As Crouch (2001; 2006; 2010), Wakefield (2001) and 
Pile (2010) discussed, affective based risk knowledge is produced through a 
                                            
72
 The action of drawing up this list makes me uncomfortable for its reductionist leanings. So I 
need to emphasise here that in practice farmers are constantly reading the water environment 
and changes which affect farm management. I do not claim this is, by any means, an 
exhaustive list but rather it’s simply reflective of the reoccurring themes in my data. 
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process of everyday encounter; in this data that encounter centres on farm 
environment.  
 
“the most important information source is from their fathers” 
One key theme, with regard to how farmers are able to know the environment, 
and afford risk, was that of ‘handed down knowledge’. For example to my 
question “what is the most important source of knowledge for understanding 
water related risks and farming?” a dairy farmer (AB) answered “historical 
based knowledge would be your main thing. You know your area you know your 
farm you know what it can do and can’t do”. Or as another dairy farming family 
reiterated to the same question; 
 
WC:  Father. He is a good farmer. 
TW:  So the most important information source is from 
fathers? 
GC:  Definitely, it’s got to be passed down. If you were to 
learn it from scratch you would lose hellish money. 
Before I even walk in a field I know. 
 
As these quotes allude to though, knowledge is not simple ‘handed down’ 
through verbal transmission but they require fathers to guide their offspring 
through practices and to explain how the environment and their stock should be 
read. As a small dairy farmer (ST, 2013) explained: 
 
ST: There is a lot of stigma with farming, when you are 
farming for generations. No disrespect to anyone 
entering into agriculture. But in order for you to even 
know how to walk an animal down the road it’s a skill 
and you have to be brought up in it. I will tell you 
something now, and my boy always laughs at me, 
you walk behind a cow and the cow will look to the 
left side and you walk on the right side and the cow 
look over here right. If you want her to turn left you 
walk on the opposite side and they will always bolt. It 
is a skill that you have to get through doing it. 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
232 
 
 
The extract from ST’s interview offers us an important insight into how farmers 
come to build knowledges. In that knowledges are not only handed down but 
they are inextricable from learning through the daily practice of farming. As 
another dairy farmer expressed in relation to the process of teaching young 
farmers:  
 
 TW:  There is a certain skill set dealing with animals isn’t 
   there. 
AC: That skill set isn’t there anymore. You can’t really 
teach it in college you need that basic experience. If 
you grow up with it you grow up with it. Everyone 
says you are born with it but you are not, you are 
seeing things from a young age and building your 
knowledge up. Whereas if you have got someone 
who is 21 comes in fresh, they might be alright in 10 
years’ time but you can’t sit in a class room and learn 
it all, no chance. It’s just too much practical based 
knowledge. 
 
The way knowledge is ‘passed down’ is closely related to the being and doing of 
farming. Farmers spoke of “being reared on the farm” (ST, 2013) rather than 
being ‘brought up’ or how the best farmers at handling stock “are born into it” 
(RJ, 2013). Indeed, especially with regard to animals the ‘training programme’ 
starts young. As AC (2013) said “As soon as you can walk you are doing bits 
and bobs, you keep building up; building up until you are a bit stronger then you 
do more. By the time you get 12 or 13 you are doing pretty much everything 
then. Maybe at a slower pace but you would be doing most of the jobs”. The key 
point I am making here is that origin for the way farmers understand the 
environment is not analytical but wholly affective and socio-culturally influenced. 
The basis for farmers risk knowledge is social learning, real world experience 
predicated on positive or negative feelings (Slovic et al., 1998; Weber, 2006; 
Weber, 2010). To extrapolate, experience of how practices have worked in past 
enable positive or negative feeling to be generated about the state of the 
environment and potential risks. I expand on these points now. 
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Figure 62: Young farmers (13yrs) working in the yard 
 
“what’s important is what’s around you” 
Another way farmer’s read the environment is in relation to natural and 
agricultural rhythms. As the extracts below demonstrate stock grazing patterns, 
bird migrations, flowering plants, and tree growth are all keenly observed events 
from which risk knowledge is produced. For DR (2013), a small beef farmer, the 
arrival of the Cuckoo is the rhythm through which he reads the environment and 
understands the seasons:  
 
DR: The month of March he is on his perch, April he 
sounds the bell, May he sings night and day, June he 
changes his tune, may they fly away. It’s always 
right! You won’t hear a Cuckoo until April, the earliest 
I have heard Cuckoo is the 18th of April. This year I 
haven’t heard them at all because it’s too cold. You 
always know spring has come when the Cuckoo is 
here. 
 
For DR (2013) the rhythm of the Cuckoo’s life is a, and highly specific “the 18th 
of April”, marker from which unseasonal patterns in the environment are 
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referenced from. Similarly, as the wife (CW, 2012) of a dairy farmer replied to 
my questioning: 
 
TW: You mentioned the rhythms of nature. Is this an 
important way to know the changes in the 
environment? 
CW: Of course, what’s important is what’s around you. My 
first swallow was here on the 16th of April. The 
babies are being fed now. They are in the cow shed. 
Just have to watch the cat. I am so waiting for the 
Elderflowers but they are not out yet. Its lovely, put it 
with lemonade and ice aww it’s lush. You don’t need 
a lot, just about 6 flower heads. They are June flower 
really, but up here it’s later anyway. Because we are 
so exposed, the temperature is shocking. My trees 
only came out the other week, so we are at least a 
month behind. On everything; blackberries, trees 
everything. 
 
CW’s (2012) observations of these subtle rhythms enables a mental calendar to 
be produced and thus she is able to note how “we are at least a month behind” 
on a typical season. CW farm is at the highest point in catchment and thus she 
has adapted her mental calendar to her farm, “up here it’s later anyway 
because we are so exposed” (CW, 2012). These knowledges are therefore 
locally, even farm scale, specific. Along with rhythms in flora and fauna farmers 
also know the water environment in relation to timings of out grazing their stock. 
As dairy farmer (AD, 2013) explained “typically I would have brought them in at 
the end of November and then turn them out 3rd/4th week in March. This time 
they came in 1st week of November and then turned out on the 23rd of April; So 
2 to 3 weeks at the beginning and 4 weeks extra at the end”. The ability to read 
to natures and agricultural rhythms offers a way to know and anticipate risks for 
the farm. For example (AD, 2013) explained that in prolonged wet winters you 
can anticipate a costs of “£4,500. Feed also up, with everything else. You are 
also looking at the extra work of cleaning the dung out the sheds and all the 
other aspects”.  
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“one obvious marker is the slurry pit to see if that’s gone up or not” 
With specific regard to rainfall, one everyday indicator dairy farmers refer to is 
the level of their slurry tank. As GC (2013) answered to my question:  
 
TW: What objects or indicators do you use to understand 
the water risks and weather? 
GC: One obvious marker is the slurry pit to see if that’s 
gone up or not. If you have a lot of rain in the night 
and you have slept through it then you go out there 
and you can really tell. 
 
Or as MW (2014) said “our slurry tank is not covered so provides a good 
indicator” or as MV (2012) noted “our dirty water tank is a point I check 
regularly”. GC (2013) went on to explain that while this was an important 
indicator it was the embodied experience that was more important “I spend all 
day in the weather and then the night isn’t that long for me so I don’t miss much. 
I read the weather through experiencing it” (GC, 2013). So rather than 
knowledge simply being produced from visual perception and ‘handed down’, 
farmers actually produce knowledge through affective and sensory aspects to 
the doing (Crouch, 2001; Pile, 2010). 
 
“the weather meant that people couldn’t save it, couldn’t save their crops” 
Cropping in terms of sowing, managing and reaping was another key moment 
when farmers interacted with the water environment and come know water as 
risk. At the time of ethnography this was a particularly sensitive point because 
recent heavy rainfall patterns had badly impacted farm outputs. As an interview 
with a female dairy farmer emphasised explicitly:  
 
RJ: The rainfall was stupid in 2012. It has still knock on 
effects now simply because we are running out of 
grass. The cold spring too, so we have not had the 
rainfall when it was supposed to grow. May is when 
most farmers cut, but across the road they cut 
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yesterday?! We are six weeks behind a typical 
season, but what’s typical these days. 
 
Rainfall along with temperature thus represents significant risks for farmers in 
terms of enterprise productivity. This point was reiterated in a conversation with 
a dairy farming family:  
 
MV: Well the weather meant that people couldn’t save it, 
couldn’t save their crops. With the wet winter and cold 
spring they really needed the feed. 
SV:  Yeah this spring was cold. 
MV:  Everyone is saying we are running a month to 6 weeks 
behind. 
CV: You are not going to catch that up as the season goes on 
are you? 
 
For farmers then the weather is not simply something that is a factor in an 
analytical assessment of risk. Weather, water and the risk it poses is not a 
statistical notion but closely experienced through worry of farm enterprise 
survival. In this sense farmers have an affective relationship to weather and 
water. For example when farmers experience prolonged heavy rainfall patterns 
they internally translate into the affective responses of fear, dread and anxiety. 
 
“if their ears are hanging down then that’s a sign that they are miserable” 
The final point I want to make in this section is how farmers come to know the 
water environment through reading the happiness and health of their herd. 
Excessive rain affects the happiness and health of cows as well as well as milk 
yields. Ensuring the health of dairy cows relies on being able to read their body 
language. As a third generation dairy farmer (AC) explained:  
 
TW:  So you can tell when your cows are happy? 
AC: Yes, you can usually tell just by looking at them. If 
there chewing the cud that’s a good sign. If their ears 
are hanging down then that’s a sign that they are 
miserable, bit like people really. It’s the body 
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language too, the way they hold themselves in the 
field. But also how slow and lethargic they become 
too. But it’s hard to pin it down really; it’s just 
something you know. It’s something you learn as you 
go along and from my father. 
 
AC’s ability to ‘tell by just looking’ is akin to Gibson’s (1979: 172) theory of direct 
perception wherein “people do not perceive qualities but rather affordances, the 
meaning is observed before the substance and surface, the colour and form, 
are seen as such”. A female dairy farmer (RJ, 2014) reiterated this point about 
direct perception “Before I even walk in a field I know there is a sick cow down 
there. She might be standing in a different corner or standing in a different way. 
I said to Michel the other day, hang on a minute look at the sick cow in the 
cabin, he said how can you see that? I can see by the way her tail is standing, 
you just know. If you went in green [untrained young farmer] you wouldn’t have 
a bloody clue. The chances are that you get down there and you might have a 
dead calf or a dead cow”. The point is that, as Kilbourn and Isaksson (2007) 
discussed, while the composition and layout of surfaces (in this case of a cows 
body language and position in the field) constitutes what an object affords the 
key idea is that meaning is directly perceived. As RJ (2014) said “you just 
know”. Further to RJ’s (2014) account is a point to make about cultural 
attuenment. RJ (2014) spoke how a “green” farmer would not “have bloody 
clue”. RJ (2014) is referring the skills of the perceiver to read the animal’s body 
language, which as I have previously discussed, relies on the capacity to afford 
being culturally handed down. The wider claim I make here is that this ability to 
read their animal’s body language is a crucial way farmers came to know the 
water environment. As a discussion with a family dairy farm reveals: 
 
TW:  So you can tell when you cows aren’t happy? 
MV:  Well in this weather now they aren’t happy are they?  
SV:  There not. 
MV: Its cold wet and miserable. We were up in the top 
field a fortnight ago and they were happy lying down 
then. This weather they don’t want to go anywhere. 
Bit like we really, they don’t like the cold. 
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SV: Not in the summer they don’t. In the winter it’s ok as 
they expect it. 
 
Thus, the ability of farmers to read their animal’s body language and afford risk 
to their health is a key practice through which they log patterns in water and 
weather. As the discussion with the family dairy farm continued: 
 
MV: The trouble with the cattle is that they don’t know 
summer from winter at the moment; when it’s this 
cold and wet all the time. 
TW:  So they have their own rhythm? 
SV:  Yeah they know. 
CV: Yeah they know in the autumn when it is time to 
come in. either by light or by what I don’t know. They 
don’t want to go out of the yard; they don’t want to go 
out of the cubicles. Whereas in the spring they are 
sniffing away at the gate, they know it’s time to go 
out. You think they are morons, but they are not. 
SV:  They are not stupid. 
 
This extract shows how knowing the environment happens not only in relation to 
animal’s health and happiness but in turn that knowledge is built in relation to 
rhythms in the environment. 
 
Figure 63: Photo of herd on route to parlour 
In the discussion above I have shown how farmers come to produce knowledge 
in relation to their everyday farming practices and natures rhythms. As Brace 
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and Leyshon  explained, a focus on practices leverages an understanding of 
how risk knowledges develop through living, working and encounters with the 
environment. I found that ‘typical seasonal events’ in nature’s rhythm offered 
way markers in the agricultural calendar for farmers to reference ‘unseasonal’ or 
‘unnatural’ weather patterns against. From these way markers farmers build 
knowledges about the water environment and potential risks to their farming 
livelihood. Indeed, it cannot be understated how these daily knowledge 
practices inform farm management strategies and ultimately affect their profit. 
The ability to afford risk to an observed change in their farm environment is 
informed by the ‘observational skills’ which have been ‘handed down’. Farmer’s 
knowledges of runoff are thus constituted from both hereditary knowledge and 
embodied practices. Admittedly, the points made so far do not critically 
challenge the existing literature on lay knowledge. In fact I have only confirmed 
how farmers ‘lay’ knowledge is based on real world experience (Weber, 2006) 
and how this knowledge of farm and runoff risks are based on ‘temporal and 
spatial association and similarity’ (Loewenstein et al., 2001); for example how 
their farm environment has changed in relation to ‘typical seasons’. Essentially 
the ability to read the environment is based on the ‘education of attention 
(Kilbourn and Isaksson, 2007) which has been both handed down but also 
developed through a ‘curriculum of learning’ within the farming culture. 
 
8.2: Scientific Knowledge Practices 
“The unseen threat to water quality” is the title of the EA’s report on the diffuse 
pollution risk in England and Wales (2007): i). This is a fitting phrase to 
commence discussion on scientific knowledge practices and how they come to 
know water risks. Fitting because according to Beck (1992) a characteristic of 
late modern risks is that they require the sensory organs of science to detect 
because of their imperceptibility to the human senses. However I found, similar 
to farmers, to the contrary and how scientists rely on their own sensory organs 
to identify water pollution. As such this section explicitly focuses on the ‘more 
than just visual’ and non-scientific relationships developed through and crucially 
relied on, in the process of knowing and mapping pollution risk. Of course, 
scientific knowledge on water pollution comes from a variety of analytical 
knowledge practices. These practices include: 1) EA’s monitoring data; 2) SWW 
monitoring data; 3) SAGIS modelling of pollution source apportionment; 4) RPA 
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land use data inter alia. However, I argue here that in the case of LPF this 
analytical process only tells half the story about how they come to know water 
risks. The arguments I make here centre on how field experts employ affectual 
based methods in reading and affording risk to different aspects of the 
environment. This fundamentally disrupts the boundary between expert and lay 
knowledges in the context of diffuse pollution. 
 
“i remember that smell from last time, I had to have three baths” 
In September 2012 as part of ongoing ecological monitoring of Loe Pool a team 
of divers were commissioned to survey the macrophyte community. As they 
returned to shore, after crawling73 across the Pool for an hour, they reflected 
with the ecologist [JD] on the immersive and sensory experience of being in a 
polluted lake.  
 
D1: I remember that smell from last time, I had to have 3 
baths. 
D2:  It’s particularly stinky here because of the thickness 
  of it. 
JD: I think it is more smelly today than it was down the 
Carminowe Creek74 end. 
All:  murmurs of agreement 
D1: Is that because it’s a bit warmer and so it’s 
decomposing more? 
JD: Yes and I think it’s because the river comes in here 
so there is more of an influence from stuff which is 
being brought down, more unstable. 
D1:  Poo coming in from [RNAS] Culdrose [the local air 
  base]? 
JD: Probably be Heston’s poo rather than Culdrose, 
which is more treated. We can’t always blame it on 
them. 
                                            
73
 The Loe is no more than 1m deep on the transect line the divers took on this occasion. 
74
 Carminowe Creek is the south eastern arm of Loe Pool. 
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D1: You’re still not selling it. The thing is when you go 
back in the sea everything just seems so lush. It 
seems so clean. 
All:  nods & murmurs of agreement 
D3: And we only had 3 metres visibility which is rubbish! 
Ahhh, now look at this! 
All:  everyone laughs about the idea of 3m visibility being 
relatively good. 
 
This extract provides a rare glimpse into what it feels like to be immersed in a 
turbid lake which has been the receptor of mining, agricultural and domestic 
waste water for hundreds of years. For the divers the survey was a multi-
sensory experience stimulating their smell, touch and visual receptors. Their 
resulting emotional response at the state of the environment was one of disgust. 
Importantly this response of disgust was enabled because of their long 
experience with water and their ability to compare with different water 
environments. So rather, as Pile (2010) explained, than conceiving knowledge 
to just be produced through just visual perception an ethnographic study of 
practices brings to the fore the non-visual, affective and sensory aspects to 
human experience. 
 
 
Figure 64: Photograph of divers’ muddy and smelly hands 
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“it was really slimy and gross” 
In a follow up interview with the ecologist on the dive we discussed the sensory 
relationships scientists have with environments. JD (2012) explained how 
growing up on a farm meant that the “whole link with the environment is really 
strong” and after training as a botanists she has “an appreciation for good 
quality habitat”.  JD went on to talk about how she takes this appreciation for the 
environment and knowledge with her everywhere. 
 
JD: So I have just been on holiday to a lake in France, 
my husband really wanted to go fishing there but it 
was really brown and smelly and I couldn’t get any 
enjoyment out of seeing it at all. I didn’t want to go on 
it, there were people swimming in it and it was really 
slimy and gross. The lake used to be really clear, so I 
guess I do have that knowledge and understanding 
of the difference between a good quality habitat and 
a bad quality habitat. And what I want to see is better 
quality habitats and that is what I would like to see 
for Loe Pool and I don’t feel like it is just a job, and I 
do feel like really passionate about it now. Even 
though it feels like it might be unobtainable as we 
have been doing it for 15 years, but we have made 
great progress I guess. 
 
JD’s account highlights how the relationship with pollution is not simply based 
on scientific data sets but also is comprised of a sensory reading of the 
environment. Similar to the divers, experiencing polluted environments 
produced an affectual response of disgust. In JD’s case her professional skill 
set matched her emotional register for environmental quality and led to action in 
the form of leading LPF as the project consultant. In fact nearly all experts 
interviewed explained how they came to work in the environmental sector 
because of some affectual and sensory experience with the environment. For 
example the WFD Engagement Officer explained:  
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
243 
 
RT: One of the drivers for getting me into the job was I 
used to be a very keen windsurfer and I used to 
windsurf a lot in Plymouth Sound. We all used to get 
very, very sick. I was forever going to the doctor with 
bad tummy, sore throats, and earache; the classic 
surfer’s illnesses. They used to put it down to all 
sorts of things and never admit that it was the crude 
sewage going out to Plymouth Sound. One of the 
things that got me interested in pollution and the 
environment was that… and certainly in the very 
early days you have that drive to put the environment 
right and make it better for people. And that’s 
happened, I am very proud of what we did at the 
National Rivers Authority in the early days.  
 
In the accounts above I have presented the idea that experts, similar to farmers, 
have a relation with the environment which is based on sensory and affective 
engagements. I now move the discussion forward to specifically discuss how 
these abilities to sense and read the environment is applied to identify diffuse 
pollution risk in the field. 
 
“you could smell that the soil was dead” 
In 2013 LPF were contacted by a horticultural farmer about a severe runoff 
incident which had resulted in a hamlet downstream being flooded with soil and 
water. Representatives from the EA and NE were summoned to the site along 
with an expert in soil conservation (BW) to address the runoff problem. As we 
began to walk the fields I observed how the team read the soil and the runoff 
risk. There are of course a number of factors in field runoff risk, i.e. ploughing 
direction and crop type, but the experts focused on the soil structure as the 
primary source of risk. This risk was ‘read’ through touching, looking and 
smelling the soil. As EA Officer (ST, 2013) reported “On our visit to the top field 
you could tell there were serious soil management issues, we dug a 50cm pit to 
investigate its structure, before we even did any analysis you could smell that 
the soil was dead”. Or as BW (2013) said as he grasped the soil and ran it 
through his hands “You can feel how vulnerable this soil is, it has no structure, 
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no organic matter, all its natural resilience has been removed”. The point that I 
want to make here is that reading soil risk does not start with experts getting out 
PH kits or waiting for analysis from a soil analysis lab. Risk is read in the 
immediacy through using their human sensory receptors to read the soil and 
afford potential for good or evil.  
 
 
Figure 65: Photograph of severe runoff event in the Cober catchment 
 
“i need to smell it to be sure” 
Smell emerged as key sense used by experts to read the environment and 
determine pollution risk. This distinguishes water pollution risk from the flooding, 
as the other major type of water risk, in that it is difficult to perceive through 
sight alone. An example from one of the LPF Walk Over events captures this 
point wherein smell was relied on, required even, to evidence a pollution 
problem. The team came across a large quantity of what looked like sewage 
fungus coating the bankside vegetation and stream bottom on a northern 
tributary of the Cober; fungus is an indication of long term nutrient enrichment. 
For the EA Officer observation of the fungus was enough to log it on the 
National Incident Reporting System (NIRS) but the ecologist was not 
immediately convinced: 
 
JD: Before you log it, we need to make sure. There are 
different types of fungus. To know if it is sewage 
related I need to smell it, have a look at it. That 
sounds weird I know, but I have to be sure in myself 
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that it is sewage related. There will be ramifications 
for the farm up there once you log it.  
 
 
Figure 66: Photograph of Ecologist collecting fungi for smell test 
 
This comment says two key things about the process of identifying water 
pollution in the field. First, that risk identification is by no means simple, there 
are different types of fungus, caused by different malpractices as well as 
naturally occurring conditions. Second, that assignment of risk in the field is not 
always done by chemical or biological analysis but through using the human 
senses of smell. And for JD smell was a trusted method of identification. Smell 
as an indicator and driver for response also emerged in other conversations, as 
I put to SWW’s Principle Scientist in a conversation about catchment 
management: 
 
TW:  The difficultly with water pollution is that people can’t see it. 
SW: Yes, that’s right. It’s only if the water is smelling that 
people would phone the EA. The majority of people 
are apathetic unless it’s up their nose. If you stick a 
dump on people’s door step then they will kick up 
about it. But if it’s smelling on someone else door 
then they don’t care. 
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Figure 67: Close up photograph of sewage fungi 
 
“i can tell the difference between pig and poultry manure from a Km 
away” 
My observation about how experts rely on their senses as much as analytical 
analysis in the identification of diffuse pollution was reinforced when I explored 
the issue with the EA Walk Over survey team. This is worth considering in detail 
because it provides a definitive example of how scientific processes of knowing 
diffuse pollution are reliant on affective and sensory processes. 
 
The EA Walk Over investigations are conducted in order to identify the reasons 
why a waterbody is failing its WFD GES targets. From my perceptive the 
interesting start point is how the EA’s guide for the WO methodology is 
underpinned by traditional risk thinking and set up as a pure analytical process 
of risk analysis. The EA have developed a standardised Walkover methodology 
(Operational instruction 356_12) to guide the Walkover teams. The 
methodology has three components. The first is a desk-based study to assess 
the geographic scale of the waterbody, review available water quality (i.e. 
chemical levels) and biological data (i.e. macrophytes, macroinvertebrates, 
diatoms), and the known potential impacts (STW, CSO, industry inputs, mine 
discharge, invasive species etc.). In the Cober catchment the EA’s Walkover 
team met up with LPF prior to the survey to gather the partnership’s ‘local 
knowledge’ on the issues. The second component is the Walkover field survey 
where the team walks the tributaries in a waterbody. Ideally a field walk is 
conducted in a severe wet weather event so risk pathways are visible. In this 
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assessment the critical sources of risk are identified, classified, mapped and 
photographed. Risks are classified using standardised codes and on a scale of 
Grade 1 to Grade 4 (see Table 28). The location of each pressure on the 
waterbody is also recorded, as a 10 figure National Grid Reference (NGR), and 
mapped (see Figure 68). The third component of the Walkover survey is to 
conduct follow up water quality monitoring on specific pressures identified; for 
example on diatoms, macrophytes, macroinvertebrates, sediment sampling 
inter alia. The Walkover survey in the Cober was conducted in September 2012.  
 
Grade Impact Category 
1 MAJOR impacts over 1km 
2 SIGNIFICANT impacts over 100m 
3 
LOCALISED and LIMITED impacts less than 
100m 
4 
POTENTIAL for regular and persistent transport 
of pollutants, but none observed at time of 
survey. 
Table 29: EA guide for categorising diffuse pollution risk (EA, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 68: Output map from EA Walk Over survey in the Cober catchment (EA, 2013) 
 
The point that I now make is how the actual method, through which EA WO 
officers identify and classify diffuse pollution risk, is more akin to affectual 
processes of risk perception rather than an analytical process forwarded as the 
EA’s standardised methodology.  
 
TW: What percentage of the data on a Walk Over survey 
comes from using your senses? 
NB: A high percentage would be the senses because it’s 
that which will lead to the testing, for example by 
picking up a stone and seeing if much is living 
underneath it. That will lead to us getting out the test 
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kits. Senses are maybe 85%. Sometime we will test 
the tributary out of routine, and then would be 
surprised that we would find a lot it because it looks 
fine. That is probably 15%. 
 
Or as the second WO Officer (GN, 2013) interviewed said “So I would say from 
your own feelings, I would say 70% or 80% before you go down the testing 
route…that’s very much what we do”. This point was reiterated by NB (2013): 
 
NB: Touch is quite useful because one of the things we 
look for is compaction. If the ground is compacted 
then it effects infiltration and then effects runoff, 
taking whatever is on the surface with it. We quite 
often have a poke around in the ground with our 
walking sticks. That can give us an idea for the risk 
of runoff. 
 
I then further explored this point by asking “how do you use your senses to 
identify risk?”: 
 
GN:  It’s funny you should say that. I was out on a Walk 
Over and it was a miserable wet day. I went from one 
field which was just pasture into the next field. One 
field was hard and one was spongy. I picked that up 
straight away. There is something going on 
differently in these fields. I sensed that straight off 
and noted compaction issues. If you had more time 
you could go back and do some testing and dig 
some soil pits. So I would say you do use your feel a 
lot of the time, because the cows have been walking 
across there it is a right mess. You are falling down 
the hoof holes, so yes you are using your sense of 
feel. Smell, you may come across a slurry smell and 
you know what silage smells like. That’s another 
indicator. You might smell it where you don’t expect 
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to come across it. Obviously sight, both in the water 
course and on the land. 
 
GN explained how touch was an important sensory tool. The feel of the soil 
underfoot not only guided risk identification but in this case was used instead of 
employing analytical tests; as GN noted “If you had more time you could go 
back and do some testing”. The time element is important to elaborate on here. 
As we know the analytical process of risk identification is resource intensive 
(Kahneman, 2011), in this case it would require digging a soil pit or using a soil 
compaction gauge (see Figure 69) over a representative area of the field. 
Whereas what GN used was his affective system which enables him navigate 
more quickly and efficiently through the catchment. Thus it offers a more time 
effective way of identifying the main risks. 
 
 
Figure 69: Photograph of a compaction tester 
 
Alongside touch smell was also an important sensory tool for EA WO Officers. 
Smell and the ability to afford risk to a smell was developed not from scientific 
training but through affective system based on real world experience (Weber, 
2006). As NB (2013) explained:  
 
NB: Smell is a great one for us because if there is any 
manure spreading activity in the area we can pick it 
up straight away. After working in research for 8 
years I can generally tell the different animal 
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excrement. I can tell the difference between pig and 
poultry manure at a couple of KM away. Smell is a 
really useful one because if we know the conditions 
are not suitable for spreading then we can tell if we 
think there is a land management issue. 
 
In this section I have shown how experts in field rely on their senses to identify 
and afford risk to different aspects of the water environment. There is one key 
implication of this claim I wish to emphasise. That ‘scientific methods’ of 
identifying diffuse pollution risk are no different to the lay practices which are 
employed by farmers to understand their land; no different, in that both rely on 
sensory processes, require a ‘curriculum of learning’, and affordance granted on 
the basis of ‘temporal and spatial association and similarity’ – for example what 
type of fungus should be found where at what point in the year. I would argue 
that this reliance on the senses, beyond the visual, is required because of the 
nature of diffuse pollution risk and its elusive, complex and contingent 
character. As I will discuss in 8.4 this has implications for the validity of Beck’s 
(1992) Risk Society thesis with regard to the imperceptibility of late modern 
risks. The wider contribution of this section is to initiate critical reflection on how 
water scientists read and afford risk affectively in the field; a gap in the literature 
which to data has not been addressed in context of diffuse pollution. 
 
8.3: Affordance, Risk and Socio-Cultural Attunement 
In penultimate section of Chapter 8 I draw the two accounts of knowledge 
practices together and explore the origins for different risk framings. It is widely 
acknowledged in cultural geography that people interpret landscapes in different 
ways and ascribe a variety of meanings to the same landscape (see Cosgrove., 
1984;(Burgess et al., 2000; Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011)inter alia). Or 
alternatively put, while farmers and conservationists may view the same 
landscapes, habitats or species, they see them quite differently (Burgess et al., 
2000). Yet academics interested in ambiguity have paid scant attention to the 
‘how’ of differing frame production. In order to understand how catchment 
stakeholders produce different framings of the same environments it is 
imperative to study how meaning is attached to water and landscapes. I will 
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now continue to employ the concept of affordance to theorise how meaning is 
assigned to the environment and in turn how a framing of risk is produced. 
 
“that’s mine but its waste land really” 
As part of PAR Cycle 11 I brought risk maps to farmer interviews in order to: 1) 
communicate the diffuse pollution risks from a LPF perspective; 2) ascertain the 
farmer’s perspective on those same risky, or environmentally important, areas 
of land. These risk maps discussions proved particularly effectual in drawing out 
the values, meanings and risks farmers attached to areas of their land. The key 
theme which emerged out of the data was that farmers fundamentally afford a 
different function and thus value to a piece of land in comparison to LPF as 
conservationists. As I will now demonstrate, what farmer’s term as ‘waste land’ 
are the very areas which are highly valued by LPF in terms of their function as 
flow attenuation features and wildlife habitat. Indeed, I found that farmers assign 
affordances to land in relation to its productive function in their farming system, 
as this first extract from an interview with a beef farmer (DR, 2013) illustrates: 
 
TW:  Is this bit of Willow Carr75 yours? 
DR: Yep, that’s mine but its waste land really, so it doesn’t 
really matter. 
TW:  But it looks like a good area of habitat? 
DR: Oh yeah it’s full of wildlife; birds and foxes and 
badgers, well perhaps not badgers as they like it dry. 
TW: From a LPF point of view the ‘waste land’ bit is of high 
value; as a habitat, but also in its small way it’s 
helping reduce flooding and pollution downstream. 
 
What we can draw from this is that DR differentiates land on the ground of 
whether it affords use within his beef farming system. The area of concern is so 
wet and encroached by Willow Carr that it provides little potential function as 
grazing space for livestock. This notion of affording value to land based on its 
productivity was more polemically expressed by a retiring beef farmer who has 
begun renting land to horticultural farmers (NB, 2014). 
 
                                            
75
 Willow Carr is a type of waterlogged wooded terrain. 
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TW:  This valley has the some rare plants in it. 
NB: Ok, I don’t know. But you can’t graze animals there. 
The fence isn’t good enough to graze in there 
anyway; I am not prepared to fence it. 
TW:  Because it’s not of economic value? 
NB: No it isn’t, it’s just rough land. I haven’t been down 
there for 3 years myself. I never go down there. 
TW:   Why is that? 
NB: What for?... I am not against wildlife, in its place. 
Round here now, we have 40-50 acres of cabbages. 
Trying to keep pigeons off the damn things! Wildlife 
can become vermin can’t they? When they over 
crowd our land. They will rip cabbage to pieces. 
TW:   So wildlife is a pest? 
NB: Well some of it is, it’s nice to see some but if it gets 
out of control. 
 
For NB affordance of land value is wholly based on economic value. NB, similar 
to DR, affords little value to habitat and wildlife but further actually ‘affords ill’ to 
the pigeons for damaging productivity. This was affordance based on land 
productivity was reiterated by IT. The interview with IT was challenging because 
of his antipathy towards research which perceivable forwarded a conservationist 
agenda. The discussion only lasted 20 minutes but I was able to press IT on his 
problem with ‘non-productive’ use of land. 
 
TW: From a conservationist’s perspective this valley 
below your bulb field is an important area, are there 
any features in this field to slow runoff? 
IT:  No. There is a hedge.  
TW: What would your objections [be] to putting a buffer 
strip in to hold nutrients? 
IT: If they want to put in a buffer strip they that will have 
to be their side not mine. The strip would have to be 
in the rough ground not in the good land. 
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TW:  Because you have signed a contract with the  
  growers? 
IT: Yes, but if I hadn’t signed a contract then it would still 
be no. Don’t take a strip of the good land.  
TW:  OK, what about if you [were] paid the same amount 
as you would get from Riveria? 
IT: I would object to it even then. We can’t feed our 
nation. Natural England and all the conservationists 
are coming along and taking land which we haven’t 
got. If they are going to take land take some 
unproductive or unworkable land. Don’t take 
productive land. End of story.  
 
How IT affords value to the land thus goes deeper than just productive value but 
is entwined with his cultural identity as a farmer. There are a number of distinct 
cultural influences on how farmers see the landscape, what they purpose they 
afford and in turn how they make decisions about its management. IT’s 
objection to any sort of land management change was not just a practical one 
but a deeply held ideological aversion to wildlife over agricultural productivism. 
Agreeing with Burton and Paragahawewa (2011), farmers dislike for untidy or 
wasted areas of the farm are because it is indicative of inefficient farming. 
 
“where they would see unproductive ground is the bit for wildlife” 
Along with risk maps discussions, a few farmers were able to spare the time to 
walk and talk me round their farm. In the following extract David Mildren (DM) 
talks me through his rushes management and how traditionally farmers would 
spray and cut them down because they take up grazing land. 
 
DM: Up until I joined ELS. It took me my lifetime to get rid 
of all these reeds. You wouldn’t see a rush here. But 
one of the conditions of ELS is that I don’t spray that 
and keep it natural habitat. I could get rid of these 
rushes in two seasons if I had to. 
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So while the Juncaceae rushes, which populate the Cober flood plain on DM’s 
bottom fields, were seen as a nuisance to DM. But from a LPF point of view 
they are particularly important habitat and flow attenuation feature; a wet and 
connected flood plain slowing flow and allowing sediment and attached 
nutrients to settle. Again the central idea here is that land is afforded in relation 
to its productive value. This observation was concurrent with discussions which 
I had with farm advisors and ecologists who engage with farmers. As JD noted: 
 
JD: It’s often quite difficult to find the common ground, 
where they would see their waste ground or 
unproductive ground is the bit we are interested in for 
wildlife; “you will just be interested in the bit down at 
the bottom where there are all those rushes”, which is 
the annoying bit of ground for them because it’s not 
productive.  
 
My argument is not that farmers are principally against a healthy and diverse 
water environment. My argument is that farmers simply afford value to the land 
differently to conservationists. This claim provides a foundation in 
understanding the existence of ambiguity in catchment management. Similar to 
Isendahl et al’s (2010) finding, it’s the clash in substance frames between 
conservation and farming which is at the heart of the issue. A ‘productivist’ 
frame is not necessarily incompatible with implementing measures to reduce 
diffuse pollution but can cause conflict. I will demonstrate this point now by 
considering the implementation of risk management options. In a risk map 
discussion with the Borne family, they identified a high risk field near their family 
farm (See Figure 70). The field was being rented by horticulturalists to grow 
daffodils (see red boxed fields in map). The Borne’s explained that in heavy 
rainfall events water would run directly off the field, down the road and into the 
river (see blue line on map). The conversation continued and they explained 
what they thought should be done to mitigate the risk. Their solution would be to 
redirect the water onto a piece of ‘waste land’ (see black triangle of map) across 
the road from the risky fields. I brought this particular runoff issue up at a LPF 
Catchment Group meeting (15/10/2013) as an example of how farmers’ local 
knowledge could help direct on-the-ground risk management solutions. The 
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group got out the risk maps and aerial photographs of the area with the issue. It 
immediately became apparent that the suggested area to redirect the runoff to 
was not ‘waste land’ but in fact biodiverse rich moorland which, because of the 
road, was isolated from becoming nitrified. This discussion starkly revealed how 
the conservationists and farmers afford value and function to the land 
differently. 
 
 
Figure 70: Annotated risk map from farmer interview 
 
“practices without an agricultural eye can be misconstrued as the wrong 
thing” 
The final observation to explain is how that LPF and farmers might not afford 
risk in the same way, but also sometimes they don’t read risk in the same way. 
 
PP: There are practices that without an agricultural eye 
can be misconstrued as the wrong thing. People 
have commented on things which are not risky. 
Someone commented to me the other day about the 
potatoes they grow over the other side and how 
steep the fields are. Yeah if you went there on a wet 
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day, to the lay man it would look bad. But actually 
because of the crop rotation actually balances that 
out; the planning and everything. The same as we do 
here, we grow a lot of bulbs but we have put things 
into place. Pot buffers in and sacrificed land so that 
you don’t get a problem. 
 
PP has crucially emphasised how diffuse pollution risk is not an overt risk. It 
requires considered analysis at the farm scale but also of the overall agricultural 
system through the seasons. PP criticism is that the ‘non-expert’ lacks both 
sufficient information and the skills to afford risk correctly. Or in reference to 
Gibson’s (1979) attunement they do not have sufficient ‘education of attention’. 
In summary, farmers and LPF fundamentally afforded different risks, values and 
meanings to the same pieces of land. Further, it can be concluded that value 
and function is afforded in relation to a stakeholders practice, whether that is the 
production of food or the conservation of the environment. I now zoom out from 
the detailed empirics and use Beck’s Risk Society to theorise the geographies 
of knowing risk. 
 
8.4: Risk Society and Diffuse Pollution 
One criticism of Risk Society is that it is not universally applicable to all 
contemporary issues and that the dynamics of risk need to be evidenced in 
each case (Benn et al., 2009; Bulkeley, 2001). In response to this criticism, I 
now explore the applicability of Risk Society for interpreting the empirical foci of 
this PhD, diffuse water pollution. With the exception of Jenson and Block 
(2008)76 and Stuart et al (2012) the application of Risk Society to the issue of 
diffuse pollution risk is novel. Indeed, there is an absence of work which has 
applied the framework of the Risk Society to theorise how people know water 
pollution; as such the following arguments represent new insights. Firstly I use 
Beck’s epochs to theorise how the nature of knowing pollution risk has changed 
through time. Secondly I critically consider the characteristics of diffuse pollution 
as a late modern risk.   
 
                                            
76
 Jenson and Block (2008) use Risk Society to interpret pesticides in everyday life.  
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8.4.1: Beck’s Epochs & Developments in Water Policy 
As I discussed in the Chapter 2, Page and Kaika (2003: 329–330), Frederiksen 
and Maenpaa (2006: 16-18) and (Muller-Grabherr et al., 2014: 243-245) divide 
the development of European water legislation into three phases. I illustrate 
here that these developments in the water Directives and legislation are 
comparable to Beck’s (1992) epochs (pre-modern, early modern, late modern). I 
argue that rather than these epoch’s being temporally bound, i.e. refereeing to 
discrete eras in history, I claim that they are equally applicable to theorise the 
developing relationship between science, the environment and society for the 
contemporary risk of water pollution. 
 
In the first phase of Directives the focus was on water quality for public health 
reasons. In line with Beck’s thinking about the characteristics of pre-modern 
risks I argue that public illness stemming from water pollution was not a ‘risk’ 
per se, but rather a hazard. This is because understanding the consequence of 
the public’s ingestion of chemicals or pathogens from polluted water does not 
require a calculation of ‘probability of occurrence × impact’, but rather a simple 
consideration of impact. I would further argue that the hazard of illness can be 
detected through bodily senses and attached, by the memory of ingestion, to 
water quality by the public without the need for science. The second phase 
included pollution control measures for ecological reasons, alongside health 
reasons, and was accompanied by an improvement in water monitoring 
systems (Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007) Whereas hazards to health can be 
known through the bodily senses, understanding the ecological risk of pollutants 
requires monitoring systems to certify relationships between different chemicals 
and ecological health. Data from monitoring systems enabled the Directives to 
set value limits on pollutants and thus science plays a closer role with risk 
identification and management; this, I argue, is akin to the nature of risks Beck’s 
(1992) describes in the early modern epoch. 
 
In the third phase, akin to Beck’s characterisation of late modern risks, science 
still underpins the management of pollution but its hegemony is becoming 
increasingly challenged because of knowledge uncertainties and ambiguities. 
Furthermore, I would also agree with Beck that dealing with diffuse pollution has 
become politicised where “the management of contemporary risks has become 
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a political conflict about the possession and articulation of knowledge” (Beck, 
1992: 23). I agree because diffuse pollution management requires the 
cooperation of the catchment’s stakeholders which often contest, as explained 
in 7.3 Mobilising Collective Action, uncertainty in another group’s knowledge 
and thus distance their own responsibility for the problem. In summary, Beck’s 
epochs provide an effective framework to theorise the developments within 
water Directives. Crucially, I would argue that at the macro scale the epochs 
enable a narrative to be created about the ways society and science have 
known contemporary water risks and how they have developed through recent 
history. The implication of this is that diffuse pollution bears the hallmarks of 
Beck’s late modern risks. I critically consider this particular issue now.  
 
8.4.2: Characteristics of diffuse pollution 
To remind the reader, Beck (1992: 22-24) identifies three characteristics of late 
modern risks: 1) they arise as the unintended consequence of modernity; 2) 
they are distanciated over space and time but inescapable; 3) they are invisible 
to the senses and depend on scientific knowledge. I will now examine these 
three issues in turn. 
 
Diffuse pollution risk is the unintended consequences of modernity 
Admittedly this point was originally made in the wider sense about agriculture by 
Beck (1992), but I will critically discuss the point more deeply. Beck describes 
how the increasing use of pesticides and fertilisers in Germany resulted in the 
doubling of grain yields, but also resulted in significant environmental 
degradation (Stuart et al., 2012)77. I would agree with Beck that the increasing 
issue of diffuse pollution can primarily be attributed to the intensification of 
agricultural practices, which are a product of modernisation (EA, 2007). For 
example soil compaction risk has increased because of machinery which is 
more technologically advanced but also larger and heavier machinery. Or 
another example is that the risk of eutrophication in the water environment has 
increased due to the proliferation of nitrates and phosphates as a direct result of 
modernist achievements in industrial processing and distribution of chemicals 
(Jensen and Blok, 2008). Again, agreeing with Beck, diffuse pollution is a side 
                                            
77
 Stuart et al (2012) use the concept of reflexive modernisation to examine the climate change 
and U.S agriculture. 
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effect of modernisation; “in the effort to increase productivity, the associated 
risks have always been and still are being neglected” (Beck, 1992: 60). 
 
Diffuse pollution risk is distanciated over space and time but inescapable  
Beck argues that the risk of diffuse pollution has stretched the spatial relations 
of cause, effect and responsibility. Indeed, I argue here that, ‘diffuse pollution’ is 
essentially a euphemism for ‘indeterminable point source pollution’. Point 
source pollution is referred to as such because it is determinable and it is 
possible to assign responsibility to a particular industry (EA, 2007). Diffuse 
pollution on the other hand is so-called because of the spatial uncertainty about 
its origin. In temporal terms diffuse pollution is distanciated because of its lag 
effect on the water environment. For example, I found that diffuse pollution from 
the mining industry, released in the late 18th century, was still causing 
environmental damage in the Cober catchment 200 years later. So in one sense 
I would agree with Beck that diffuse pollution risk is distanciated over space and 
time. However, I would disagree in another sense because I found that ‘diffuse 
pollution’ was often used by the EA as a label for miscellaneous incidents or 
because of the lack of local knowledge or data about a pollution source. 
 
Diffuse pollution risk is invisible to the senses and dependent on science 
According to Beck (1992) the third characteristic of late modern risks is their 
imperceptibility to the human senses. Instead of senses, detecting late modern 
risks requires the ‘sensory organs’ of modern science to gain recognition, 
cognitively and socially (Jenson and Blok, 2008). One argument is that this 
invisibility with diffuse pollution is because it is a statistical construct and 
manufactured from interrogation of large data sets. As such the assumed 
position is that diffuse pollution (i.e. pesticide residue or fertiliser quantities) 
cannot be tasted, smelled or seen and thus requires long term water quality 
monitoring (Jenson and Blok, 2008). However, I found to the contrary; as 
discussed above. I found that, because of the uncertainty associated with 
modelling and mapping diffuse pollution, LPF and the EA through their WO 
Surveys have begun using ‘non-scientific’ methods to know diffuse pollution. I 
evidenced how experts actually use their ‘sensory organs’ to identify and afford 
risk to the water environment. This finding is crucial because it overturns two 
assumptions. Firstly, that late modern risks cannot be sensed, and secondly 
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that expert ways of knowing diffuse pollution is different to lay farmers. As I 
discussed previously, experts conducting diffuse pollution walk over surveys are 
increasingly relying on agriculturally derived local knowledge for reading the 
risks. 
 
8.5: Chapter Conclusion 
Chapter 8 has contributed to the body of geographical literature on knowing risk 
in three significant ways. Firstly, I have brought new insights to how both 
agricultural and scientific stakeholders come to know risk; and in doing so 
addressed the literature gap, explained in section 4.2, on research which has 
explained how frames are produced in the first instance. I have shown how an 
ability to read the environment has been ‘culturally attuned’ through their 
respective farming or scientific practices. An attention towards cultural 
attunement has enabled me to explain that while stakeholders may see, work 
within, and experience the same landscape they afford risk to that same 
landscape in very different ways. In making these arguments I have provided 
new insights into the epistemological origins of stakeholder’s frames and thus 
the underpinning reasons for ambiguity within catchment management. 
 
Secondly, I found that experts are employing ‘non-scientific’ methods to identify 
diffuse pollution. It’s worth considering the journey to this finding in detail. While 
there is of course a profusion of research from STS which has evidenced how 
the distinction between scientific and lay practices is a blurred one, ‘with 
science being remarkably like most other social activities in that it’s more or less 
a messy set of practical contingencies’ (Clark and Murdoch, 1997; Law, 2004). 
On initial inspection of the two communities, in my case study, it was difficult to 
see this ambiguity. Science seemed to be done ‘to the text book’ in that surveys 
were conducted, monitoring data collected, processed using calculations and 
models and then presented as ‘evidence’ in reports back to Loe Pool Forum 
and regional partners. Whereas it was immediately, and overtly, apparent that 
farmers’ observational knowledge was the indirect product of everyday, lived 
and routinized activities which constitute farming practice; rather than explicit 
effort of data collection. However, post-ethnographic analysis this 
epistemological ambiguity was clearly present from a number of perspectives. 
Indeed I found, and have shown, how experts are increasingly relying on their 
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ability to read the environment through ‘non-scientific methods’, i.e. through 
walk overs, to know diffuse pollution. I also found that experts actually use their 
‘sensory organs’ to identify and afford risk to the water environment. 
 
Thirdly, I found that despite Beck’s Risk Society being over two decades old the 
thesis still has significant traction for explanation in how people know water 
pollution risk and how that relationship has developed through time. In particular 
I found great comparability between Beck’s three epochs and the development 
of water Directives. I conclude that this comparability is reflective of a 
universally applicable pattern of society’s and sciences relationship with risk 
articulated by Beck. I then drilled down into Beck’s characterisation of late 
modern risks in relation to diffuse pollution. I concluded that diffuse pollution 
adheres to the hallmarks of late modern risk with the exception of its ‘invisibility 
to the senses and dependence on science’. Indeed, to the contrary I found that 
experts in both the officially organised EA walk overs and the non-official LPF 
walk overs employed their ‘sensory organs’ to identify and afford risk to the 
water environment. I argued that experts were relying on such non-scientific 
methods because of the inadequacy of current scientific monitoring and models 
to provide comprehensive risk maps. The wider implication of these conclusions 
is that the geographies of knowing diffuse pollution risk are complex and at 
times contradictory. 
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Chapter 9: Delivering the CaBA 
 
In the final empirical Chapter I answer the third research question, what are the 
drivers and barriers to delivering the CaBA? As we know, the CaBA is a 
response to Article 14 in the WFD which requires member states to ‘encourage 
the active involvement of all interested parties in its implementation’. As the EU 
state, “delivering WFD objectives will not only require the ‘right laws’ and ‘right 
prices’ but also the development of communicative and participatory 
approaches” (Ison et al., 2007: 500). ‘Active involvement’ and ‘successful 
interaction’ could of course be interpreted in many ways so the empirical focus 
of this chapter is how this has been delivered in practice78 at both WFD 
catchment scale and the WFD waterbody scale through LPF. Through this 
critical analysis of participation and stakeholder engagement in practice I draw 
out the drivers and barriers for the CaBA’s delivery. To answer the research 
question I have spit the Chapter in two; 1) drivers; 2) barriers. I begin by 
discussing the different rationales for stakeholder participation, from both the 
perspectives of the EA staff working at the WFD catchment scale and from the 
members of LPF working at the waterbody scale. The second section examines 
the barriers to delivering the CaBA through analysis of the scientific culture in 
water governance. In theoretical terms I use the three rationales for 
participation, outlined by Blackstock et al (2007), Reed (2008) and Reed et al 
(2009), as a comparative framework for analysing the drivers and barriers. 
 
9.1: Drivers for the CaBA 
I begin with a short piece of document analysis to draw out the underlying 
discourses within the EA’s policy around the drivers for the CaBA. The EA 
explain that they intend to devise an approach to deliver “WFD public 
participation” (EA, 2011: 13). Interestingly though the term “public participation” 
does not appear in the Article 14 of the WFD. Article 14 actually uses is term 
“stakeholder engagement”. Arguably then the term ‘public participation’ has 
been used as a surrogate, or interpretation by UK’s EA, for the requirements of 
downscaling the WFD (Wesselink et al.,(2011). Nevertheless, ‘stakeholder 
engagement’ is required in three forms by the WFD: 1) access to background 
                                            
78
 By examining both ‘what people say’ and ‘what actually happens’ the rigour in the claims I 
make on my data is assured.  
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information; 2) consultation in three steps of the planning process; 3) active 
involvement of interested parties in all aspects of the implementation of the 
WFD. We can draw two important points from these policy observations. Firstly 
that in practice the ‘participatory agenda’ is based on an interpretation of EU 
policy rather than its direct implementation. Secondly that participation is driven 
by a pragmatic rationale around information exchange. With specific regard to 
the drivers from an EA perspective they explain, in their ‘Guidance for Hosts: 
Extending the catchment-based approach’ (EA, 2011b), how ‘collaborative 
governance’ is about people from different organisations working together to 
achieve results which they could not achieve through working alone’ (EA, 2011). 
This will be achieved through: 1) agreeing issues and outcomes in a transparent 
way; 2) accommodating different ways of working across other organisations. 
However they acknowledge that “the issues are often very difficult and the goals 
are challenging” and that “there is no standard agreed process by which things 
will happen” (EA, 2011: 4). 
 
The key point we can draw from this is that a new ‘collaborative way of working’ 
is needed to ‘achieve results which could not be done alone’. This ‘need’ could 
of course be hypothesised from a number of different directions. To put it into a 
laden question, but why would the EA want to complicate current risk 
management by involving non-expert stakeholders? To trail a conclusion, I 
argue that this need relates to the dysfunction of the current risk management 
regime, especially with regard to punitive strategies for diffuse pollution. To 
further develop this document analysis I now turn to the RBMP documents. This 
helps draw out the discourses for the CaBA at regional scale.  
 
The ‘River basin management: working together’ consultation document asks 
“how you want to be involved in further improving the water environment in the 
South West” (EA, 2012: 1). There are a number of points to discuss from this 
document about the drivers from the EA perspective. The document is pitched 
as an “opportunity for everyone” to “have their say” to “influence the 
management plan’s direction”. The EA “need your ideas, to allow us all to do 
even more to improve the precious water environment in the South West” (EA, 
2012: 1). This of course implies a listening exercise to understand stakeholder’s 
needs and priorities in relation to the issues. One might conclude that 
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participation is driven by instrumental rationales, but this an assumption I argue 
against next. Secondly, under the heading ‘Your views count’ it is stated that 
“the best way to protect and improve the water environment is by everyone 
becoming actively involved”. Interestingly though, what the EA mean by active 
involvement is far removed from what you would expect from an instrumental 
driven ‘listening exercise’ to understand issues from a stakeholders perspective. 
What the EA want is for you to “communicate your views on: i) how interested 
groups or individuals work together better so that everyone has the chance to 
contribute to the South West RBMP and be involved in managing the water 
environment; ii) working at a catchment scale; iii) how you think the 
Environment Agency can co-ordinate consultation on the South West RBMP 
and flood risk management plans” (EA, 2012: 2). Clearly then, “having your say” 
refers to how the RBMP’s might be delivered, rather than enabling local 
perspectives and knowledge to improve understanding or democratic 
accountability per se. Thirdly and most importantly the document emphasises 
that “We cannot do this alone” (EA, 2012: 1) and that “no one individual or 
organisation can do everything alone…It is essential that everyone who has a 
role works better together. That means working out who does what” (EA, 2012: 
1). To summarise, the EA forward participation as a way for stakeholders to 
“have their say”.  But if we read deeper they actually refer to ‘having their say’ 
with regard to inputting into their own delivery plans. I thus argue that the EA 
are driven by pragmatic rationales of achieving CaBA policy implementation and 
WFD targets. This is as opposed to normative or instrumental rationales. The 
interesting absence is the lack of acknowledgement that manging catchments is 
a complex issue, i.e. PNS, and involves huge uncertainties which cannot 
necessarily be dealt with through more data. The final point to make, which 
needs reiterating, is that if ‘we don’t work together’ the water environment 
cannot be improved and targets met. As trailed before, I argue that this points to 
the failure, sufficiency and efficacy of current punitive based risk management 
strategies. I move on to consider the discourses which emerged from face to 
face interviews and LPF meetings.  
 
“looking to identify what leavers they can pull in order to achieve GES” 
As discussed above, the policy discourse around stakeholder participation is 
driven by and should involve success on pragmatic grounds. However, the EA 
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also note that within collaborative working “there is no standard agreed process 
by which things will happen” (EA, 2011: 9). Echoing this, in practice I found that 
the participatory agenda represents a huge shift in working approaches and 
was a new and uncertain direction for the EA. It is the WFD Engagement Officer 
(RT, 2013) who directly overseas the delivery of the CaBA, so in order to 
identify the key drivers from an ‘on the ground’ EA perspective I put the 
question directly to him.  
 
TW: What do you think the EA wants to achieve through 
participation?  
RT: Well obviously we are a regulatory authority and a lot 
of the things are given to us by Europe. We have 
targets and standards which the environment has to 
meet. So selfishly if you like. We are looking for 
partners to achieve our statutory aims and 
objectives. That is it in a nutshell. 
 
RT (2013) went on to say how “my role is to outlook from the EA to see where 
we can engage with third parties both private and public sector, and charities to 
help us to deliver the requirements of the WFD on water quality”. The ‘nutshell’ 
of RT’s point is that the participatory agenda is being driven by the need to 
deliver on WFD GES targets. The implied assumption is that through enrolling 
partners they will be able assist with the delivery of these targets. RT was not 
alone in his views on the EA’s motivations for participation. For example the 
Integrated Environmental Planning Officer (DH, 2013) talked about “delivery of 
WFD standards” with regard to stakeholder engagement. While a different 
Integrated Environmental Planning Officer (JB, 2012) also spoke how 
engagement was about “engendering how people can take more responsibility 
and not just look to others to regulate”. From this data we can draw that the 
primary driver for the EA, and in turn the desired outcomes, of stakeholder 
participation is the achievement of WFD targets. Importantly RT noted how the 
EA’s ambition is wider than that. 
 
RT: I think that the environment benefits all and it is 
bigger than just regulation. If we can improve the 
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environment for everyone there are knock on 
benefits, not just in us meeting our statutory targets 
but people’s health and enjoyment of the 
countryside; increasing its value so more money can 
be made out of it, tourism for example. Then those 
are knock-on benefits. Part of my job is comparing 
those synergies and comparability’s. So that we can 
all benefit. But in a narrowest sense we go into our 
partnership meetings thinking what can we get out of 
it. But that’s what our partners are doing as well. My 
job is look for those mutual benefits. We all benefit in 
a sense.  
 
A number of direct criticisms were aired by the independent researchers 
working in the East Looe catchment about what was driving the participatory 
agenda. MB (2013) observed that “the EA respond to targets, they are simply 
looking to identify what leavers they can pull in order to achieve Good 
Ecological Status, they are looking for one answer and one leaver”. MB (2013) 
went on to explain:  
 
MB: The EA have a focus on targets rather than having 
an aim of creating informed and active communities 
in a long term approach to changing environmental 
practices… for example, I had a conversation with an 
EA officer who was talking about de-designating 
Bathing Water Areas so we can achieve the targets.  
 
Or as BH (2012) noted “the staff are experts in their job and care about doing 
their job. But not how that fits into the bigger picture. They care about enforcing 
the environment, they don’t necessarily care about everything else which 
happens”. The implication is that the EA is not driven by the more ethically 
imbued normative or instrumental rationales but purely pragmatic. The above 
discussion only emphasises MB’s (2013) criticisms about a WFD GES target-
driven approach for the rationale for participation, the phrase ‘achieving 
statutory aims and objectives’ epitomising this point. 
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The data discussed above illustrates how the EA’s participatory agenda is 
driven by pragmatic rationales, in the sense that it is about the statutory 
requirements of achieving the WFD GES targets. Discussion about what is 
driving the participatory agenda is important to consider in the first instance 
because it provides necessary context to explaining the relations in practice of 
participatory governance. The underpinning rationale is thus not participation for 
the sake of normative or instrumental benefits but is more akin to what would be 
termed pragmatic (Reed, 2008). Pragmatic in the sense that the driver for the 
EA is about the “exchange of useful information” which enables “tailored 
interventions” (Reed, 2008: 2420); but not pragmatic in the full sense, which is 
also about “quality and durability of environmental decisions” achieved through 
two way knowledge exchange with stakeholders” (Reed, 2008). The benefits of 
participation are achieved not through the process of engagement with 
stakeholders but the resulting environmental quality. 
 
“engaging with communities is definitely a new thing for the EA” 
The many conversations I had with the EA or EA partners would typically start 
off with staff explaining how a participatory approach is a substantial shift in how 
they have worked historically. As an independent researcher (BH, 2012) 
working for the EA said “this is such a new area for them, they have good 
intentions but they are really feeling their way with it, they will get what they can 
out of it”. Or as the SW Principle Climate Change Officer (2012) explained “I 
think in the past we would have told communities what the risk was and that 
would have been it…this is quite a new area in terms of engaging with 
communities and talking about, it is definitely a new thing for the EA”. It can be 
said that historically the EA have taken a top down and deficit model approach 
to managing risk; scientifically assessing the risk and then communicating to the 
lay public in linear way. The SW Principle Climate Change Officer (2012) went 
on to explain what had driven this shift in working and the underpinning 
rationale “we have moved from being a regulator to more of an advisory body. 
So we didn’t used to do as much engagement with communities, but because of 
how we did it in the past was not very good we now consult with the community 
and talk through it”. This transition from a regulatory top down approach 
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towards a participatory one is thus driven by a realisation that the previous 
model of working may not be the most effective.  
 
Interestingly though this realisation, that that the status quo approaches to risk 
management may not be the most effective, does not necessarily come 
internally from the EA. As BH (2012) suggested “I think what you have got is, 
what is happening at their higher level in the EA, operating at a strategic 
national level and that is pushing though a participatory agenda ‘we have to 
engage differently, we have to engage people’”. BH (2012) extrapolated, based 
on her experience, on this point with regard to practical delivery by the EA at the 
catchment scale “they have told the different offices what they have to do, but 
there is no practical plan. So it comes down to individual interpretation of it at 
the local level. How people want to move on that is up to them. But obviously it 
comes down to the constraints on funding which is directing their [EA] thinking”. 
We can draw from this that the EA are pushing through CaBA from the top 
down but as there is ‘no standard agreed process’ of how things will happen 
and that the realisation of the CaBA principles and practices will be interpreted 
differently at the local scale. This brings the potential of LPF, as a local 
catchment partnership, as an agent of change to the fore as it is at this scale 
where the CaBA will be interpreted and delivered on in practice. As the SW 
River Basin Management Programme Manager (JB, 2013) answered to my 
question. 
 
TW: What does the EA want to achieve through 
participation, especially with the agricultural 
community, and where would you like to be by 
2015? 
JB: We will obviously follow the line of the CaBA when it 
is rolled out. What we think we should be aiming for 
is engaging at that catchment level in a way which 
works best for groups. It’s about what works for local 
catchment groups and the stakeholders. For 
example in the Tamar project we took part but we let 
them lead, and it worked. If we can get that across 
the whole of the SW, that approach rolled out, so it is 
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bottom up at the scale that is working that is great, 
collaborative working.  
 
9.1.1: Participation in Practice 
Considering how the participatory agenda is a new direction for the EA, target 
driven, and underpinned by pragmatic rationales its important now to consider 
the resulting relations between stakeholders and governance networks. To 
illustrate this I have constructed a diagram ‘Relations in Participatory 
Governance’ (see Table 29) which offers a tool for discussing the 
characteristics of participation in practice. By relations I refer to the flow of 
knowledge and ideas between stakeholders (i.e. LPF and the agricultural 
community) and institutions; both regulatory and advisory. The spaces of 
engagement are highlighted in the grey boxes with the direction of knowledge 
flow indicated with grey arrows. The key institutions and relevant policy are 
represented in the black boxes. 
 
There are two key points which I wish to emphasise immediately. The first point 
is that the only two-way relationship between governance bodies and the 
agricultural community that I observed in practice was enabled by Natural 
England agri-environmental schemes (e.g. ELS, HLS, CSF, S4P). Knowledge 
from the farmers about the environmental and economic risks they faced was 
able to flow ‘upwards’ to LPF, while knowledge about low risk farming practice 
was able to flow ‘downwards’ from advisors to the farmers. I enhanced this flow 
through my PAR. The second point is the WFD has driven, organised regionally 
through the SW RBLP, what can only be described as a surveillance network; 
wherein the relationship between agricultural and the scientific communities is 
characterised by the movement of data ‘upwards’. I have observed that it 
represents surveillance rather than a participatory network in four ways. Firstly 
through the monitoring; in order to collect physical, chemical and biological data 
for GES classification. Secondly through investigative walk overs; to assess 
catchment risks qualitatively. Thirdly through, in the Cober case, SAGIS 
modelling; in order to map the risks. And fourthly through the EA’s Incident 
Reporting Hotline, as the EA’s Head of Regional Integrated Planning (PG, 
2012) noted “the most frequent type of engagement is actually just people 
‘dobbin’ in other people”.  
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Table 30: Observed relations in participatory governance 
 
To theorise, this notion of a surveillance network I draw from(Latour, 2005):181) 
and his concept of Oligoptica wherein “they [EA] see much too little to feed the 
megalomania of the inspector [the EA as water regulator] or the paranoia of the 
inspected, but what they see, they see it well”. What I mean by this is that the 
current water risk monitoring, modelling and Walkover surveys produce narrow 
and fragile gazes at the diffuse pollution problem which never quite capture the 
whole. As (Albrechtslund and Lauritsen)(2013: 2) explain, an oligoptica 
“produces invisibilities in the sense that a specific gaze will always be blind to 
everything outside of the particular focus”. Because, as I have discussed, and 
theorise further below, the current scientific mechanisms for identifying diffuse 
pollution are ineffective. But rather than “see it well” (Latour, 2005: 181) I would 
argue that the uncertainties (see section 7.2) in water management mean that 
they don’t ‘see it well’ and rather are faced with a situation of ambiguity. 
 
There are two wider implications of these observations, made in Table 29, in 
relation to governance. The first is with regard to the participatory agenda and 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
271 
 
the second with regard to LPF and the alternative spaces for participation they 
have created. So firstly, to agree with Watson (2014), there is a significant gap 
between the idealized narrative of collaboration and the actual experience and 
practice of collaboration. Indeed, despite being normatively embedded within 
policy documents achieving participation in practice is a difficult task and many 
attempts fall short of an idealised notion of collaborative governance 
(Frederiksen and Maenpaa, 2007; Reed, 2008). I argue that this difficulty, in the 
case of the WFD and the CaBA, is not just the practice of engagement but 
fundamentally how the policy has been interpreted by the EA. With the 
pragmatic rationale being so deeply embedded it leaves little space for more 
creative and organic spaces for participation to be initiated. Secondly with 
respect to LPF, the relative autonomy of voluntary catchment partnership 
enables alternative approaches to be pursued with regard to participation. For 
example, alongside the official NE initiatives, such as CSF inter alia, LPF have 
organised active farmer events to engage with the catchment issues on their 
terms and endorsed my PAR project to uncover ambiguities and reasons for 
management conflicts. This observation supports Watson (2014) point that local 
catchment partnerships are powerful entities in their own right and that their 
own values and attitudes can shape the process of collaborative working. 
Certainly with the case of LPF there is great ambition to engage with the 
agricultural community on terms beyond just regulation and advice. I would thus 
argue that LPF could be termed positive deviants. Because of their autonomy 
they are, to an extent, exempt or at least can subvert aspects of ‘evidence 
based decision making’ protocol compared to a public funded scientific 
institution, i.e. the EA. This has given them scope to experiment with new 
methods for understanding diffuse pollution risk; reflected in the PAR 
endeavours. To summarise, I would argue that the CCP, who are responsible 
for driving forward the CaBA, offer a potential conduit to back the need for a 
change in culture within the EA to enable a more open approach to potential 
catchment solutions.  
 
9.1.2: Participation and Power 
In the Participation in Practice section above I have argued that LPF is a 
powerful partnership in its own right. In this section I examine, in further detail, 
this issue of power and how it is enacted both externally and internally. My 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
272 
 
starting point is underpinned the post-structural view that participation in itself is 
a form of power (Kesby, 2007). Thus attention is first turned to the issue of 
inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders in LPF meetings. 
 
In Table 6, on p122, the key stakeholder groups in the catchment are listed 
along with their interests and responsibilities. Post analysis it became clear that 
three groups were unrepresented in person at LPF meetings; 1) farmers; 2) 
Helston Town Council; 3) the public79. The non-participation of these three 
groups was a regularly discussed topic at LPF meetings. The reason for their 
exclusion, through non invitation to the meetings, was due to a combination of 
ethical, practical and strategic factors. 
 
For both farmers and the public there were ethical challenges with respect to 
who could be invited to the meetings. Farmers for example are not a 
homogenous community. In the Cober catchment there are at least three types; 
1) beef; 2) dairy; 3) horticultural. This issue was discussed at a Lake and Lower 
Cober Group meeting (09/07/2014).  
 
 TW:  Have you considered inviting farmers? There was 
   quite a lot of interest about LPF at the CSF soils 
   workshop. 
 JD:  Yes, we have talked about this on and off over the 
   years. The problem is who do you actually invite? 
   We have quite good relations with the farmers round 
   the Loe. One does a lot of community engagement. 
   But these farmers don’t represent the community as 
   a whole, certainty not those who are smaller beef 
   farmers in the upper catchment. 
JC:  We certainly couldn’t invite all of them, it would be 
  mayhem! And also unfair on those who didn’t come.  
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 Of course there are many other groups, e.g. businesses, in the catchment. However, analysis 
here focuses on these three absent groups because they are directly affected by the decisions 
made by LPF; whether that is with regard to planning around land management, flood 
alleviation or access. 
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This exchange illustrates the ethical challenge LPF members face with regard 
to who to invite, and what interests they would be representing. The key point 
being that it is simply not possible to have one farmer speak for all. This ethical 
challenge is identical when LPF was thinking about which publics to invite. Or in 
other words, there are diverse interests from different individuals amongst 
publics and farmers; as such there is risk in giving one party, out of many, 
space to influence.  
 
There were two practical reasons for not inviting farmers or the public. All 
meetings involve discussing specific farms, risks and both advisory and 
regulatory proceedings. Therefore there is a confidentially issue with non-
environmental agency professionals being present. The second practical reason 
is because of time, language and specialist knowledge. As I discuss in section 
9.2 ‘Barriers to the CaBA’, to be able to participate meaningfully during a LPF 
meeting a considerable level of expert knowledge around catchment 
management is needed; along with a depth of understanding about the risk 
histories to its management. Therefore LPF has not been opened up to the 
public because “they just would not know what we go on about half the time; 
you can’t expect people to learn the acronyms or of read all the policy” (MH, 
2014). Language, jargon and protocol participation barriers are not peculiar to 
LPF. As JD (2014) explained “we have tried inviting the Council to the LPF 
meetings. But they brought all their rules about who can speak when and 
wanted us to write an official memorandum or something about how the 
meetings work. It simply didn’t work. We [environmental sector] speak a 
completely different language to them [statutory sector].  
 
The final reason for non-participation of these groups was strategic. By strategic 
I refer to how a group could be excluded on the grounds that their aims don’t 
align with that of LPF. In practice there was only one example of exclusion on 
strategic grounds; and that was with the case of Helston Town Council. Council 
representatives were members of the original LPF when it was established in 
1996. However, in 2000 members from the NT, NE, CWT, and EA who 
collectively represented environmental interests politely un-invited the Council 
representatives. As the LPF coordinator and NT Property manager explained, 
“It felt like they high jacked our agenda” (JD, 2012) and “steered us away from 
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our own aims, they talked about what was important for them not necessarily 
our core conservationist aim” (AC, 2013). Essentially the Council’s primary 
interest was that of flood risk in Helston rather than the ecology, habitats and 
causes of flooding in the catchment. 
 
I sum, the ethical and practical factors for exclusion were far more powerful than 
the strategic factors for LPF. As such I would argue that the way power is 
exercised through invitation to participation at meeting is relatively benign. To 
understand why there is an absence of power and politics, with regard to 
participation, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of LPF as a 
voluntary partnership. Cook et al (2013) defines a ‘voluntary partnership’ as one 
which works at the waterbody scale and has formed organically in response to a 
specific local risk. What Cook et al (2013) does not fully explicate is the 
‘voluntary’ component to this type of partnership.  
 
Firstly, voluntary partnerships have no statutory powers. The power for these 
partnerships to affect change comes from the voluntary support of its members. 
This support begins with attendance of and participation at LPF meetings. The 
attendance by environmental agency staff to voluntary partnerships is of course 
not compulsory. But rather the attendance is actually a significant challenge for 
time and resource pressured environmental agencies. Building on these points, 
voluntary partnerships do not have their own finances but rely on the voluntary 
contribution of time and respective agencies budgets to function. As such there 
is not central finance account for members to bid into in order to further their 
interests. All these points considered I argue here that power and politics, with 
regard to participation, are not prevalent issues for voluntary partnerships due 
to practicalities and attendance costs. I would anticipate that the situation would 
be markedly different if LPF had statutory powers and finances.  
 
9.1.3: CaBA as Translation 
To bring this section of the drivers for the CaBA together I step back from the 
specific empirics and theorise the CaBA and the diffuse pollution risk 
management at the Meta scale. As we know, the participatory agenda is most 
often predicated on instrumental, normative and pragmatic arguments (Bakker 
and Page, 2005; Blackstock and Richards, 2007; Reed, 2008; Stirling, 2008; 
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Wesselink, 2011; Wright and Fritsch, 2011). Building on the conclusion that the 
CaBA is being driven by pragmatic rationales I put forward here a far more 
radical proposition about the underpinning rationale for the CaBA. The central 
proposition I make is that the participatory agenda is the response to the 
dysfunction of the regulatory actor-network in dealing with the contemporary risk 
of diffuse pollution. As I will explain, there has been a shift in the character of 
water risks, from point source pollution, which is knowable, to diffuse pollution, 
which is an uncertain phenomenon for regulatory agencies. I employ Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) to make this argument. In particular I use the concepts 
of enrolment and translation to provide interpretative leverage to explain the 
construction and dysfunction of actor-networks in relation to water governance. 
The first account focuses on the construction of the regulatory actor-network 
which manages point source pollution. The second account looks at how the 
regulatory actor-network has become dysfunctional in controlling diffuse 
pollution, and the third account explores the process of constructing a new 
participatory actor-network at the waterbody scale with LPF as the specific case 
study. 
 
Establishing the Regulatory Actor-network 
To understand the regulatory actor-network it is necessary to first consider the 
history of water discharge permits. Of course the ways in which UK individuals 
and industries receive, use and dispose of water have markedly changed 
through the last century. In 1945 there were more than 1,000 bodies involved in 
the supply of water and around 1,400 bodies responsible for sewerage disposal 
(OFWAT, 2006). Today the UK’s water and sewerage is managed through just 
12 private companies (OFWAT, 2006). Parallel to the rationalisation of the 
water industry has been the evolution of water pollution regulation. Through a 
succession of Acts of Parliament (Rivers Board Act, 1948; Rivers Act, 1960; 
Water Acts 1973, 1983, 1989 and 2003), there has been a tightening of 
regulation of point source discharges to rivers from industrial and sewerage 
operations. Discharge is regulated through discharge permits which impose 
conditions on the nature, composition, temperature and rate of discharge to 
ensure water quality standards (OFWAT, 2006). Acts of Parliament have also 
endowed the water regulator (currently the Environment Agency (EA), formerly 
the National Rivers Authority (NRA) with the powers to sample effluent from any 
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land or vessel discharging into any water course (OFWAT, 2006). Breaches of 
discharge permits will be dealt with punitively through the legal system (see 
Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010: 38 (1) and 12 (1). Knowingly 
permitting a water discharge, without a permit, will result in a conviction in a 
Magistrates Court. Polluters could be fined up to £50,000 or sentenced to a 
maximum of 12 months imprisonment. 
 
The establishment of discharge permits and responsibilities assigned for their 
regulation is akin to what Callon (1986) term problematisation. Callon (1986) 
used the term problematisation to describe the first stage of translation where 
the problems, goals and solutions are established (Clark and Murdoch, 1997; 
Clarke, 2002). At the problematisation stage whoever gets to define the problem 
locates ‘themselves’ as the gatekeeper and casting director, determining who 
the other actors are (Clarke, 2002). In formation of this actor-network the EA 
have been positioned as the gate keeper through being assigned the role of 
regulator by DEFRA. This position empowers the EA to problematize the risk of 
water pollution in terms of conditions on discharge permit limits, the goals in 
terms of water quality targets and the solutions which are through the 
enforcement of regulation. The next stage of translation, and a crucial aspect to 
the construction of the regulatory actor-network, is mobilisation. Callon (1986) 
describes mobilisation as the process whereby various actors are translated 
into manageable entities. In my account of constructing a regulatory actor-
network the mobilisation stage requires ‘managing’ the non-human actant of 
water.  
 
Water is simultaneously the object at risk and the conduit of risk which connects 
the regulatory actor-network. For the regulatory actor-network to be mobilised, 
and to effectively function, water needs to be inscribed. Inscription is a process 
of creating text or data which enhances and perpetuates the interests of an 
actor (Spinuzzi, 2008). An inscription device is the technology, in this case 
water monitoring technology, which renders water into a medium which then 
becomes credible in the network (Kaghan and Bowker, 2001). I argue that for 
the EA the inscription is the process by which they monitor, measure, analyse 
and render water into statistical data. Data on discharge is imperative if 
calculations are to be performed and subsequently accusations of illegal 
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pollution discharge are going to be made by the EA. Furthermore discharge 
data must be accompanied by the highest degree of statistical certainty if it is to 
be credible and stand up to scrutiny in the punitive legal system. One of most 
crucial components to the regulatory actor-network is the infrastructural network 
of pipes which connect industrial discharge to an outfall point into a water 
course. This component is what ANT scholars term an intermediary actant. An 
intermediary is an actant which transports meaning, or force, without 
transformation; or put differently, defining its inputs is enough to define its 
outputs. The infrastructural network of pipes enables discharge data to be 
accompanied with certainty precisely because it does not transform the 
chemical makeup of the discharge; in other words the chemicals leaving 
industry and entering the pipe are the same as the chemicals discharged and 
monitored by the EA.  
 
Once water has been successfully inscribed into a credible form, the 
mechanism of discharge permits becomes a viable solution to regulate actors. 
In ANT terms, the discharge permit becomes the obligatory passage point 
through which all actors must pass (Clarke, 2002). Discharge permits are 
therefore a key node in the coordination of the regulatory actor-network by the 
EA. The fundamental claim I am making in this section is that the regulation of 
point source water pollution should be considered as a stable, functioning, 
coordinated and highly converged80 actor-network. So converged, in fact, that 
relationships between actors are enshrined in environmental law and so long as 
water can be neatly inscribed the network will continue to function. Testament to 
functioning, or fully mobilised, of the regulatory actor-network has been a huge 
progress in reducing point source pollution from industry and sewerage 
treatment works (DEFRA, 2011). For example the EA reported that six out of 
489 bathing water areas failed imperative standards but only two could be 
attributable partly, or wholly, to water company discharges (OFWAT, 2006). 
Improvement in the quality of UK water courses has been put down to an 
effective regulatory network for point sources coupled with Water Companies’ 
investment in infrastructure (DEFRA, 2011).  
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 ANT scholars use the term ‘convergence’ to describe networks characterised by a high level 
of agreement between actors as the result of translation (Crawford, 2005). 
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Dysfunction of the Regulatory Actor- network 
I now make the argument that the regulatory actor-network has become 
dysfunctional in the context of diffuse pollution. I use the term dysfunction in a 
particular way. Many ANT accounts focus on failure in translation or how the 
actor-network has collapsed through betrayal. But in the case of the regulatory 
actor-network it has not collapsed or been betrayed but still adequately 
functions in managing point source pollution.  Rather, what I mean is that the 
regulatory actor-network has simply become dysfunctional for enrolling the new 
actors, i.e. agricultural and domestic catchment communities, who are 
responsible for diffuse pollution. I now discuss three factors which, I would 
argue, are responsible for the dysfunction: 1) actors responsible for diffuse 
pollution do not pass the obligatory passage point; 2) diffuse water pollution is 
difficult, if not impossible, to inscribe; 3) the catchment acts as a mediator rather 
than intermediary. 
 
On the first factor, diffuse pollution comprises of a large number of individually 
minor point sources coming from an almost limitless number of actors. These 
sources include domestic septic tanks, highway runoff, domestic cleaning 
practices and agriculture. While each of these actor’s activities are bound by the 
same UK discharge regulations (Environmental Permitting Regulations., 2010: 
38 (1) and 12 (1)) the small scale such water usage means they are not 
required to maintain a discharge permit in the same way as large industries 
must. Furthermore, the intermittency of diffuse pollution incidents means that 
they often elude patrolling by EA Officers81. The key point here is that actors 
responsible for the diffuse pollution do not pass the obligatory passage point of 
the discharge permits. This results in the regulator actor-network to become 
bypassed and thus dysfunctional.  
 
The second factor is the issue of inscription of diffuse water pollution. The 
fundamental point is that actors cannot be enrolled in the regulatory actor-
network if there is no certain scientific data to back up their responsibility for 
discharge. As the CWT Agricultural Engagement Officer (SC) explained in LPF 
Catchment Group meeting (06/10/2015) “throwing stones at the point sources is 
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 As discussed through this thesis, there is great uncertainty in scientific data about the source 
and pathways of diffuse pollution. 
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easy. Diffuse source is just so complex. At the end of the day its always comes 
back to data and evidence”. Essentially the inscription devices used to inscribe 
discharge from piped water infrastructure are ineffective at capturing the source 
and pathways of diffuse pollution. Further, to date there is no scientific method 
which can adequately monitor, measure or model diffuse pollution to the 
satisfaction of the established regulatory actor-network. As discussed in 
Chapter 7 this has driven the EA, and LPF, to conduct seemingly ‘non-scientific’ 
Walk Over surveys in attempt to gather such data. 
 
The third factor is that the catchment acts a mediator rather than an 
intermediary. Above I made the point that the infrastructural network of pipes, a 
key feature of a point source, does not transform the chemical makeup of 
discharge. As such it can be classified as an intermediary. However, diffuse 
pollution does not arrive at a water monitoring station via a pipe but rather it 
travels through the catchment. This considered the catchment can be defined 
as a mediator. A mediator being something that transforms, distorts or modifies 
the meaning of the original object, i.e. water. As water travels through the 
catchment its original characteristics are distorted in a number of ways 
depending on local geology, land practices, topology, inter alia. All of which are 
highly contingent and thus impossible to scientifically model compared to piped 
infrastructure.  
 
In conclusion, my point is that regulatory management, here conceived as an 
actor-network, has become dysfunctional for managing diffuse pollution. This 
may appear to be an obvious conclusion but nevertheless an original one. I 
would argue that up until now the practice of water regulation, through 
discharge permitting, has been black boxed82. Indeed, because of its success in 
reducing point source pollution the actual regulatory process and how it 
functions have become invisible. However, with the realisation that the network 
is failing to address diffuse pollution it has opened opportunity, for me, to critical 
analyse how it functions. Although I need to add the following caveat, in many 
ways the regulatory system was never designed for managing diffuse pollution. 
And as such it cannot function in this new epoch of risk. With regard to ANT, I 
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 A black box is the term for a device, system or object which is viewed in terms of its input, 
output and transfer characteristics without any knowledge required of its internal workings. 
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would argue that it has provided powerful conceptual leverage for uncovering 
how scientific objects are manoeuvred, both successfully and unsuccessfully, 
by organisations to the ends of their aims and interests. The last point I make 
here is that my analysis challenges the assumption that the participatory 
agenda within the CaBA is simply predicated on the positional goods of 
instrumental, normative and pragmatic arguments. Rather, I argue that the 
participatory agenda is driven by the inability to inscribe water into compelling 
data format to be consummate for regulatory action. 
 
Construction of the Participatory Actor-network 
My starting point here is that because of the dysfunction in the traditional water 
regulation a new actor-network, which can better manage diffuse pollution, 
needs to be constructed. My argument is that the participatory agenda, 
embedded within the CaBA, represents an attempt to construct, what I term, a 
new participatory actor-network. In the following section I evidence this claim 
through reference to grounded data. Through doing so I also address the major 
criticism of ANT accounts; i.e. that their descriptive nature lack reference to 
specific empirics (Ginn and Demerit, 2008). Further, through this section, I also 
provide a retort to another criticism of ANT accounts that they often fail to 
address moral or political questions about what such relations should take (Ginn 
and Demerit, 2008). I initially draw from discursive data at the regional scale 
which substantiates my claim that the participatory agenda represents a 
construction of a new actor-network to address the risk of diffuse pollution. I 
then go on to draw on data, from my ethnography of LPF, to explore moments 
of enrolment and resistance in the process of building a localised actor-network 
to deal with diffuse pollution in the Cober catchment. 
 
EA’s WFD targets and Co-optation 
Firstly, and explicitly, the River Basin Programme Manager for the South West 
explained how the participatory agenda was a response to the failings of the 
regulatory actor network. 
 
TW:  So is regulatory action hard to implement with diffuse 
water pollution issues? 
JB:   Yes, very much so. 
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TW: So would you say that the participatory agenda is 
driven by the difficulty in regulating against diffuse 
water pollution? 
JB: Exactly, so that’s why we need the voluntary 
approach. That’s the role of the Catchment 
Coordinator for the CBA. It’s about getting the 
community involved at the catchment scale. 
 
In practice this new actor-network is reliant on enrolling partners to deliver the 
WFD objectives. As the WFD Engagement Officer (RT, 2014) detailed; “my role 
is to outlook from the EA to see where we can engage with third parties both 
private and public sector, and charities to help us to deliver the requirements of 
the WFD”. Essentially RT (2014) empathises how partnerships are an integral 
mechanism to deliver the CaBA. In structural terms new Catchment Coordinator 
roles have been created by the EA in order to develop and support new local 
partnerships. The EA’s anticipation is that these new local partnerships will 
instigate the on-the-ground changes in the catchment to deliver their WFD GES 
targets. However, getting others to deliver the WFD targets is not a given and 
process requires, what ANT scholar’s term, co-optation. This is a sub process 
where actors seek to have their individual objectives agreed and delivered by 
other actors. This process of co-optation is the responsibility of the WFD EO 
(RT, 2014), as he describes in relation to his job role. 
 
WFD EO: Well obviously we are a regulatory authority and 
responsible for the WFD and we have targets and 
standards which the environment has to meet. So 
selfishly if you like. We are looking for partners to 
achieve our statutory aims and objectives. That is it 
in a nutshell, but I think that it is wider than that. I 
think that the environment benefits all and it is bigger 
than just regulation. If we can improve the 
environment for everyone there are knock on 
benefits, not just in us meeting our statutory targets 
but people’s health and enjoyment of the 
countryside. Part of my job is comparing those 
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synergies and compatibilities. So that we can all 
benefit. But in a narrowest sense we go into our 
partnership meetings thinking ‘what can we get out of 
it?’ But that’s what our partners are doing as well. My 
job is to look for those mutual benefits. We all benefit 
in a sense. 
 
The WFD EO went on to further detail this process of co-optation “my role is to 
look for that potential to see who we should be engaging with. The trick is to 
turn the GES into our partners’ requirements as well. So then you are into 
getting on board these local pressure group initiatives. Angling clubs, parish 
councils, specific trusts, the RSPB, even with the private sector. It’s about 
partnership working”. The clear point here is that at the regional scale there is 
the momentum to create a new actor-network to ensure the EA’s WFD targets 
are achieved. 
 
Enrolment and network construction at the catchment scale 
In the section above I have discussed the EA’s ambition for a new actor-
network to be constructed. I now focus in on my case study catchment and 
explore how this process of enrolment, co-optation and even un-enrolment has 
happened on the ground. The first example I use is one of un-enrolment. I 
argue that equally important as enrolment is un-enrolment. What is meant by 
this is that some actors have vastly different agendas to that of the gate keeper 
actor and thus try to steer LPF away from their desired direction. This was the 
case with Helston Parish Council who in the beginning (1996-2000) were 
members of LPF. But as time progressed the core LPF team uninvited the 
Council to the meetings as they “high jacked our agenda” (JD, 2012) and 
“steered us away from our own aims, they talked about what was important for 
them not necessarily our core conservationist aim” (AC, 2013). To read this 
through ANT, this represents a challenge to Network Stability. Actor-networks 
are in a continual state of becoming, including possible dissolution (Kaghan and 
Bowker, 2001). From the view point of the primary actor, i.e. LPF, the network 
demands maintenance to prevent desertion to, or recruitment from, competing 
networks, i.e. Helston Council. Thus, in this case, LPF articulated the actor-
network to ensure their agenda was not compromised. 
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The second example is from the winter of 2013/14 when there was a very 
curious incident of self-enrolment by Winchester growers (horticultural 
business). Winchester farms daffodils on one of the Cober’s tributaries an in 
that winter a huge runoff incident occurred which damaged properties, road 
infrastructure and obviously discharged nutrients and sediment into the 
watercourses. The EA was aware of the incident and had carried out extensive 
assessment of the land practices. The EA concluded the business practices 
were irresponsible and were considering regulatory action to prevent usage of 
this particular farm for growing high risk crops. What happened next was 
surprising. Rather than contesting the grey area of diffuse pollution runoff, 
Winchester came forward and contacted Natural England (NE) for support and 
advice on remedying the issue. This was unusual in the fact that such growing 
industries do not typically interact with conservation agencies. By involving NE, 
who subsequently brought in an expert in soil and sediment traps to fit 
immediate short term remedies, Winchester avoided punitive action from the 
EA. Essentially what happened is that Winchester cleverly manoeuvred NE as 
an intermediary and in doing so showed willing. This act was enough for the EA 
to back off. I argue this is an act of reversal enrolment wherein an actor has 
self-enrolled to a network for personal gain (i.e. . avoided the punitive action of 
fields being taken out of use as threatened by the EA). 
 
The third example I provide is that of the reintroduction of Strapwort to Loe 
Pool83. Strapwort is a rare and almost extinct plant which currently only grows in 
bio-houses. The last place Strapwort grew naturally was Loe Pool some 100 
years ago. A project by Paignton Zoo wanted to reintroduce Strapwort to Loe 
Pool and this endeavour was discussed at many LPF meetings. While 
altruistically this was a good project the lack of resources, within the NT, for its 
long term management prevented initial enthusiasm for the programme. 
Further, for LPF its presence in the Loe did not help their primary objective to 
reduce pollution. However, thinking in LPF changed as it was realised that 
having an extremely rare species present in the Loe would enable them to 
leverage new financial resources and raise the profile and concern for water 
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 On the Loe Pool Forum website you can find the film I made about the reintroduction of 
Strapwort to Loe Pool. 
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quality in the Loe. The result was an enrolment of this reintroduction programme 
in the hope that this would help pending funding bids to improve and address 
the pollution risks. This is a practice which was also noted by Watson (2014) 
who found that collaborative outputs were often pursued by groups based on 
anticipation that they could potentially lead to future positive outcomes. 
 
To summarise, these examples go some way to evidencing how a new 
participatory network is being constructed. In particular I have shown how 
through a co-optation process the EA are trying to turn the GES into local 
partner’s objectives. However, by also considering how the network is 
constructed at the catchment scale I have revealed some challenges for the EA 
doing this in practice. Firstly, I have reiterated a previous conclusion, first made 
by Watson (2014), that local catchment partnerships are powerful entities in 
their own right and are shaping how a participatory network is constructed in 
practice. Secondly, that co-optation is not a one way street. I have shown how 
local actors, potential ‘polluters’, are equally active in shaping the relationships 
in diffuse pollution management. My concluding point here is that ANT has 
provided a new way to theorise the drivers for the CaBA, and my forwarding 
point is that much more work needs doing for how this plays out in practice over 
time. 
 
9.2: Barriers to the CaBA 
This section address the second part to the third research question “what are 
the barriers to delivering the CaBA?”. In the previous sections I have examined 
the extent and nature of participation in practice. A key observation was that 
participation in practice is more akin to communication rather than a two way 
exchange of knowledge and risk framings. To understand why the practice of 
participation is somewhat limited, despite being at the centre of policy rhetoric, 
we need to examine the institutional culture within water governance. Initially I 
draw from data which emerged from interviews84 with the EA about delivering 
the CaBA more generally in Cornwall. I then go on to draw from data which 
emerged from interviews with LPF members about delivering the CaBA at the 
waterbody scale, i.e. the Cober catchment. The argument I make here is that 
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 More specifically, the majority of this data came from responses to the interview questions; 1) 
what do you think the EA wants to achieve from stakeholder participation?; 2) what do you think 
the barriers are to achieving successful engagement?. 
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the ‘culture of science’ raises a barrier to participation beyond a base level of 
‘communication’. Further, that the culture of science precipitates an 
organisational structure of ‘silo working’ which in turn presents a barrier to 
authentic integrated catchment management. The following section is structured 
under the central tenants of the CaBA; 1) stakeholder participation; 2) 
integrated catchment management. 
 
9.2.1: Barriers to Stakeholder Participation 
As a way to introduce the culture of science I pull from excerpts in water policy 
documents. The UK Government (gov.uk) state that “science and evidence 
underpins the work of the Environment Agency”. Indeed, the EA’s strapline on 
its publications is “using science to create a better place” (see Figure 71). This 
strapline is typically fleshed out on the second page of reports with a description 
of ‘Science at the Environment Agency’. For example, ‘Making Information 
Available for Integrated Catchment Management’ contains a description of how 
science provides “an up-to-date understanding of the world about us and helps 
us to develop monitoring tools and techniques to manage our environment as 
efficiently and effectively as possible” (EA, 2008: iii). My argument starts with 
the point that ‘science’ and its associated epistemologies, methodologies and 
protocols sit at the heart of current approaches in the CaBA. As an Independent 
researcher based in the Looe Catchment reiterated, “the EA are obsessed with 
something called science, they are always referring to the importance of 
evidence based, transparent, and auditable data” (BH, 2012). Of course, there 
is an obvious and solid rationale for an ‘evidenced based’ approach for a public 
funded body institution. My point is not that this in itself is a problem, but as I will 
now elaborate on it does raise, admittedly long discussed, barriers for the 
participation of non-experts in catchment management. So similar to Cook et al 
(2013) I found that participation in practice is reshaped by the competing frames 
of: 1) professionalism which excludes alternative framings of the risks; 2) 
evidence based decision making which maintains knowledge hierarchies. I go 
further by pulling apart these issues by also drawing out the culturally influenced 
epistemological frames which underpin these framings as a way to explain the 
unsymmetrical relations within the opportunity for participation in water 
management.  
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Figure 71: Image of the EA’s tag line for reports ‘Using science to create a better place’ 
 
“we are an evidence-based organisation” 
In the polemic sense science is often conceived as a truth-making practice 
distinct from all other forms of human activity (Gregory et al., 2009). The 
process of constructing this distinction between science and non-science is 
termed as ‘boundary work’ in STS (Gieryn, 1999; Irwin, 2008). ‘Boundary work’ 
also captures the idea that achieving and maintaining scientific credibility 
involves constructing and policing these knowledge boundaries (Braun and 
Kropp, 2010; Collins and Evans, 2007; Gieryn, 1999). Collins and Evans (2008: 
610) note “a standard critique is that the traditional boundaries between experts 
and non-experts remain strong in the wider society, even though they have 
been shown to be permeable by STS”. I begin then with a ‘standard critique’, 
but a standard critique which still holds relevance so many years on from it 
coinage. As Lane et al (2011) and Cook et al (2013) more recently noted, the 
discursive and practical resources that can facilitate knowledge hierarchy are 
surprisingly durable and not yet institutionally dislodged despite the participatory 
turn. 
 
I observed how the EA Officers position stakeholder’s knowledge as non-expert 
or as Collins and Evans (2008: 610) put it “unaccredited, and the wrong side of 
the expert boundary”. For example, to my question “Where do you think it’s 
appropriate to engage with local stakeholders in order to understand and 
respond to pollution risks?” the Head of Regional Integrated Environmental 
Planning replied “Well we are an evidence-based organisation, so that’s a 
difficult question” (PG, 2012). The implication of this statement is two-fold, firstly 
that local knowledge does not represent ‘evidence’ and secondly that the EA 
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only use ‘evidence’ in responding to catchment risks. My point about boundary 
work and ‘evidenced based’ decision making was reiterated by the SW WFD 
Engagement Officer, “You have to understand that linking their anecdotal 
evidence to real science events, what they perceive and see may not be a 
problem and may not. It’s like the police, I saw a man walking down the street 
he must be a criminal, it might be useful it might not” (RT, 2012). In interviewing 
an Integrated Planning Officer (DH, 2012), I received a more nuanced answer 
to the question: 
 
DH: The public are our eyes and ears if you like; they 
often spot something directly which can help us to 
identify a problem, we can’t be everywhere. But I 
guess it’s tricky for the EA to imagine how this would 
directly help us to deliver WFD standards. Knowing 
what to do to solve the issue is the difficult bit. So 
awareness raising is important but a bit disjointed 
from achieving our WFD aims.  
 
In this excerpt DH emphasises stakeholder knowledge as a ‘canary’ for 
identifying risks, but also emphasises a boundary in terms of the usefulness of 
local knowledge with regard to ‘helpful’ evidence and guidance for solutions. A 
second point here is that there is a belief that engagement with stakeholders is 
about ‘communicating the risks to them’ rather than participation for the 
pragmatic benefits; wherein stakeholder engagement enables ‘higher quality 
decision making based on more complete information’ (Blackstock, 2007; Reed, 
2008). Pursuing a clearer understanding of the EA’s ‘evidence boundary’, I 
questioned the WFD Engagement Officer (RT, 2012) about the where the 
distinction lies: 
 
RT: The difference between local knowledge and science 
is that the science is basically Q & A’ed and that 
there are known confidence limits within that. The 
confidence limits within lay knowledge and anecdotal 
knowledge are unknown. Because of the uncertainty 
and the importance of uncertainty it is difficult for 
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organisations like us, which are evidence based, to 
know how to use it.  
 
It is pertinent to note here that the phrase “Q & A’ed” refers to the EA’s 
knowledge validating process and is associated with positivism, wherein the 
truth is arrived at by using observations and statistical inferences to either verify 
or falsify a statement (Moon and Blackman, 2014). Thus for the WFD 
Engagement Officer, as a voice of the EA, the boundary between science and 
non-science is drawn on grounds of ‘confidence limits’ or put differently, the 
absence of a verifiable methodology in stakeholders knowledge. As DH (2014) 
similarly noted “It has to be our data that leads to WFD classification. That’s not 
to say we can’t take in others’ knowledge on, but it just can’t feed into WFD as it 
might not be the same methodology as the UK TAG group set classification”. 
 
There clearly are epistemological differences between WFD water science and 
stakeholders lay knowledge but my point is more nuanced than that. The EA’s 
starting assumption is that lay stakeholders’ knowledge is so laden with 
contextual contingencies “it’s difficult for evidence-based organisations to know 
how to use it” (RT, 2012). My argument is that if stakeholder participation is a 
genuine EA ambition, as part of the CaBA, then in practice they are falling at the 
first hurdle. That hurdle being the recognition that lay knowledge is not only 
potentially valid locally but also that it may offer new perspectives on how WFD 
standards may be achieved. To build on that argument I need to make a point 
about framing. Irwin (2008) notes how boundary work also encompasses how 
issues become framed as problems in the first place. The underlying 
assumption from interviews with the EA is that the current scientific lenses are 
adequate for addressing the challenges and solutions for diffuse pollution risk 
management. As DH noted “there is a limited usefulness of lay knowledge for 
achieving WFD standards”. But as set out in Chapter 2, evidenced in Chapter 7, 
and theorised in the first half of Chapter 8 that is not the case. Not only does 
diffuse pollution still represent a pervasive risk but, more so, that many of the 
uncertainties about how to manage it originate from not knowing enough about 
local catchments. 
 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
289 
 
“the EA talk about scenarios rather than hydrological catchments, it’s so 
difficult to relate to” 
I now turn to the issue of WFD River Basin Management Planning and its 
consultation phases. This is the process through which both lay publics and 
NGO stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in identifying water risks. 
In 2014, when the WFD RBMP process was in its second phase of consultation, 
there was a request by the CCP for its regional stakeholders (i.e. LPF partners) 
to reply to the RBMP consultation. At the LPF Catchment Group meeting 
(19/3/2015), after different members had attempted replies to the consultation, 
the group aired their frustrations about the accessibility and ‘scientisation’ of the 
process. The first criticism from LPF partners was the scale of the document, 
articulated by JL (2015) the National Trust’s SW region Wildlife and Countryside 
Adviser: 
 
JL: the EA talk about scenarios [of WFD catchments] 
rather than water bodies or hydrological catchments, 
it’s so difficult to relate our properties to. In fact if you 
want specific information on a waterbody you have to 
request further documents from CCP. I can’t respond 
with any accuracy to what’s going on in Cornwall 
generally, I can only tell them about the issues the 
NT faces on its properties….me and Andrew spent 3 
days and 560 pages working through the documents 
to find issues we could actually respond to. 
 
The barriers JL identifies are the problem of scale. JL feels she can only 
comment meaningfully on the NT properties or moreover that she has no 
relation to ‘regional scale (i.e. WFD catchment scale) water risk scenarios’ on 
which the EA wish consultation on. This then brings into question the EA’s claim 
that the WFD “catchments are the natural scale to consider this aspect of the 
environment” (DEFRA, 2013: 1). Indeed through this LPF meeting the WFD 
‘catchment’ scale was questioned for its efficacy in a consultation process. As 
the JL extract was an example of; people know risk in relation to their 
profession and this is, at most, compatible to the hydrological catchment scale 
(i.e. WFD waterbody scale). The second barrier to participation identified relates 
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to accessibly of the document for non-experts. The LPF Group struggled to see 
how “non-agency experts would ever find the time or ability to respond” (JC, 
2015). Considering JL spent three days with a colleague going through the 560 
pages it seems in probably that lay publics or even less committed NGO’s 
would take on the consultation process. And the impenetrability and arguable 
failure of the process is evidenced in the response rate to the first consultation 
phase; where the EA only received 13 responses from stakeholders in the SW. 
As a Group it was decided that the consultation is “an opaque and illogical 
process” (JC, 2015), especially if stakeholder engagement and gathering local 
knowledge were objectives of the process. The criticisms aired in this LPF 
meeting were logged and JL agreed to add to her RBMP consultation 
comments. 
 
“in some aspects I think they would know their land better than anyone” 
In the discussion so far I have demonstrated how boundary work raises a 
barrier to the inclusion of local knowledge in risk identification and secondly, 
even if this knowledge was validated, the convoluted and scientised process of 
RBMP ‘consultation’ blocks such participation. But while at the regional scale 
EA Officers questioned the validity and usefulness of local knowledge there was 
a much more nuanced perspective from EA WO Officers. The WO Officers face 
the difficult task of identifying reasons for WFD GES failures in the field. This 
process involves engaging with farmers on a daily basis, at the face-to-face 
level, to gather evidence. Rather than dismissing non-science completely these 
Officers, to an extent, incorporate local knowledge in the survey process. For 
example, to my question “What is your perspective on farmer’s risk 
knowledge?” the WO Officer (NB, 2012) answered: 
 
NB: In some aspects I think they would know their land 
better than anyone. But there are still areas of land 
management where they are not particularly aware 
of. One of those that I have been aware of is soil 
compaction and of the below ground soil structure. 
From a wildlife point of view they know, they have 
been there for years. That’s where we get a lot of our 
intelligence from, ‘there were fish here and no there 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
291 
 
is no longer fish here’. They can be really informative 
and really useful. 
 
Far from local knowledge having “limited usefulness for achieving WFD 
standards’ (DH, 2012) NB reveals how in practice this local knowledge can 
direct the WO surveys to issues of potential risk. While this potential was 
acknowledge it came with a caveat that this knowledge would be localised. For 
the second WO Officer I interviewed (GN, 2013) the question of risk knowledge 
was inseparable from risky practices. GN (2013) explained that “there is a 
spectrum of knowledge” amongst the farming community and then went on to 
make a point about the deficiency in knowledge about low risk farming:  
 
GN: About dairy farmers; some of them are really good 
dairy farmers but some of them are crap at land 
management. When you see out wintering85 and it is 
just bog. You do question it. There are reasons why 
he is doing it. You think ‘you aren’t doing your land 
any good you are just trashing that for years to come’. 
So I often think about that aspect. There may 
economic reasons for that; there may be social 
reasons too. 
 
For WO Officers the problem with farmers’ risk knowledge is that it is not always 
the right knowledge nor does it lead to the right practices. Further, that this 
knowledge originates from ancestrally cultural practices rather than evidence 
based best practice. As NB (2012) explained: 
 
NB: Farmers have been surprised when experts from the 
EA have gone out and shown them the profile of their 
soil and they will say ‘crikey I never realised that it 
was compacted to that level, I have been ploughing 
to 12 inches for the last 25 years since my dad 
                                            
85
 ‘Out wintering’ refers to the practice of grazing cattle on fields during the winter rather than 
sheltering and feeding with roofed housing. The risk for diffuse pollution is increased with this 
practice due the vulnerability of soils to poaching. 
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handed my farm to me, but I hadn’t thought that 
there would be a compacted layer below that’. 
 
In the polemic sense lay knowledge of risk is often characterised as inseparable 
from cultural practices and worldviews, constructed through local memory rather 
than evidence, locally contingent and thus questionably credible (Irwin, 1995; 
Wynne, 1996). As I have previously discussed, more recently lay knowledge 
and scientific knowledge are considered to be different areas of expertise that 
complement rather than contradict each other (Giordano and Liersch, 2012; 
Lane et al., 2011). While the previous excerpts from interviews with the WO 
Officers reinforce the characterisation of lay knowledge as ‘inseparable from 
cultural practices, based on local experiences and locally contingent’ they also 
highlight how local knowledge can complement ‘scientific understanding’. For 
example, NB noted ‘how they probably know the land better than anyone’ and 
‘how the EA receive a lot of good intelligence from farmers about local changes 
in wildlife’. However, at the core of the WO Officers perspectives is that risk 
knowledge is entwined with culturally influenced farming practices which have 
been handed down and locally specific.  
 
“effective engagement with the farming community relies on…” 
I now move on from the epistemological barriers to stakeholder participation 
and consider more practical aspects to engaging with stakeholders. A re-
occurring point of discussion at LPF meetings has been the turnover of staff 
within the government environmental agencies working on the ground, 
specifically within the EA and NE. For example in four years I have been 
working with LPF four out of the five NE staff and five out of the ten EA staff 
have either changed post or left their agency completely. The concern is that 
the transience of staff negatively affects both relations with the catchment’s 
agricultural community and partnership working. In the following section I 
explore this issue and explain how it represents a barrier to successful and 
sustainable catchment management. 
 
“trust and mutual respect” 
In the LPF Executive meeting (2015) the NE representative pointed out that 
“effective engagement with the farming community relies on trust and mutual 
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respect, BH has done great in getting the CSF message out there and 
delivering capital grants, but the uncertainty in the post has sadly meant she 
has had to move on” (JC, 2015). In fact there has been staff turnover in all the 
NE posts which cover the Cober catchment; with exception of the HLS Lead 
Advisor. For example in 2012 EH was in post as the Soils for Profit (S4P) 
officer, in 2013 EH moved posts and was replaced by Charlotte Evans (CE); CE 
stayed in post until 2014 when the NE funding for the S4P initiative finished. 
The Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) advisor was in post from 2012 till 2015 
and then similarly left when funding for the initiative became under certain; 
uncertainty due to the transition to the new Countryside Stewardship Scheme. 
Previously I have argued that the CSF and S4P are successful initiatives 
because of their direct and positive engagement with the agricultural 
community. However, the take-up by farmers of advice and grant aid is not a 
given. I observed how there is a process of trust building between a farmer and 
an advisor wherein the advisor must convince the farmer that their ‘expert’ 
advice is worth listening too. The extract below illustrates one way this trust 
building process happens through a farmer testing an advisor on the technical 
knowledge of machinery: 
 
PP:  I have a Uni drill. 
CE:  That’s for cereals? 
PP: It will drill anything. A lot of the cereals we will put in 
with a Massey 30. We have got an air drill to 
complement. We are doing a lot of grass seed 
reseeding. But I think we are going switch to a 
Clayton so we can strip till. You couldn’t put all your 
eggs in one basket, not down here. You couldn’t strip 
till a field of potatoes without having a cultivator and 
working it first. So you are never going to get into a 
pocket where the drill is all you need. It is all very 
well when they are in East Anglia drilling 10 acre 
fields, but you are not going to get that down here. 
So you have got to have a happy medium. It’s that or 
a weaving time drill where you rely on running 2-3 
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cultivation passes. Because even on a ZUMO, errr 
sorry are you familiar with machinery? 
CE:  Yeah I’m with you on machinery. 
PP: A Zumo, you will never make a seed bed down here 
with a Zumo with one pass. 
CE: Yeah some people up around the Roseland have 
been trying that and it seems to be good. 
PP:  But in one pass though? 
CE:  Yes. 
PP:  That’s interesting. 
CE:  It’s been taken up this year more.  
PP:  What drill are they using behind that? 
CE:  Zumo express with drill combi type thing. 
PP:  And then running the drill combination after that?  
CE:  Yes. 
PP: That’s not true one pass. That’s using a Zumo then a 
drill combination. So why don’t you just plough and 
then use a drill combination. All you’re doing with a 
Zumo is….  
CE:  You can run the risk of compacting. 
 
In a discussion after this S4P engagement I asked CE about the seemingly 
combative exchange of machinery jargon. CE explained that “yeah, that 
happens a lot. He was just testing me. Any advice I give him will affect his 
farming system and ultimately his profit. He has got to know I know my stuff to 
trust me”. Engagement with the agricultural stakeholders is thus not just about 
the one way communication of risk knowledge and advice. If that advice is 
going to be taken on board by farmers there needs to be trust building process 
which requires face to face engagements. This process of developing trust is 
something I also discussed with the JC the HLS advisor.  
 
TW: So is your knowledge of land management is verified 
to the other farmers through the fact that you farm 
too? 
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JC: Yes it has more street credibility doesn’t it. It is 
always a good thing to let them know, you have 
turned up and you have not imposed yourself 
necessarily, that might be a bit of a strong word, but 
sometimes you have to. But you have turned up at 
their doorstep and they welcome you in and you sit 
at their table. They don’t know you at all, so it is 
always good to get to know you as a person and 
what makes you tick because they are welcoming 
you into their family, their house and their business 
and you become part of that as being an advisor who 
turns up and gives them money to do things they say 
they will do because you have asked them to do it. 
So it is important you have street credibility with them 
and they know what makes you tick and you have 
cows and chickens and things like that. I have 
always been involved in farming, so they can trust 
you then and know where you’re coming from. It’s 
important.  
 
The point of analysis we can make here is that delivery of advice and uptake of 
grant aid, which reduce diffuse pollution risk, relies on trust being established 
between the advisor and the farmers. CE explained that once trust is 
established a relationship can develop where “they feel like they can call you 
when they are making decisions”. As the HLS advisor also noted “it’s the long 
term engagement I have had with the farmers round the Loe which has meant 
we have delivered so much for conservation and reducing the runoff”. Because 
changing the farming system or investing in infrastructure happens over a long 
period, with many decisions to be made, the development of a good long term 
working relationship is crucial for success. Returning to my starting point, the 
high staff turnover in NE thus compromises long term working relationships with 
the catchments agricultural community. 
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“it’s about affecting change, it’s necessary to have that local knowledge” 
Staff turnover also affects the success and sustainability of partnership working. 
At the core of LPF there are four particularly committed individuals; 1) CWT 
ecologist; 2) NT General Manager at Penrose; 3) NE HLS Lead Advisor; 4) EA 
Environmental Planning Officer. These individuals have been the driving force 
in the partnership since 1996. Alongside this core membership have been 
various officers and advisors from different organisations who have engaged 
sporadically or for a short time only. I observed how the core members are 
always encouraging and patient with new members. However, new members 
can struggle with understanding the context of issues discussed in LPF sub 
group meetings. Each item on an agenda will have a decision history which is 
based on local context. The turnover and transience of staff is thus a hindrance 
to full and complete participation of members in meetings as they lack the local 
knowledge about the issue. In practical terms the lack of local knowledge also 
consumes time as the chair typically has to explain the reasoning behind a 
series of previous actions.  
 
For example, in 2014, the Catchment Coordinator (CC) from the CCP began 
attending the LPF Catchment Group meetings. Much meeting time was spent 
bringing them, and other new members, up to speed on the history, politics and 
geography or the Cober catchment. Over the next year the CC became an 
active member bringing in ideas of best practice from other catchment 
partnerships and securing £15,000 for funding a feasibility study on the Willow 
Carr. However, in 2015 the EA changed the role and responsibility for the CC 
post. Anticipating this role change, the CC left and was replaced in 2015. This 
role change had two implications. Firstly, that the EA had changed the CC role 
to cover the whole of Cornwall; whereas previously there were two officers for 
Cornwall (East and West). Secondly that it would require re-explaining, at 
valuable meeting time, LPF context. In a discussion with NE HLS advisor at a 
day out planting Strapwort in Loe Pool we discussed this change, the 
importance of local knowledge and the problem of staff turnover more generally.  
 
JC: It’s about affecting change, it’s necessary to have 
that local knowledge. DH [EA’s Environmental 
Planning Officer and long term member of the point 
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sources group] for example is fantastic in that 
respect, it’s just a shame he can’t make it to the 
meetings that often as he brings the technical 
modelling knowledge and the local stuff. Shame we 
are losing TF [first CCP lead for West Cornwall] too, 
he was great. Getting us that funding and promoting 
LPF at the regional scale. I do worry that the 
coverage of the new CC role will mean that we won’t 
see GA (second CC) that much as she will be spread 
so thinly.  
 
The greatest loss for LPF has been CWT Ecologist (JD) as LPF Project 
Consultant; JD was replaced by me in 2015. JD’s exceptional local knowledge 
of the catchment’s history, geography, ecology and agriculture is combined with 
twenty years of working for CWT with the local and regional environmental 
organisations. At the LPF Lake and Lower Cober Group meeting in 2015 I 
announced that I had taken over from JD. The Cornwall Council representative, 
Dave Watkins (DW) expressed his regret.  
 
DW: Ahh that’s a shame. JD was phenomenal, a one stop 
shop for any questions about the area. I am sure you 
will do a great job. JD’s local knowledge was second 
to none, I guess that’s because she lives here and 
knows everyone. 
TW: I know, I have big boots to fill. JD will still be involved 
as part of the UST project. 
DW:  Oh that’s good, not gone for good. 
 
In summary, I have demonstrated that staff turnover and transience is a barrier 
to successful and sustainable catchment management. It affects both the trust 
factor in the delivery of advice to the agricultural community and the local 
knowledge issue in partnership working.  
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9.2.2: Barriers to Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) 
STS informs us that for scientific knowledge to be successful it must be made to 
fit the environment or the environment must be made to fit the science 
(Sismondo, 2008). The process of adjusting pieces of science and their 
environments to each other is termed coproduction86 (Jasanoff, 2004) or co-
construction (Taylor, 1995 – cited in Sismondo, 2008: 17). The suggestion is not 
that there is ‘devious manipulation’ going on to ‘fit the environment to the 
science’. My point is that for a scientific knowledge to be successful i.e. classed 
as usable evidence, it has to be highly certain; and for certainty to be achieved 
there must be a process of ‘fitting the environment to the available scientific 
tools’. This is alternatively known as reductionism which is about the 
decomposing of phenomena to its basic constituents (Moon and Blackman, 
2014). To give an example; through the four years of studying LPF rarely was 
the term ‘water pollution’ used in discussing water pollution. Pollution for 
scientists is much more specific than that; a matter of phosphate, 
orthophosphate, nitrate, and ammonia levels. These are the constituents of 
water pollution. This reductionism allows scientists to speak with certainty and 
thus be successful. Or in the words of WFD Engagement Officer (2012), this 
reductionism enables the EA to speak of “evidence which has been Q & A’ed”.  
 
Over time reductionism has spawned the many and diverse sub disciplines of 
science and the associated “the structural and organizational conditions of 
scientific production” (Fuchs.,(1993):942). The obvious benefit of niche and 
stable disciplines is that the knowledge produced is attached to a high level of 
certainty (Solomon, 2008). The disadvantage in the context of ICM is that each 
discipline will frame catchment risks in a different way. Furthermore, that 
interdisciplinary working as a necessity of ICM requires reconsidering the 
boundary work which has formed and maintained a disciplines credibility and 
success in the first place (Gieryn, 1983; Gieryn, 1999). The argument I make in 
the following discussion is that reductionism, as I observed, raises a barrier for 
delivering ICM. This is because ICM requires a simultaneous focus on the 
constituents of water pollution and on the parallel risks of flooding, ecosystem 
services and the local economy. 
                                            
86
 For example, Sismondo (2008: 17) notes how classifications of diseases afford diagnoses 
that reinforce those classifications (Bowker and Star, 1999), or how climate science has created 
both knowledge and institutions that help validate and address that knowledge (Miller, 2004). 
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“it’s only a name change, but also I was told a change in culture” 
As set out fully in Chapter 2, the rationale behind ICM is that many risks are 
interlinked at a catchment scale and thus not best explained individually through 
ecology, flood risk modelling, or water quality science alone. However, rather 
than holistically considering catchments with all their complexity the EA, 
underpinned by a ‘scientific culture’, have historically addressed through 
disciplinary specialisms. As the WO Officer noted “We used to cut the issues up 
by sciences type rather than geographical area”. This point was extrapolated on 
by the EA Environmental Planning Officer (DH, 2014) “I think that historically 
separating different issues has been a problem. Not having the links between 
them. Those links were already happening. But the CaBA has sped that up”. 
We can draw from this that historically there has been disciplinary separation of 
environmental risks within the EA, but driven by the CaBA their approach is 
moving towards ICM. As the EA’s SW Principle Climate Change Scientist (KD, 
2012) explicated stated “everyone is moving towards integrated management 
where it about bring the different aspects together to show that the environment 
interconnected”. The CaBA has impelled an organisational change within the 
EA. As WO Officer (NB, 2012) explained “we are having a structural change 
because of the CaBA which will mean that EA officers will either specialise in 
waste matters or land and water. It might increase the size of area we cover, 
but we will cover the things you know best in that area”. The CaBA has not just 
heralded an organisational change but also a ‘change in culture’ as explained 
by the EA’s Integrated Environmental Planning Officer (DH, 2013): 
 
DH: The team I worked in has changed, I guess it’s only a 
name change but also I was told a change in culture. 
It went from Area and Environmental Planning to 
Integrated Environmental Planning. So what that 
meant is the remit where we had to bring everything 
together for the EA. 
 
There was an agreement that ICM is positive direction for the EA. For the SW 
Principle Climate Change Scientist (KD, 2012) this was “a really important thing. 
Often people go off in their own silos, but actually climate change impacts on all 
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of those things and so it brings everyone together. Otherwise people would just 
be looking at their separate things”. As I have trailed in Chapter 3, in many ways 
climate change is comparable to diffuse pollution as both exhibit characteristics 
of Beck’s (1992) late modern risks; in that the risks alone are small and hard to 
evidence but cumulatively have profound impacts. In the context of a shrinking 
public purse there is increased need for catchment partnerships to be holistic 
and highlight multiple benefits of adaptation strategies. For example, to 
demonstrate that catchment management strategies will benefit not only water 
pollution but also flood risk, climate change and community wellbeing. The 
potential of an ICM is to join up cross cutting issues and drive risk management 
agendas out of ‘silo working’. As KD (2012) explained: 
 
KD: If you can pile up those multiple benefits you are 
more likely to get something done. To say that 
planting those trees will actually shade the river and 
cool the water for fish, so you are actually becoming 
resilient and adapting to climate change. In terms of 
water quality, the heavy rain we keep having we are 
struggling to meet our WFD targets because 
everything is getting washed down. I think there is a 
lot more we could and should be doing around it, 
especially at the catchment scale.  
 
The opinion that ICM is the right direction for the EA was reiterated by EA 
Environmental Planning Officer (DH, 2012): 
 
DH: Beforehand the EA was not as linked as they could 
have been; in terms of multiple outcomes and talking 
to each other. I think that is particular true of water 
quality and the flood side of the business. They have 
come together recently. I think the flood side of 
things and the rest of the business coming together 
will provide multiple benefits and opportunities as 
well. I guess the CaBA has refocused everything. 
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In summary, I have demonstrated how historically the EA have approached the 
management of catchment risks in a non-holistic way but how the launch of the 
CaBA, underinned by the ICM agenda, has heralded both organisational and 
cultural change in the EA. Further, that is this change is welcome by EA staff, in 
particular those who work on cross cutting issues such as climate change. 
However, in the next section I examine how this new CaBA has actually worked 
out in practice. 
 
“they work in silos” 
ICM approach has been part of policy rhetoric for a decade and is a 
development welcomed by EA staff, never the less it is a relatively new87 
direction for the EA. So while the EA staff sees it is a positive direction there 
was critical response about the CaBA delivery in practice from partners. Rather 
than the CaBA being a bearer of a new participatory working approach, based 
on the principles of ICM, the opinion was that the EA still worked in ‘silos’. As an 
independent researcher (MB, 2013) working with the EA on a catchment project 
commented:  
 
MB: There is an organisational issue with the EA, they 
work in silos. The EA have conducted some really 
interesting and productive catchment projects around 
the country drawing attention to basics about 
community engagement, but EA Officers are 
unaware of other projects or literature on such 
issues. 
 
This notion of silo working was echoed by a CSF officer (BH, 2012) who noted 
“I met this EA Bathing Water Quality Officer in the Par catchment and they had 
never heard of CSF, there is this ‘end of pipe’ approach in the EA”. My argument 
is that it’s the scientific culture which means individuals struggle to think in an 
ICM way; as science typically subdivides the environment into bounded issues. 
For example, what happens upstream through CSF directly affects the 
downstream BWQ, but silo working seems to have prevented inter-agency 
partnership working, let alone basic awareness of parallel initiative. This notion 
                                            
87
 The CaBA was only launched in the SW in 2013 
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of silo working and the ‘end of pipe approach’ directly relates back to earlier 
points I made about partnership working being conceived as a ‘lever to pull’, by 
the EA, to achieve WFD targets, as opposed to ICM, in the bona fide sense, as 
a process to engender more effective sustainable catchment management. As 
the CSF Officer (BH, 2012) confirmed:   
 
BH: The interesting thing with the EA, and this comes 
from the horse’s mouth, is that they are made up of 
lots of scientists and specialists to quote, ‘it was 
‘80% of their staff are experts’, so you would think 
that they would all be very much environmental 
advocates. What they are more about is doing their 
job. But not how that fits into the bigger picture. They 
care about enforcing the environment they don’t 
necessarily care about everything else which 
happens. 
 
The consequences of this ‘end of pipe approach’ and target focused working is 
worth considering in more detail. In Chapter 8 I outlined how the EA prognosis 
for Helston’s FAS centred on downstream hard engineering solutions. I 
discussed how this diagnosis emerged from their framing of risk through 
catchment modelling. Here I insert a perspective from JC which highlights 
another factor for the EA’s preference for such an ‘end of pipe approach’. 
Through eighteen years of working with the EA, on catchment management 
issues in the Cober, JC (2014) had formed a particular perspective on their way 
of working:  
 
JC: the EA have this strong engineering bend and an 
aversion to upstream management, perverse given 
that the EA are in charge of delivering the CaBA, but 
I guess it’s because concrete and steel have material 
results for the public to see.  
 
My point here is that ‘silo working and an ‘end of pipe approach’ precipitates a 
preference for immediate and concrete solutions which achieves their job 
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responsibilities at the cost of considering how it ‘fits into the bigger picture’ of 
ICM. Or as the Principle Climate Change Scientist (KD, 2012) put it “how you 
can pile up those multiple benefits” to simultaneously address flooding and 
water pollution risks. My conclusion here is that administrative rationalism 
(Dryzek, 2005) is still a valid description of how water governance is happening 
in practice. 
 
“they have this fascination with models and simplicity” 
The notion that there is a propensity for reductionism and simplicity rather than 
recognising uncertainty is epitomised in the following example from an interview 
with an independent researcher (BH, 2011) talking about internal 
communications: 
 
BH: The EA like simplicity and punch; you need to put 
things in a one page summary report with colourful 
photos. I poured my heart and soul into that scoping 
report88 and ended up having to put it into a one 
page report because that’s all they read. I know they 
are really stretched resource wise but it’s difficult to 
communicate everything in that space.  
 
Similarly I also found a preference for simplicity, within requested 
communications to the EA, during my own research experience. I was told by 
the Regional Water Resource Planning Officer (2012) that “any project outline 
should not be longer than a page”. The point here then is that this propensity for 
simplicity raises a barrier to delivering ICM as part of the CaBA; where 
uncertainty and contingency need to be worked with rather than silenced.  The 
nature of ‘simplicity working’ within the EA was resolutely described by another 
independent researcher (MB, 2013):  
 
MB: The EA have a mechanistic, linear thinking, male 
dominated and non-collaborative approach to 
                                            
88
 BH is referring to ‘The Challenges and Opportunities of Improving Environmental Standards’ 
report which was commissioned by the EA in order ‘to develop understanding on what inhibits 
and facilitates the organisation achieving its aim of improved environmental quality whist 
adapting to the new policy drivers for economic efficiency and community participation in 
decision making’. 
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problem solving, they have this antipathy of complex 
systems…They have this fascination with models 
and simplicity, the pathway to receptor mentality, 
catchments issues are too complex to model in a 
linear way.  
 
This point about ‘antipathy to complex systems’ was also echoed and 
developed on by an UoE Lecturer in Environmental Social Science (OF, 2013):  
 
OF: the EA seem to deny that implementation of the 
WFD is a political process, the RMBP Coordinator 
said to me that ‘it’s not a political process, it’s a 
technical issue’, but this denies all the conflicts, 
politics and value disputes in water management.  
 
OF’s (2013) perspective emphasises how the scientisation of risk has 
eradicated any considerations for ambiguity. Approaching risk management as 
simply a technical also better explains the challenges for mobilising collective 
action as discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
“hindered by structures” 
In the above section I have critiqued the reductionism in the EA from a cultural 
or epistemological perspective. While the points above hold fast, a sole focus 
on scientific culture does not fully explain the barriers to delivering ICM in 
practice. The final theme I will discuss is that of the organisation and resource 
challenges the EA face. EA staff and partnership organisations highlighted the 
constantly changing organisation structure of the EA as barrier to long term 
grounded engagement with stakeholders: “they are always changing 
departments and their structure, this doesn’t help” (MB, 2013). As OF (2012) 
said “staff join the EA because love the environment, but they are hindered by 
structures”. For an internal perspective I spoke to the local Environmental 
Planning Officer (DH, 2013). 
 
DH:  the EA is constantly shifting around and trying to 
become more efficient. We are about to go through 
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another transition this year. Now all our permits are 
done nationally as well now. Waste permits, 
abstraction permits etc. I was working on the 
discharge side of things.  
 
As GN (2013) explains, this raises barriers to engagement for voluntary 
catchment groups and catchment stakeholders such as farmers. 
 
TW:   How do you think the seemingly constantly changing 
structure of the EA affects engagement? 
GN:  Oh yes, it’s very difficult to know who to talk to. I 
would agree with you to a degree. Change 
sometimes isn’t great. Something I picked up on is 
that there is so many interested parties that the 
farmer doesn’t know who to turn to. You have got 
CSF, NE, CWT, the EA…. The farmer must just be 
thinking ahh stop!”  
 
Or as the NE CSF officer (BH, 2012) noted “from a CSF point of view it’s really 
important to have long term staff, its key to have face to face interaction, the 
farming community need to be able to feel like they can pick up a phone and 
speak to someone who knows their situation”. The EA aimed to address this 
problem of staff permanency by establishing Catchment Coordinator posts as 
part of the CaBA. As JB (2013) observed “Our catchment coordinators are 
going to be seen as core posts. They are not temporary posts. Yes, we do have 
tendency to change roles. But in the SW we are recruiting them now and they 
will be long term core posts. Who knows what will happen with government cuts 
though”. In summary a practical barrier to delivering ICM is the constantly 
changing structures and job roles within environmental agencies which prevent 
long term and trusted relations being built with agricultural stakeholders. 
 
9.3: Chapter Conclusion 
Chapter 9 has critically analysed and theorised the drivers and barriers to 
delivering the CaBA. I evidenced how the drivers for CaBA, from an EA 
perspective, are the anticipated pragmatic benefits, i.e. achievements of WFD 
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GES targets. I found that the pragmatic rationale was so deeply embedded 
within how the CaBA had been interpreted by the EA it left little space for more 
creative and organic spaces for participation to be initiated. While this criticism 
could be made of the EA’s current mechanisms (see Participation in Practice 
diagram) to deliver the CaBA I explained how LPF, as a voluntary catchment 
partnership, were able to do more. I characterised LPF as positive deviants 
because of their ambition to go beyond just data gathering, regulation and 
agricultural advice and work towards more symmetrical and symbiotic (Cook et 
al., 2013) relations with the agricultural community. I argued that this was 
because of their relative autonomy, compared to the EA, which enabled them to 
subvert aspects of ‘evidence based decision making’ protocol and build two way 
relationships with farmers where knowledge and best practice can ‘flow up’ as 
well as ‘down’. Building on analysis about the CaBA being driven by pragmatic 
rationales I then went on to theorise through ANT. I put forward the argument 
that the CaBA was being driven by the dysfunction of the regulatory actor-
network in dealing with the contemporary risk of diffuse pollution; and, most 
importantly, that the CaBA represents the attempt to construct a new 
participatory actor-network in order to manage diffuse pollution. By approaching 
water governance as network and the participatory agenda as a practical 
requirement I offered a new, and coherent argument, for the drivers behind 
stakeholder engagement. This is radical in the sense that rather than the CaBA 
being simply driven by a more progressive way to manage water, informed by 
ICM literature (Hering et al., 2010; van Asselt and Renn, 2011), it is in fact 
primarily a response to the failure in current UK regulatory mechanism to 
manage diffuse pollution. 
 
The second part of Chapter 9 explored the barriers to delivering the CaBA. The 
wider argument I made was that the culture of science raises a barrier to 
participation beyond a base level of ‘communication’. Because of the evidence 
obsessed culture with tightly policed boundaries there is little opportunity for 
non-scientists to participate. However, again within LPF I found willing and 
action to explore different routes and sources for knowledge to inform 
catchment management. With regard to delivering an integrated approach I also 
concluded the primary barrier was organisational culture and associated 
epistemological frames. Building on this analysis I also drew attention to the 
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mismatch between the EA, as an organised scientific decision-making body, 
and the geographical nature of complex catchment issues. For example, for 
reasons of achieving certainty in data sets the EA cut the environment into 
themes, i.e. water quantity or quality, and manage these through separate 
departments. This is problematic for an integrated approach because of the 
cross cutting nature of issues such as diffuse pollution. I concluded that the 
culture of science, underpinned by distinct epistemological frames, precipitates 
an organisational structure of ‘silo working’ which in turn presents a barrier to 
authentic integrated catchment management. And by ‘authentic’ I specifically 
refer a management approach which seeks holistic solutions; in the case of the 
Cober that refers to solutions which are sensitive to both ecological and flooding 
risks. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
This concluding Chapter is structured in three; Conclusions, Implications and 
Recommendations. The Chapter has been split as such in order to most clearly 
demonstrate: 1) new empirical contributions; 2) wider value of this thesis to both 
academics and water managers; and 3) how approaches in catchment 
management could be improved for the future. The final point to make in this 
short introduction is with regard to the empirical comparisons I make. 20yrs ago 
Lowe et al (1997) published Moralizing the Environment. This text was 
influential for my thesis with regard to structure, the conceptual and 
methodological approach, and its empirical focus. As such, throughout this 
conclusion I compare my results to that of Lowe et al (1997) original sociological 
analysis of water pollution. 
 
10.1: Findings 
In this section I provide an overview to the headline findings and conclusions. 
Firstly I discuss the outputs of PAR and explore the benefits and challenges of 
this methodology. Following this I draw out the central conclusions from each of 
the empirical chapters. In particular I critically reflect on how the concept of 
ambiguity has enabled new learning about catchment management and diffuse 
pollution. 
 
10.1.1: Participatory Action Research 
My rationale for employing PAR was that geographer’s inevitably intervene and 
change practices in the field they study and instead of negating that 
responsibility researchers should embrace it (Pain, 2004; Mesman, 2007). 
Indeed, rather than merely describing practices, the PAR methodology enabled 
me to make a positive contribution to LPF, including: 1) creating 
www.loepool.org; 2) develop risk maps and employ interviews to gather 
agricultural perspectives on catchment pollution; 3) organise and delivering 
three catchment walkovers; 4) conducting an agricultural enterprise survey. Out 
of all the PAR cycles it was the walk over exercises which proved most effective 
for both action and research components of the project. I conclude that walk 
overs are a successful method on three accounts: 1) they enable ‘ground 
truthing’ of diffuse pollution catchment models and risk assessments; 2) provide 
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a social learning exercise for all; 3) expose framings of diffuse pollution and how 
it should be managed. 
 
The outcomes from PAR were both a change in practice and thinking around 
diffuse pollution risk management within LPF. With regard to practice I 
developed new lines of media communication (www.loepool.org) and instigated 
new community and research partnerships (i.e. Helston Community School, 
RNAS Culdrose, UoE and CSM). This promoted LPF beyond expert scientific 
networks and enabled new research resources to be accessed. With regard to 
thinking, through the walk over exercises and research dissemination I 
demonstrated the importance of considering ambiguity in the catchment 
management process. Further, I demonstrated how uncertainties do not just 
stem from a lack of data but also social and cultural factors. In the wider sense 
this PAR project enabled LPF to depart from ‘normal catchment management’ 
and begin to reshape how risks are known and framed in the first instance. 
 
Alongside the action aspects to PAR there were a number of research benefits 
from this methodology. In fact I would strongly argue that I could not have 
gathered the data which forms this thesis in any other way. As I discussed in 
Chapter 6, catchment management is a cumulative process, rather than a 
single event. This necessitated me to be there in the processual moments to 
observe decision making. Without my commitment to delivering LPF actions I 
would of certainty not gained such a depth or length of access to capture those 
moments of risk management. While PAR was a necessary process to achieve 
my research aims it also involved a number of challenges. 
 
The key challenge I faced as a researcher was my changing positionality 
through the project and how this influenced both the action and the research 
elements. Table 24 explicates this changing role; from being an Observer 
(unknowing of people, practices and politics), to becoming Integrated (knowing 
and understanding), through to situating myself as an Agent of Change 
(influencing and directing). This was not a methodological challenge in the 
traditional sense; as in a barrier to gathering data. This is was a more complex 
issue which was accompanied with both pros and cons. As an observer I was 
positioned to critically observe the process and politics but had little power to 
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instigate action; whereas becoming an Agent of Change enabled me to direct 
actions. The downside to this was that the boundary between the LPF’s agenda 
and my own research agenda became blurred. 
 
The issue of positionality leads us to the second challenge; PAR was extremely 
time and resource intensive. Because of the absence of a written agreement 
about my role and responsibility I admittedly ended up committing too much 
time, relative to academic lines of enquiry, to forwarding LPF action agenda. 
The problem, I retrospectively observed, with this was that becoming an Agent 
of Change directed me away from the original academic questions. The third 
critique of PAR, or at least a challenge of working with a catchment partnership, 
is that it was not necessarily consummate with sociocultural geography. As the 
reader may have assessed already, my thesis has been stretched in two 
different directions. The PAR driven LPF work pulls the thesis towards policy 
and practice questions while the sociocultural work pulls the thesis towards 
micro geographies of risk and ambiguity. The result was a mixed and complex 
data set that proved challenging to analyse and marry in a coherent way. While 
challenging I feel this thesis has appropriately merged the PAR and academic 
aspects and in doing so I argue that it has made a strong case example to the 
practitioner community about the worth of sociocultural geography and studies 
of ambiguity. In conclusion, PAR offers an effective, but difficult to deliver in 
practice, methodology for geographers. Based on my learning from overcoming 
these difficulties I have made number of recommendations, see section 10.3.1, 
for geographers considering conducting PAR in a similar context.  
 
10.1.2: Ambiguity 
Chapter 7 answered research question one; where are the ambiguities in 
catchment management and how do catchment partnerships negotiate them? 
To answer this question the Chapter was split in two. The first section examined 
agricultural and LPF knowledge and framings of diffuse pollution. I found that 
within agricultural discourses the issues were highly certain and straightforward. 
For farmers the runoff was driven by unseasonal summer rainfall events and 
pollution risk exacerbated by bad land practices of ‘other’ farmers. So similar to 
Lowe et al (1997) I found that farmers portrayed themselves as subject to 
elemental forces that they could only partially control and thus which absolved 
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them of culpability. But while the downstream impacts of nutrient laden runoff 
were not a primary concern for farmers, the loss of nutrients out the farm 
system was. I concluded that farmers were working to reduce runoff as 
earnestly as LPF but simply driven by different motives. For LPF the situation 
was far more complex. The discourses within catchment management were 
laden with the issues of uncertainty and ambiguity. The conclusion I came to 
was that notions of uncertainty and ambiguity can only exist after a process of 
reflection on one’s own knowledge. Thus, the self-critical culture in science 
produces uncertainty itself. The crucial caveat to this finding is that for ambiguity 
or uncertainty to be revealed it requires a forum within which alternative, and 
sometimes opposing, scientific analysis can be interrogated. In my case study 
the LPF meetings provided this discursive space. Whereas I found that the 
analysis and recommendations coming from siloed departments in the EA were 
void of critical considerations around the alternative readings of data. Instead 
the EA conceptualised pollution as a definable, or absolute, risk which can be 
addressed with better science and technical solutions. In this regard not much 
has changed since 1997 when Pollution Inspectors were described as having 
an “absolute notion of farm pollution” by Lowe et al (1997: 204). My conclusion 
here is that such a standpoint was a cultural product. A standpoint which is 
underpinned by antipathy to complex systems and the propensity for 
reductionism within departments which were not engaged with on the ground 
pollution risks. The wider conclusion is that risk, uncertainty and ambiguity are 
highly relational phenomenon that do not exist independently but are 
constructed and known to particular groups in particular moments. 
 
This Chapter went on to detail where these uncertainties and ambiguities were 
in catchment management. I found that unpredictability, incomplete knowledge 
and multiple knowledge frames existed within all aspects of catchment decision 
making. Furthermore that these sources of uncertainty interacted to further 
complicate the decision making process. Identifying where the uncertainties and 
ambiguities were in catchment management enabled me to provide an account 
of how they were negotiated in practice. I did this through following how two 
catchment management plans were being delivered. My conclusion was that, 
driven by the EA’s epistemological frames, the status quo of pursuing hard 
engineering had been followed. This came down to issues of uncertainty where 
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alterative, and arguably more progressive CaBA informed, options of upstream 
flow attenuation to reduce both pollution and flooding risks were not taken on 
because of uncertainties in evidence. I argue that such thinking and decision 
making was driven by the epistemological frames and paradigms which exist in 
the hegemonic scientific culture of the EA. My contribution to the body of 
literature on ambiguity rests on these arguments of culturally influenced 
epistemologies in catchment management. Indeed, I showed how a study of 
epistemological frames provided new leverage to understand how ambiguity is 
negotiated in catchment management; and in turn helps to identify the 
subsequent challenges of delivering the participatory agenda and soft 
engineering solutions. 
 
Methodologically this Chapter also provided new insights to ambiguity research 
through its approach. Firstly, up until this project the concept of ambiguity had 
only been used to analyse large scale environmental projects and had not been 
used to examine a voluntary partnership at the catchment scale. Secondly, 
most of this previous work in the context of water management had just 
considered the framings of the easy to access stakeholders such as agency 
staff. This project went further by bringing the framings and knowledges of the 
hard to access, but nevertheless crucial, agricultural stakeholders into the 
research. Thirdly, most research on ambiguity employs workshops to gather 
data; whereas this project employed a long term and in-depth ethnography. I 
argue this provided more than just a snap shot of the ambiguities. All 
considered I have made significant contributions from a number of angles 
towards the geographies of ambiguity in catchment management. 
 
10.1.3: Knowing Risk 
Chapter 8 answered research question two; how do catchment stakeholders 
come to know water risks? The starting assumption from Beck (1992: 24) was 
that late modern risks, such as diffuse pollution, were “invisible to the senses 
and depend on scientific knowledge”. However, I concluded to the contrary. I 
found that farmers and increasingly scientific experts employ their sensory 
organs to identify and know diffuse pollution risk in the field. With regard to 
scientists, I argued that reliance on such lay methods is because of 
insufficiencies and uncertainties in the current scientific monitoring and 
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modelling of water risk. I also explored how this process of knowing water risks 
happens in practice through the lens of affordance and cultural attunement. I 
showed how the ability to read the environment has been ‘culturally attuned’ 
through their respective farming or scientific backgrounds. For farmers the 
ability to afford risk to an observed change in the farm environment was 
informed by ‘observational skills’ which have been ‘handed down’ and then 
employed through everyday embodied farming practices. For experts this ability 
to read the environment through their affective processes and afford risk was in 
its development infancy. For example EA WO staff explained how they were 
learning off agricultural experts in order to be able to afford risk to the sights, 
smells and textures of the environment. A conclusion here is that both groups 
are in a constant ‘curriculum of learning’ to attune their senses to affording risk 
through their affective processes. 
 
The wider implication of this conclusion is that, as STS literature has long noted, 
the distinction between scientific and lay practices is a sullied one. My addition 
to this claim is that in the context of diffuse pollution, as a distinctive type of late 
modern risk, the boundaries between science and non-science becomes further 
blurred. I argue this is not a negative progression but rather a positive step 
forward for catchment management. For example, through the walk over 
exercises (PAR Cycles 6, 7, and 8) new locally relevant and time specific data 
was gathered about the complex and ever changing diffuse pollution risk in the 
catchment. Further, that by the LPF accepting and working with observational 
qualitative local knowledge a new layer of tacit understanding about the Cober 
catchment was developed and shared in partnership meetings. I brought the 
aforementioned observations together by considering why, if the method for 
knowing risk is no different, is there a difference in risk perceptions. Indeed, 
while they may see the same landscape they perceive the same environment 
very differently. I argue that such difference rests on the culturally influence 
affordance of risk. I showed how affordances are made on the function and 
value of particular environment in relation to group’s substance frames. For 
farmers the environment is framed in relation to food production while for water 
LPF the environment is framed in relation to conservation value and functions. 
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The conclusion in the Knowing Risk Chapter were brought together in relation to 
Beck’s Risk society thesis. Firstly I critically compared developments in 
European legislation, which was reacting to the changing characteristics in 
water pollution risk, to Beck’s epochs. Beck’s epochs are traditionally attached 
to specific historic eras (Jarvis, 2010; Matten, 2004; Rasborg, 2012) but I 
concluded these epochs had traction to explain the development of European 
water legislation and in doing so the contemporary relationships between 
science, society and water pollution. The follow on conclusion is that diffuse 
pollution adheres to the characteristics of Beck’s late modern risks. Indeed, I 
claimed that diffuse pollution has ‘arisen as an unintended consequence of 
modernity’ and to an extent the risk is ‘distanciated over space and time but 
inescapable’. However, I found, to the contrary, that diffuse pollution was not 
invisible to the senses and dependent on scientific knowledge. I evidenced how 
experts actually use their ‘sensory organs’ to identify and afford risk to the water 
environment. This finding is crucial because it overturns two assumptions. 
Firstly, that late modern risks cannot be sensed, and secondly that expert ways 
of knowing diffuse pollution are any different to lay farmers. I argued this 
reliance on individual sensory and affective processes was because of the 
inadequacy of and uncertainty in the current scientific monitoring, mapping and 
modelling of diffuse pollution. The point to forward here is that diffuse pollution 
is a complex and contested problem which challenges current scientific 
approaches to knowing risk. To add to the conclusions from the ambiguity 
Chapter, knowing and managing diffuse pollution requires a complete rethink of 
how water risks are mapped and who is enabled to contribute to that process. 
 
Similar to this thesis, Lowe et al (1997) concluded that much of their study 
conformed to Beck’s analysis. The crucial difference was with how water 
pollution became a social and politicised problem in their study. Lowe et al 
(1997) demonstrated how scientists, regulatory officials, citizens and 
environmental groups can combine in strategic alliances to politicise, publicise 
and in turn build a constituency of support for regulatory mechanisms to 
address pollution risk. In fact the NRA drew from discourses in environmental 
morality, propagated by the environmental social movements of the time, to 
build this constituency. This showed, contrary to Beck’s arguments, how late 
modern risks can actually be established as pressing social issues within ‘lay 
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publics’ through sociocultural constructions; rather than solely relying on 
science. An observation which concurs with my conclusion that sensory, rather 
than scientific, organs can be a component in identifying diffuse pollution risk. 
 
This comparison with Moralizing the Environment necessities me to reflect here 
on the alliances between different groups within my case study. Unlike Lowe et 
al (1997) there was no local constituency of support for developing mechanisms 
to address diffuse water pollution risk in the Cober catchment. As discussed 
through the PAR Chapters (detailed on p147), there was a significant absence 
of public knowledge and concern for the water pollution risk. In fact the actions 
taken to address the water pollution risk solely stemmed from concern amongst 
environmental experts in LPF. I argue that is primarily due to the historical, and 
to extent current, lack of access for the catchment’s public to engage and build 
relations with Loe Pool. For example, footpath access to Loe Pool was only 
established in 1990, no recreation on the lake has ever been allowed, and 
because of the poor water quality the number of registered fishermen is less 
than 5. Cumulatively this has prevented a constituency of local interest, concern 
and local knowledge about the environmental problems in the Loe. The wider 
conclusion to make from this is that in order for pollution to become a social and 
political problem it requires more than just scientific risk assessments. In fact It 
requires a moral discourse amongst a local community to be established. The 
implications of this conclusion are picked up below. 
 
10.1.4: Delivering the CaBA 
Chapter 9 answered research question three; what are the drivers and barriers 
to delivering the CaBA? To answer this question I split the Chapter in two, with 
the first half discussing the drivers and the second the barriers. I evidenced how 
within the EA the participatory agenda, as part of the CaBA, is driven by 
pragmatic rationales in two ways. Firstly, participation for the EA is about 
extracting useful information from partners. Secondly, participation is about 
enrolling or co-opting partners to take responsibility for delivering the WFD GES 
targets. In sum, I found that the CaBA amounted to more of a surveillance 
rather than a participatory network. Theorising through ANT I concluded that the 
CaBA was being driven by the dysfunction of the regulatory actor-network in 
dealing with the contemporary risk of diffuse pollution. Further, that the CaBA 
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represents an attempt to construct a new participatory actor-network in order to 
manage diffuse pollution. My conclusion was that the CaBA has been driven in 
response to the failure in current UK regulatory mechanism to manage diffuse 
pollution. However what I found within LPF, as an autonomous voluntary group, 
was a drive for participation for normative and instrumental benefits. As Watson 
(2014) also concluded local catchment partnerships are powerful entities in their 
own right and interpret the CaBA according to their own priorities and values. In 
the case of LPF they saw importance to engage agricultural stakeholders in a 
two way relationship to understand their needs and framings of the issues too. 
Crucial to note here is how my PAR project enabled this ambition, to better 
engage and understand farmers, through the risk mapping, field walks, 
interviews and farm enterprise survey. 
 
This said, I also found that three key stakeholders (e.g. publics, farmers and the 
Council) were absent at LPF meetings. I argued that the primary explanation for 
this non-participation was the result of ethical and practical factors; as opposed 
to actors blocking participation driven by their own strategic interests. I 
concluded that the politics and power surrounding participation in LPF was 
relatively benign. My explanation for this rested on the nature of LPF as a 
voluntary catchment partnership. Voluntary partnerships having neither explicit 
statutory powers nor finances and are reliant on the commitment of time and 
resources from underfunded environmental agencies. So rather than the 
challenge being controlling participation the primary issue was encouraging 
attendance of the relevant statutory and non-statutory environmental agencies. 
It would be anticipated that the geographies of power would be different in a 
partnership with more powers and finances. With regard to the barriers, to 
delivering the CaBA, I concluded that it was the organisational culture, structure 
and epistemological frames within publically funded environmental agencies 
which prevented the CaBA being realised in its authentic, ICM, form. In 
particular the tightly policed boundaries around what can be considered 
‘evidence or data’ in the process of understanding catchment risks. However, 
again at the local scale, within LPF there was a willingness to disregard the 
traditional rules for data collection and conduct ‘non-scientific’ walk over events 
to grasp the local and temporally distinct diffuse pollution risk. The implications 
of these conclusions are discussed in detail next. 
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10.2: Implications 
In the second part of this conclusion I consider the wider implications of the 
findings. I do this from three directions. Firstly I draw out the implications for 
geographers with respect to theorising of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity. In 
particular I compare the conclusions and implications of my thesis to Moralizing 
the Environment. Secondly I discuss the theoretical and practical implications 
for voluntary partnerships; with a focus on their role in delivering environmental 
goods. Thirdly I examine what this all means for delivering the CaBA and what 
environmental agencies should do in order to more effectively support voluntary 
partnerships to work in an integrated way at the catchment scale.  
 
10.2.1: For Geographers 
Over almost four decades, instigated by the work of Mary Douglas and Ulrick 
Beck, geographers have researched and theorised what risk is and what it 
means to different people. From my empirical study of diffuse pollution 
management I have further contributed to this body of work. At the individual 
scale my thesis has implications for how geographers understand and theorise 
the risk relations amongst farmers and scientists with water. Specifically with 
regard to the character of those risk relations 20yrs on from Lowe et al (1997) 
study. 
 
I concluded that the 20yrs on the discourses amongst farmers and 
environmental agency staff about the causes and culpability of water pollution 
had changed very little. For environmental agency staff, those removed from on 
the ground management, there was still this absolute notion of farm pollution. 
As an officer manager exclaimed, on a walk over exercise, with reference to a 
relatively minor incident of runoff “it’s caused by this farmer applying an 
industrialised process; there is possibility of enforcement, we should be talking 
about direct action really” (RD, 2014). Farm advisors on the other hand had a 
much higher degree of tolerance towards incidents and were able to understand 
issues from a farmer’s perspective. And finally, akin to Lowe et al (1997), 
farmers in my study had an entirely relative notion of pollution. Farmers saw 
pollution as an externality of food production, driven by a societal need, and 
runoff being strongly influenced by the forces of nature. The addition I would 
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add to this point is that farmers have now drawn in climate change to their 
discourse for the ‘natural forces’ causing runoff. 
 
This comparative analysis of risk framings has a number of implications for 
geographers. Firstly, that the framings on the causes, severity and responsibility 
of pollution are deeply entrenched amongst farmers, farm advisors and 
environmental regulators. Since these discourses have changed little in 20yrs it 
implies that a ‘stale mate’ as such has been reached between the competing 
risk framings. I would argue that this has mostly to do with the complexity and 
contingent nature of diffuse pollution risk and the lack in ability for 
environmental agencies to regulate. Or put differently, it is not just that farmers 
and environmental agencies see pollution risk differently it is the fact that both 
farmers and regulators have to argue, in advisory and legal contexts, their case 
in each individual pollution incident. And of course the key characteristic of 
diffuse pollution is that evidencing cause, effect and thus responsibility is 
extremely difficult. So to go beyond Lowe et al’s (1997) assertion that pollution 
is social construction, albeit one that is informed by the available evidence, I 
would argue that diffuse pollution is a deeply ambiguous issue. And as such it 
may never become, as Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) put it, a ‘normal science’. 
This then adds to the multiplicity of reasons for the countryside being a space of 
contest rather than a rural idyll. The job for geographers is then not to attempt to 
reconcile these knowledge and framing conflicts but to develop effective 
methods to capture and communicate these issues to different stakeholders. 
Because as the literature on frame analysis has taught us, enabling 
understanding and respect between different groups allows people to talk to, 
rather than over, each other (Shmueli, 2008). 
 
10.2.2: For Voluntary Catchment Partnerships 
Voluntary catchment partnerships form in response to a local issue. In the case 
of LPF that issue was algae blooms within a freshwater lake. But what I have 
demonstrated through this thesis is how LPF developed from a single issue 
focused partnership to one which became a forum to discuss and address, 
through both regulation and advice, catchment risks holistically. For example, 
LPF began with a focus on the point source discharge problem which then led 
on to concern for upstream diffuse pollution, land management practices, septic 
Geographies of Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Catchment Management 
 
319 
 
tank misconnections and the interconnection between flood risk management 
and habitat management. In particular LPF realised that if Loe Pool is going to 
achieve its SSSI and WFD GES targets the water level management plans 
need changing to ensure habitat restoration. Further, that as these issues were 
explored new stakeholders emerged bringing their own interests and framings 
of the problems. The wider point I am making here is that an integrated 
approach, embedded in the CaBA, is the logical ambition for any local 
environmental partnership. Or put differently, single environmental issues do not 
exist. Not only are environmental systems interconnected but the management 
options connect and can affect a variety of catchment communities.  
 
The organisational changes needed, by environmental agencies, to support 
delivery of the CaBA are discussed below. So here I set forth two implications 
for voluntary partnerships based on my conclusions. Firstly, in order to develop 
a local understanding of the issues there needs to be public engagement with 
the environment of concern. As I concluded above, in order for pollution to 
become a social and political problem it requires more than just scientific risk 
assessments. It requires a moral discourse to be established around pollution. 
One suggestion is to increase access to environments and encourage 
volunteering opportunities and public experiences. These initiatives need to 
demonstrate the important ecosystem services a healthy catchment provides to 
the local community. Building on this point about lay participation, this thesis 
demonstrated the importance and usefulness of non-scientific knowledge for 
understanding the local catchments geography, land use and weather patterns. 
All of which helped LPF to respond and anticipate environmental problems. The 
recommendation is that the traditional expert-lay dichotomy needs to be 
discarded by voluntary partnerships and instead focus on creating more 
opportunities for public participation in the knowing and responding to 
environmental risks.   
 
10.2.3: For Environmental Agencies 
The empirical focus of diffuse pollution management in the Cober catchment 
has offered a lens to examine and reflect on the process and practice of 
delivering the CaBA at the local scale. In sum I would conclude that the CaBA is 
still, as Butterworth et al (2010) described, challenged by modernist thinking, 
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sectorial interests and reductionist epistemologies. So despite ICM being first 
advocated in 1977 by UNESCO there is still many changes to be made in order 
to move away from punitive regulations and engineering solutions, and towards 
a participatory governance approach which involves upstream flow attenuation 
solutions. Based on my conclusions, stated above, there are a number of 
implications for senior staff in environmental agencies if the CaBA is to be 
achieved to its original ICM principles. I now set out the changes needed to 
address the cultural and organisational barriers to delivering CaBA. These are 
particularly important to expound here because there are not referenced in 
CaBA policy.  
 
The first barrier identified was the preference for command and control 
approaches within the Environment Agency; specifically with regard to the 
Helston Flood Alleviate Scheme (FAS). This is of course in antipathy to CaBA 
which directs equal attention to upstream flow attenuation responses. The 
implication is that the potential role of flow attenuation is not being adequately 
communicated within policy and working practice directives from DEFRA and 
EA national. As such I argue that more needs to be done within the EA to 
embed a cultural and epistemological change, away from reductionism, to 
encourage EA risk modellers to take up and recommend the CaBA. One 
suggestion is that internal workshops and conferences would be an effective 
method for this communication. 
 
The second barrier identified was the level of staff turnover in environmental 
agencies. I observed how the constant re-structuring of environmental agencies 
and the transience of staff in posts is a barrier to creating effective working 
relationships within LPF. This has implications for both environmental agencies 
and other voluntary catchment partnerships. The central argument is that 
delivering the CaBA, at the local scale, requires long term commitment from 
individuals in agencies. Indeed, I demonstrated how short term commitment not 
only erodes trusted relationships between different agency staff working for 
partnerships, but also any local knowledge of issues can be lost as staff move 
posts; or at least it costs catchment partnerships resources and time to bring 
new members up to speed. In order to effectively deliver the CaBA through local 
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voluntary catchment partnerships environmental agencies need to properly 
commit staff time and resources to this on the ground work. 
 
10.3: Recommendations 
The final component to this thesis is a series of recommendations for the 
intended audiences of this work. These recommendations serve three 
purposes: 1) to guide geographers employing PAR in a study of catchment 
management; 2) to advise voluntary catchment partnerships on how they can 
more effectively work with local stakeholders to achieve environmental 
objectives; 3) to instruct water managers, and to a lesser extent policy makers, 
on how process and practice needs to be changed in order to achieve the 
CaBA. There is not an order of importance to these recommendations. 
 
10.3.1: For Geographer’s 
 
 PAR practitioners should employ the Phases of Positionality framework 
(see Table 24). This will enable researchers to anticipate how their role 
will change and provide a method to meticulously record how 
positionality has affected data collection, management and analysis. 
 
 Develop a memorandum of PAR commitments with the host partnership; 
this should explicitly state the researcher’s and partners role, 
responsibilities and resource provision. 
 
 Create and publicise info-graphics which effectively communicate all 
stakeholders risk framings. These info-graphics should be used as 
engagement tools to enable stakeholders to talk to rather than over each 
other. 
 
10.3.2: For Voluntary Catchment Partnerships 
 
 Conduct regular Walk Over exercises with all voluntary partnership 
members. This should be used to ground truth risk models, understand 
local land management issues and reveal members risk framings. 
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 Develop spaces within partnership meetings for the interrogation of risk 
models and risk maps provided my regional agencies. All assumed risk 
causes and pathways need to be critically assessed based on local 
knowledge. 
 
 Increase public access, encourage volunteering opportunities, and 
deliver public engagement events around the environment of concern. 
 
10.3.3: For Environmental Agencies and Policy Makers 
 
 Environmental agencies should better support voluntary catchment 
partnerships though the allocation of resources for long term staff 
participation. In particular the encouragement of risk modellers and 
mappers to attend meetings in order to explain the localised implications. 
 
 Provide internal workshops and conferences to embed the principles of 
the CaBA within different departments. This will address the cultural and 
epistemological barriers to delivering the CaBA. 
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Appendix 
 
1: Case Study Identification  
To identify the potential case studies I began by researching what catchment 
partnerships were operating in Cornwall. It was anticipated that I would be 
spending a large amount of time embedded within the partnership so it was 
decided that Cornwall should be the geographical parameter for the practical 
reasons of access, travel time and travel expenses. I began by making a long 
list of active partnerships in Cornwall (see Figure 68). A criteria for choosing a 
case study partnership was drawn up: 1) no overlap with existing research 
projects; 2) a fresh partnership and stakeholders, avoid catchments which 
‘suffer researcher fatigue’; 3) a significant diffuse pollution problem; 4) 
enthusiasm for project; 5) a definable constituent of stakeholders. 
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Figure 72: Map of active catchment partnerships in Cornwall (CMC, 2013) 
No*      Catchment Project Partnership Lead 
1 Tamar catchment project West Country Rivers Trust 
2 East Looe catchment project Cornwall Wildlife Trust 
3 Red River catchment Surfers Against Sewerage 
4 Drift Upstream Thinking Project South West Water 
5 Cober catchment project Loe Pool Forum 
Table 31: List of Active Partnerships 
 
Through phone interviews, meetings and email exchanges I discussed my initial 
project aim and research design with the key individuals working at each of 
catchment partnerships on the long list (see Table 28) and regional staff and the 
Environment Agency. The Cober catchment was eventually decided on 
because it met all the criteria set out previously; i) the only project which did not 
have other researchers or delivery partners seeking to engage with the 
stakeholders; ii) my enquires were met with an enormous amount of enthusiasm 
(boded well for conducting PAR); iii) Cober catchment suffers from significant 
diffuse pollution.  
 
No*      Catchment Project Partnership Lead Contact I discussed project with: 
1 
Tamar catchment project 
West Country Rivers Trust 
(WCRT) 
 WCRT Chief Executive 
Officer 
2 East Looe catchment project Cornwall Wildlife Trust  CWT Project Delivery 
2 
3 
4 5 
1 
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(CWT) Officer 
3 
Red River catchment 
Surfers Against Sewerage 
(SAS) 
 SAS Campaign Director 
4 Drift Upstream Thinking 
Project 
South West Water (SWW) 
 CWT Drift Project Farm 
Advisor 
5 Cober catchment project Loe Pool Forum (LPF)  LPF Project Consultant 
 
Regional Overview Environment Agency (EA) 
 South West Regional 
Environmental Planner 
 Water Resources Planning 
Officer 
 West Cornwall 
Environment Planning 
Officer 
Table 32: List of experts consulted through scoping study 
 
2. Science in Observation 
As explained in Chapter 6, the science events I observed are not self-
explanatory in terms of what they are and their importance in the process of 
catchment management, thus I provide a full explanation below. With regard to 
observation of ecological surveys; Macrophtes are aquatic plants that grow in 
the submerged areas of lakes and provide cover for fish and, invertebrates and 
as well as producing oxygen needed for lake life. Successful lake rehabilitation 
from a eutrophic algal dominated condition of Loe Pool relies heavily upon the 
reestablishment of submerged vegetation (Dinsdale, 2012). The survey was 
funded by Natural England’s Conservation Enhancement Scheme. The National 
Trust commissioned Dr Jan Dinsdale (Independent Ecological Consultant) and 
Kennack Diving to conduct the macrophyte survey in Loe Pool. The survey is 
important because it informs LPF’s understanding of the Loe’s ecological health 
and thus directs management preferences. 
 
 
Figure 73: Photograph of Macrophte survey in Loe Pool 
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The catchment Walk Over investigations are conducted by the Environment 
Agency (EA) in order to identify the reasons why a waterbody is failing its Water 
Framework Directive Good Ecological Status targets. The survey aims to 
identify the key pressures from diffuse source pollution, point source pollution, 
hydromorphology (including physical modifications), and invasive species. In 
the South West River Basin District (SWRBD) the EA assembled specific 
walkover teams to survey the failing waterbodies. The resulting Walkover report 
is designed to inform priority setting and mitigation planning for local EA 
Officers, catchment partnerships and also to feed into the WFD RBD planning 
process.  
 
 
Figure 74: Photograph of turbid lake identified as risk by EA (2013) on Walk Over survey 
 
Soils for Profit (S4P) are an initiative developed in partnership with DEFRA, 
Environment Agency and Natural England to help farmers improve their 
management of soils, nutrients and manures. It is framed as a win-win project in 
that it enables farm business become more profitable through efficiency whilst 
at the same time reducing environmental impacts from reducing nutrient and 
sediment enriched runoff.  At the heart of the initiative is the free opportunity for 
farmers to have five soil samples analysed and a follow up report on how best 
to improve soil management. The five soil samples will be analysed in a lab to 
determine pH, SOM (soil organic matter), and key nutrients P, K and Mg. The 
follow up report of suggested actions is not simply based on this analysis but a 
qualitative understanding of the soil structure, the soil management practices 
and farm system of concern. This requires the S4P advisor ‘reading’ the land 
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and it is this process I am specifically concerned with. To understand this 
process I attended three S4P farm visits in the catchment. On one of these 
visits we were accompanied by David Cliffe who is an Environmental 
Agronomist. During field walks and the soil analysis process I conducted a ‘on 
the hoof’ interview wherein I asked the S4P advisor to talk me through how, why 
and what they were doing in order to understand the soil. I recorded the 
conversations on a Dictaphone and took photos of the field work. 
 
 
Figure 75: Photograph of S4P soil sampling 
 
In the case of severe runoff incidents, Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF), 
directed by the Environment Agency, are often requested to assess and put in 
place mitigative action on farms. In Cornwall, CSF have been working with Dr 
Bob Watson who is a specialist soil management advisor working for ADAS. 
The action Dr Watson has been delivering, primarily for horticultural businesses, 
is sediment traps. Sediment traps are essentially a flow attenuation feature 
installed to prevent nutrient laden sediment leaving the farm. They are not a 
long term solution but rather a preventative measure to reduce runoff risk to 
highways, houses and water courses. Knowing where and how to install these 
traps requires a field walk to read the land. I attended one of these events after 
an incident in the catchment where a group of cottages were flooded because a 
wall had blown out.  
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Figure 76: Photograph of temporary sediment trap 
 
